The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Focusing on the cycle of political instability and development failure in Afghanistan, this research examines three main variables including ethnic divisions, external dependence, and legitimacy crisis as factors in this cycle. faults that are intertwined with internal political and security competitions and have prevented the creation of an inclusive and stable state. Also, historical and structural dependence on foreign support, whether in the form of direct interventions by world powers or in the form of dependence on financial and military aid, has weakened the country's independence of political decision-making and has led to the fragility of the state structure. The legitimacy crisis, as a complementary link in this cycle, is caused by the lack of transparent elections and the weakness of democratic institutions, which ultimately has led to citizens' distrust of the political system. The research method was conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner and data were collected from historical, political sources, and contemporary reports. The findings show that the combination of these three factors has trapped Afghanistan in a vicious cycle that is difficult to escape from, such that whenever there is room for development, ethnic divisions or foreign interventions have disrupted stability and exacerbated the legitimacy crisis. The results suggest that resolving the Afghan crisis depends only on redefining political legitimacy based on genuine citizen participation, reducing dependence on foreign support, and constructively managing ethnic diversity. Otherwise, the cycle of political instability will continue and the failure to progress on the path to development will continue.

Abstract One of the important achievements of Afghanistan after the 1980s is the separation of powers and responsibilities of the three branches of government. The division is carried out in order to prevent the monopoly of power. According to the Afghan Constitution, the legislative body of Afghanistan was recognized as an independent body with specific powers. The Afghan parliament is basically two-chamber and bicameral; one is called the Wolesi Jirga, which has 250 representatives and is directly elected by the people, and the other is the Meshrano Jirga, which consists of 102 representatives, 34 of whom are appointed from among the representatives of the provincial councils (one representative from each province for a period of four years), another 34 from among the district councils (one representative from each province) for a period of three years, and another 34 of whom are appointed by the president for a period of five years.

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.

Abstract The term narco-terrorism was first introduced in 1983 by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry to describe violent actions undertaken by drug traffickers against state institutions. Over time, the concept has evolved to capture the complex and increasingly intertwined relationship between terrorism and illicit drug economies. In contemporary security studies, terrorism is no longer understood solely as a state-centric or ideologically rigid phenomenon. Instead, it has assumed non-state, transnational, and hybrid forms shaped by globalization, political instability, economic inequality, and weak governance. The convergence of terrorism and narcotics trafficking has transformed many extremist organizations into financially self-sustaining entities capable of conducting prolonged campaigns of violence. Afghanistan, due to decades of conflict, institutional fragility, and its major role in global narcotics production, has become one of the most prominent arenas for narcoterrorism. Within this context, ISIS-K has emerged as a critical destabilizing actor, challenging the Taliban’s authority and complicating efforts toward state-building and governance consolidation. Narco-terrorism is composed of two interdependent features: organized political violence and systematic engagement in the production, trafficking, or taxation of narcotics. Terrorist groups involved in narco-terrorism utilize drug revenues to finance recruitment, acquire weapons, sustain territorial presence, and exert coercive control over populations. As a result, narco-terrorism directly undermines state sovereignty, rule of law, and institutional legitimacy.In Afghanistan, the narcotics economy has long flourished due to limited state capacity, widespread poverty, and persistent insecurity. Armed groups have repeatedly exploited this economy to secure financial resources. Although ISIS-K presents itself as ideologically distinct from other militant actors, it has demonstrated pragmatic engagement with narcotics-related activities, either through direct involvement or indirect cooperation with trafficking networks. This involvement has enabled ISIS-K to pose a challenge the Taliban not only through violence but also by weakening the important economic foundations for effective governance. Existing literature identifies narco-terrorism as a multidimensional threat with far-reaching consequences. Studies focusing on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) illustrate how narcotics revenues sustain long-term insurgent campaigns and facilitate transnational criminal activities. Research on Central Asia highlights the role of narco-terrorist networks in undermining regional multilateralism and security cooperation, particularly in politically fragile environments. Comparative analyses of the Middle East and Latin America identify groups such as ISIS, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as prominent examples of narco-terrorist organizations. These studies emphasize that narco-terrorism generates security, political, economic, and social challenges that extend beyond national borders. However, scholarly attention to ISIS-K’s specific role in obstructing the Taliban’s state-building process remains limited, underscoring the need for focused analysis. This study draws upon the Frustration–Aggression Theory to explain the mechanisms of recruitment and violence within extremist organizations. Originally formulated by John Dollard in the late 1930s, the theory posits that persistent frustration arising from unmet expectations or perceived injustice produces aggressive behavior. When institutional mechanisms fail to address grievances, individuals may turn to violence as an alternative means of expression and redress. In Afghanistan, prolonged conflict, economic deprivation, social marginalization, and political exclusion have created fertile ground for extremist recruitment. ISIS-K capitalizes on these conditions by offering financial incentives, ideological narratives, and a sense of purpose to disaffected individuals. This dynamic transforms individual frustration into organized violence and reinforces the group’s capacity to challenge state-building efforts. Narco-terrorism can be categorized into several forms. Genuine narco-terrorism involves direct participation by terrorist groups in drug trafficking to finance militant activities. Criminal narco-terrorism prioritizes profit, with drug syndicates employing terror tactics to intimidate governments and rivals. State-sponsored narco-terrorism emerges when governments support or tolerate terrorist groups engaged in narcotics trafficking to achieve strategic objectives.Additionally, fabricated narco-terrorism refers to the political manipulation of narco-terrorist narratives, while instrumental narcoterrorism conceptualizes drug trafficking as a tool to weaken governance and social order. ISIS-K’s activities in Afghanistan most closely resemble genuine and instrumental narco-terrorism, as the group exploits the narcotics economy to destabilize governance and undermine Taliban authority. The Taliban’s state-building project faces significant obstacles that are intensified by ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities. From a security perspective, persistent attacks undermine public safety, erode public confidence, and stretch the Taliban’s limited security capabilities. Economically, ISIS-K’s involvement in narcotics trafficking distorts local economies, fuels corruption, and deprives the Taliban of potential revenues needed for governance and service provision.Politically, ISIS-K challenges the Taliban’s legitimacy by presenting itself as a more ideologically uncompromising alternative. This strategy has enabled the group to attract dissatisfied Taliban members, particularly when financial incentives are offered. Socially, continued violence exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, undermining social cohesion and complicating nation-building efforts. These dynamics collectively weaken the Taliban’s capacity to consolidate authority and establish effective governance Although Afghanistan’s instability has deep historical roots, its current intensification is closely linked to the U.S. military withdrawal and the resulting political plan. Within this context, the rivalry between ISIS-K and the Taliban represents a crucial security challenge with significant regional implications, extending to I.R of Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite the Taliban’s claims for combating ISIS-K, persistent governance deficits and limited institutional capacity hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities continue to pose serious threats to the Taliban’s state-building process and to regional stability more broadly. Prolonged delays in governance consolidation are likely to exacerbate security, political, economic, social, and environmental risks, increasing the likelihood of broader regional instability. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that extend beyond military responses to include economic development, political inclusion, and sustained regional cooperation.

Abstract This article examines the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. The country has been the scene of confrontation between various and conflicting ideologies over the past two centuries. Supporters of these ideologies have undertaken political struggles at various levels, from discursive confrontation to armed struggle, to achieve political power and implement their ideological goals. Meanwhile, political Islam, as an ideology, has faced the stability and sustainability of Afghanistan's political systems with many problems since the beginning.
Developments in Afghanistan over the past two centuries have paved the way for the emergence of political and intellectual ideologies, including political Islam. The country has been the focus of major, extra-regional, regional, and neighboring powers due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position, but the entry of the British, followed by the Russians and the West led by the United States over the past 200 years, has further highlighted the discussion of political Islam in Afghanistan. Political ideologies have taken shape in the context of political, social, economic, and cultural developments, influenced by the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of the nation-state process, class contradictions, and religious and ethnic differences. Political Islam emerged as a political ideology in competition with ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and democracy. Political Islam was a response to the intellectual and political conditions of the 19th century and the expansion of Western ideas and political systems.
Afghanistan, like other Islamic and non-Islamic countries, has witnessed the emergence and growth of various movements and ideologies. Regarding the grounds for the emergence of political Islam, thinkers have mentioned various reasons: Fouad Ajami cites the failure of secular elites, Theda Skocpol cites the lack of political participation, Nikki Keddie and Gilles Kepel cite the crisis of the petite bourgeoisie, and Michael Fischer cites oil dollars and unequal development and the effects of cultural decline. Political Islam, with its approach to the Islamic state, is attributed to the first government of early Islam, but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 is considered a turning point for the resurgence of Islamism after a period of decline. In essence, political Islam is considered the reconstruction of society based on Islamic rules, and this discourse, in opposition and contradiction to all traditional and modern discourses that prohibit the combination of religion and politics, has been considered. Political Islam is not only a struggle against modernism, but also a reaction against injustices, bullying, and inequalities in Islamic societies. Political Islam is understood as Islam that is justice-seeking, development-oriented, worldly, authoritarian, civilization-building, realistic, revolutionary and reformist, science and reason-based, progressive, fighting against domination, system-building, and pragmatic.
The main question of this research is to investigate the political and social contexts of the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. According to the data, it is hypothesized that the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan is rooted in the ideas and thoughts of Sayyid Jamal al-Din. Furthermore, political Islam with different tendencies has been influenced by the views of Turkish political Islam by Mahmud Tarzi, Sufi political Islam by the Mujaddidi and Gailani families, and Deobandi political Islam by Indian teachers. However, in its modern sense, it entered Afghanistan with the return of Al-Azhar University of Egypt graduates with the intellectual line of the Muslim Brotherhood and the return of Qom seminary students from Iran with Shia views. The current research is exploratory and uses the historical sociology method with a descriptive and analytical approach. The present article, with a descriptive and analytical approach, falls into the category of theoretical and applied research. The documentary technique has been used for data collection. For data analysis, text analysis patterns in historical sociology have been used, drawing on the views of Charles Wright Mills. These topics are discussed in detail in the theoretical framework section. Historical sociology is a method that, by examining the past, seeks to understand how the formation and emergence of phenomena and transformations of societies occur over time. By analyzing macro political and social patterns, this method understands the complex processes that shape social structures.
The discussion of Islamic political movements began with Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi, born in 1838, coinciding with the first British invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequently, through the efforts of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in Egypt, it gradually grew and expanded in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Later, figures such as Hassan al-Banna and Muhammad Rashid Rida founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Simultaneously, Maulana Maududi initiated his Islamic thought in British India, emphasizing the realization of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic Sharia, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan party in 1941.
 

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan are two countries that are facing the issue of ownership of common rivers in their international borders. Although the current land of Afghanistan has been part of the territories of Iran for a long time, but after the formation of this country, the relations between the two countries have entered new stages. The borders of the two countries, in addition to the issue of conflict, also face the phenomenon of drug and human trafficking. Necessarily, these issues have caused the border guards to face different managements of these borders. The dependence of parts of the eastern region of the country on water resources on the common borders with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan and Afghanistan's non-compliance with the laws related to border waters, the movement of water resources between regions, the heavy decline of underground water resources and their pollution, the drying up of water resources Like wells and springs, the emptying of rural settlements and group displacement of the population are among the most prominent challenges in the field of water, followed by security challenges in the region. The main problem between Iran and Afghanistan started when the political leaders of Afghanistan supported by Britain in the early 20th century assumed the Hirmand River as an internal river and considered any use of it as their exclusive right. Iran shares border rivers and water resources with all its neighbors, the war of neighboring countries over water resources is one of the dangers that threatens many of these countries and can be a potential source of differences between Iran and its neighbors. The problems of transboundary watersheds clarify the importance of studying and investigating the issue.   Methodology This research is practical in terms of purpose and based on the nature of the subject, the main question and the hypothesis of the research, it was carried out in a descriptive-analytical method using the document collection method. The question raised in this article is, what are the effects of the Hirmand river conflict on the political relations between the two countries?   Result and discussion In terms of hydropolitical indicators, Hirmand River is the only river among Iran's border rivers whose estuary is in the inner regions of Iran, and in this respect it is different from other border rivers of Iran. As the 10th largest river in Asia, this river is the main source of water supply for Lake Hamon and Sistan region. In recent years, the fluctuation of Hirmand water has been one of the factors influencing the political relations between Iran and Afghanistan. Some of the geopolitical and hydropolitical challenges that have been created for Iran due to Afghanistan's exclusive ownership of the Hirmand River are: In the last one hundred years, Afghanistan has reduced the amount of water flowing towards Iran (Sistan) by building reservoir and diversion dams on Hirmand and separating numerous channels from it. This has aggravated the water shortage in Sistan during droughts in the upper part of the river. The location of Sistan at the end of the Hirmand basin and its strong dependence on Hirmand water has made the Sistan region extremely vulnerable. The increase in water consumption of Hirmand in Afghanistan in the last hundred years and the decrease of water flowing towards Sistan has caused the area of ​​Hamun to decrease, the size of agricultural lands in Sistan has decreased and finally caused the migration of a large number of the population of this region. The location of 95% of the Hirmand river in Afghanistan, the use of Hirmand water by most Afghans and the high dependence of the southern and southwestern provinces of Afghanistan on the water of this river have caused the issue of the distribution of Hirmand water to become a national issue that is of concern to the people of the country. This case has made it difficult for the Afghan government to decide on the distribution of Hirmand water and to solve this problem between the two countries. Conclusion The Hirmand River in the east of the country originates from the upstream watersheds in Afghanistan, and this has caused Iran to consider this issue in its relations with Afghanistan. Cities and villages in eastern Iran are facing water problems. By examining the two countries of Iran and Afghanistan, it can be seen that the situation of Iran is better in terms of development, but both countries have challenges in the way of exploiting the waters of these two rivers. Always, when the sources of a river in the upstream country are accompanied by other characteristics such as weak management, lack of development, being in the third world, etc., it causes the statesmen of that country, to compensate for their weaknesses and their land, in such cases, i.e. exploitation show unjustified strictures from the shared waters. Like what we see in relation to the behavior of the Afghan government or Iran's lack of attention to the issue of Hirmand and Hariroud. These issues have had a negative impact on the situation of the border cities of the two countries in such a way that the agricultural and horticultural products of Sistan region have faced a decrease during these years. However, the governments of Iran and Afghanistan have a difficult way forward in reaching a comprehensive and practical agreement on the exploitation of border rivers.    

Abstract The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is one of the significant political and security developments in the region having some extensive implications for internal stability and the region's geopolitics. A precise understanding of the factors influencing this phenomenon can be helpful to analyze the roots of the crisis and to propose appropriate solutions to prevent its recurrence. Taliban’s recurrence raises some fundamental questions about its structural, social, political, and international roots as follows: Why were the Taliban able to seize control of the country after twenty years of war without significant resistance from the Afghan government and the international community? What factors led to the collapse of Afghanistan’s governmental structures, allowing the Taliban to fill the power vacuum? Was the Taliban's recurrence a result of internal weaknesses and social crises in Afghanistan, or did external variables, such as the influence of regional powers and NATO's withdrawal, play a crucial role in this process? Answering these questions requires a systemic analysis of the factors that contributed to the Taliban's re-emergence. Therefore, the main question of the article is formulated as follows: "What factors have played a role in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and how have these factors interacted within a systemic framework?"
This article explains the foundations of the Taliban's resurgence, considering the surrounding geopolitical realities of Afghanistan. To this end, a descriptive-analytic method is employed, and the VIKOR technique is used to assess Afghanistan provinces’ rankings in terms of spatial justice indices. Furthermore, qualitative data and observation method is utilized to examine the roles of religion, ethnicity, language, foreign influence, the influence of warlords, and reactions to the Taliban within a systemic approach.
In a systemic approach, various factors are viewed as components of a complex and dynamic network. These factors interact with one another in a closed loop, leading to either the stability or change of the current situation. The systemic approach illustrates that the Taliban's resurgence is not merely the result of one factor but rather the product of a chain of complex relationships.
The rise of the Taliban has placed increased pressure on opposition groups, particularly ethnic minorities, raising the likelihood of new resistance movements. By assuming control over Afghanistan, the Taliban gained new financial and military resources, which strengthened their position against both internal and regional rivals. Through contradictory strategies (some supporting and others opposing), regional countries have contributed to the ongoing instability. A close examination of the factors influencing the Taliban's return to power reveals that this phenomenon is not simply the result of a single cause, rather, it is the outcome of a complex interplay between internal and external factors.
The systemic analysis indicate that the Taliban have not only exploited internal factors such as ethnic and religious divides but also international opportunities, including the withdrawal of American forces and the inability of regional countries to form a united front against them. Additionally, the systemic model demonstrates that the process of reproducing the crisis in Afghanistan is such that even after the Taliban's resurgence, the likelihood of new resistances and regional instability remains.
The results of the research indicate that spatial injustice, ethnic disparities, language policies, foreign support, the weakness of the central government, and the influence of warlords have been among the most significant factors facilitating the Taliban's return to power. The systemic analysis revealed that these factors are interconnected in a causal and feedback loop, and the withdrawal of foreign forces created a power vacuum that the Taliban exploited to gain control over the country. The systemic model presented in this research illustrates that the Taliban's resurgence is a multifaceted and complex process, and without reforms in governance structures and policymaking, the likelihood of similar crises remains high in the future.
 

Abstract The role of America in the modernization of Afghanistan (2001-2021)
 
Mohammad Bay Basharat Rahmani, PhD student in sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
 
Akbar Zare Shahabadi, Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
 
R: 10-03-2024
A:11-05-2024
 
How To Cite:
Basharat Rahmani, mohammad bay & Zare Shahabadi, Akbar, Z. S. (2024). The role of America in the modernization of Afghanistan (2001-2021). The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World, 6(2),
 
 
The theory of modernization emerged after World War II, shaped by three significant events: the rise of the United States as a global superpower in the 1950s, the expansion of global communism, and the collapse of European empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, leading to the creation of numerous new nation-states in the Third World. In this context, American political elites called upon social scientists to study Third World countries to prevent them from falling into the communist bloc by promoting economic development. Thus, the primary concern of modernization scholars was to identify the causes of underdevelopment and the means to overcome it in these countries.
Modernization theorists viewed the roots of underdevelopment in undeveloped nations as being embedded in the prevailing cultures and traditions of these societies. They argued that one of the major reasons for underdevelopment was the beliefs, customs, and practices in these communities. The theorists proposed that for these countries to develop, they must abandon their cultural values and adopt Western, particularly American, models. They believed that the only path to development was to set aside traditional values and embrace modern Western principles.
Although economic development was considered the driving force behind progress in other areas, modernization theories largely focused on values, beliefs, and emulating the West. Some of these theories also advocated for receiving foreign aid to spur development. Overall, the central focus of this school of thought was on the relationship between undeveloped nations and Western countries, emphasizing distancing from indigenous values and relying on Western knowledge and support. The dominant view was that the only way to achieve development was by following the path of developed nations and leveraging their knowledge and experience.
In Afghanistan, the extensive presence of developed nations, particularly the United States, in the early 21st century (2001-2021) provided the necessary conditions for modernization based on these theories. This included unparalleled financial aid, the influx of advisors and specialists, modern technologies, and efforts to promote Western values. However, evidence suggests that these efforts failed to create significant development in Afghanistan and even had negative consequences. The country continues to struggle with widespread poverty, hunger, unemployment, and some of the lowest global development indicators. Therefore, this study examines the role of the United States in the modernization of Afghanistan within the framework of modernization theory.
This research is conducted within the framework of the critical paradigm, classified as fundamental in its objectives and documentary in terms of sources. The study adopts an explanatory-analytical approach to address the issue. The target population of this research includes modernization theories, studies related to the presence and support of First World countries in undeveloped nations, and their impact on modernization, as well as documents and studies on the role of the United States in Afghanistan. Sampling was conducted through content analysis, keyword identification, and consultation with experts. Data collection was carried out using note-taking methods, and data analysis involved categorizing key concepts, identifying categories, and ultimately determining the core themes of the study.
Despite the extensive presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the main objectives of ensuring security and combating terrorism were not achieved. The Taliban retained control over vast parts of the country and even exerted influence in government-controlled areas. Consequently, insecurity and rising crime rates in urban areas persisted, and efforts at social reconstruction and modernization failed.
Poverty Levels
Poverty in Afghanistan increased significantly despite years of U.S. and allied presence. In 2016, more than 54% of the population lived below the poverty line, and by 2020, this number had risen to 90%. U.S. reconstruction efforts did not produce any meaningful improvement in the lives of the Afghan people.
Drug Addiction Levels
Drug addiction, especially among the youth in Afghanistan, has escalated drastically. Approximately 3.5 million people in the country are addicted to drugs, a situation exacerbated by poverty, unemployment, and unfavorable social conditions.
Literacy Rates
Despite international aid, Afghanistan still has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. About 80% of women and over 60% of men cannot read or write. This reflects the failure of foreign education programs in Afghanistan.
Administrative Corruption
Widespread administrative corruption remains one of Afghanistan's most significant challenges. According to annual reports, Afghanistan is consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries globally. Efforts to combat corruption have had no meaningful results (Wardak, 2019).
Political Participation
Political participation in Afghanistan has declined over time. This drop is linked to the growing corruption within the government and its inability to gain public trust. The gap between the government and the people has widened, posing serious challenges to the realization of democracy.
Access to Energy
Despite Afghanistan’s favorable conditions for generating electricity through dam construction, little progress was made in energy production after two decades of foreign-backed governance. Only 31% of the population has access to electricity, with 70% of the energy being imported from neighboring countries. The lack of an effective governance structure in the energy sector has restricted access to electricity, hindering both economic and environmental development.
Access to Clean Drinking Water
Access to clean drinking water remains a major challenge in Afghanistan. In many cities, especially Kabul, there is no organized water supply system, and groundwater is contaminated with feces and chemicals. Reports indicate that around 70% of Kabul’s groundwater is unusable, and 60% of the country’s water is contaminated with feces. Despite international aid, access to clean water has not been realized.
Access to Healthcare Services
Access to quality healthcare in Afghanistan was limited throughout the U.S. and allied presence. Public hospitals struggled to provide basic services to citizens, with most treatments requiring personal expenditure. Even in major cities, the construction of standard hospitals was limited, and the healthcare insurance system was underdeveloped.
Modernization is a key development paradigm with both supporters and critics. While it promises progress for underdeveloped societies, its ability to address the realities and crises of different countries is questioned. In Afghanistan, modernization efforts have revealed that theorists focus too narrowly on cultural factors, overlooking the complex interplay of multiple elements required for development. Critics of modernization theory argue that the imposition of foreign models under the guise of modernization has not only failed to help underdeveloped societies but has also led to new forms of violence and challenges. Although the positive impacts of these models in areas such as technology access and public awareness cannot be overlooked, these benefits seem minor compared to the damages inflicted on societies. In Afghanistan, the introduction of external strategies has similarly resulted in greater challenges. Ultimately, Afghanistan's history of dependence on foreign powers—whether Britain, the Soviet Union, or the U.S.—demonstrates that external interventions and the imposition of modernization models have not brought development but instead fostered corruption, poverty, and numerous other problems. The extensive foreign military presence and massive financial expenditures failed to provide security, basic services, or public welfare for the Afghan people, rendering the modernization paradigm ineffective in this context.
 
 

Abstract After the United States and its allies' attack on Afghanistan, the Republic government replaced the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban. One of the gifts of the Democratic Republic to Afghanistan was holding elections with the presence of eligible women and men as voters and election candidates. Based on this, the fourth presidential election in Afghanistan in 2019 was held amidst the confrontation between the central government and the Taliban in peace talks in Doha and war in various parts of the country. Approximately ten million eligible voters had registered to vote. The elections, which had been delayed for several months, were finally held in September 2019. The low voter turnout quickly made headlines. Only about two million six hundred thousand people, or just twenty percent of eligible voters, had turned up to the polls. This lack of enthusiasm signaled a major shift in Afghanistan's political situation. Given that elections are one of the most important symbols of democracy, the behavior of Afghan voters sounded an important alarm for the central government and, consequently, the survival of democracy. An alarm that no one paid attention to, and less than two years later, its result was evident with the fall of the republic and the return of the Taliban.
In this regard, the research question has been raised as to how the grounds for the collapse of the republican system in Afghanistan were formed in the behavior of voters in the 2019 presidential elections? The research method is qualitative with a descriptive-analytical approach. The data has been collected from library and internet sources. The theoretical basis of this research is also based on the views and opinions of Robert Dahl, Inglehart, and Pippa Nouris in the field of voting behavior.
Robert Dahl's theory, based on the principle of cost-benefit calculation, denies the approach of sociability and emphasizes the importance of rational choice. Overall, this approach seeks to demonstrate a direct relationship between citizens' inclination to vote and their benefit from participating in elections.
Inglehart's theory focuses on changing the values of generations. He believes that over time and with changes in the international climate, the desires and thoughts of generations change. These changes are reflected in the social and political behavior of individuals.
Finally, this research has sought the help of the Pippa Nouris views, which has proposed a model for examining political participation and, consequently, voting behavior, which is one of the most comprehensive theoretical models in the field of elections to date. The popularity and acceptance of this model is due to the use of three groups of macro, meso, and micro theories. With such characteristics, it is possible to examine the voting behavior of citizens at different levels.
The research findings indicate that a set of factors has influenced the voting behavior of the people of Afghanistan. These factors not only illustrate the people's disillusionment with the 2019 elections but also reflect a general sense of hopelessness and distance from the republican system among the people. This hopelessness ultimately led to the fall of the republic to the Taliban less than two years later.
 
These factors and backgrounds included the following:
First, "political and economic inequalities and imbalances" resulting from the monopolization of power by the Pashtun ethnic group.
Second, "undermining the religious identity of the people" resulting from the Western democratic system's governance, which incited bias and religious sentiment among the people of Afghanistan, ultimately paving the way for the acceptance of the Taliban.
The third factor was the "negative effects of the engineering of the 2014 presidential elections." The engineering of these elections dealt a heavy blow to the framework of democracy imposed on Afghanistan, the consequences and effects of which were evident five years later with the people's lack of enthusiasm for the fourth presidential elections.
In the lead-up to the 2019 elections in Afghanistan, the legitimacy and acceptance of the republican system had reached its lowest point.
Fourth, "the failure to achieve peace and national tranquility" after the US invasion of Afghanistan, which, with the continuation of military confrontation between the US and the Taliban, was never realized, and the security of Afghanistan was severely undermined.
Fifth, "Deepening ethnic divides" as a result of the Pashtun-centric policies of Afghan presidents (Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani) intensified ethnic nationalism and division, impacting societal cohesion and unity. In reality, on the brink of the 2019 elections, democracy in Afghanistan brought about systematic and modern ethnic biases, fostering increased division and significantly diminishing political participation.
Sixth, "Multiplicity and weakness of parties." The emerging parties in Afghanistan were predominantly ethnocentric and focused on individual interests. In the 2019 elections, rather than uniting society to find the best presidential option, parties engaged in political maneuvering, leading to division along ethnic and religious lines.
Seventh, "Exclusion of women from political participation." Despite efforts during the republican system to uphold women's rights, an anti-women culture hindered active female engagement. Women's involvement in political and social spheres was notably low on the eve of the 2019 presidential elections.
Eighth, "Emergence of a new generation." Educated and well-informed, the new generation perceived the current Afghan government as ineffective and untrustworthy, prompting a boycott of electoral participation.
Conclusion: The lack of enthusiasm for the 2019 fourth presidential elections in Afghanistan served as an initial indication, signaling reduced legitimacy and acceptance of the republican system amongst Afghan citizens.
In this regard, the actions of the central government, opposition groups to the republican system, and the interventions of foreign countries were three crucial elements contributing to the diminishing desire for political participation among the Afghan people. Over the past two decades, the central government, through the monopolization of power within a specific ethnic group and the marginalization of other ethnicities, fostered a cold war scenario among various groups, political parties, and ethnic factions both against the central government and the favored ethnic group. Concurrently, the Taliban and ISIS, serving as the primary opposition forces to the central government, gained significant influence and power in Afghanistan.
The shift from military confrontation to soft negotiations with the Taliban, coupled with the government's unaccountable concessions to this group, further demoralized the populace regarding the republic and democracy. This led to political and social distrust towards the democratic system. By the time of the 2019 elections, democracy lacked a solid track record among the citizens. The voting behavior showcased that the downfall of democracy or the republican system in 2021 was not unforeseen. Issues like poverty, corruption, insecurity, and inequality had peaked prior to the 2019 elections. These problems exacerbated post-elections, resulting in the central government losing its primary asset - public trust.
 
The election results and the voting tendencies of the Afghan people underscored that democracy cannot be imposed without substantial foundations in place. There was a disenchantment with Western democracy, with the populace anticipating a new political structure following the elections and the Doha peace accord. However, less than two years after the elections, Afghanistan found itself back under the same autocratic Taliban rule from a quarter of a century ago.
 

Abstract Of the most unexpected events in the year, 2021 was the collapse of the Afghanistan government, on August 15th, 2021, and the re-emergence of the Taliban’s Islamic state (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) without facing up serious resistance from the state and society. How can one analyze the Taliban`s takeover of the country? This is the central question that guides the analytical narration in the text. The present research attempts to come up with a multi-faceted scheme to respond to the question. In this regard, the paper hypothesizes that the Taliban movement managed to retrieve its sovereignty owing to symmetry of some factors: its internal social solidarity/ coherence in the context of Afghanistan’s segmented society and failed state, and connivance in the international environment as well. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of some theoretical approaches under a combinative theoretical framework. The constituents are as follows: the concept of ‘Asabiyyah’ (social solidarity in Ibn Khalodn's sense of the word), ‘resource mobilization theory, the quadruple crisis of the regime, and the role of the international environment in revolutionary transformation.
 
According to the framework, the Taliban`s mobility to conquer the country was proceeding continually because of internal social solidarity driven by its ethnic (Pashtunism) and religious (Deobandi Salafi) foundations. It is whilst, on the contrary, there had been a segmented society and failed state due to a crisis in the process of nation-state building. Consequently, not only was there were lack of national solidarity and united orientation against the coherent ethnoreligious movement of the Taliban, but also the Taliban utilized the government’s inefficacies and miss-functions (such as juncture and corruption in the political system) to mobilize the followers and attract the potential ones among the disappointed people.
 
In terms of the process of capturing the country, the Taliban’s mobility pattern showed some formal similarities to ‘Eastern Revolutions’ (in Huntington's sense of the word); that is, launching from the periphery to the capital. Having learned from the past, the Taliban came up with a more pragmatic orientation in its second round. While showing a tendency to negotiate with internal and foreign effective agents in the political environment of Afghanistan, the Taliban aimed to represent a modified picture of the movement compared to the long-standing violent image. To sum up, the causes of the Taliban`s success in re-taking political power can be narrated as the symmetry of the strong movement and the weak nation-state; the ethnoreligious social solidarity of the Taliban, and the lack of national solidarity and efficient government.
 
Afghanistan went through difficult times in 2021. It was not yet summer when those provinces came under the pressure of the Taliban fighting forces and then dominoes fell one after another until the Taliban forces reached the gates of Kabul. Finally, in the middle of August, to the surprise of the world, the capital fell and the Taliban managed to seize power in Afghanistan for the second time and start a rapid transformation in the Afghan political system in order to revive the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. There are factors involved in the occurrence of this transformation, some of which are the responsibility of the Afghan government and the others part of the United States: 1. The announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan; 2. Weakness and a deep gap in the leadership of the Afghan government; 3. The deep gap between army and country policies; 4. Perpetuation of the corrupting incomes caused by drugs, as well as increasing the Taliban's income generation from local sources; 5. Denial of many problems in the organization, training, equipment, and leadership of Afghan forces at least from 2007 onwards by the US, NATO, and the Afghan government; 6. The low level of readiness of the Afghan army due to dependence on American forces; 7. Dependence of Afghan forces on contractors for equipment; 8. The wrong focus of America and NATO on only the terrorist and military threat of the Taliban instead of evaluating the reasons for their increasing progress, 9. Focusing only on the cities and densely populated centers and leaving the villages and suburbs; 10. Not paying attention to the strategy of the Taliban, which was preparing for a massive advance toward the north and other regions at the same time as the peace talks.
This development has been analyzed from different perspectives, such as examining the causes of the weakness of the Afghan government, the role of foreign powers, its impact on the future of Afghanistan, regional relations, and its threats and opportunities for Iran. What distinguishes the current research is the focus on analyzing why and how this political transformation occurred from the perspective of "revolutionary transformation theories". In this context, the question is raised, how to analyze the Taliban's re-gaining power? The nature and context of the recent political transformation in Afghanistan have been such that the fixation on one of the common divisions of revolutionary transformations (revolution, coup, civil war, etc.) hinders the understanding of the various dimensions and complexities of this transformation. Based on this, the current research is based on the hypothesis that the theoretical analysis of this event requires a combination of old and new theories about the logic of political transformation. In this sense, the Taliban's ethnoreligious movement, relies on the element of nervousness, in the conditions of the crisis of the nation-state in Afghanistan, i.e. a mixture of a fragmented society and a bankrupt government and symmetry with suitable international conditions, without facing serious resistance from the society, the government and successful foreign actors to restore its sovereignty in Afghanistan. The way this transformation took place was similar to the style of eastern revolutions, advancing from the periphery to conquering the capital.
The present research consists of several parts. First, in the form of a combined theoretical framework, the theoretical possibilities of old and new theories are highlighted in the direction of designing the elements of a conceptual model. In the next steps, we show the implications and examples of each of the elements of this combined theoretical framework for the analysis of the Taliban's resumption of power. In order, to the importance of nervousness in the group cohesion of the Taliban, the effect of social disintegration and the absence of the national government on the non-formation of anti-mobilization against the Taliban, and symmetry with the appropriate international conditions in the transfer of power. In the end, by freely using the style of eastern revolutions, we explain the formation of this transformation (how the Taliban advance).