The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Globalization and glocalization have significantly reshaped the landscape of international relations, introducing innovative diplomatic tools such as paradiplomacy and the strategic utilization of diaspora communities. Paradiplomacy, as a form of sub-state diplomacy, empowers non-central governments and diaspora groups to engage in cross-border interactions, complementing formal state diplomacy. The Iranian diaspora in Turkey serves as a compelling case study due to its ability to influence bilateral relations through cultural, economic, and political channels. This study explores the paradiplomatic capacities of the Iranian diaspora in Turkey and evaluates how these capacities can enhance Iran-Turkey relations.
The research addresses the central question: What paradiplomatic potential does the Iranian diaspora in Turkey possess, and how can it impact bilateral relations? The study posits that the Iranian diaspora holds considerable paradiplomatic capabilities that can foster stronger ties between the two nations. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can expand its influence in the region while simultaneously strengthening its bilateral ties with Turkey. This research aims to shed light on the role of Diasporas as informal yet significant contributors to international relations, particularly in the context of neighboring countries with shared historical and cultural ties.
The research employs a causal (cause-and-effect) approach to analyze the relationship between diaspora activities and their diplomatic impacts. Data collection was conducted through a combination of library research (academic articles, policy reports, and historical records) and semi-structured interviews with Iranian diaspora members in Turkey, as well as experts in international relations and diaspora studies. The qualitative analysis focuses on identifying key areas cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and political engagement where diaspora involvement can contribute to paradiplomatic efforts. This methodology ensures a comprehensive understanding of the Iranian diaspora’s potential and the challenges it faces in Turkey.
The findings highlight three primary dimensions in which the Iranian diaspora in Turkey can exercise paradiplomatic influence:
1-     Cultural Diplomacy:
The Iranian diaspora acts as a cultural bridge, promoting mutual understanding through language, art, literature, and academic exchanges. Iranian cultural associations in Turkey organize events such as Persian language workshops, art exhibitions, and cultural festivals that introduce Turkish society to Iranian heritage. These activities foster people-to-people connections and strengthen cultural ties between the two nations. Additionally, Iranian cuisine and cultural traditions have gained popularity in Turkey, further enhancing cultural diplomacy.
2-     Economic Diplomacy:
Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and business professionals in Turkey contribute significantly to trade and investment flows between the two countries. The diaspora facilitates business partnerships, joint ventures, and knowledge transfer, particularly in sectors such as tourism, technology, and manufacturing. For instance, Iranian-owned businesses in Turkey often serve as intermediaries for circumventing international sanctions, facilitating trade in goods such as petrochemicals, agricultural products, and handicrafts. This economic engagement not only bolsters bilateral trade but also creates opportunities for collaborative ventures.
3-     Political Engagement:
Certain members of the Iranian diaspora engage in lobbying efforts, think tank collaborations, and policy dialogues that indirectly shape diplomatic relations. Their dual familiarity with Iranian and Turkish political landscapes positions them as informal mediators capable of addressing shared challenges. For example, diaspora members have participated in initiatives to promote regional stability and counter negative narratives about Iran in Turkish media and political circles.
The study underscores the Iranian diaspora’s networking capabilities, transnational ties, and socio-economic influence, which position it as a valuable actor in paradiplomacy. However, the research also identifies challenges, such as political sensitivities, differing foreign policy priorities, and the lack of a cohesive strategy for diaspora engagement, which may limit the full realization of these potentials.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey represents a unique asset for both countries, offering opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations across cultural, economic, and political dimensions. The study identifies several key factors that contribute to the diaspora’s paradiplomatic effectiveness:
1-     Transnational Networks:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey maintains strong transnational networks that facilitate cultural exchange, economic collaboration, and political dialogue. These networks enable the diaspora to act as a bridge between Iranian and Turkish societies, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation.
2-     Shared Historical and Cultural Ties:
Iran and Turkey share a rich history of cultural and civilizational interactions, which the diaspora can leverage to foster closer relations. The diaspora’s efforts to highlight these shared legacies through events, publications, and media can counter divisive narratives and strengthen cultural bonds.
3-     Economic Contributions:
The diaspora’s economic activities, particularly in trade and investment, serve as a critical component of Iran-Turkey relations. By facilitating cross-border commerce and promoting Iranian products in Turkish markets, the diaspora contributes to the economic interdependence of the two nations.
4-     Cultural Representation:
The Iranian diaspora’s cultural initiatives, such as organizing Persian New Year (Nowruz) celebrations and establishing Persian language schools, enhance Iran’s soft power in Turkey. These activities not only promote Iranian culture but also improve Iran’s image among Turkish citizens.
Despite these strengths, the research highlights several challenges that need to be addressed to maximize the diaspora’s paradiplomatic potential. These include:
ü  Political Sensitivities:
The complex political dynamics between Iran and Turkey, including regional rivalries and differing foreign policy objectives, can create obstacles for diaspora engagement.
ü  Fragmentation within the Diaspora:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey is diverse in terms of socio-economic status, political affiliations, and motivations for migration. This diversity can hinder the formation of a cohesive and unified diaspora strategy.
ü  Resource Constraints:
Limited financial and institutional support from Iranian authorities restricts the diaspora’s ability to implement large-scale paradiplomatic initiatives.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey possesses significant paradiplomatic capacities that can enhance Iran-Turkey relations in cultural, economic, and political spheres. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can strengthen its regional influence and foster closer ties with Turkey. However, realizing the full potential of the diaspora requires addressing the identified challenges through targeted policies and initiatives.
Policy Recommendations:
1-     Develop a Comprehensive Diaspora Strategy:
The Iranian government should establish a clear and cohesive strategy for engaging the diaspora in Turkey. This strategy should include mechanisms for supporting cultural, economic, and political initiatives led by diaspora members.
2-     Enhance Institutional Support:
Strengthening the role of cultural attachés and other institutional representatives in Turkey can provide the diaspora with the resources and guidance needed to implement paradiplomatic projects effectively.
3-     Promote Cultural and Educational Exchanges:
Expanding cultural and educational programs, such as scholarships for Turkish students to study in Iran and vice versa, can deepen people-to-people connections and foster mutual understanding.
4-     Facilitate Economic Collaboration:
Encouraging joint ventures and trade partnerships between Iranian and Turkish businesses can leverage the diaspora’s economic influence to strengthen bilateral trade and investment.
5-     Address Political Challenges:
Diplomatic efforts should focus on reducing political tensions and building trust between Iranian and Turkish authorities, creating a more favorable environment for diaspora engagement.
By addressing these challenges and implementing the proposed recommendations, Iran can harness the paradiplomatic potential of its diaspora in Turkey to achieve strategic objectives and strengthen its regional position.
 
 
 

Abstract The fall of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. military occupation of Iraq in March 2003 led to the emergence of regional competitions within the country's political and economic arena. As a result of the ensuing power vacuum in Iraq, regional rivalries between its two neighbors, Turkey and Iran, intensified. This study aims to explain the elements and variables influencing the escalation of Ankara's competition with Tehran in Iraq. Accordingly, the central question of this article is: What factors facilitated the expansion of competition between Turkey and Iran in Iraq from 2003 to 2020? The findings suggest that the power vacuum created after Saddam's fall, energy acquisition and its transit in the region, and the takeover of Iraqi markets due to reconstruction and economic needs resulting from war damages have been significant drivers of increased rivalry between Iran and Turkey. The strategic visions of both countries—Iran aiming to become the leading regional power by 2025 (1404 in the Iranian calendar) and Turkey by 2023—have placed them in a process of securing advantageous political and economic positions in the region, competing to become regional role models. This article employs an explanatory-analytical method and analyzes economic interaction statistics to explore the dimensions of Iran-Turkey competition in Iraq after 2003. The United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein were not simply regime‑changing events but a turning point that reshaped the geopolitical map of the Middle East in ways still unfolding. Iraq, geographically positioned between the Levant, Iran, the Pertion Gulf, and Anatolia, became a fragile state whose political order and economic resources turned into arenas for regional and international rivalry. Among the neighbors most directly involved, Iran and Turkey emerged as the primary competitors. Although both states share security concerns regarding terrorism, instability, and Kurdish separatism, their historical experience and national interests have largely driven them into forms of conflict rather than cooperation. The post‑2003 period created a particular context where overlapping political, economic, and energy considerations gave new intensity to long‑standing rivalries. 
This paper analyses the rivalry between Iran and Turkey in Iraq from 2003 to 2020 through the lens of international political economy, with particular emphasis on three interrelated factors: political influence over Iraq’s new state order, the struggle for energy resources and transit routes, and the attempt to dominate Iraq’s markets in the aftermath of war. The methodological approach is explanatory and analytical, relying on statistical data as well as secondary sources, while the theoretical perspective is inspired by Robert Gilpin’s neo‑realist interpretation of the global political economy. Gilpin’s framework is particularly relevant because it insists, against claims of globalization’s transcendence, that states remain the decisive agents in shaping both political and economic outcomes. 
Politically, the transformation inside Iraq after 2003 reversed the traditional Sunni dominance and elevated the Shiʿa population to the corridors of power. Before 1958, out of fifty‑nine cabinets, barely five Shiʿa ministers were ever appointed; after 2003, their dominance increased dramatically, producing not only a novel political landscape but also a fundamental shift in Iraq’s external alignments. For Iran this represented a major strategic opening, as it could rely on shared sectarian and religious ties as well as long‑standing networks built with clerics, parties, and militias. For Turkey, however, the change carried threatening implications. Ankara perceived the Shiʿa ascendancy as an extension of Iranian influence, thereby undermining the presence of actors closer to its own interests. The issue was compounded by the strengthening of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which, though initially favored by Washington, soon became an economic partner of Turkey itself, particularly through investment, trade, and energy deals. Yet this pragmatic partnership never eliminated the deeper strategic rivalry, as Ankara and Tehran positioned themselves as competitors in Baghdad’s fragile order. 
Energy constituted the second, and arguably the most strategic, ground of competition. Iraq holds around 141 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, equivalent to about 11 percent of world reserves, alongside 110 billion cubic feet of natural gas. For energy‑poor Turkey, the control and transit of these resources have long been a national priority. It is not coincidental that by the 1990s Turkish leaders floated claims over the oil fields of Kirkuk, expressing in thinly veiled terms how central northern Iraq’s hydrocarbons were too Turkish geostrategy. Iran, while possessing its own significant energy wealth, has consistently sought to integrate Iraq into a broader conception of energy corridors under its direction, including the so‑called Islamic pipeline project. However, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, especially after Washington’s exit from the nuclear agreement in 2018, rendered Iran unable to fully realize its ambitions. In contrast, Turkey through its refining corporation TÜPRAŞ and governmental agreements, embedded itself more deeply in Iraq’s oil economy.
The bargaining over oil pipelines, the struggle to capture contracts, and the political maneuvering within Baghdad’s evolving institutions are all part of one complex fabric of competitive state behavior. Iraq has therefore become not merely a post‑war fragile state but a laboratory of political economy rivalry in which neighboring states seek to maximize gains under the shadow of global sanctions, shifting alliances, and persistent insecurity. 
In conclusion, the Iraqi case between 2003 and 2020 underscores the resilience of state‑centric rivalry in the Middle East despite discourses of globalization and interdependence. Iran and Turkey have approached Iraq less as a partner and more as an arena where political influence, economic control, and energy access are contested in mutually exclusive terms. The evidence suggests that Iraq’s trajectory of development and stability will remain deeply conditioned by this rivalry, as neither state is likely to forgo opportunities to secure dominance. For international relations scholarship, the implication is that the interaction of politics and economics cannot be analyzed separately; what appears as trade or investment is simultaneously an expression of strategic rivalry. The post‑2003 history of Iraq therefore illustrates how the logic of the political economy of rivalry continues to define the regional order of West Asia. 
 
 
 

Abstract The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is a deeply rooted issue that has posed a significant challenge to the Turkish state since its inception. The emergence of Kurdish identity, in opposition to the principles of Kemalism, which emphasized Turkish nationalism, led to the marginalization of Kurds within Turkey. This dynamic was further exacerbated by the actions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), despite its initial attempts to modify the Kemalist approach to ethnic minorities. The AKP government's objectives included seeking membership in the European Union, improving relations with neighboring countries, and establishing Turkey as a prominent regional power. This strategy involved increasing soft power through democratization, resolving conflicts with neighbors, and enhancing Turkey's security. However, a discrepancy between Turkey's capabilities and resources, and its international commitments, has resulted in a widespread sense of siege, retreat, and isolation, hindering the government's ability to normalize relations with the Kurds. This research aims to analyze the Turkish government's policies towards the Kurdish minority and explore the underlying reasons for the ongoing conflict. The central question is: Why did the reforms implemented by the AKP to integrate Kurdish identity into a national unit fail, and why did the Turkish government resort to military suppression of the Kurds once again? The hypothesis suggests that these reforms failed due to Turkey's inability to address the post-Kemalist identity review of ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds. The theoretical basis of this research is constructivism, examining the roles of structure and agency in the interactive processes of governance and power. The research methodology is descriptive, utilizing data gathered from library and online resources, including articles, books, and analyses. The analysis highlights that the emphasis on Turkish nationalism and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire within Kemalism, the ideological foundation of the political coalition in the Turkish government, led to stringent national policies regarding ethnic minorities. The suppression of Kurdish identity-seeking activities and the restriction of their political and cultural autonomy have been key approaches in this area. The dominant identity in Turkey has historically been unwilling to officially recognize a distinct ethnic minority called Kurds. With the rise of the AKP, there was a move towards a multicultural approach consistent with neo-Ottomanism in dealing with minorities, opening the door to a multicultural conceptualization of Turkish citizenship. Contrary to Kemalist nationalist behavior, as long as minorities demonstrated loyalty to the Republic of Turkey, their cultural rights and expressions of national identity were not seen as major threats. However, when faced with the cultural and political demands of the Kurds, the ruling party sought to secure these rights within the framework of multiculturalism and Islamic identity. Accordingly, there were efforts to modify behavior towards the Kurds, promote the use of the Kurdish language, engage in official negotiations with Kurdish leaders, and foster economic and political relations with the independent Kurdish government in Iraq, as well as cooperate against the PKK with Syria after 2015. This process of de-escalation was ultimately unsuccessful due to internal contradictions within the Turkish government. These contradictions included the ongoing challenge from the Turkish military, which adhered to Kemalist ideology; the AKP's own internal divisions, which led it to use opposition to the Kurds to gain parliamentary victories; and the military attacks on Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, ostensibly to fight the PKK. This dynamic brought the issue of identity reconsideration in the face of Kurdish nationalism to a head. According to structural analysis, the Turkification of Kurdish identity has consistently been a major factor in the armed struggles of the Kurds, particularly through the PKK. It is essential for the Turkish government to recognize that effective policymaking and the prevention of current tensions between the Turkish government and Kurdish military forces depend on considering the official existence of Kurdish identity. An identity reconstruction that does not include these and similar issues will face resistance from the Kurds. Therefore, the policies of the AKP, while seemingly emphasizing the redefinition of national identity based on pluralistic principles, are still heavily influenced by the spirit of Kemalism. This underlying tension between an apparent desire for pluralism and the deep-rooted adherence to Turkish nationalism has hindered meaningful progress in resolving the conflict. The situation is further complicated by the ongoing military actions against Kurdish groups in neighboring countries, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish government's perception of these groups as threats to national security. These actions, while ostensibly aimed at combating the PKK, often result in civilian casualties and further alienate the Kurdish population. The history of conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds includes significant events like the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, and subsequent uprisings in the 1930s, which were met with severe military crackdowns and the suppression of Kurdish cultural expression. The Turkish government's approach has often been to deny the existence of a distinct Kurdish identity and to characterize the Kurdish issue as a problem caused by external factors, like the influence of neighboring countries. This denial has fueled further unrest and created a cycle of violence. The PKK, formed in the late 1970s, has been a central element of this conflict, engaging in armed struggle for greater Kurdish autonomy. Despite periods of ceasefire and peace negotiations, the conflict continues due to a lack of fundamental change in the Turkish government's approach to Kurdish identity and rights. The ongoing tensions also highlight the complex geopolitical considerations, with Turkey viewing Kurdish groups in neighboring countries with suspicion, while these same groups are sometimes allies of western powers. Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding the degree of influence Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, still has on the organization and whether he can meaningfully contribute to any peace process. The conflict is exacerbated by the use of military force and airstrikes by the Turkish military in the region, which has often led to civilian deaths and injuries. The Turkish government's attempts to establish itself as a regional power have also complicated the issue, as its pursuit of strategic interests has sometimes been at odds with the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question. Ultimately, the persistent conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is a result of Turkey's inability to reconcile its unitary national identity with the demands of its Kurdish population for recognition, autonomy, and cultural rights. The failure of the AKP's reforms can be attributed to the deep-rooted influence of Kemalist ideology, the internal contradictions within the ruling party, and the complex regional dynamics, which all have contributed to a cycle of violence and instability. A lasting resolution requires a fundamental shift in the Turkish government's approach, one that moves beyond suppression and towards genuine recognition and acceptance of Kurdish identity and rights. This will necessitate a significant change in how the Turkish state constructs its national identity and how it views the role and place of ethnic minorities within its borders.
 
 

Abstract The initiator of the politicization of water in most of the previously mentioned and the most profound findings is that water has become one of the important and influential factors in a region. It has been a key factor contributing to tension and conflicts between countries in the past and present, and it will continue to impact grazing policies in the future.
One of the characteristics of arid and semi-arid regions is the problem of water, its fragile ecosystems. That is, the pressures caused by dam construction, along with factors such as climate change and global warming, have increased this fragility.
Previously, some experts in the field of geopolitics claimed that in the future, water will replace oil as a rare and expensive commodity and will be the main focus of disputes and compromises in the coming decade. This claim has now been demonstrated following the large-scale implementation of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) in Turkey. We see this trend in the Middle East, especially in the countries that are along the path of the aforementioned water flow.
Today, the Middle East is witnessing a relative shift in the source of power from oil to water on one hand and mismanagement of its inter-basin governance on the other hand. This shift, coupled with the scarcity of this resource and global climate changes, has led Turkey to cede control over its water resources due to the implementation of the GAP megaproject. Turkey uses this as a bargaining chip to advance its developmental policies in the region, particularly in countries that rely on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, while simultaneously disregarding the repeated pleas of its neighbors (Iran, Syria, and Iraq) concerning water rights.
In addition, this plan has diminished the water resources flowing out of Turkey, resulting in detrimental consequences for the ecosystems of countries along the path of these water resources. It has led to environmental, economic, and social damages.
Therefore, according to the assertion of the Turkish government, which is grounded in the implementation of the GAP plan for sustainable economic development, this matter has been analyzed within the framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The conclusion is reached that while Turkey's hydraulic initiatives seem to offer water security across various sectors, the downside, from Copenhagen's perspective, is the creation of new security challenges for other stakeholders. The continued pursuit of Turkey's hydraulic strategy, regardless of the dimensions and the political, social, economic, and environmental impacts of this plan, is poised to have far-reaching and irreversible consequences.
And this vital resource has been turned into a means to gain political power and influence in Turkey. The reverse of the claim has been proven: the GAP project is in line with human-centered development and sustainable economic growth. However, it has been aimed at creating economic power, advancing political goals, and achieving blue hegemony. This process leads to multilateral damages with wide consequences in the countries affected by this project.
It is attempting to leverage its water resources against the oil resources of the Persian Gulf countries by defining and implementing numerous water projects through a hydraulic mission strategy. However, this approach disregards the environmental, social, economic, and political dimensions and consequences.
In such a way that the hydrological system of the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, which constitutes the vital artery of West Asia, has been disturbed. This process, from Copenhagen’s point of view, has created a potential basis and capacity for conflict and threats in the region. By reducing the amount of water input in the downstream section, it has caused environmental crises. Meanwhile, the effects of the environmental assessment reveal that the GAP project does not align with the internal governance of the countries and has extra-regional effects.
Therefore, on the one hand, making water security dependent on water resources outside the country effectively ties a part of national security to the region. The absence of management structures for joint exploitation and water governance has transformed it into a factor that contributes to crises between countries. In this context, it is possible to highlight the connection between the Turkish GAP project’s ideological understanding of politics and economy and the concept of security and sustainable development within the framework of the Copenhagen school.
In other words, considering that the ideological understanding of the principle of excellence and its reproduction prioritizes it over other factors. Elements such as the environment, economic growth, and social welfare, which define the concept of security and sustainable development in the Copenhagen school, become victims of this principle of project excellence. The GAP in Turkey, when security standards are reduced in various aspects, increases its structural ideological function in the public domain.
Concepts such as security, in all its aspects, undergo a fundamental transformation. This evolutionary change of the GAP project is related to the instability of the development space and the discourse of development and sustainable development worldwide. The GAP plan is largely a product of concepts, norms, and criteria borrowed from other places, without considering its compatibility with Turkey’s own internal conditions, sensitivities, concerns, and internal demands. As a result, many concepts, goals, and activities are in conflict with each other.
Using the descriptive-analytical method and library and media sources, this research seeks to answer the question: How will Turkey’s GAP project cause a crisis in the Middle East, especially in the downstream countries of this project? According to the Copenhagen school, the findings indicate that the implementation of the GAP project will result in the political dependence of downstream countries on Turkey. Additionally, it will lead to extensive damage and consequences in these countries, encompassing five security threats: environmental, social, economic, political, and military. These destructive consequences align with Turkey’s ideology, as it treats water as a source of power similar to oil.
In the meantime, Iran, together with the countries affected by the GAP plan, can form a regional confederation at two levels: "regional diplomacy" and "joint management of transboundary waters" to manage the environmental risks of the Turkish GAP plan. If regional diplomacy fails, Iran can pursue this issue legally through international organizations and The Hague Court.
 

Abstract The Syrian crisis has been one of the most complex international issues in the last decade, which has become a source of competition between regional and global powers due to the length of time and the number of effective actors. This country has been one of the strategic goals of foreign policy, on the one hand, as the most focal country of the axis of resistance for Iran, and on the other hand, as a strategic depth in Turkey's Ottomanism policy. In this article, within the framework of the theory of soft power, with a comparative approach, we want to answer the question that what are the commonalities and differences between the two countries of Iran and Turkey in the application of soft power to the Syrian crisis? In response to this hypothesis, the foundation of the soft power of the two countries based on different historical, religious and political values has caused similarities and contradictions in the use of soft power of the two countries after the Syrian crisis. Data from library and documentary sources have been collected and the challenges and opportunities of the two countries' soft power in relation to the Syrian crisis have been compared descriptively and analytically.
The emergence of a process called globalization has led to the emergence of new forms of power and, accordingly, new forms of security interactions. Investigating the nature of power in today's global politics has given birth to a concept called soft power and creating a place for it in international politics. Sources of soft power, unlike hard power which has a military and economic basis, are based on culture and thought. Of course, according to Joseph Nye, soft power is more than cultural power. Soft power relies on both the policy agenda setting method and the power of absorption (Nye, 2008: 151). The Islamic Revolution of Iran has been an effective phenomenon in the Middle East region due to its appeal in its slogans, goals, methods, content and common religious, historical, and regional and international conditions. This revolution caused a kind of Islamic awakening and revival based on the return to the ideology and school of Islam, and especially in the young generation, it created a kind of fascination and return to Islamic thoughts and ideas. An idea that believes that Islam has all human affairs to manage human affairs (Blanks, 1999: 88. Considering that culture is considered one of the most important sources of soft power and religion as the main manifestation of culture is one of the main foundations of the Islamic revolution, the republican system According to its ideological background and geopolitical and geostrategic position, Islamic Iran has huge aspects of soft power.
In Iran's neighborhood, the entry of Islamists into Turkey's political scene turned the country's politicians' eyes from Europe to the Middle East. Turkey correctly realized that decades of looking to the West and over-emphasis on Europe and America have led to a one-sided and unbalanced foreign policy for this country. For this reason, Turkey looked at Islamic countries and the West at the same time (Öztürk and Baser, 2022: 714). Due to Turkey's history, culture and many commonalities with Middle East countries, this country quickly became an active player in the regional arena, and Turkish politicians, by introducing themselves as a successful model of combining religion and democracy in the governance arena, put their efforts in increasing soft power and Its acceptability among the educated youth and the middle class in the Arab countries of the Middle East (Ismaili et al., 2016: 181).
Following the Arab Spring and the instability of the Arab governments, Takfiri groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, by occupying a large part of the Syrian territory and the severe weakness of the government of this country, brought Syria into a crisis that has continued to this day, and at the same time, most of the country's infrastructure has been destroyed. became. This crisis turned Syria into a field of conflict between big and regional powers, including Turkey and Iran, to gain regional influence and hegemony. This question is raised, what are the commonalities and differences between the two countries of Iran and Turkey in the use of soft power in the wake of the Syrian crisis? In response to this hypothesis, the foundation of the soft power of the two countries based on different historical, religious and political values has caused similarities and contradictions in the use of soft power of the two countries after the Syrian crisis. By comparing the opportunities and challenges of using soft power in combination with the hard power of two countries, we try to show which country's strategy in Syria was accompanied by relative success or failure.
 
It seems that Turkish politicians consider the developments in Syria as an opportunity to expand their influence, increase their role and ultimately, regional hegemony, but not using a principled approach in facing the Syrian crisis, incurring high costs and eroding the political and security crises in Syria, causes disruption of soft power. And the regional position of the Turkish government in the region has been degraded. On the other hand, field realities such as the stability and relative stability of the Syrian government after the country's crisis and the defeat of Takfiri groups show that Iran's approach to regional influence and maintaining strategic depth in Syria has strengthened Iran's position and increased its soft power.
 

Abstract Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the turkey had problems with this country over issues such as the political activities of the Kurds in PKK and how to divide the Euphrates water and Iskanderun province together. However, since 2011, turkey's foreign policy has become aggressive to the extent that it has provided logistical support as well as supported the establishment of a no-fly zone and military interventions in Syria, and in the last decade has become an active and influential actor in has become the region. Erdoğan government's uneven policies during this period have shown that Turkey has changed its positions many times to keep its interests in Syria stable. He considered the groups useful in achieving their goals in Syria, but it was not long before the extremist thought of a group like ISIS reached Turkey, which considers this country a tyranny, and Turkey's security environment faced insecurity. Besides these issues and solving these concerns, Turkey can also pursue its geopolitical interests. by showing strength in the field of Syrian conflicts, by trying to introduce itself as the superior power of the region, which is also present in NATO, and increase its strategic depth in the region, it can even reach the leadership of the modern Islamic world with the perspective of Latinism, like in the Ottoman era. On the way to achieving his goals in Syria, he can control the source of the Euphrates River and exert pressure on the Syrian government to force them to fulfill their wishes, and by turning this issue, he can go towards oil resources and oil fields and compensate for his lack of resources. Slow down and enter the field of oil geopolitics.
Methodology
The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical, which has a fundamental nature. In this research, using library studies and field findings, an attempt has been made to investigate Turkey's geopolitical interests and concerns in Syria. In the library findings section, books, media, theses, articles, and internet resources have been used, and field findings have been obtained through a questionnaire (50 items) received from experts in the field of political geography, geopolitics, political science, and international relations. Whose results have been analyzed using Spss software and T-Test?  
Findings
According to the library and field findings that were obtained through the questionnaire and its analysis by the relevant statistical test, it was determined that the strategic position of Syria and its position in the strategic depth of Turkey are the most important in terms of Turkey's geopolitical interest in Syria and gaining power. The Turkish element and their autonomy, as well as the influence of regional powers such as Iran, create the most important geopolitical concern for Turkey in Syria.
Analysis and conclusion
According to the findings of the research, we come to the conclusion that after the justice and Development Party came to power, the theoretical background of the country's foreign policy was founded by Ahmet Davutoğlu with the name of strategic depth, and he believed that Turkey, due to its unique geographical location, its cultural and historical depth, as a result of the Ottoman Empire, should be the main country that injects the power and glory of the Ottoman period in a new form to Turkey, which has political and ideological alignment tendencies with the west. Even Islam should be introduced in a new form to the leadership of Turkey that is democratized and does not conflict with western politics. In order to achieve these goals, he must create a mental structure in the form of Ottomanism thinking in the countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire and he wants to expand his influence in them. Creating a savior mindset from Turkey will help significantly in this country's rise to power in the region. This mentality shows that countries like Syria are like a toddler in Turkey's mind that has not yet been able to communicate with political independence and must face political and ideological salvation. Ideological depiction of Turkey through tools such as movies and series indicates that this government has taken steps to create this mentality. If we look at this country's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Akhrani regime in Syria, we will find that the desired behavior structure of Turkey was found in these groups, which is the wife of Turkey's interests. And the Kurdish minority in Turkey has been ignored and suppressed by the Turkish authorities for years, to the extent that they feel like second-class citizens, and now these pan-Kurdish and greater Kurdistan claims in Syria can create a unity that is more dangerous for Turkey than for countries that have a Kurdish population and this geopolitical concern can justify aggressive behavior and, of course, from Turkey's point of view, military defensive behavior in Syria. The danger of the Kurds is so great for Turkey that it uses a concern like terrorist-takfiri forces to face the Kurds, and defeat them because this autonomy is dangerous for the future goals of this country.
According to the library and field findings that were obtained through the questionnaire and its analysis by the relevant statistical test, it was determined that the strategic position of Syria and its position in the strategic depth of Turkey are the most important in terms of Turkey's geopolitical interest in Syria and the empowerment of the Kurdish element and their autonomy and Also, the influence of regional powers like Iran creates the most important geopolitical concern for Turkey in Syria. Therefore, according to the research findings, we reach these results:
After the establishment of the Justice and Development Party, Ahmad Davdaglu founded the theoretical framework of this country's foreign policy under the name of strategic depth. He believed that Turkey, due to its unique geographical location, and cultural and historical depth as a result of the Ottoman Empire, should be a major country that injects the power and glory of the Ottoman period in a new form into a Turkey that has political and ideological alignment tendencies with the West. Even Islam should be introduced to Turkish leadership in a new form that is democratized and does not conflict with Western politics. In order to achieve these goals, he must create a mental structure in the form of Ottomanism in the countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire and he wants to expand his influence in them. Creating a savior mentality from Turkey will help significantly in this country's rise to power in the region. This mentality shows that countries like Syria in Turkey's mind are like a toddler who has not yet been able to communicate with political independence and must face political and ideological salvation. The ideological depiction of Turkey with tools such as films and series shows that this government has taken steps to create this mentality. If we look at this country's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Brotherhood order in Syria, we will find that the behavior structure desired by Turkey was found in these groups, which is in line with Turkey's interests.

Abstract There is great importance to use economic diplomacy in foreign policy; especially in those countries, in addition to having a great potential economic, have other commonalities such as cultural and historical commonalities. The field of international relations is heavily influenced by cultural and identity factors. Therefore, gaining reputation and influence in a country or the region are among the important goals of states in diplomacy, which is commensurate with their position, each country’s cultural opportunities, and capacities are pursued in a variety of ways and mechanisms.
Turkey has good potential for cooperation with the Central Asian Republics in the economic field due to its cultural history with the countries and having a high level of economic development in the region. One of the Principles of Turkey’s foreign policy during the AK Party era (2002-2020) is having close relations with the Central Asian countries. For Turkey, it is important to strengthen economic diplomacy with countries in the region because of having a shared culture with them.
The main question is “How is the economic diplomacy of Turkey during the AKP era in the Central Asia region?” and the sub-question is “What are the factors of economic diplomacy of Turkey in the Central Asia region during the AKP era?”
Six indicators of economic diplomacy that are part of the foreign policy of the developmental government are presented as trade growth based on export development strategy, attracting foreign investment and foreign contracting policy, free and preferential trade agreements, harmonious relations with all, positive interaction with international economic institutions and creating a positive image which are briefly explained below:
Increasing foreign trade: There is a positive correlation between an efficient foreign policy, a strong economy, and a strong foreign trade. Some, such as Gershon Feder, argue that the impact of exports on GDP is not limited to GDP growth
Attract foreign investment and expand contracting: Overseas investment and export of foreign engineering and contracting technical services, in addition to laying the groundwork for the soft power of the exporting country, will also lead to long-term interdependence and the creation of national wealth. Newly industrialized countries not only attract foreign investment but also strengthen a country’s foreign trade by transferring capital abroad and contracting abroad. This leads to the creation of new markets and the exercise of soft power in the target countries.
Free and preferential trade agreements: Agreements between countries that are not necessarily in a geographical area and include actions taken by governments to facilitate trade through free trade agreements or customs unions. Efforts to achieve systematic conditions for the national development strategy are made through bargaining and international trade negotiations through free and preferential trade agreements.
Harmonious relationship with everyone: The foreign policy of a country like a businessman can communicate with all potential customers and the strategy of a successful actor is to attract more capital apart from personal interest. This strategy seeks positive interaction with all potential markets and related governments.
Positive interaction with international economic institutions: A government must use the resources and guidelines of international business and financial institutions in line with its business and economic vision. Apart from decision-making independence and political power, constructive interaction with these institutions is very effective.
Positive image: The classification of countries into two categories, positive and negative, is examined under the heading of image or mentality in international relations. Each image contains cognitive information from another country in these areas: culture, capability (military, economic), security, democracy, and so on. Depending on the type of image presented by the actors, they and others interact with it. These images are usually formed in the minds of individuals and leaders for a long time, and in the face of situations, people use only pre-made images and words to make decisions. This index does not fall into the category of formal economic diplomacy, but indirectly has a positive effect on target markets and practically plays the role of informal economic diplomacy.
The hypothesis to answer the two questions is: “Turkey's economic diplomacy in Central Asia during the AKP era has worked efficiently and effectively.  The Economic Diplomacy of Turkey in the region during the AKP era can be explained through 6 factors of economic diplomacy in the Foreign Policy of the Developmentalist Government, which are: trade growth based on export development strategy, foreign investment attraction and foreign contracting policy, free and preferential trade agreements, harmonious relationship with all, Positive Interaction with International Economic Institutions and creating a positive image. Turkey’s economic diplomacy in the Central Asian region has been pursued seriously in the region and has used its cultural and economic potential at a good level in the region during the AK Party.
This article, analyzed the level of this relationship is analyzed by analyzing the data on Turkey’s economic diplomacy in the Central Asia region, especially with the focus on the 6 factors. Methodology Type in this thesis is Descriptive-Analytical and the data Gathering Methods are Library methods and Internet Resources. This thesis is based on an explanatory research methodology. The Methods of Data Analysis are Quantitative-Qualitative.

Abstract 1.Introduction
In the recent years, a scientific look to the future and the attempt to obtain a scientific perspective of the future to make a strategic plan suited to the coming changes of the future have found a way to the academic circles, and this has let futures studies become an approved methodology among the researchers. Future studies helps decision-makers to get prepared to confront with the different scenarios and reduce the costs of decisions by giving a picture of factors affecting the future and a view of probable futures. So, the ability to identify the probable scenarios in the future relations of Iran with its neighboring countries can be one of the many applications of futures research, and the preface to that is the identification of the key factors affecting the future.
Turkey is one of the most important neighbors of Iran. Iran and Turkey are two important and effective political players in the region. They have various geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural competencies that help them be supplementary partners for one another. Of the common features of Iran and Turkey is their alternate sovereignty over many West Asian countries throughout history. This has influenced the culture of those countries. But due to special features of this region, the political, security, and economic aspects of the relations between these two countries have been highly stressed, and cultural relations have been to some extent neglected. Therefore, the cultural relations of these two countries are not at a reasonable level, despite the presence of potential capacity.
2.Methodology
The present study follows a future studies approach to find the answer to the question of what are the key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. This research is exploratory in nature, practical in purpose, mixed in data gathering, and correlational in data analysis.
In the current research, first, effective cultural variables on the future relations of Iran and Turkey are identified. Then, based on the experts' opinions, factors and grounds that affect Iran-Turkey relations are determined. Variables whose impact is confirmed by experts will be cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. This study will also examine the factors in terms of importance and uncertainty to grasp the key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. Experts in this research are grouped into two categories: executive and academic.
3.Discussion
Cultural variables affecting Iran-Turkey relations were identified by examining written sources and interviewing experts. These variables are: Ethnic commonalities between Iran and Turkey, which considers the ethnic commonalities of Turks and Kurds in the two countries; ethnic differences between Iran and Turkey that indicates the amity/enmity patterns; historical-cultural commonalities in the Persian language which deals with the Turkish people interest and teaching Persian in Turkish universities; religious commonalities between Iran and Turkey, which refers to the two countries being Muslim and to Islam as a common religion; religious differences (Shia-Sunni) between Iran and Turkey are also discussed; common cultural customs (weddings, mourning, food culture, music, art, etc.) and cultural connections and exchanges (holding film, music, and book week-rituals) are also factors that affect Iran-Turkey relations. Variables like Pan-Turkism and the probability of Turkey supporting Pan-Turkic separatist groups in Iran, the relationship between Iran and the Alawites in Turkey, the national registration of Iranian cultural and scientific figures by Turkey, the competition for soft power in West Asia, the competition for soft power in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Iran's relationship with Shiites and supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Turkey were also examined.
4.Conclusion
By distributing a questionnaire among 35 experts on Iran-Turkey relations and adopting the IPA analytical method, the factors whose importance and uncertainty were higher than the threshold value were identified. Except for the variable of national registration of Iranian cultural figures by Turkey whose validity was not confirmed, other variables were identified as cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. Finally, with the identification of the threshold value, the five factors of ethnic commonalities between Iran and Turkey, Pan-Turkism and the probability of Turkish support for Pan-Turkish movements in Iran, competitions for soft power in West Asia and Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Iran's relationship with Shiites and supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Turkey were identified as key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations.

Abstract Important countries in the Muslim world - Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia - are seeking to influence Muslims and gain leadership in the Islamic world with three Shiite, Brotherhood and Wahhabi discourses. The three countries that are trying their policies to create a new regional order become the dominant hegemony in the Muslim world. With huge energy reserves, important geopolitical and strategic positions, emphasis on religion and the Islamic Revolution, Saudi Arabia with its huge oil resources, the Holy Shrine and the birthplace of Islam and Turkey are each pursuing their own policies in the region due to the strategic importance and discourse of postmodernism. . These three rivals seek to increase their weight in regional and world equations by increasing economic, political and cultural power to influence the decisions of the Muslim world. In this article we seek to answer the question of how the future of the Islamic world will be shaped by regional powers that are not ideologically compatible. From a futuristic perspective, understanding and understanding of ongoing trends in the Muslim world will have an impact on this world. In fact, the future of the Muslim world depends on what decisions the Islamic powers and the Muslim Ummah make and what they will do in the context of their ideas and desires.