The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Introduction :The West Asia region, referred to in geopolitical literature as both the cradle of ancient civilizations and the epicenter of contemporary crises, has consistently played a pivotal role in global security and economic equations. Owing to its possession of the world's largest proven oil and gas reserves, its location at the crossroads of three continents, and its numerous flashpoints of tension, West Asia has historically been the primary arena for great-power rivalries. For the past seven decades, the United States — relying on an extensive network of military bases, a formidable naval fleet, and a web of security treaties with key regional states — had managed to establish an unparalleled hegemony over this region. However, the rise of the People's Republic of China as an emerging economic and political power on the international stage has fundamentally challenged this long-standing structure.
The central research question this study seeks to answer is: "How has China's multidimensional influence in the West Asia region during the 2021–2025 period affected the strategies, priorities, and practical actions of the United States in this region?" In response, the core hypothesis posits that, unlike the traditional U.S. approach based on military interventions, direct force presence, and unilateral security ordering, China — by leveraging economic soft power, multilateral diplomacy, and massive infrastructure investments — has succeeded in constraining Washington's strategic space in the region, compelling it to undertake a profound reassessment of its policies. The significance and necessity of this research lie in its precise depiction of emerging trends in West Asia's regional order, its provision of an analytical framework for better understanding international system dynamics in the era of power transition, and its assistance to policymakers and regional studies scholars in more accurately assessing plausible future scenarios.

Theoretical Framework :To analyze the escalating rivalry between these two major powers in West Asia, this study employs Offensive Realism as its primary theoretical framework. This theory, systematically articulated by John Mearsheimer in his seminal work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, rests on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic, lacking any overarching sovereign authority to resolve disputes; (2) great powers inherently possess offensive military capabilities that can be used to threaten others; (3) states can never be certain of others' intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of states; and (5) states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative power. Within this framework, China's emergence and its steadily growing economic, technological, and military capabilities are interpreted as a serious threat to U.S. regional and global hegemony. Moreover, China's pragmatic and non-confrontational approach — built on the principle of "win-win cooperation" and avoidance of direct military engagement — has created favorable conditions for its penetration into domains previously regarded as America's exclusive sphere of influence.Conceptually, key notions such as "Balance of Power," "Hegemony," "Economic Diplomacy," "Complex Interdependence," and "Great Strategic Rivalry" are employed in this research. Furthermore, to more accurately explain China's behavior, the concept of "Smart Power" — combining hard and soft power — has been utilized. By successfully integrating economic investments (economic hard power), provision of regional public goods (soft power), and maintaining neutrality in regional states' internal conflicts (diplomatic smart power), China has demonstrated a novel model of influence that has been insufficiently addressed in earlier theoretical literature.

Research Methodology: This study is designed and conducted using a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method. Data collection is based on content analysis of authoritative scientific documents, strategic reports from reputable international institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Crisis Group (ICG), annual U.S. Department of Defense reports on China's military power, and official statements by senior officials from both countries and regional states. The study's timeframe is deliberately limited to the years 2021–2025 to enable precise examination of current developments and the short-to-medium-term effects of China's active presence in the region. To ensure validity and reliability, the triangulation method has been employed, whereby data are collected and cross-referenced from multiple sources and through various approaches. The coding and content analysis process has been conducted systematically using thematic categorization. In this context, five dimensions of China's influence in West Asia have been identified and subjected to in-depth analysis: (1) economic dimension (trade, investment, and energy); (2) political-diplomatic dimension (bilateral and multilateral relations and mediation); (3) technological-infrastructural dimension (construction projects, communication networks, and technology transfer); (4) security-military dimension (training cooperation, arms sales, and joint exercises); and (5) cultural-public dimension (public diplomacy and academic exchanges). Correspondingly, U.S. responses in each of these domains have been categorized and explained separately.

Research Findings:The research findings indicate that during 2021–2025, China, through the adoption of a smart, multi-layered, and forward-looking strategy, has established a steadily growing and sustainable presence in West Asia that extends far beyond mere economic relations. In the economic dimension: In addition to securing a stable flow of oil and gas from major producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, China has undertaken large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure projects, including the construction and management of modern ports (such as Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi), development of high-speed rail networks, establishment of special economic zones and industrial parks, and expansion of advanced communication networks and the Internet of Things. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — as the largest infrastructure investment project in human history — has played a central role in linking the economic interests of regional countries with China's economy and creating transregional value chains. By 2023, China's trade volume with Gulf Cooperation Council countries exceeded $300 billion, more than double the trade volume of these countries with the United States in the same year. In the political and diplomatic dimension: By adopting a policy of "active neutrality" in regional conflicts and strengthening strategic bilateral relations with key regional actors — including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt — China has succeeded in presenting itself as a cross-factional, trustworthy, and independent player free from the region's identity-based and religious disputes. The most significant event in this domain was Beijing's historic mediation in the normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, which, through the signing of a tripartite statement in Beijing, created a dramatic shift in the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf and West Asia. This move demonstrated China's emerging capacity for engagement in complex security conflicts and signified the decline of the traditional U.S. role as the region's sole hegemonic mediator.


Discussion and Analysis of Results: The results derived from the findings clearly demonstrate that China's growing multidimensional influence in West Asia has unprecedentedly challenged the United States' long-standing hegemony. This challenge is not only manifest in the economic sphere — reducing America's share of regional energy markets and infrastructure projects — but is equally pronounced in strategic and diplomatic domains. On the one hand, Washington — which in recent decades, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, had adopted the "Pivot to Asia" or "Rebalancing toward East Asia" strategy centered on containing China — now confronts a new and paradoxical reality: China has not only emerged as a dominant power in its traditional sphere of influence in East Asia, but has also established new and extensive bases of influence in the heart of America's vital sphere, i.e., West Asia. This situation places the White House in a strategic dilemma: any withdrawal or reduction of presence from the region will be interpreted as ceding strategic space to the rival, while any direct military confrontation or engagement could incur enormous financial, human, and diplomatic costs. In response to this existential challenge, the United States has undertaken a series of diverse measures, including: (1) significantly increasing military and economic aid to its long-standing regional allies, particularly Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain; (2) attempting to revive regional security pacts, such as the creation of a joint naval fleet under the "Combined Forces" banner in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; (3) intensive diplomacy to normalize Israel's relations with Arab states through the Abraham Accords; (4) intensifying economic and technological sanctions against Chinese companies and institutions active in the region; and (5) striving to design and present alternative projects to the Belt and Road Initiative, such as the "Build Back Better World" (B3W) scheme and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). However, evidence suggests that purely confrontational and security-oriented strategies no longer possess their former efficacy, and the U.S. is gradually compelled to accept the reality of the multipolarization of the regional order and China's effective role alongside other powers.

Conclusion:Based on the comprehensive analyses conducted in this study, the escalating rivalry between China and the United States in West Asia is not a temporary or fleeting phenomenon but rather a tangible reflection of profound and fundamental changes in the global balance of power and the transition from a unipolar order to a multipolar-multi-actor one. China, skillfully utilizing economic tools, long-term infrastructure investments, non-confrontational diplomacy, and a win-win cooperation approach, is redefining its role from a marginal actor and mere energy supplier to an effective, influential, and even decisive player in West Asia's security and political equations. In contrast, the United States — accustomed for decades to exclusive, unilateral, and coercive role-playing in this region — now faces an unprecedented historical scenario that demands fundamental adjustments to its traditional strategies, reduced reliance on military interventions, and adaptation to the new regional and global order.

Abstract The central research question of this study is: How does Xi Jinping’s operational code shape China’s foreign policy orientation, particularly toward the Islamic Republic of Iran? The article advanced the hypothesis that Xi Jinping’s operational code is neither aimed at overthrowing the liberal international order nor based on direct ideological confrontation with the United States. Rather, it reflects a gradual and pragmatic effort to expand China’s power, influence, and strategic autonomy within the existing international system through the selective use of international institutions, rules, and mechanisms. This approach enables China to compete with the United States while avoiding costly, full-scale confrontation and to calibrate its relations with countries such as Iran primarily on the basis of national interests and cost–benefit calculations. The findings of the study support this hypothesis. They indicate that Xi Jinping perceives the political environment as predominantly cooperative and consistently attributes cooperative intentions to other actors. At the same time, he believes that a profound historical transformation is underway in international relations and that China is capable of playing an active role in shaping this transformation. However, his score on this dimension is relatively moderate, suggesting that he does not regard historical developments as highly predictable. Furthermore, in dealing with international conflicts, Xi demonstrates a clear preference for peaceful settlement, while victory, stalemate, and surrender rank respectively as secondary options. Based on the operational code profile of Xi Jinping, the characteristics associated with his leadership style, and the historical evolution, opportunities, and challenges of Iran–China relations, several strategic implications for Iran’s policy toward China can be identified. First, it appears that China studies in Iran have often been shaped more by conventional assumptions than by rigorous empirical analysis. A widespread perception among many Iranian foreign policy elites is that China seeks to dismantle the liberal international order and that the Middle East constitutes a central pillar of this strategy. The present study, however, demonstrates that Xi Jinping’s personality profile is characterized by a preference for compromise and negotiated solutions rather than direct confrontation with the United States. Developments on the ground likewise support this conclusion. China has consistently sought to manage its strategic competition with the United States while avoiding direct conflict. Consequently, China’s Middle East policy—and, by extension, its policy toward Iran—should be understood as a function of its broader global strategy. Equally important, the Middle East occupies a lower strategic priority in Chinese foreign policy than China’s immediate neighborhood in the Asia-Pacific and even Central Asia. Another important finding emerging from Xi Jinping’s personality profile, which reinforces the previous point, is his preference for avoiding tension. In the Middle East, and particularly with regard to Iran, China generally opposes escalatory policies and prioritizes the preservation of state stability. This helps explain why Beijing simultaneously supported the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while also backing the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in Yemen. In essence, irrespective of the ideological orientation of governments, China seeks to cooperate with and support established state authorities whenever possible. Iran should therefore recognize that China is unlikely to become involved in situations that Beijing perceives as unnecessarily escalatory. China’s balancing strategy in the Middle East—including its simultaneous engagement with Tehran and Riyadh prior to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries—can also be understood within this broader framework. At the same time, China’s critique of the anarchic nature of the international system may create important opportunities for Iran. In pursuit of a more favorable international order and the maximization of its national interests, China has adopted a strategy of gradual institutional transformation. This strategy has involved establishing non-Western institutions while simultaneously seeking a greater role within long-standing international organizations. Such developments provide Iran with opportunities to expand cooperation with China through these institutional frameworks. Moreover, the convergence between Chinese initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the "Go West" strategy—and Iran’s "Look East" policy offers additional prospects for strengthening bilateral relations. Xi Jinping’s belief in the strategic importance of non-military sources of power, reflected in his concept of comprehensive security, represents another important opportunity for Iran. Xi adopts a holistic understanding of security that extends beyond military considerations. As discussed earlier, Chinese policymakers regard development as the foundation of security, which explains the central role of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. This perspective provides a strong basis for expanding developmental cooperation between Tehran and Beijing. Furthermore, given China’s acute security concerns regarding ethnic terrorism in its northwestern provinces and Iran’s experience in confronting similar threats, the two countries also possess significant potential for cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Finally, the findings underscore the importance of assigning greater strategic priority to the Look East policy and a broader Asia-oriented approach in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the principal weaknesses of Iran’s Look East policy has been its largely instrumental and secondary character. Rather than being pursued as a long-term strategic orientation, engagement with Asia has frequently been employed as a means of balancing against the West. This approach has not only constrained and fragmented Iran’s relations with Asian countries but has also increased the likelihood of Iran becoming a bargaining instrument in the strategic calculations of other powers. Accordingly, a stronger commitment to multilateralism, improved relations with a wider range of major powers, and the adoption of a hedging strategy would reduce the risk of falling into such a strategic trap.

Abstract The growing global power of the People's Republic of China and its efforts for superiority in power-generating resources in the international arena have made it particularly important to explain the role of other countries in its global approach. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its regional position and influence, geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages, and its role in the power structure in the international system, is of great importance to the great powers in different eras and to China in the current state of the world system. Also, the development of growing relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China as a result of the commonalities and structural requirements of the international system, the capabilities of various areas of cooperation, and emerging common areas has led to increased attention to the relations between these two countries in the international arena. The purpose of this article is to explain the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and examines the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and the strategies branching from it.
This study employs an experiential epistemology and an analytical-explanatory method, gathering credible evidence through empirical methods to elucidate the reality and relationships between variables. The research design began with an initial idea and evolved as the researcher's understanding of the subject deepened. Data were collected through library research. In this method, sources related to the research are studied and the necessary evidence is prepared in the form of the index card and analyzed using a Qualitative method.
Analysis of China's choices, political actions, and economic actions in the global arena indicate that the country has adopted a partnership-oriented approach to developing its global relations. Within the framework of the partnership-oriented approach, after the end of the Cold War, China has established a network of global and multidimensional partnerships that serves as a guiding framework for foreign policy and the center of its strategy for developing economic and political cooperation with other countries in the world. In the first step, it signed strategic partnership documents with various countries. In the second step, it sought to deepen partnerships with various countries in the world by creating foreign policy initiatives .In the third step, along with other dimensions of partnership-oriented cooperation, it promoted institutional cooperation to strengthen partnerships in the world.
China's global approach is indeed partnership, which is in contrast to the US's alliance approach. China's partnership approach includes; bilateral strategic partnership, partnership in the form of Chinese initiatives and institutions, and partnership in economic, political-security and specific Practical areas including energy, technology, digital and investment. China’s political-security partnership approach in the region is in its early stages compared to economic partnership, and the status of its long-term security commitments to the countries in the region is unclear. In fact, Beijing, in continuation of its energy security and investment policy in the region, seeks to play a diplomatic and security role in West Asian affairs. In the cultural sphere, it is also trying to expand its influence in the region with political and financial support and the establishment of cultural institutions.
China's partnership-oriented approach with West Asian governments is being pursued in the economic, political-security and cultural fields. The signing of strategic partnership documents with regional governments and the effective role in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative demonstrate the prominence of the West Asian region in China's partnership-oriented approach.
In this framework, Iran plays an important role. Strategies such as the “South-South Strategy”, “Hedging Strategy” and Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Health Silk Road, the Digital Silk Road, the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative are in line with China’s partnership-oriented approach, in which Iran’s role is prominent due to its geopolitical location, energy security and Iran and China similar views on international political and security issues. China promotes a multipolar world order through institutions and rules in which other civilizations and worldviews, such as Iran, have a special position. The Islamic Republic of Iran and China have similar views on global political and economic blocs to move from the rules of the liberal order to a new order.
For example, Iran has a special place alongside other major countries in the region in Beijing’s balanced approach. In addition to developing China’s relations with the Persian Gulf countries, cooperation with Iran is also on the agenda of the Chinese government, and Beijing has a balanced view of cooperation with Iran compared to other countries in the West Asian region.
Iran’s geopolitical and strategic location in Central Asia, Europe, and Africa and direct access to international waterways have given it a special place in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the “Digital Silk Road,” the “Health Silk Road,” the “Global Development Initiative,” the “Global Security Initiative,” and the “Global Civilization Initiative”.
The structural requirements of the international system have forced China to adopt new partnership-based strategies such as; searching for a like-minded partner outside the liberal order, diversifying markets, industrial strategy and creating new investment axes in the world and creating a supply chain independent of the West to neutralize the US sanctions policy. In each of these strategies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has an important position for China. In order to escape the US containment policy, China has developed relations with like-minded governments, developed relations with governments outside the US alliance network, activated and expanded the development of regional organizations and groups.
Iran is one of the countries that can help China to implement the above strategy. China has tried to expand trade relations with other regions of the world and diversify global supply chains, in which countries of the global south, including Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and West Asia, including Iran, play a decisive role. China is seeking to create a supply chain independent of the sphere of influence of the United States and its allies in the world. The investment policy on clean and renewable energy and electric vehicles is at the center of Beijing's policy. China needs a strategic partner in the sanctions sectors to escape US pressure. Given the similar conditions of Iran and China in this sector, the country needs a long-term strategic partner like Iran.
The US containment policy through new plans and alliances at the global level (QUAD and AQUOS) and the region (Abraham Pact aimed at normalizing relations between the regime-Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia) as well as the multidimensional interaction of the regional rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran with China are among the obstacles to the development of cooperation between Tehran and Beijing.
Within the framework of China's partnership-oriented approach, the initiatives and strategies that China has developed in various fields to guide foreign policy in the world prescribe principles, foundations, and actions in China's foreign policy that both have potential capacities for cooperation with Iran. At the same time, China needs Iran's current role and position in the international system to better implement them. Iran has a special position in the aforementioned initiative and China's partnership-oriented policies in the economic and political sectors of China towards West Asia. By developing specific programs in various fields, Iran's role in China's grand strategies in the West Asia region can be improved.

Abstract Over the past two decades, China has undergone a profound transformation from a regionally focused actor into a globally influential power whose economic dynamism, technological advancement, and diplomatic activism have reshaped the international system. As Beijing’s material capabilities have expanded, so too has its ambition to redefine the norms, principles, and institutional arrangements governing global order. Central to this ambition is China’s effort to articulate and promote a distinct interpretation of "great power responsibility" a concept that diverges significantly from Western understandings of global leadership, intervention, and normative authority. Rather than framing responsibility in terms of military engagement, democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention, China emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, development-oriented cooperation, and multilateralism. This alternative framing has become a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy identity and a key instrument in its strategy to expand influence in critical regions, including the Middle East. The Middle East occupies a pivotal position in China’s strategic calculus. It is a region where Beijing’s core interests—energy security, connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis the United States—intersect. China’s growing presence in the Middle East is not merely a byproduct of economic expansion; it is a deliberate and carefully calibrated policy aimed at embedding China within the political, economic, and security architecture of the region. The question guiding this study is therefore: How has China employed the concept of great power responsibility to expand its influence in the Middle East in competition with the United States? Addressing this question requires a conceptual examination of China’s interpretation of great power responsibility, as well as an empirical analysis of its policies, initiatives, and diplomatic behavior in the region. China’s official discourse presents great power responsibility as a commitment to promoting stability, development, and mutually beneficial cooperation. This discourse gained renewed prominence following President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Governance Initiative in September 2025, which builds upon earlier frameworks such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Collectively, these initiatives articulate China’s vision for a more equitable and multipolar world order grounded in respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and inclusive multilateralism. In the Middle East, this vision translates into a foreign policy approach that seeks to avoid entanglement in regional conflicts while simultaneously expanding China’s economic footprint, diplomatic presence, and normative influence. China’s strategy in the Middle East rests on three foundational pillars. The first is energy security, as the region supplies more than 40 percent of Chinas crude oil imports. Ensuring stable access to energy resources is therefore a core national interest, and China has cultivated long-term partnerships with major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. These partnerships are framed not as extractive relationships but as mutually beneficial arrangements that contribute to regional stability and economic development an interpretation consistent with China’s development-oriented notion of responsibility. The second pillar is the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, which positions the Middle East as a critical hub for global connectivity. Through infrastructure investments, port development, digital cooperation, and financial integration, China seeks to embed regional economies within a broader Eurasian network centered on Beijing. The BRI is presented as a vehicle for shared prosperity, reflecting China’s claim that great power responsibility entails enabling development rather than imposing political conditions. In practice, BRI projects have deepened China’s economic interdependence with Middle Eastern states, thereby increasing Beijing’s leverage and influence. The third pillar is multilateralism and geopolitical balancing, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. China’s growing diplomatic engagement including its role in mediating the 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement illustrates Beijing’s attempt to position itself as a neutral, stabilizing actor capable of facilitating dialogue without imposing ideological agendas. This stands in contrast to Western approaches that often involve political conditionality or military intervention. By emphasizing neutrality, sovereignty, and non-interference, China seeks to differentiate its model of great power responsibility from that of the United States and present itself as a more acceptable partner to regional governments. China’s behavior in the Middle East demonstrates how the concept of great power responsibility functions as both a normative framework and a strategic tool. Beijing consistently portrays its actions as contributing to regional stability, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. For example, China’s diplomatic rhetoric surrounding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine emphasizes political solutions, humanitarian assistance, and respect for national sovereignty. Although China avoids direct military involvement, it leverages its economic influence and diplomatic channels to shape regional dynamics in ways that align with its long-term interests. The findings of this study, based on conceptual analysis and descriptive–analytical methodology, indicate that China’s approach to great power responsibility in the Middle East is characterized by pragmatism, restraint, and strategic opportunism. China seeks stability not out of altruism but because instability threatens its energy supply, investment environment, and regional partnerships. By respecting sovereignty and avoiding intervention, China appeals to regional governments wary of Western interference. Through development-oriented cooperation, China strengthens economic ties that gradually translate into political influence. And by promoting multilateralism, China challenges U.S. dominance while presenting itself as a constructive global actor. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has intensified efforts to expand both hard and soft power in the Middle East. Unlike Western powers that often invoke great power responsibility to justify military intervention or political pressure, China frames responsibility in terms of economic development, stability, and partnership. This alternative framing has resonated with many Middle Eastern states seeking diversification of external partnerships and greater autonomy from Western influence. China’s mediation efforts, economic diplomacy, and participation in regional forums further reinforce its image as a responsible major power committed to peaceful development. Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative represents the culmination of China’s evolving vision for global order. It emphasizes multilateralism, justice, and respect for civilizational diversity principles that challenge Western-centric models of governance. In the Middle East, these principles translate into policies aimed at reducing regional dependence on Western powers, strengthening China’s role as a key economic and diplomatic actor, and embedding the region within a multipolar global system. China’s growing influence is therefore not merely a consequence of economic expansion but a deliberate effort to reshape regional and global governance norms. In conclusion, China’s use of the concept of great power responsibility in the Middle East reflects a broader strategy to expand influence while avoiding the costs and risks associated with military intervention. By emphasizing sovereignty, development, and multilateralism, China presents itself as a benign and constructive actor, even as it pursues strategic objectives such as energy security, geopolitical balancing, and regional integration under the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach enables China to compete with the United States for influence in the Middle East while maintaining a narrative of peaceful rise and responsible leadership. Ultimately, China’s development-oriented interpretation of great power responsibility serves as both a normative justification and a practical mechanism for expanding its presence in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions.

Abstract  
The grounds for China's active presence in the Central Asian region were provided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of the regional governments. In addition to geopolitical proximity, Beijing has put the continuation and expansion of relations with Central Asian countries and an increasing presence, especially in the energy equations of the region, on the agenda, and has sought to develop influence in the layers of power in Central Asia, which, in addition to helping China become the future leading power in the region, can provide the necessary grounds for expanding Beijing's power on the international stage. The region's proximity to China's western borders, rich energy resources, the region's consumer market, the region's need to attract foreign investment, the activity of the Uyghurs in the region, and the geographical location of Central Asia, which provides China with the possibility of establishing connections with Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe, are among the attractions that have increased Beijing's attention to this region. China sees Central Asia as an important region that can develop its economic growth through trade routes and meet China’s need for hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the stability and economic development of neighboring states in Central Asia are considered an important prerequisite for ensuring stability and security in China’s western regions.
China’s doctrine towards Central Asia can be seen as having three main aspects: The first aspect is rooted in China’s history, which has always considered Central Asia as the first bulwark for its security on its western borders. The possibility of instability in Xinjiang has always been an intellectual concern for Chinese statesmen. The seven million Muslims in this region, who are mainly Turks and Uyghurs, feel closer to the Muslim ethnic groups of Central Asia than to the Han Chinese. The autonomous and Uyghur-populated Xinjiang region is highly vulnerable to separatist tendencies and anti-Chinese propaganda. The second aspect, or economic dimension, of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia involves efforts to create a free Central Asian zone in order to improve China’s economy and security. The economic development of Central Asia can be both attractive and dangerous for China’s backward and remote regions bordering the region. Chinese leaders, especially after the Tiananmen Square unrest in 1989, realized the importance of investment for the economic growth of these regions. The third pillar of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia stems from its increasing desire to play a role in the global security system. In order for China to have an effective and prominent presence on the world stage, it must first be able to assert its voice in the Central Asian region. In a short time, China has become the most important player in the Central Asian energy equation and has been able to direct a significant part of the region’s energy resources to its consumer market, which is the largest in the world, through extensive investments. China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia mainly has three dimensions. First, establishing long-term energy relations with the region through economic integration and developing trade relations; Second, the construction of direct pipelines carrying oil and gas from producing countries in the region to China, and third, the reduction of the role of greedy trans-regional countries in the governments of Central Asia. China has become the dominant economic power in the Central Asian region by implementing a comprehensive, long-term and targeted planning. Its extensive economic presence and influence in the Central Asian region in the three areas of energy exchanges, trade relations and investment in the economic infrastructure of Central Asia have played an important role in developing the country's economic influence in the region and have narrowed the space for the entry and role of actors such as Russia and Iran. The result of these developments, namely China's rise and dominance in the Central Asian economy, has led some analysts to speak of a "Chinese Marshall Plan" by Beijing for Central Asia, which is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan of the United States of America after the end of World War II. The interpretation of this symbolic interpretation and historical simulation is to pay attention to a long-term trend and planning by the Chinese to create a capable market for purchasing Chinese products, ensuring energy security and increasing China's economic influence in the Central Asian region, which has significantly changed and transformed the geoeconomic picture of this region.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of an American presence in Central Asia became very serious for China when the United States invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. In the wake of this event, Central Asian states sought to develop their strategic, military, and economic relations with Washington, but China’s response to this issue was proactive; meaning that Beijing sought to redouble its efforts in the region, and did so by developing bilateral security agreements with regional countries and strengthening the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China’s strategy in this regard has been to present Beijing as a real and reliable security partner for Central Asian states, thereby providing them with a reliable alternative to developing military and security cooperation with the United States. Since 2002, China has signed a series of military and security agreements with Central Asian countries, including providing $3 million in military aid to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, an extradition agreement with these two countries, an agreement on cooperation in combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the opening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s “Regional Counter-Terrorism Center” in Tashkent, and the holding of annual joint exercises with Central Asian countries under the title “Peace Mission.” The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the formation of new republics in Central Asia opened up new opportunities for Beijing’s leaders to develop political, economic, and military relations with the Central Asian republics and thereby regain their former interests in the region. Beijing’s top priority in Central Asia is economic and trade, and investment in oil and gas fields. As the largest investor in Central Asia, China has focused on infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative. Two international corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative pass through Central Asia, connecting China to the Middle East, South Asia and Europe. Apart from its economic importance, Central Asia plays an important role for Beijing from a security perspective. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, China became interested in the issue of border security. However, due to China’s increasing global influence, monitoring the region is very important given its proximity to China and Russia. The insecurity on the borders of Xinjiang and the fight against religious extremists have led Beijing to expand its relations with Central Asian countries, and in this regard, Chinese authorities are taking steps to ensure regional security and ensure internal stability, especially in the western regions of China.
 

Abstract In the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, few nations have ascended as dramatically as China. Over the past few decades, China has transitioned from a largely agrarian economy to a dominant global economic powerhouse, now recognized as the second-largest economy in the world after the United States. This rapid economic development is accompanied by a commensurate rise in political clout, elevating China’s status as a central player in international relations. As a result, China’s role in the global order has undergone a significant transformation, influencing not only its regional neighbors but also the broader international community. This shift has profound implications, particularly for entities like the European Union (EU), which find themselves navigating new and complex dynamics in the face of China’s growing influence.
The European Union, as a unique political and economic entity composed of multiple member states, possesses a diverse range of interests and challenges in its relations with China. The EU's approach to China is shaped by its dual objectives: on one hand, to harness the economic opportunities presented by a burgeoning Chinese market and, on the other, to address pressing concerns related to human rights violations, security threats, and the broader geopolitical ramifications of China’s actions. The EU has embarked on a nuanced strategy to engage with China, seeking to balance economic cooperation with the need to uphold its values and principles, particularly in response to issues such as civil liberties, environmental standards, and the territorial integrity of nations.
This evolving relationship between the EU and China is not without its challenges. The EU must navigate a landscape filled with competing interests, both internally and externally. Member states of the EU have divergent views toward China based on their historical ties, economic dependencies, and individual strategic priorities. This fragmentation poses a significant challenge to forging a cohesive and effective European strategy toward China. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism and populism within several EU member states complicates the landscape, as these political movements often advocate for a more cautious or confrontational stance toward external powers, including China.
Parallel to these dynamics is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which finds itself in a unique position due to its strategic geographic location and vast natural resource wealth, particularly in oil and gas. Iran has recognized the potential benefits of fostering closer ties with China within the broader context of its foreign policy. The historical animosities stemming from Western sanctions have led Iran to seek alternative partnerships to bolster its economy and enhance its geopolitical standing. In recent years, Iran has made significant strides in deepening its engagements with China, viewing it as a priority partner capable of counterbalancing Western influence and providing vital economic support.
This burgeoning relationship is particularly pronounced in light of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Although the deal faced significant challenges, particularly after the United States’ withdrawal in 2018, China emerged as a crucial player in supporting Iran diplomatically and economically. Beijing’s involvement has fueled expectations in Tehran regarding Chinese investment in infrastructure, energy projects, and trade relations. As Iran grapples with the ramifications of international sanctions, the potential for a mutually beneficial partnership with China has become increasingly attractive.
However, this deepening relationship is not without its complexities and potential pitfalls. The shifting dynamics of international politics, including the EU's recalibration of its foreign policy toward China, could significantly impact Iran’s strategic calculations. As the EU seeks to reassert its influence in Asia through initiatives like the Global Gateway and its own Indo-Pacific strategy, Iran may face new diplomatic challenges. The EU is likely to weigh its economic interests in China against the value of a principled stance on issues like human rights and regional security, potentially complicating Iran's position.
Moreover, the broader geopolitical landscape marked by the U.S.-China rivalry adds another layer of complexity to the EU-Iran-China triangle. As the United States attempts to counter China's growing influence, it may adopt strategies that compel its allies, including EU members, to reassess their relationships with China. This could force Iran to navigate tenuous waters, balancing its partnerships with both China and the EU while remaining vigilant about being caught in the crossfire of great power competition.
This multifaceted interaction between the EU, China, and Iran brings us to the core objectives of this research. The first objective is to analyze the key political and economic strategies that the EU employs in its dealings with China. This investigation will focus on the EU's engagements, including trade partnerships, investment agreements, and collaborative initiatives aimed at addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health. Understanding these strategies allows for a comprehensive assessment of how the EU seeks to influence China while safeguarding its interests.
The second objective centers on examining the implications of the EU’s China policies on Iran's foreign and economic strategies. This involves scrutinizing how shifts in the EU’s approach toward China could impact Iran’s attempts to leverage its relations with Beijing for economic gains and strategic support in the context of its broader geopolitical ambitions. It is essential to consider how Iran perceives the EU’s stance toward China and whether this perception translates into strategic adjustments in its own foreign policy.
Ultimately, this research aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay among these three important geopolitical actors. By delving into the evolving relationships between the EU, China, and Iran, we can shed light on the possible future trajectories of their interactions and the impacts on regional and global stability. The goal is to offer insights that not only inform scholars and policymakers but also contribute to a more comprehensive dialogue about the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in this dynamic triad.
 
 
 
 
 

Abstract The dramatic growth and sudden rise of China's economy on the one hand has increased its national power and on the other hand has strengthened "China-phobia" and presented a threatening image of it by the world powers. On the other hand, in order to counter this threatening image and neutralize the wave of "Sinophobia", the Chinese tried to present a peaceful and cooperative image of their country to the world by using the power strategy. . By relying on the capabilities and capacities of their country in various fields, the Chinese have given their power a "Chinese character" and tried to rebuild their image inside China and in international circles by applying power strategies. The main question of the article is what is the position of West Asia in China's power strategy and what resources does it use to achieve its goals in this region? In response to the main question, the paper's hypothesis is that power in its Chinese version had significant differences from Joseph Nye's original idea. In fact, the Chinese have imported the American version of power and adjusted, strengthened and, in other words, internalized it with their abilities, capacities and political philosophy.
The current research, by adopting the descriptive-analytical method and relying on library data, to understand and explain China's presence in West Asia, traces China's efforts in three areas: 1) In the cultural area: through the examination of strategies such as "use of educational tools and methods", "media methods" and "tourism industry"; 2) In the political field: through the examination of the policy of "balance of influence" and the policy of "mediation" and relying on the "ideological foundations of Confucianism" and 3) In the economic field: through the examination of the three tools of "energy exchanges", " Foreign Investments" and "Belt-Road Initiative".
The region of West Asia, which has long been a platform for competition between great powers, has been heavily focused on by Chinese policymakers in the last two decades. China has a special view on this region for various reasons, such as ensuring its energy security in order to maintain sustainable economic growth, and the special position of the West Asian region in the "Belt-Road" initiative. Therefore, China is seriously seeking to expand diplomatic relations with the countries of the region, and one of the most important tools for facilitating these relations is the use of power strategy and its tools in this region.
In West Asia, China's cultural power strategy is realized in three ways: 1) the use of educational tools and methods, 2) media methods and 3) the tourism industry. In line with the application of educational diplomacy, since the beginning of 2004, the Chinese government has made extensive investments in the creation of cultural and linguistic centers known as Confucian institutions in the world. These institutes, which operate in major universities around the world, are managed by Hanban (Office of the International Chinese Language Council, a branch of the Chinese Ministry of Education). Today, China has 17 Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classes in West Asia. In line with media diplomacy, since China's goal is to gain fame and popularity and portray the world through power and confront the Western portrayal of this country, it has also internationalized its media. In 2009, China's state television started broadcasting news in Arabic with the launch of the International Arabic Channel (CCTV), which is now called CGTN. In addition, China Today publishes its Arabic edition in West Asia, which informs its readers about world affairs, news related to China, and China's organized activities in the region.
During the last few decades, America has been the most important foreign interventionist power in West Asia. Therefore, reducing American influence in the West Asian region is a priority for China. The intensification of the competition between China and America at the global level also makes this goal more prominent in China's foreign policy. But China's approach to achieve this goal is different from the approach of America and other great powers in the West Asian region; Instead of using military power and trying to expand the military base or deploying its troops in the region, China prefers diplomatic and economic means. In other words, China is trying to balance the influence of other powers in the region without a direct and extensive military presence and define its role in West Asia by using diplomatic and economic tools. Examining China's approach to the Syrian war, Libyan war and nuclear negotiations with Iran confirms this issue. To put it more clearly, China has replaced the balance of influence using economic and diplomatic tools with the "balance of power" using military tools. The most important advantage of this approach for China is to avoid direct conflict with America and its exorbitant costs, while advancing its goals in the region. China tries to indirectly reduce American influence in the region and adjust the balance of power in the region to the detriment of the United States without military conflict in two ways: First, by supporting those regional actors. that their political system has an anti-western nature and secondly, by using existing regional and global institutional arrangements.
China's average economic growth of 10% and, as a result, the use of economic diplomacy, led to the expansion of this country's economic presence in the world. Based on the geo-economic strategy, the main duty of the government was to develop economic links with other governments. In West Asia, the relationship between economic development and the application of soft power strategies for the Chinese has been two-way. This means, on the one hand, the Chinese used soft power tools to facilitate the establishment of economic ties with the countries of the region, and on the other hand, high economic exchanges and exchanges have become the basis for the soft influence of China in the culture and politics of the countries of the region. is Therefore, the Chinese have turned their economic diplomacy into sources of soft power and increasing their regional influence in West Asia in three ways, which are: "energy exchanges", "foreign investments" and the project "Belt-Road Initiative".
The investigations of this research showed that China's software presence in West Asia can be traced in three areas. The first source of China's soft power in this region of West Asia is cultural in nature and is achieved through strategies such as "use of educational tools and methods", "media methods" and "tourism industry". The second source is related to the political soft power, which is applied through the policy of "balance of influence" and the policy of "mediation" and relying on the "ideological foundations of Confucianism". The third source also refers to China's economic soft power and is achieved through three tools: "energy exchanges", "foreign investments" and "Belt-Road initiative".
 
 

Abstract  
Introduction: At the beginning of the 21st century, the new orientation of the great powers and their greater attention to economic interests in the world's strategic regions has caused them to compete with each other. The Persian Gulf is one of the regions that, from the point of view of geoeconomic theories, is the most international region in the world, which provides consumer markets and huge economic investments, vast resources and a suitable environment for playing the role of regional and transregional actors in the form of conflict, cooperation and competition. Among regional and transregional actors in West Asia, the People's Republic of China has an increasing need for oil, capital and the Persian Gulf consumer market to continue its economic growth. In this regard, in the last century, China has sought to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf region and has gradually increased its political presence and activities, and has sought to ensure the security of energy imports from the Persian Gulf to compete with the great powers in the region; As a result, it can be said that the examination of the nature of the interests of the People's Republic of China in the Persian Gulf region indicates three major areas in which the interests of the Persian Gulf countries and China are linked to each other, and the process of economic diplomacy of this country with the heartland of the Persian Gulf has been added day by day. These three areas are the discussion of political-military links and the priority of energy and finally commercial and economic interests. Since China, as an emerging power and with a strategic attitude, in recent years has shown its desire to play a different role than in the past, this article tries to make an accurate assessment of the interests of the Persian Gulf countries with China in the future of the new order. This article seeks to answer the question, what factors have effectively determined China's economic diplomacy in the Persian Gulf subsystem in the 21st century? This article believes that the regional competition in the Persian Gulf subsystem in two parts, the intra-regional competition between the countries of the region and the competition between the great powers in this region, has provided the necessary conditions to facilitate China's economic diplomacy in this region.
Methodology: This article has collected data using library and internet method to evaluate its claim. In terms of data analysis, relying on the descriptive-explanatory method, it has first described the trends of increasing China's interactions in the Persian Gulf subsystem in different subject areas, and then to understand and explain this improvement of relations by using the regional balancing approach, the platforms It has examined the existing competition in the region at two levels, the competition of regional powers and the competition of extra-regional powers in the Persian Gulf subsystem.
Results and discussion: China, as a trans-regional power, has tried not to interfere in the security order of the region and to introduce itself as an economic player in the region. It has managed to gain the trust of the Persian Gulf countries and become the most important trading partner of the Arab countries and Iran in the region; By applying the policy of regional balancing between the existing powers in the Persian Gulf subsystem, China has been able to recognize the dualities in the region and design a special strategy to interact with each of these conflicting poles, while maintaining a balance in the interaction with each of the existing powers. China is trying to increase its power softly and by expanding its economic power all over the world in the long run, it will push America aside and become a dominant hegemon. In this regard, with its dominance and influence in the Persian Gulf, it has implemented successful economic diplomacy in this region, and the evidence indicates that Beijing has been able to surpass its most important regional competitor, the United States of America, in economic indicators, and has attracted the attention of other powers as well. Therefore, Beijing feels threatened by any of the other trans-regional powers that have an effective presence in the Persian Gulf and is forced to use the advantage of its presence in the Persian Gulf over the presence of other powers, including India, by updating comprehensive strategic plans and cooperation with the major countries of the region.
Conclusion: China advances its relations with the kingdoms of the Persian Gulf by relying on cooperative diplomacy instead of resorting to the policy of alliance because China does not seek to upset the balance of the region and intensify the existing bipolarity in the region and benefits from the existing regional competition between the Persian Gulf countries because he knows that she has neither the will nor the capacity to play the role of the United States in the region; Therefore, by using the strategic opportunity to create regional balance and by carrying out projects such as the belt and road and securing its energy portfolio from the region, it seeks to strengthen Beijing's position. What is important is the future of the interactions of the countries of the Persian Gulf region, which mainly, along with the strategic partnership with the United States, have also put establishment of relations with other powers in order to protect themselves against threats and rapidly change the balance of power. This policy aims to use China as an additional source to gain political, economic and even military support, as well as exploit relations with Beijing to pressure Washington to adjust its policies. In line with its interests, the region also affects the totalitarianism of the United States in this subsystem, and by using soft power tools, it directs the balancing of power in the region in the direction of its goals; Therefore, it seems that the regional competitions in the Persian Gulf subsystem in two parts, intra-regional competitions between the countries of the region and the competition between the great powers in this region have provided the necessary conditions to facilitate China's economic diplomacy in this region.
 

Abstract The Middle East region, especially the Persian Gulf, is one of the most strategically important regions in the world. Throughout history, great powers have sought to gain influence in this region through various strategies and policies. In addition to asserting their dominance in the area, they also aim to control their competitors.
For more than half a century, the United States of America has dominated this region with different policies and strategies. On the other hand, China has been trying to expand its influence in this region for about two decades. The gradual weakening of US positions in the region is a long-term trend that originated long before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
During Obama's presidency, the "Pivot to Asia" policy was announced. According to this policy, America was preparing to gradually shift the focus of its foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region, while at the same time reducing America's presence in the Middle East and Europe. This policy continued during the periods of Donald Trump and Biden.
The goal of the Biden administration's Middle East policy, especially after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, encourage this country to increase oil production for the world market, and strengthen ties with Israel to bolster America's position in the region.
At first, China viewed developments and events in the Middle East mainly through the lens of revolutionary ideology.
The Middle East and North Africa have traditionally been outside China's sphere of interest. Geographical distance, loose historical contacts, and social, cultural, and linguistic differences all played a role in adopting this policy. In the early 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping's reforms and the "opening door" policy, China began to look for new partners that could meet the growing need for energy resources, and thus the Persian Gulf countries became the focus of China's attention. Therefore, this country's relations with political actors in the Middle East were mainly based on energy and commercial interests. China has a strong and increasing need for energy and natural resources to maintain economic growth.
China and the United States of America, as two great powers based on national interests, have cooperative or competitive relations in political and economic fields and issues. The purpose of writing this article is to examine the policies of the United States and China in the Middle East region based on the concept of "competition."
Methodology
The current research methodology involves collecting data from library resources and internet sources and articles. The analytical and explanatory research approach, along with qualitative data analysis methods, will be utilized. The study will focus on the period from 2021 to 2023. The research findings indicate a decline in the power, influence, and capacity of the United States as one of the great powers. The capabilities and power of the United States across various dimensions - political, economic, social, and cultural - have decreased. Conversely, China's power, ability, and capacity have been increasing. As an emerging power, China is working to expand its influence in different regions globally, particularly in the Middle East region.
 
The main question addressed in this article is: What policies will China and America pursue in the Middle East between 2021 and 2023? In the Middle East, these policies revolve around "oil and energy transit," "Iranian threats," and "arms sales." China's strategy in this region involves building political and economic relationships with America's adversaries, such as Iran, while attempting to distance hesitant and distrustful allies of America, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, etc., by establishing economic partnerships and gaining access to the oil and energy market. China's foreign relations are guided by principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-commitment.
 
Result and Discussion
While the United States of America played a pivotal role in shaping the Middle East order after World War II, its presence in the region has significantly declined over the past decade. A critical turning point for the United States occurred with the remarkable expansion of oil and natural gas production within its own borders since the 2010s, driven by the development of domestic shale reserves starting around 2006. By 2014, the United States had surpassed both Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the world’s largest oil producer. Consequently, the U.S. was no longer reliant on the Middle East for a sustainable energy supply.
In the Biden era, America’s national security strategy emphasizes two fundamental components: military de-escalation and regional integration. The recognition that U.S. military intervention does not necessarily lead to democracy in the region has shifted the focus toward more attainable goals, such as creating stability and safeguarding national interests.
The Middle East policy of the People’s Republic of China is guided by the document titled “China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era,” published by the Information Office of the State Council of China in January 2021. China’s interaction with Middle Eastern countries operates within the framework of the One Belt, One Road concept. This strategy aligns with China’s broader global plans to reduce commercial, economic, and technological dependence on Western countries and global production chains.
The factors that have increased China's influence in the Middle East are:
- Similarity of the political systems (authoritarian systems) of the Middle East Arab countries with the political system of China.
- The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries by China under the pretext of violating human rights.
- China's lack of support for opponents and opposition in Middle East countries.
- The non-establishment of opponents of Middle East political systems in China and the granting of all kinds of asylum to them.
- Lack of colonial history of China in the Middle East region.
- Sharing of economic benefits.
 
The findings of this research indicate that China does not seek to form alliances or coalitions in the Middle East to confront America. The region is not as strategically important to China as regions like the South China Sea or Central Asia. Therefore, low-level competition between the two countries in this region is more likely.
Conclusion
Competition between America and China is ongoing in various regions worldwide, including the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States is gradually losing its dominant military and political positions in the Middle East. The country has been compelled to abandon its aggressive "regime change" and "democratization" efforts in Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, as well as its emphasis on human rights. In essence, America's strategy in the Middle East is evolving gradually.
 
Meanwhile, China is undeniably expanding its influence in both political and economic realms, adhering to a policy of non-intervention. China appears to be striving to steer clear of local conflicts and avoid direct confrontation with the United States. China's foreign relations are guided by principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-commitment.
 
Research findings suggest that China in the Middle East is not actively seeking alliances or coalitions to counter America, as the region holds less strategic significance for China compared to areas like the South China Sea. Through strategic investments in key infrastructure, China has emerged as a primary economic partner for Middle Eastern countries. In essence, China and the United States are engaged in a competition to enhance their influence and power in the Middle East.
 

Abstract After the end of the Cold War, China has formed a global partnership network. In the last three decades, China's participatory diplomacy has become the main tool of this country's foreign policy and is a symbolic indicator of the level of bilateral and multilateral relations with governments and international and regional organizations. The main question of the article is what is the position of West Asia in China's cooperative diplomacy? In response to the main question, the hypothesis of the article is that China has not limited its partners to big powers as in the past, which is the most significant change in China's partnership network. Since West Asia is one of the most important regions for China outside the Indo-Pacific region, China's approach to West Asia is based on the security of key resources and access to markets and resources. This article argues that the hierarchy of levels of participatory diplomacy shows that the governments and organizations of the West Asian region are important for China. Therefore, by understanding this hierarchy, it is possible to analyze China's approach to relations with West-Asian countries. China's partnership diplomacy with West Asia is centered around energy, the Belt and Road Initiative, foreign investment, trade and technology. The research method of this article is descriptive-analytical.
After the end of the Cold War, China has formed a global and multidimensional partnership network. Since 1993, when Beijing established its first strategic partnership with Brazil, cooperative diplomacy has gradually become one of the main components of China's grand diplomacy, and Beijing has expanded its special relations in the world with the concept of strategic partnership. To better understand China's strategic evolution in diplomacy, we need to know how these partnerships are formed and what motivates Beijing to strengthen its partnership network. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, by the end of 2021, more than 100 partnerships have been established at different levels, which include regional and international countries and organizations. These partnerships have been a prominent tool in China's diplomatic toolkit to ensure a suitable environment for the country's emergence. As a diplomatic tool, strategic partnership diplomacy reflects a broader change in China's development path and its diplomacy paradigm. China is not unique in using participatory diplomacy as a way to advance its national interests, but what distinguishes China's approach is that Beijing has placed participatory networks at the center of its foreign policy strategy. Also, like in the past, China has not limited its partners to big powers, which is the most significant change in China's partnership network. In fact, cooperative diplomacy has become China's prominent strategy to advance its economic and political growth. From an economic point of view, China is looking for partnerships with countries that have the ability to provide a market for Chinese goods and natural resources and strengthen China's economic presence in the world. Politically, China's goal of participation is to counter American pressure and create a favorable political environment for China's rise. Outside the Indo-Pacific region, West Asia is the most important region for China. The unique geopolitical position of West Asia is a vital source for the exchange of energy, technology and expansion of economic, trade and investment relations between the two sides.
  In the last decade, China has increased its economic, political and, to a lesser extent, its security footprint in West Asia and has become the largest trading partner and foreign investor for many countries in the region; China's role has also expanded with the announcement by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is the cornerstone of China's modern strategy. We start this article by analyzing the concept of strategic partnership based on the existing literature in international relations. Since there is no consensus on the meaning of the term strategic partnership, in this article we use the conceptual framework of Thomas Wilkins to explain the partnership between China and the West Asia region. Wilkins is one of the few authors who explained the conceptual framework of strategic partnership. The main question of the article is what is the position of West Asia in China's cooperative diplomacy? In response to this question, we propose the hypothesis that China has not limited its partners to big powers as in the past, that this strategy is the most significant change in China's partnership network, and China's partnership diplomacy with West Asia with energy, foreign investment, trade, innovation One Belt and One Road is focused, and Beijing is careful to avoid repeating what it sees as Western interference and present a narrative of neutral engagement with all countries, including those that are in conflict with each other, based on mutually beneficial agreements.
In this article, after analyzing the concept of strategic partnership diplomacy and reviewing the existing literature, we examined the position of West Asia in China's strategic partnership diplomacy. The findings of the research showed that China did not limit its partners to big powers as in the past, which is the most significant change in China's partnership network. Since West Asia is the most important region for China outside the Indo-Pacific region, China's approach to West Asia is based on the security of key resources and access to markets and resources. The hierarchy of levels of cooperative diplomacy shows that the governments and organizations of the West Asian region are important to China. Therefore, by understanding this hierarchy, China's approach to relations with West Asian countries can be analyzed.
  China's partnership diplomacy with West Asia focuses on energy, the Belt and Road Initiative, foreign investment, and trade and technology. In general, strategic partnerships go beyond security alignments. This is especially true for China. In recent years, Beijing has repeatedly emphasized that the partnerships are "a new type of state-to-state relationship and not against any third state." What makes China's approach unique is that partnership networks are at the strategic center of China's foreign policy. It seems that China's choice to create a cooperative diplomacy network is not accidental. On the contrary, it is determined to a large extent by the three factors of the need to deal with American pressure, the need to maintain peace and stability in its borders, and to achieve the long-term goal of modernization. Overall, although China's main goal is to seek economic benefits while avoiding political conflict, it seems that Beijing cannot indefinitely avoid playing an active role in regional security. In order to protect its long-term economic interests in West Asia, as well as to present itself as an emerging power in the multipolar international order, China will find it necessary to play a greater and more active role in the security and political dynamics of the region as soon as possible.