The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract The central research question of this study is: How does Xi Jinping’s operational code shape China’s foreign policy orientation, particularly toward the Islamic Republic of Iran? The article advanced the hypothesis that Xi Jinping’s operational code is neither aimed at overthrowing the liberal international order nor based on direct ideological confrontation with the United States. Rather, it reflects a gradual and pragmatic effort to expand China’s power, influence, and strategic autonomy within the existing international system through the selective use of international institutions, rules, and mechanisms. This approach enables China to compete with the United States while avoiding costly, full-scale confrontation and to calibrate its relations with countries such as Iran primarily on the basis of national interests and cost–benefit calculations. The findings of the study support this hypothesis. They indicate that Xi Jinping perceives the political environment as predominantly cooperative and consistently attributes cooperative intentions to other actors. At the same time, he believes that a profound historical transformation is underway in international relations and that China is capable of playing an active role in shaping this transformation. However, his score on this dimension is relatively moderate, suggesting that he does not regard historical developments as highly predictable. Furthermore, in dealing with international conflicts, Xi demonstrates a clear preference for peaceful settlement, while victory, stalemate, and surrender rank respectively as secondary options. Based on the operational code profile of Xi Jinping, the characteristics associated with his leadership style, and the historical evolution, opportunities, and challenges of Iran–China relations, several strategic implications for Iran’s policy toward China can be identified. First, it appears that China studies in Iran have often been shaped more by conventional assumptions than by rigorous empirical analysis. A widespread perception among many Iranian foreign policy elites is that China seeks to dismantle the liberal international order and that the Middle East constitutes a central pillar of this strategy. The present study, however, demonstrates that Xi Jinping’s personality profile is characterized by a preference for compromise and negotiated solutions rather than direct confrontation with the United States. Developments on the ground likewise support this conclusion. China has consistently sought to manage its strategic competition with the United States while avoiding direct conflict. Consequently, China’s Middle East policy—and, by extension, its policy toward Iran—should be understood as a function of its broader global strategy. Equally important, the Middle East occupies a lower strategic priority in Chinese foreign policy than China’s immediate neighborhood in the Asia-Pacific and even Central Asia. Another important finding emerging from Xi Jinping’s personality profile, which reinforces the previous point, is his preference for avoiding tension. In the Middle East, and particularly with regard to Iran, China generally opposes escalatory policies and prioritizes the preservation of state stability. This helps explain why Beijing simultaneously supported the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while also backing the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in Yemen. In essence, irrespective of the ideological orientation of governments, China seeks to cooperate with and support established state authorities whenever possible. Iran should therefore recognize that China is unlikely to become involved in situations that Beijing perceives as unnecessarily escalatory. China’s balancing strategy in the Middle East—including its simultaneous engagement with Tehran and Riyadh prior to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries—can also be understood within this broader framework. At the same time, China’s critique of the anarchic nature of the international system may create important opportunities for Iran. In pursuit of a more favorable international order and the maximization of its national interests, China has adopted a strategy of gradual institutional transformation. This strategy has involved establishing non-Western institutions while simultaneously seeking a greater role within long-standing international organizations. Such developments provide Iran with opportunities to expand cooperation with China through these institutional frameworks. Moreover, the convergence between Chinese initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the "Go West" strategy—and Iran’s "Look East" policy offers additional prospects for strengthening bilateral relations. Xi Jinping’s belief in the strategic importance of non-military sources of power, reflected in his concept of comprehensive security, represents another important opportunity for Iran. Xi adopts a holistic understanding of security that extends beyond military considerations. As discussed earlier, Chinese policymakers regard development as the foundation of security, which explains the central role of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. This perspective provides a strong basis for expanding developmental cooperation between Tehran and Beijing. Furthermore, given China’s acute security concerns regarding ethnic terrorism in its northwestern provinces and Iran’s experience in confronting similar threats, the two countries also possess significant potential for cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Finally, the findings underscore the importance of assigning greater strategic priority to the Look East policy and a broader Asia-oriented approach in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the principal weaknesses of Iran’s Look East policy has been its largely instrumental and secondary character. Rather than being pursued as a long-term strategic orientation, engagement with Asia has frequently been employed as a means of balancing against the West. This approach has not only constrained and fragmented Iran’s relations with Asian countries but has also increased the likelihood of Iran becoming a bargaining instrument in the strategic calculations of other powers. Accordingly, a stronger commitment to multilateralism, improved relations with a wider range of major powers, and the adoption of a hedging strategy would reduce the risk of falling into such a strategic trap.

Abstract Takfiri Salafis, as one of the long-standing intellectual schools in Islamic history, have consistently confronted the Islamic world with numerous upheavals and problems. From within this current emerged Neo-Salafism, which, through the discursive confrontation of "Takfir" (excommunication), created an identity-based confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Problem Statement) The necessity of understanding this intellectual school and the groups arising from it, such as ISIS, leads to the importance of unity in the Islamic world. (Necessity) Various theories can be applied to the consequences of Salafi-Takfirism; since Salafi-Takfirism possesses the elements of a discourse, it can be analyzed within the framework of the "Discourse Theory" of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Accordingly, this research answers the question: "On what discursive confrontations are Neo-Salafi currents based for their identity-based confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran?" The paradigm governing this research is qualitative and has proceeded by adopting a descriptive-analytical method utilizing library and documentary data. The research hypothesis answers: "The Neo-Salafi school of thought, which considers itself indebted to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, is the ideological origin of contemporary extremist groups that identify themselves through the 'othering' of Shi'ism and consider this confrontation to be the 'Greater Jihad'." The findings of the research show that political Salafism threatens national interests to the extent that the most important "ideological" components of the Islamic Revolution, such as reducing Shi'a-Sunni and Arab-Non-Arab divides, and conversely, emphasizing the Islam-Zionism conflict, are threatened by Salafis. Problem Statement and Necessity
Takfiri Salafis, as a historical current in the Islamic world, have always been a factor of instability and conflict. The emergence of Neo-Salafi currents in the contemporary era and the actions of groups like ISIS reveal the necessity of understanding the ideology and objectives of these currents for preserving the unity of the Islamic world. Theoretical Framework
This research utilizes the "Discourse Theory" of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to analyze the subject. Based on this, discourses gain identity in confrontation with each other, and key concepts of this theory include "Nodal Point (Central Signifier)", "Articulation", "Othering", "Antagonism", and "Chain of Equivalence". The Neo-Salafi discourse fosters its cohesion and continuity through othering and creating an "Other" (Shi'a/Iran). Intellectual Foundations of Neo-Salafism
The intellectual origin of this current goes back to Ibn Taymiyyah, who laid the theoretical foundations for excommunicating others by expanding the concept of disbelief (Kufr) and restricting the concept of faith (Iman). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab revived this thought in the 12th century AH (18th century CE) and transformed it into a political-military movement. Contemporary Neo-Salafis (Takfiri-Jihadist), inspired by these two, have adopted a more extreme approach. Research Findings
The research findings are presented along four axes: Components of the Salafi-Takfiri Discourse in the Othering of Shi'ism: The ontology of this discourse is based on a rigid duality (Self/Islam vs. Other/Disbelief). Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, "Shi'ism" was reinforced as the primary Other and identity-builder for the Neo-Salafi discourse. Using the "Chain of Equivalence", they overlook differences among Salafi groups (such as al-Qaeda and ISIS) and unite them against the common enemy (Shi'ism). Identity-Based Confrontation of the Neo-Salafis: Confrontation with Shi'ism is not merely a religious difference but the main factor for the continuity and identity cohesion of these currents. The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a Shi'a power transformed this confrontation into an ideological and geopolitical challenge. Neo-Salafis, by excommunicating Shi'a, forbid any interaction with them and have engaged in practical opposition to Iran's influence in the region. The Nodal Point of Neo-Salafism in Confrontation with Shi'a Islam: The nodal point of this discourse is "Return to the Pious Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Salih) through Takfiri-Jihadi means". This nodal point articulates elements such as the implementation of Sharia (with an extremist interpretation), excommunication of Shi'a, offensive jihad, and opposition to non-Salafi governments. The Islamic Republic of Iran is represented as the "Superior Other" of this discourse, simultaneously symbolizing "Shi'a heresy (Bid'ah)", "non-Divine government" (due to Velayat-e Faqih), and "regional expansionism". Discursive Confrontation and Its Manifestations: This confrontation has been pursued in practice by various Neo-Salafi groups: Al-Qaeda: Formed with a focus on Shi'a othering and with direct/indirect support from powers like the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to act against the influence of Iran and Shi'a. Taliban: With origins in the Deobandi school (influenced by Wahhabism), are strongly anti-Shi'a. Saudi Arabia's goal in supporting the Taliban was to create a pivotal point in competing with Iran's influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. ISIS (Daesh): Shi'a-phobia was the central axis of this group's ideology and actions. They emerged through the widespread excommunication of Shi'a and by leveraging political projects of foreign powers (e.g., plans for Iraq's partition) and carried out massacres of Shi'a. ISIS considered the Islamic Republic of Iran its main enemy. ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K): As a remnant of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan, continues terrorist attacks against Shi'a and aims to re-establish the Caliphate in the historical geography of Khorasan. Conclusion
Takfiri Neo-Salafi currents, by othering Shi'ism and the Islamic Republic of Iran, have engaged in an identity-based and discursive confrontation with it. This confrontation is rooted in the ideological foundations of Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd al-Wahhab and has been reinforced by the geopolitical objectives of regional and extra-regional powers. The discursive confrontation of these currents is based on the nodal point of "Return to the Salaf through Takfiri-Jihadi methods" and the creation of an anti-Shi'a and anti-Iranian "Chain of Equivalence" that introduces Iran as the epicenter of deviation and the main threat to the Islamic world. Understanding this discourse is essential for comprehending regional developments and neutralizing its threats.

Abstract The September 11, 2001 attacks, followed by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, marked the beginning of a series of transformative developments that fundamentally altered the geopolitical order of West Asia. Amid these shifts, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, more than any other regional power, sought over the past two decades to position itself as a central political, security, economic, and cultural actor in shaping, defining, and implementing various regional initiatives.
The abstract of the resistance, given the quantitative and qualitative expansion it has found in the last two decades, has been able to show itself as an effective element in the political and military processes of the West Asian region and have special capabilities. This has led to the creation of specific security arrangements around the Iranian Islamic Republic, in a better way, to establish a balance of threats in the West Asian region, to the extent that it can "automatically" repel regional and trans -regional threats against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This study was aimed at examining the strategic requirements of resistance for the national security of the Islamic Republic.) The questionnaire (and the library, in accordance with the descriptive research method used in this study, uses a library (documentary) questionnaire to test the hypothesis. The statistical population of the present study was provided by professors and students of postgraduate and doctoral political sciences and other related trends in Tehran. Research shows that multitasking and miracles of resistance axis emphasizes the activation of the capacity of the economy, the consolidation of military and defense power, and the constructive relationship of deepening cooperation with Russia and China (as well as interacting and interacting with the neighborhood policy for the Islamic policy and adopting the most important foreign policy doctrine and adopting a strategy in the West. Has: Resistance Axis, Islamic Republic of Iran, West Asia Region, National Security. Despite sustained efforts by the United States and its allies to impose sanctions, exert economic pressure, and politically isolate Iran, the country’s regional policy in West Asia has expanded significantly over the past decade. This policy is largely reflected in Iran’s cooperation with the so-called “Resistance Axis,” a concept in Iranian foreign policy that encompasses alliances with a network of formal and informal, state and non-state actors across the region.
Iran has framed its initiative within the Resistance Axis as a counterforce to the United States, the Zionist regime, and the growing trend of normalization among regional states. While Iran’s foreign policy toward Islamic resistance movements and liberation struggles is ideologically rooted in humanitarian ideals and religious obligations, this orientation does not contradict its pursuit of national security within regional and global equations. Beyond its spiritual, religious, and humanitarian dimensions, Iran’s engagement with the Resistance Axis is a strategic response to perceived threats in the West Asian regional environment. Initially defensive in nature, this support has evolved as a deterrent against hostile powers operating in the region.
However, alongside its strategic opportunities and capabilities, the Resistance Axis also presents vulnerabilities, challenges, and structural weaknesses that adversaries may exploit to undermine Iran’s national interests and security. These include economic fragility, persistent sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia communities—and even among Shia factions regarding their alignment with Iran’s ideological and political vision—financial burdens associated with sustaining the Axis, and human losses resulting from military advisory support.
Another critical challenge is the imbalance between Iran’s military-security engagement and its political-economic relations with Resistance Axis actors. The formal and informal nature of these alliances, coupled with governance and economic disparities among member entities, introduces further complications. Thus, while the Resistance Axis yields both strategic benefits and risks for Iran’s national security and foreign policy, the central question driving this research is: What are the strategic requirements of the Resistance Axis for safeguarding the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Over the past four decades, Iran has successfully deepened its strategic ties and strengthened its political, security, and military relations with groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia factions in Iraq, thereby extending its strategic depth beyond its borders. In the last two decades, Iran has actively challenged the United States and its regional allies across multiple domains. It could be argued that no existential threat to these actors is currently more explicit, direct, and formidable than that posed by Iran.
At the strategic level, the perception of Iran by the Arab-Hebrew axis has shifted from a “containment” paradigm to one of “aggression.” Tactically, this has translated into direct attacks on Iranian assets. On the soft power front, the U.S. and its regional allies have mobilized media, cultural platforms, lobbying networks, and diplomatic influence to advance their confrontational agenda against Iran. In the semi-hard domain, they have employed sanctions, economic pressure, and political maneuvers—such as the “Deal of the Century,” the Abraham Accords, and deepening ties with regional and extra-regional powers—to recalibrate alliances and enhance their relative power vis-à-vis Iran’s position within the Resistance Axis.
Nonetheless, the substantial political, economic, and human costs borne by Iran in pursuit of these strategic gains cannot be overlooked. The security landscape in which Iran operates has become increasingly complex. The country now faces a multitude of regional and global adversaries, ranging from traditional geopolitical rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to overtly hostile actors such as the United States and the Zionist regime.
These dynamics have further complicated Iran’s strategic posture. The most pressing ambiguity lies in the absence of a comprehensive, long-term plan to capitalize on the achievements of Resistance Axis forces across the region. As a result, the future trajectory of these forces remains uncertain. Although their presence in various regional states has created valuable opportunities for Iran, the reluctance or lack of conviction among certain diplomatic actors—and their hesitation to align with Resistance forces and senior military commanders operating in the region—has led to missed opportunities for enhancing Iran’s national security.
 

Abstract The rise and fall of great powers has always been a significant subject in the international system. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the perception among observers and analysts has strengthened that a period of transition in the international system has begun, and the US-led international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union is changing. Given neorealism's emphasis on how states are influenced by the international system, this transitional period could present opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power. Therefore, the main research question is: What opportunities does the transitioning international system offer the Islamic Republic of Iran? Using neorealist theory, the research hypothesis posits that the transitioning international system provides opportunities for Iran, such as strategic cooperation with emerging powers, utilizing the potential of regional and international alliances and treaties, enhancing the agency of discursive power, and reducing the impact of sanctions. This study employs a descriptive-analytical research method. Data collection was conducted through library research, scholarly articles, and internet searches, and the information was analyzed qualitatively and interpretively using rational reasoning and analysis. The international system is a concept that has been used since the 1960s to describe interactions among state actors. It encompasses the environment in which units of international politics operate, where their intentions, orientations, and demands are influenced by the international system itself. Throughout history, international systems have undergone transformations in two domains: evolutionary and paradigmatic. In the evolutionary domain, systems have progressed from limited, regional forms (such as those in Mesopotamia, Greece, China, India, Africa, etc.) to more comprehensive systems (like those in Asia and Europe), culminating in the 20th century with a global international system. In terms of paradigmatic change, the international system, with its specific logic, norms, and rules, has given way to new systems. Examples of such changes include the multipolar system pre-World War II, the bipolar system during the Cold War, and the unipolar system in the 1990s (Karami, 2004: 83). Consequently, the primary focus here is on the second type of transformation, which neorealism theory is particularly well-suited to explain. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the proposition that a transitional period has begun in the international system has gained traction among observers and analysts. They posit that the international order envisioned by the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union is undergoing significant change. Consequently, this transitional phase in the international system, which aligns with the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, can present certain opportunities for the country. The most significant of these opportunities will be outlined below. Srategic Cooperation with Emerging Powers: The transitional period in the international system provides a conducive environment for cooperation with emerging powers. The Islamic Republic of Iran should leverage the internal contradictions within the international community currently evident between the United States (which advocates for maintaining the status quo) and certain powers such as Russia and China (which advocate for changing the status quo and playing an active role in the international system)—while bearing in mind that all actors in the international system seek to secure their national interests. By forging strategic ties with these countries, Iran can enhance its agency. Utilizing the Potential of Regional and International Alliances and Treaties:Given that regional powers have gained greater opportunity and scope for active engagement in the transitioning international system, the formation of regional unions and alliances represents another opportunity presented by this transitional phase. With the aim of consolidating its political, security, and economic role in the region, ensuring national security against regional instabilities, and maximizing economic, social, political, security, and cultural cooperation with its neighbors, the Islamic Republic of Iran can foster regional convergence by reducing points of divergence with both neighboring and non-neighboring countries. This is because, with the decline of U.S. power during the transition of the international system and the emergence of new powers, countries' dependence on the United States has diminished, thereby creating grounds for convergence, union, and alliance among nations. Enhancing the Agency of Discursive Power: Accordingly, given that the transitioning international system provides a foundation for the emergence of cultural power, discursive power, soft power, and norm-setting power, this situation presents an opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this context, owing to its possession of discursive and normative power, Iran can attain a distinct position and role, enabling it to exert influence within the international system. Reducing the Impact of Economic Sanctions: In the context of the transitioning international system, the formation of regional organizations with an economic focus and effective participation in them can serve as a strategy to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s membership in BRICS and other regional organizations can create opportunities to alleviate economic sanctions. If the power of such organizations is strengthened, BRICS countries can support Iran in international forums and help reduce political pressure on the country. This support may include opposing unilateral sanctions. Conclusion Throughout history, no similar pattern has consistently dominated power relations in the international system, which has undergone transformations corresponding to historical conditions. Changes in the structure of the international system have not only influenced its constituent units but have also been influenced by political units themselves. Following World War II, a bipolar structure prevailed in the international system, which shifted to a unipolar structure with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of American power. Given recent changes in the international order and the gradual weakening of US hegemony, a transitional period has begun in the international system, which could present significant opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power opposed to the US-centric order.Based on the theoretical framework of neorealism, which emphasizes the influence of the international system's structure on states, Iran can utilize these developments to strengthen its position. This transitional period offers opportunities such as strategic cooperation with emerging powers, leveraging regional and international alliances, enhancing agency based on discursive power, and mitigating the impact of sanctions.

Abstract With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the perspective toward the Zionist regime underwent a fundamental transformation. This regime had regarded Pahlavi Iran with particular attention within the framework of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine. The Ben-Gurion doctrine was based on the assumption that, in order to contain and counter its neighboring countries, the Zionist regime was compelled to establish strategic relations with the peripheral states of those countries. Accordingly, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia held prominent positions in the foreign policy of the Zionist regime. Specifically, the relations of this regime with the Pahlavi system in Iran were developed and expanded in multiple areas, including the military and intelligence domains. While the relations between the Pahlavi regime and the Zionist regime were expanding and deepening, the Islamic Revolution triumphed on February 11, 1979. One of the earliest and most symbolic events connected with foreign policy in this revolution was the handover of the Zionist regime’s embassy in Tehran to the Fatah Movement. For those familiar with the values of the Islamic Revolution, however, this event was by no means surprising; throughout the years of struggle of Imam Khomeini (RA) and his companions against the Pahlavi regime, one of the central pillars of their protest was the occupation of Palestine by the Zionist regime and the ties of the Pahlavi monarchy with it. Imam Khomeini (RA) analyzed the very nature of Israel within the framework of a broader hegemonic design and did not recognize any form of relations with this occupying regime, striving fundamentally for its eradication. His well-known statement that “Israel must be erased from the page of time” clearly reflects the full spectrum of his ideological and strategic outlook on the Zionist regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with such a perception of the Zionist regime, formulated its foreign policy. This was not, however, a one-sided hostility; from the very beginning, the Zionist regime also sought to advance its enmity toward Iran through multiple instruments and in diverse fields. Indeed, this hostility traces back to the years prior to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, when the regime, through its interactions with the Pahlavi system, sought to facilitate Mohammad Reza Shah’s efforts in suppressing Iranian revolutionaries. Throughout these years, the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran—or, more broadly, the axis of resistance—and the Zionist regime has remained a central subject of analysis. The Islamic Republic, relying on the “ideal of liberating al-Quds al-Sharif,” has sought, alongside capacity-building within the Islamic world, to employ available means to weaken and ultimately dismantle the Zionist regime. Conversely, the regime, through extensive exploitation of international capacities and discourses aimed at overthrowing the Islamic Republic, has actively pursued the weakening of Iran and openly placed regime change on its agenda. Within Iranian political and strategic discourse, one of the recurring themes in the confrontation with the Zionist regime has been “deterrence.” This concept has frequently appeared not only in the rhetoric of political and military officials but also in scholarly discussions addressing strategies for countering Israel. In elite debates that emerged after October 7, 2023, with the initiation of Operation Al-Aqsa Storm by Hamas against the Zionist regime, deterrence became a highly salient theme. Some argued that the deterrent capacity of the Islamic Republic had been undermined, while others—particularly before October 27, 2024, when the Zionist regime attacked Iran—emphasized the preservation of Iran’s deterrent power. Hence, it may be concluded that deterrence is a central and recurrent option within the Iran–Israel confrontation. At present, however, deterrence may be approached from a different perspective: does deterrence, in its theoretical sense, truly possess the sufficiency and conceptual validity to explain the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist regime? This article raises this question as its primary research inquiry and seeks, through a theoretical approach enriched with empirical illustrations, to reconsider the centrality of deterrence in this confrontation. In response to the aforementioned question, the hypothesis is advanced that deterrence, in its theoretical and classical sense, lacks the necessary explanatory adequacy for analyzing the Iran–Israel conflict. To evaluate this hypothesis as a possible answer to the central question of the study, the article employs a descriptive–analytical approach. It first conceptualizes deterrence and then assesses its validity in light of the environmental exigencies of the Iran–Israel confrontation. Accordingly, while emphasizing theoretical foundations, the study is also practical in orientation, as it focuses on a current problem with the aim of organizing responses to future challenges arising from this conflict. Data collection relies on library-based and documentary methods. Ultimately, this article seeks, through the lens of deterrence, to offer a conceptual framework for understanding the Iran–Israel confrontation. The significance of this endeavor lies in the fact that clarifying deterrence and its place in the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist regime can conceptually organize Iran’s offensive and defensive actions within a framework that is more coherent and effective. Based on the analytical assessment conducted, deterrence in its maximalist form does not provide comprehensive explanatory power for the Iran–Israel confrontation. This is because both actors fundamentally seek the weakening, containment, and eventual elimination of each other, and they consider offensive policies as the most central and defining layer of their strategic outlook, with defensive strategies designed subordinate to that offensive orientation. In this framework, deterrence is not a purely defensive policy aimed at preventing war and preserving the status quo; rather, it serves as a means of ensuring survival as a prelude to offensive action against the adversary. Accordingly, and in line with the reciprocal field dynamics of recent years, a conceptual framework of “deterrence in motion” can be proposed. While the detailed parameters of this framework require further precision and elaboration, at a general level, its premise is that deterrence does not entail the absolute prevention of enemy attacks. Given the offensive postures of both sides, which are rooted in strategic and ideological imperatives, avoiding aggression against the adversary holds little practical meaning. Under “deterrence in motion,” offensive actions may influence and shape enemy attacks rather than halt them outright: they may reduce their frequency and intensity, redirect their focus, or shift their domains. Thus, responding to an attack in one domain does not end the confrontation but merely transfers it to another arena. This cycle will persist so long as offensive strategies remain central and both sides retain the capacity for aggression. Naturally, with the logic of “defense for survival as a platform for offense,” the development of defensive mechanisms remains crucial, as they may restrict or halt certain types of enemy attacks. However, as noted, this does not terminate the conflict; hostilities between the two sides will continue in other domains. The offensive orientation on both sides of this struggle—though at times influenced by variables such as Iran–U.S. negotiations—cannot, for strategic and ideological reasons discussed in the article, be eliminated. Understanding this reality underscores the growing necessity for Iran to respond to the Zionist regime’s diverse and pinpoint attacks on its interests and national security.  

Abstract The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the main axes of regional and international interactions over the past three decades. Despite Iran’s emphasis on its peaceful nature and its reliance on international law, this program has always faced reactions from neighboring countries and major powers. Despite much research and study on various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program in international political studies, little attention has been paid to the effective role of Saudi Arabia in it. Saudi Arabia, as Iran’s regional rival and America’s main ally in the Persian Gulf, has adopted varying positions towards this program. This article examines the developments in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in four time periods against the Iranian nuclear program using the theoretical framework of “neoclassical realism.” Theoretical Framework of Neoclassical Realism: This theory, by combining two levels of micro and macro analysis, examines the impact of the international structure and the perceptions of political leaders on foreign policy decisions. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia's behavior is influenced by external factors (such as regional competition and the international system) and internal factors (such as the threat perception of leaders, public opinion, and decision-making structures). As the most important and largest Arab state in the Persian Gulf and also the most important US ally in the region, the Saudi government was most influenced by the security perceptions of its officials regarding Iran's nuclear and regional threats. When the United States took an aggressive approach to Iran's nuclear program, Saudi Arabia took a calm approach, and when the United States de-secured Iran's nuclear program by signing the JCPOA, it turned to staunch opposition to Iran's nuclear program. Four periods of Saudi Arabia's stance: The first period (1992–2002) Positive neutrality: During this period, Iran's nuclear program was not a priority for the international community, and only the United States considered it a threat. Saudi Arabia was also mainly involved in domestic issues, reforms, and regional conflicts with Iran and did not pay attention to Iran's nuclear program. It recognized Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and expressed only environmental concerns after the Iran-Russia agreement to complete the Bushehr power plant in 1992. Saudi Arabia considered the International Atomic Energy Agency's monitoring of Iran's activities sufficient. The second period (2002–2004) Negative neutrality: During this period, the Iranian nuclear crisis began and, after the publication of satellite images by CNN, the Iranian nuclear file entered a critical phase at the behest of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency confirmed Iran's secrecy and the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia, expressed their political, security, and environmental concerns. The United States increased pressure and demanded a suspension of Iran's nuclear activities. Iran entered into negotiations with the European Union and accepted a voluntary suspension of enrichment. Saudi Arabia supported the European diplomatic solution and considered the US military option dangerous. The country was concerned about the military consequences and the strengthening of radical groups in Iran, and emphasized that cooperation and dialogue were better than confrontation. At the same time, Saudi Arabia focused more on developments in Iraq and paid less attention to Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia was also critical of the US's dual approach towards Iran and Israel. The third period (2005–2015) Open confrontation and opposition: From 2005 to the signing of the JCPOA (2015), important changes occurred in Iran’s nuclear file. With the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran adopted a more assertive nuclear policy, left the Paris Agreement, and sought cooperation with new actors beyond the three European countries. The United States referred the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council, and it became a security file. Saudi Arabia, which had previously taken a soft approach, began to confront Iran’s nuclear program more harshly from this time on; including proposing the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Persian Gulf and supporting sanctions against Iran. WikiLeaks documents show that Saudi Arabia, behind closed doors, called on the United States to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, due to the sensitivities of Arab public opinion and support for Iran’s anti-Western policies, Saudi Arabia’s opposition remained unspoken and political and logistical support remained. Saudi-affiliated media outlets also engaged in psychological warfare against Iran’s nuclear program. Fourth period (2015 to present) Continuation of confrontation and efforts to strike a balance: The JCPOA treaty created a significant change in the regional order that Iran’s rival countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, were unhappy with. After Trump came to power and the US withdrew from the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to confront Iran intensified. Saudi Arabia adopted three main strategies within the framework of defensive neoclassical realism: calling for an international coalition to contain Iran, strengthening its defense and missile capabilities, and trying to acquire nuclear technology. Saudi Arabia initially sought to prevent the development of Iran’s nuclear program by supporting the Security Council and sanctions and tried to participate in the nuclear negotiations. The JCPOA agreement, which gave Iran a stronger position, worried Saudi Arabia and caused it to resort to more extensive security and military measures, including purchasing weapons from the US and bribing Russia to prevent the sale of defense systems to Iran. Even the claim of trying to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan sought to balance against Iran. Also, Saudi Arabia launched its national nuclear program to confront Iran and signed agreements for nuclear cooperation with the United States, France, and China. A plan to form an international uranium enrichment consortium was also presented by Saudi Arabia to control nuclear activities in the region, which Iran did not accept. These measures indicate Saudi Arabia's efforts to confront Iran's influence and nuclear capabilities in the region. Conclusion Iran and Saudi Arabia, two regional powers and rivals in the Islamic world, have complex relations that have been significantly affected by Iran's nuclear program. Initially, Saudi Arabia did not attach much importance to Iran's nuclear program, but over time, this issue became one of the important factors in the relations between the two countries. The theory of neoclassical realism shows that regional actors adopt appropriate security policies to maintain the balance of power and increase their sources of power. Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States, does not consider its behavior to be entirely in line with Washington's policies and has always emphasized a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue and the creation of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. However, since the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration, Saudi Arabia has taken a tougher stance against Iran's nuclear program, supporting sanctions and even considering military action. However, Saudi Arabia's willingness to pursue a military solution was limited, as this action could have provoked a strong reaction from Iran and the activation of its regional networks. The JCPOA agreement was not accepted by Saudi Arabia, and the country tried to reduce Iran's achievements by supporting Trump's anti-Iran policies. At the same time, competition and proxy wars between the two countries continue, but recently both sides have sought to reduce tensions and protect their interests, although their relations remain sensitive and changing.    

Abstract Introduction: National interests, as common and long-term goals of the state and nation pursued in the global arena, shape the orientation of foreign policy of countries; the most important of these goals are the preservation of independence, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, social system, security and welfare of citizens. With the 1979 revolution, political elites presented a new definition of national interests in the form of the ideology of the system, which was incompatible with the norms and requirements of the structure of the international system. Accordingly, it is necessary to conduct the following research so that through such a way, the country's diplomatic apparatus can reconstruct itself theoretically to secure national interests. The authors intend to conduct a realistic reinterpretation of the country's national interests by taking a look at the idealistic and ideological definitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran of national interests on the one hand and paying attention to the objective developments that have brought today's world to the "post-ideological" era on the other. In this regard, the main question of the research is: Given the incompatibility of national interests with the structure of the international system, what strategy in the field of foreign policy can best serve the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The main hypothesis is based on the fact that in the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, national interests consist of two parts: subjective and objective. Creating a balance and equilibrium between these two parts provides the basis for securing and continuing national interests.
Research Method: The research ahead is a theoretical/applied research that uses the theoretical foundations of pragmatism to explain the subject of the research, and the research method is qualitative content analysis. In this research, three categories of variables play a role; the independent variable is the realist structure of the international system. The dependent variable is the foreign policy strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The intervening variable itself is divided into two parts: A - The internal intervening variable, which is the continuation of the ideological strategy in the structure of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. B - The external intervening variable will be the action and reaction between the forces interested in the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and the international system. Therefore, the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran are located in the center of a square whose sides are domestic policy, foreign policy, ideology, and the international system.
Discussion and Conclusion: The four main characteristics that are effective in formulating the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and give direction to its foreign policy are: "independence and negation of domination", "Islamic globalization", "Islamic internationalism", "anti-hegemonicism" (Mahmoudikia and Dehshiri, 29:2010-22). In total, by considering two factors, a general understanding of the nature of the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be achieved, including: first; the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and second; the perspective of its leaders.
A - The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
The highest goals and ideals that constitute the main infrastructure of the Islamic Republic of Iran's government's grand planning in the field of foreign policy are stated in Article 3 of the Constitution as follows:
- Complete rejection of colonialism and prevention of foreign influence;
- Elimination of any tyranny, autocracy and monopolization;
- Development and consolidation of Islamic brotherhood and general cooperation among all people;
and most importantly, "Regulating the country's foreign policy based on the standards of Islam, fraternal commitment to all Muslims and unwavering support for the oppressed of the world."
B - The leaders' perspective:
B 1- Imam Khomeini: Imam Khomeini does not recognize the definitions of the term "national interests" in the literature of politics and international relations and offers a new explanation of national interests. The main axis of Imam Khomeini's political strategy, on which the definition of national interests is also based, is political Islam. Accordingly, he considers securing the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran dependent on the interests of the Islamic Ummah.
B 2 - Ayatollah Khamenei: Regarding national interests, Ayatollah Khamenei's view is not much different from that of Imam Khomeini. In general, his view on national interests can be explained around several elements:
- National interests as a religious identity
- National interests as a revolutionary identity
- Compatibility of the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the national interests of other Muslims
- Synchronization of ideology and national interests in the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran are in conflict in two areas:
A - Incompatibility of idealism with realism
B - Incompatibility of ideology and rationality
The incompatibility of the national interests of the Islamic Republic with the international system has faced the country with serious challenges at three levels: national, regional and global.
Conclusion: The incompatibility of national interests in the dictionary of the Islamic Republic of Iran with national interests in the global system is natural because this incompatibility is rooted in the deep difference between the principles governing the international system and the Islamic principles and ideals and revolutionary values ​​governing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. What solution can be adopted in such circumstances? Obviously, a solution must be adopted that, while maintaining ideological ideals, also resolves the incompatibility with the international system. The proposed solution is the application of a result-oriented pragmatism approach. Based on this approach, prior beliefs about national interests and foreign policy must be reviewed or de-prioritized so that posterior beliefs that are the result of practical interactions between the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international system can replace them. The axis of achieving such an understanding is this principle: "What is true is put into practice and what is put into practice is true." In this approach, it is sufficient for the Islamic Republic of Iran to update its reading of the ideal, classify its ideals based on the criterion of "practicality or impracticability" and give priority to practical goals. The Islamic Republic of Iran would do better to make the most of its relative advantage in the field of soft power and its relative advantage in the cultural field, rather than focusing on a military approach that is not a suitable basis for creating a balance of power with regional and global powers.
 

Abstract The group of people make up the nation, they founded the governments and formed the political organizations of power. National power includes all the physical and spiritual capabilities in the political and geographical realm. National power has many sources, one of these factors can be considered geographical and population effects. Therefore, geographical factors and above all population can be used and evaluated to measure the national power of countries. Having a sufficient population and having human capital is one of the most important national assets of any country, which directly interacts with moral, economic, political, and military issues and, as a result, with the country's national security. Population is important to political actors from a tool point of view and in relation to power, and by examining the problem of population, the effects of population on the distribution of power can be determined effectively. Therefore, the problem of this research is to know the importance of the population and its relationship with the country's national power, and to explain this problem, the opinions of Copenhagen school scientists such as Bari Bozan and Oli Weaver have been used. The Copenhagen school has inspired many studies and theoretical reflections on the various features of security construction and especially research in the field of demographic changes. The Copenhagen school serves as a reference for explaining and discussing the intertwining of security logics in the process of intersubjective construction, security as a component of national power and its ratio with the population of a country, because human capital as a security factor is a driving force for a country's national power. Is. The theoretical framework of the Copenhagen school has been used for two reasons: firstly, it provides a proper understanding of society and government, and secondly, it has a suitable application for understanding future theoretical developments. From the point of view of Bari Bozan, the increase and youth of the population should be considered as one of the security issues and in order to increase the national power factor, therefore, the population has a high and unique and irreplaceable position in the doctrine and calculation of the power of countries. Also, from the perspective of strategists interested in the Copenhagen school, national security in the third world requires special attention to demographic threats inside. But since the Copenhagen school has a materialistic attitude towards population and power, it was necessary to consider value issues and some abstract viewpoints, and therefore, because Islam and religious teachings value population and basically fertility benefits in a society. It has the ability to compensate for some of the weaknesses of the Copenhagen school. Several methods have been used to conduct this research, including the review of scientific documents and documents, such as books and authoritative university articles, which have been reviewed qualitatively with a contextual approach and analytical method. There are three main elements in this research: First, the importance of youth as a powerful arm of global security and authority. Second, focusing on the teachings of Islam as the driving engine of the Islamic system for a powerful presence in the system of active countries with independent plans and ideas. And the third is the relationship between Islam and the population as a main factor in long-term population planning until reaching the stable horizons of power, which is considered the main component in Shia doctrine as a universal idea. Religious beliefs and practices play an essential role in the lives of many people, and in Islam, it is believed that the population is an essential part of strengthening religious beliefs with a complex combination of cultural and historical factors. Therefore, in the orders of Islam and religious teachings, having children has a wide and comprehensive concept because on the one hand it leads to the emergence of divine power in the heart of the population and on the other hand it leads to Iran's national, regional and global authority in this turbulent and challenging world. What was said about population and power applies to Iran because the Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to improve the conventional indicators of its power. Emphasis on population growth and besides paying attention to the empowerment of the middle-aged population as well as the preparation of upstream documents to improve the structure of the government and empower the military power, have all been in the direction of increasing Iran's power, and the main springboard towards the ideological ideal of the government is the layers of the population that are in difficult times. It is used and they represent the authority of the country against the enemies. It is also important to note that if the large population of a country is not proportionate to the anthropological infrastructure such as culture, art, literature, religion, entrepreneurship associations and facilities related to youth marriage, perhaps the blessing of the population will turn into a song and cause a reduction in generational talents. Therefore, there is a mutual and interactive relationship between human development and the increase of national power, and it should be considered in the macro policies of the country. These policies have played an important role in shaping various demographic trends in the Islamic Republic of Iran, considering the developments that have taken place after the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Since the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a system based on religion and religious values, the approach to the issue of population is largely related to this issue. Such a process, while considering the views of religious teachings, can reduce the security of the population issue and turn it into a crisis for national power. Key words: population, national power, Copenhagen school, Islamic Republic of Iran, religious teachings

Abstract  
More than a decade has passed since the concept of smart power to political literature and the sphere of international policy studies. This concept was initially on the agenda of the transformation of power relations at the level of state actors, but due to the growth of the power achievements of non-state actors, the application of this concept expanded. The achievements of non-state actors Hamas and Hezbollah, particularly their deterrence power and success in the 33-day, 22-day, and 12-day wars against the Zionist regime over the past decades, have been considered a turning point for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Hamas and Hezbollah are two Islamic resistance movements that emerged in the 1980s inspired by the intellectual foundations and ideology of political Islam, Shiite values and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, non-governmental actors and regional allies of the Islamic Republic have put their declarative principles on the line in the fight against the Zionist regime and are trying to destroy the Israeli regime and reclaim the rights of the Palestinians from the Zionists. They see lasting resistance as the only way to defeat Israel and the great Western powers in the region Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has based its foreign policy on hatred of the Israeli regime, opposition to and combating the policy of Western powers, support for liberation movements, especially support for the Palestinian people in the region.
 The purpose of this study was to investigate and explain the software and hardware achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah and its impact on Iran's regional position in the Middle East during 2005-2021.Based on this, the research question is, what impact has hamas and Hezbollah's software and hardware achievements had on Iran's regional position in the Middle East?
The present research method is an explanatory method and the conceptual approach of smart power has been used. The method of collecting information and data was also library and internet.
The concept of smart power entered the political literature and international policy studies in the early 20th century. This concept was initially considered by the policy makers and decision makers of the foreign policy of the United States of America; But gradually it was noticed by other governmental and non-governmental actors. Hamas and Hezbollah are two Islamic resistance movements that emerged in the 1980s inspired by the intellectual foundations and ideology of political Islam, Shiite values, and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, one of the non-governmental actors of the regional united Islamic Republic, have put their declared principles in the line of struggle against Israel and are seeking the destruction of Israel and the recapture of Palestinian disputes and farms from the hands of the Zionists, and they are the only solution to overcome and Victory over Israel and the great western powers in the region consider resistance and standing stable. From the very beginning, the Islamic Republic of Iran has drawn its foreign policy policy on hatred and aversion to Israel, opposing and fighting the policy of Western powers, supporting liberation movements, especially supporting the Palestinian people in the region.
The Islamic Republic of Iran defined and considered Israel as an illegitimate and occupying regime and the role of Western powers, especially the United States of America, as interventionist actors causing instability in the region. With the revelation of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and its support for the Islamic resistance axis of Hamas and Hezbollah, it faced obstacles and pressure from the opposing actors, namely the regional governments of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the extra-regional government of the United States of America; But what has increased the intensity of concerns and anger of the opposition actors against the Islamic Republic over the past decades, has been the power gains of Hamas and Hezbollah. So that in the past decades, the software and hardware achievements of the two Islamic resistance movements, Hamas and Hezbollah, have expanded. in a way that has surprised even their opponents.
Hamas and Hezbollah are regional allies of the Islamic Republic and Iran supports them. Iran is located in a region that has been subjected to pressures and disruptions from opposing actors. On the other hand, these opposition actors are worried about the growth of the power of non-governmental actors united in the Islamic Republic. Based on this, in this research, while describing and explaining the software and hardware achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah in the region, we will discuss their effects on the regional position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East.
The findings indicate that the software and hardware achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah as two regionally allied non-governmental actors of the Islamic Republic of Iran had grown, which had a positive impact on Iran's regional position in the Middle East.
Conclusion: The results indicate that the increase in the smart power of Hamas and Hezbollah has increased the influence and bargaining power and ensured security for Iran against opposition actors such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States in the Middle East.
In this article, we discussed the growth of the achievements of two main and powerful Islamic resistance movements, Hamas and Hezbollah, and its impact on Iran's regional position in the Middle East, and we analyzed and evaluated that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not recognized Israel since its inception and considered itself a supporter of the people. Palestine had defined. Hamas and Hezbollah emerged in Palestine and Lebanon, respectively, inspired by the intellectual foundations of political Islam and especially the Islamic Revolution in the 1990s, and drew their vital principles in the front line against Israel and victory against it.
In the past decades, the software and hardware achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah had grown. Regarding the software achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah, we can mention the increase in popularity of these actors in their country and the region. He also mentioned about the hardware achievements of Hamas and Hezbollah, deterrence power, missiles and drones and their victory against Israel in the past decades. Considering that the presence of these actors has a deep strategic importance, especially guaranteeing security for Tehran in the region, without a doubt, any software and hardware growth of the power of Hamas and Hezbollah is beneficial to the Islamic Republic against the regional and extra-regional actors who wanted to contain Iran and their bargaining power and influence. It has promoted Iran in the region and made any peace in the Middle East inevitable without the presence and participation of Tehran.

Abstract The security structures for any country are considered as basic priorities for the survival of that country and the efforts of the governments are to create, manage and properly maintain these structures. The important elements of this structure are internal and external, and sometimes attention to the inside causes neglect of external threats. Considering that the origin of many threats is foreign, therefore, the emergence of neo-Talibanism in Afghanistan is also considered a foreign threat.
The security structures for any country are the basic priorities for the survival of that country, and the government's effort is to create, manage and maintain these structures in a proper way. The important elements of this structure are internal and external, and sometimes attention to the inside causes neglect of external threats. Considering that the root of many threats is foreign, the emergence of neo-Talibanism in Afghanistan is also considered a foreign threat. Historical friendships and hatreds, such as specific issues that cause conflict and cooperation, play a role in the formation of the comprehensive set of fears, threats and friendships that define a regional security group. Various variables such as history, culture, religion and geography affect the patterns of friendship and enmity (Buzan and Waever, 2009: 61). Due to its proximity to Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran is affected by internal developments and the actions and reactions of regional and international actors related to it. Considering the situation of Afghanistan in the last few decades and turning it into a bankrupt, weak or transitional country in the international arena, the negative effects of the developments will definitely be more. Political instability, foreign interventions, including the occupation of this country in the late 1980s, long internal wars, political differences caused by nationalism, power-seeking by factions and commanders, the emergence of the Taliban, and the intervention of foreign countries under the pretext of preventive war and carrying out neoliberal policies in this country, including The three-decade developments of this neighboring country have spread to Iran as a neighboring country. Although the focus of Iran's foreign policy in the last three centuries has been on its western borders, but practically this country has suffered significant injuries from its eastern borders; In such a way that after the division of the subcontinent into three independent countries in 1947 and the occurrence of border disputes between India and Pakistan on the one hand and Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other hand, as well as the communist coup in Afghanistan in 1979 and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces, civil wars, the emergence of the Taliban , the attack of western forces on Afghanistan and the events after that, Iran has always faced security problems in its eastern borders.
The dissolution of order after the Bonn Agreement and the triumphant return of the Taliban to Kabul indicate a return to the previous situation when the Taliban were in power. Even worse for Iran, the Taliban are now a more organized, well-equipped, and much stronger group than they were in 2001, and the Iranian-backed political and military groups that fought against the Taliban in the 1990s have now almost disappeared from the Afghan political scene (Tookhy, 2022: 2), but in the last year and a half, the world has watched new developments and events in Afghanistan. Although the root of the events in Afghanistan does not end with just one reason, the country was again in the news when Donald Trump started new negotiations with the Taliban in 2018 and finally reached an agreement on February 29, 2020 in Doha, Qatar. With the commitment of the United States to the gradual withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan and the commitment of the Taliban to prevent the activities of Al-Qaeda in the areas under their control, the developments accelerated. The Taliban, who hoped for Donald Trump's re-election, followed the news of the American elections because Washington would probably fulfill its commitments to withdraw from Afghanistan; But with the victory of Joe Biden and the beginning of his presidency, the events went more and more in favor of the Taliban. Finally, following the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban gradually took over different parts of the country, which can lead to changes in the regional and international order in the future. In this research, we are looking for an answer to the question, what effect does the re-establishment of the Taliban have on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The method in this article is descriptive-analytical and library and internet resources were used to collect data.
The dissolution of order after the Bonn Agreement and the triumphant return of the Taliban to Kabul indicate a return to the previous situation when the Taliban were in power. Even worse for Iran, the Taliban are now a more organized, well-equipped and much stronger group than they were in 2001, and the Iranian-backed political-military groups that fought the Taliban in the 1990s have now all but disappeared from the Afghan political scene.
The lack of indicators of good governance in Afghanistan has caused that any change in this country, due to a series of commonalities and geographical proximity to neighboring countries, will have a great impact on them and even the region. Developments in Afghanistan over the past few decades, including issues of identity, drugs, foreign interventions, Helmand water resources, etc., have had a wide and wide impact on the security of the region and the Islamic Republic. But the re-emergence of the Taliban with anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian tendencies will pose security risks for Iran. Nevertheless, Iran's goal is to establish stability and security on the country's borders. The main purpose of this article is to examine the effects of the emergence of a new Taliban in Afghanistan on Iran's national security. The theoretical framework of this research is the theory of regional security complex.
Research findings show that considering the nature of the Taliban's totalitarianism, as well as the influence of other countries on it, if this group does not want to share power with other ethnic groups, this will be a challenge for Afghanistan and its neighbors, including Iran. As a result, the Islamic Republic, while accepting international norms and trying to establish order in Afghanistan, cannot wait until its desired model is established in this neighboring country, but it is necessary to take measures to turn threats into opportunities and weaknesses into points.
By consolidating its relations with the Taliban, Iran can greatly reduce the ethnic and religious tensions in the eastern region and strengthen the idea of religious approximation and reduce the conspiracy and abuse of foreign agents and foreign services to use the capacities of the Baloch people and Sunnis of the east. Economically, the presence of the Taliban provides an opportunity for Iran to play a stronger role in the Afghan economy due to its past relations with the Taliban. The most important of this action in the reconstruction of war-torn Afghanistan and deprived of basic economic needs is aimed at increasing the export of goods, especially in the field of construction goods and also road construction, which Iran has good experience in these fields. In addition, the economic boom in this country has led to the return of Afghan immigrants and refugees and will lead to a significant reduction of social damage in Iran.
 

Abstract Background and purpose: The category of border security is one of the important theoretical and practical topics of the security and defense fields, which has undergone changes in terms of nature and function in the last two decades. In terms of authority, border security includes, in addition to governments, people and populations living in border areas, people and goods that cross the borders. Border security becomes more important due to the fact that it plays the role of an intermediary between internal and external security and is considered the Achilles heel of governments. The borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not exempt from this general rule and have been the site of many wars and conflicts. World War I, II, and Iraq's imposed war against Iran show the turbulence of threats on Iran's borders. The new challenges that have arisen in Iran's eastern neighbor, Afghanistan, and the rise of the Taliban in this country, will change all the security equations of the country's eastern borders. Things like refugees, religious radicalism, insecurity, and even terrorism and drug trafficking, all change quantitatively and qualitatively. Also, the Taliban's way of looking at Islam and the alignment of their thoughts with the government and especially the intelligence apparatus of Pakistan has an impact on the Baluchistan region of Iran. Based on this, in order to predict the country's security situation in the coming years and design suitable security scenarios, it seems necessary to identify the drivers of threats to the country's eastern borders, and researchers seek to answer the main question of what social and economic variables are on the horizon. Are 1405 challenges for the security of the country's eastern borders?
Method: This research is applied in terms of its nature and purpose, and descriptive survey in terms of the type of method and exploratory due to its prospective nature. In this research, the environmental monitoring method was used to identify key variables and form questionnaire items. The statistical population of the research includes familiar experts in related scientific fields. In order to analyze the findings of the research, cross-matrix future research methods were used using Mic Mac software.
Findings: The findings of the research showed that the variable of underdevelopment as a strategic variable and the variables of poverty and illiteracy of the people of the region, the problem of unemployment, the construction of border terminals, human trafficking and drug trafficking as key economic and social challenging variables. The eastern borders of the country were identified in connection with the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in the perspective of 1405.
Conclusion: The results of the research also show that economic and social variables in Sistan and Baluchistan province are the cause of security problems such as human trafficking and drug trafficking. And these results confirm the opinions of the famous thinker of the Copenhagen school, Bari Buzan.
Borders have long been heavily guarded places. Contemporary borders are segregated, and the security function of the border has changed from the territorial limits of states to heterogeneous places that are beyond the geopolitics of borderlines. Various researchers have discussed issues such as the competencies and powers of border authorities, the intensification of cross-border policies over time, new border security technologies, immigration control with citizenship laws, and some dimensions of border security xenophobia. The study of borders has confronted us with a variety of new challenges in the contemporary global political environment, despite efforts to dynamize national borders, governments are still trying to maintain traditional borders. Contrary to the initial slogans about the breaking of national borders (Jones & Johnson) due to ISIS attacks and the refugee crisis, the European Union has gone to re-establish the control of internal Schengen borders (McConnell et al).
The issue of border security is one of the important theoretical and practical issues in security and defense fields, which has undergone changes in terms of nature and function in the last two decades. In terms of border security jurisdiction, in addition to governments, it includes people and populations living in border areas, as well as people and goods that cross borders. Border security becomes more important due to the fact that it plays the role of intermediary between internal and external security and is considered the Achilles heel of governments. The direction of threats from external sources is the vulnerability point of governments, and relations between neighbors may turn dark at any time. Borders are the first layer of absorbing negative waves, so governments focus on border security more than anything else.
The borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not exempted from this general rule and have been the site of many wars and conflicts, World War I, and II and the war imposed by Iraq against Iran are indicative of the turbulence of threats on Iran's borders. Iran's peripheral borders are over 8731 km, of which 4113 km are land borders and 1918 km are river, lake, and swamp borders, and 2700 km are the coasts of Iran in the north (Mazandaran Sea) and in the south (Persian Gulf and Oman Sea). Iran's eastern borders share a 945-kilometer border with Afghanistan from the mouth of Zulfiqar to Mount Malek Siah and a 978-kilometer border with Pakistan from Mount Malek Siah to the mouth of the Gulf of Gwadar. Iran's eastern borders require a national and even international perspective due to geopolitical reasons. In the two eastern neighboring countries, we are witnessing a combination of terrorism, war, insecurity, and radicalism, which has manifested its direct and indirect effects on the eastern borders. With the connection of drug trafficking to the international mafia, this process has entered new and complicated stages. The borders of Iran and Afghanistan were determined in the Hariroud area by General McLean in 1891, in the Hashtadan and Dasht Hashem areas in 1935 by Fakhreddin Altai Turk, and in the Hamon and Hirmand areas by Goldsmith and McCammon in 1872 and 1903. The borders of Iran and Pakistan were also defined by Holdij in 1905 and 1896 from Black Mountain to Kohak.
One of the determining factors in the field of security studies, especially border security, is the element of time. Knowing the future and taking timely action is the key to success in the field of security and strategic decisions. In the current era, studying the future and trying to predict it, the existing trends and the features of emerging trends and phenomena, and in its continuation, building the future by it is one of the main features of security planning. The new challenges that have arisen in Iran's eastern neighbor, Afghanistan, and the rise of the Taliban in this country, will change all the security equations of the country's eastern borders. Things like refugees, religious radicalism, insecurity, even terrorism, and drug trafficking all change quantitatively and qualitatively. Also, the Taliban's way of looking at Islam and the alignment of their thoughts with the government and especially the intelligence apparatus of Pakistan has an impact on the Baluchistan region of Iran. Based on this, in order to predict the country's security situation in the coming years and design suitable security scenarios, it seems necessary to identify the drivers of threats to the eastern borders of the country, and researchers are looking for answers to the main question of what social and economic variables in the time horizon of 1405 for the security of the eastern borders. Are they a challenging country؟

Abstract The foreign policy approach plays an important role in the development of regional and global relations for countries. Especially in the age of globalization, when the ties and relations between countries in the international arena are completely intertwined; It can even be said that the special nature of the globalization period is such that the least available capacity to communicate with other countries has a positive effect on the international image of that country. In regional relations, the foreign policy approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been different approaches and behaviors towards the geopolitical regions around it. South Asia, as an independent geopolitical region based on Sol Cohen's theory and its transformation into a third geostrategic realm, can be one of the regions that offers the necessary potential to change the country's foreign policy approach to this region.
Cross-border national interests and demands of countries in the last decades of the 20th century caused globalization. The globalization of the market economy and the economization of the world system, which gained a lot of speed since the last decade of the 20th century, greatly boosted the geo-economic and geo-strategic competitions in the world. These important developments in the world system have encouraged regionalism and turning to cooperation and regional groupings and convergences to make effective competition between the regions of the world a reality in the global geopolitical system of the postmodern era (Mojtahedzadeh, 2012 : 185). In any case, the foreign policy of countries in the era of globalization is required to respect the national interests of the people of that country. As one of the countries in the world that is located in the geopolitical and geo-economics region of the Middle East, Iran follows the trend of regionalism and regional relations in its foreign policy.
Iran's historical-civilizational, geopolitical and political-security position in the regional and international security system is such that it is inevitable to adopt different approaches in operationalizing Iran's foreign policy. The three main approaches in Iran's foreign policy are: geographical and geopolitical approach, cultural and historical approach, ideological and political-security approach. During the past decades, Iran's foreign policy has had a challenge in creating a balance between these three approaches, which in a way can be considered as a theoretical challenge of focusing on different regional systems in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and South Asia (Barzegar, 2009 : 25).
 
Methodology
The main purpose of this article is to analyze the foreign policy approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in regional relations with the South Asian region. The main question is that "what is the position of the South Asian region in Iran's foreign policy relations and approach"? To answer this question, this research has been done using descriptive-analytical research method and data collection method is from library sources and Internet sites.
 
Result and discussion
In any case, developments in Iran and developments in the international system at the regional and global levels have created a sinusoidal trend in the country's foreign policy. As in most experts' opinions, there is a consensus regarding this process. From the colorfulness to the three riddles that have been proposed for foreign policy, they all tell the behavior of Pandoli and Sinus. For example, a single policy has not been followed in the regional relations between Iran and South Asia. Before the Islamic Revolution, the expansion of geopolitical depth in foreign policy was from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. So that when the largest air-sea base of the Indian Ocean was established in Chabahar in 1975, it was announced by the then president of the country. Those who are familiar with geopolitical issues know that our geopolitical sensitivities include the entire Indian Ocean. So that the proposal to form a union of Indian Ocean countries was raised and welcomed by the governments of that region(Mojtahedzadeh, 2012 : 142).
The subcontinent region (South Asia) is very important for Iran. Among the reasons for the political-security importance of this region for Iran are the long borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, the existence of ecological minorities (Balochs), the weakness of the nation-state structure and fragile governments in this region, political instability, trade and drug smuggling. Narcotics and the threats arising from it, Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism, the situation of Shiites and finally the presence of the United States and its military bases in the region. Culturally and socially, a large part of this region is considered part of the Iranian civilization, so that Afghanistan can be considered a Persian-speaking nation-state. From an economic point of view, the sub-continent region has not been given much attention due to insecurity and instability, but the peace pipeline extending to the region (Pakistan-India) can bring economic and security advantages for Iran. In general, the subcontinent is the most important geopolitical region around Iran after the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
In relation to Iran's territorial situation, the concept of geopolitical dependence can be used to expand regional relations with South Asian countries. The dependence of the national interests and goals of a country or political actor on the values and geographical advantages of other countries and political actors is called geopolitical dependence. The distribution pattern of the supply of advantages as well as the demand for geographical advantages is unbalanced. Therefore, places and geographical spaces and then the human groups living in them, nations and governments need and depend on each other. Geopolitical dependence reflects this fact. It should be said that governments try to reduce the level of their geopolitical dependence on other actors, and in unavoidable situations, use balancing tools and mechanisms and increase the dependence of other political units on themselves. Although geopolitical and geographical advantages have a wide range, some of them are: communication route and corridor, port, energy supply source, water resources, export markets, defense and military base, scientific, cultural, historical, religious centers and institutions and ... (Hafezniya, 2006: 146-147). For example, the country of Afghanistan needs a land route to connect to open waters, which can be built from the east of Iran, considering the level of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Figure 3 shows the corridors that Iran can provide for India. Therefore, it can be said that the geopolitical position of Iran has the ability to create geopolitical dependence for the countries of the South Asian region.
 
Conclusion
What is important in regional relations is efficient foreign policy and active diplomacy so that a government can achieve the national interests of its respective country. Iran can be more successful in its regional relations due to its abundant energy resources. As a geopolitical region and the need for fossil energy, South Asia has the necessary potential in economic and political development. According to the theory of the spatial structure of the geopolitical system of the world, which was proposed by Cohen, the South Asian region as an independent geopolitical region that is mentioned in this theory and it is predicted that in the future, as the third geostrategic region, it will be divided into two geostrategic regions (Maritime and Berry) added to Cohen's theory, can strengthen regional relations for Iran through dependence on fossil energy. however, what can be seen and can be acknowledged is that the approach of Iran's foreign policy to the South Asian region lacks sufficient attention and it can be said that the position of this region in the country's foreign policy is among Iran's important regional priorities. It is not a good place to pay attention to the lack of actions and regional relations observed in this region.
 

Abstract In the international system, which is anarchic in nature due to Kenneth Waltz's theory and its actors tend to impose will on other actors according to their Hobbesian nature, balance of power has always been a practical way to create public security in the world. In the meantime, weaker countries are motivated to avoid regional hegemony by forming regional and international coalitions to withstand the threats of powerful global actors by forming a higher power that is the product of the convergence of smaller powers.
From the beginning of the victory of the Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran confronted the bipolar system of that time with the strategic slogan of "neither East nor West". However, events such as the capture of the US embassy in Tehran, the Iraqi war against Iran, etc., deepened Iran's conflict with the United States. The Islamic Republic has sought to join one of the strongest regional coalitions to counter the US hegemony.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes two veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia, as well as India's economic power, is a viable option for the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, the huge energy reserves (oil and gas) of its members and the geopolitical position of its members, as well as their nuclear and military capabilities, have given the organization the potential to counter the US hegemony.
By becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2021, the Islamic Republic will be able to pursue its "Look East" policy in order to overcome Western economic sanctions, and by converging with its powerful members, China and Russia to have the upper hand in negotiations with European governments on Iran's nuclear case known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(BARJAM).
The military confrontation of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the United States, which took place after the assassination of the commander of the Quds Force of Iran, General Soleimani, carried out by the direct order of the President of the United States and resulted in the Islamic Republic’s serious response in a missile assault against the Amerrican military base in Iraq, with Iran's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, now reached a new stage. US leaders now see Iran's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a serious threat to their interests in the region and are seeking an alternative plan to thwart the Islamic Republic's alliance with the East.
Iran's full membership in this organization will have significant geopolitical, military, political and economic effects on the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. But the realization of these cases depends on the proper functioning of the diplomatic apparatus of the Islamic Republic and regional and global developments in the future.
Iran must be able to solve its problems with the world system while joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran's nuclear program and the problems caused by the FATF are serious obstacles to Iran's prominent role in the international system. At the same time, membership in other international organizations will help complete this process. Of course, the Islamic Republic of Iran is trying to join the Eurasian Union in order to achieve this goal and wants to use the economic capacity of this union to neutralize another part of the economic problems caused by Western sanctions.
The consequences of NATO's eastward expansion policy, which has led to many tensions in the region, including the Crimean and Ukrainian crises, should not be repeated elsewhere, including in the Persian Gulf. China and Russia also desperately need a strong asymmetric player like Iran to secure energy in the region and counter NATO's eastward expansion. Therefore, their serious support for Iran's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization indicates the strategic balance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the hegemony of the Western world led by the United States of America.
The water crisis, which has plagued eastern Iran for years due to Afghanistan dam projects, and the long-stagnant water transfer program from Tajikistan to Iran, must be completed using Iran's full membership capacity.
The development of the tourism industry and the use of Iran's potential capacity in this industry is another economic goal of Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which should be pursued with the cooperation of other members and the rich tourism revenue gained by some countries in the region, including Turkey, will be to a large extent absorbed by Iran's tourism potential.

Abstract 1.Introduction
In today's world, education is the fourth dimension of foreign policy. Educational cooperation is a kind of investment for the future of diplomatic relations among nations. Since the most political elites are selected from academia, the expansion of international scholarships and the admission of international students are two ways of introduction of their cultures and communities to the future political leaders and the senior executives around the world. Academic relations can also develop political and economic relations between the governments. It is argued that from an economic point of view, science and technology diplomacy can save countries’ national economies, because, first, it accelerates countries’ scientific development; second, it creates a wealth of economic experience and connections, and third, it expands trade, industry, science, and national gross income as an economic resource. From a cultural point of view, the most important function of science and technology diplomacy is to spread and export the values, principles, norms, and meanings of the national culture of countries to the international arena.
One of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the ninth government onward has been to expand the relations with Asian countries in the form of Look East Policy. This article tries to analyze and evaluate a part of Look East Policy, namely science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the countries of the Southeast Asia region, especially the Islamic countries of this region. On this basis, we first address the issue of what is science and technology diplomacy and what are its components, features, and dimensions. Secondly, what are the goals and manifestations of this type of diplomacy? Third, what is the place of science and technology diplomacy in the Look East Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and finally, how is Iran's science and technology diplomacy evaluated in relation to the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia and Indonesia?
2.Discussion and Result
If we want to study the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, this study has to be done based on documented data. Unfortunately, there was no data on the country of Brunei in the research process, and therefore, this country was removed from the list of countries which were surveyed. There were also scattered data on scientific and technological cooperation of Iran on the one hand and Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand, based on which the data of this topic has been adjusted.
However, the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia is significant in some indicators, including joint scientific productions with researchers from Malaysia, the establishment of a Persian language department at Putra University Malaysia and the conclusion of memorandums and academic agreements, but in some respects it still needs further strengthening. It seems that before addressing other indicators of the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, the issue of reviewing the Look East Policy should be on the agenda of the country's policymakers. Accordingly, the Look East Policy should move away from the initial reactionary and reflective status and become a strategic and long-term plan of Iran's foreign policy.
The Islamic Republic of Iran can easily expand its cooperation with the mentioned countries in various fields, including science and technology, by belonging to the civilization of the Orient and having some cultural and religious commonalities and historical relations with the inhabitants of the Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, it must take a strategic and long-term approach to the great society of the East and devise a suitable strategy to make optimal use of the maximum capacity of Asian countries and promote its national interests.
3.Conclusion
In this regard, due to some cultural and religious commonalities, and historical relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, it is possible to come up with proposals focusing on different dimensions of diplomacy, which can be viewed as strategies for expanding science and technology diplomacy under the Look East Policy:
• Holding joint scientific conferences and meetings in various areas;
• Identifying the scientific capabilities of the Islamic countries of the region and trying to strengthen relations in those fields;
• Compilation of a science and technology diplomacy document and determining the position of Islamic countries in the Southeast Asian region;
• Making efforts at further expansion of the exchange of professors and students between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic countries of the region;
• Promoting cooperation of national scientific and technological institutions with their counterparts in the Islamic countries of the region;
• Establishig Persian language departments in Malaysian and Indonesian universities;
• Using the capacity of regional institutions and organizations to expand scientific and technological relations;
• Holding training courses for Iranian ambassadors and diplomats in the countries of the region to get acquainted with science and technology diplomacy as well as the scientific developments in the country of mission.