The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract This research was conducted with the aim of identifying the key factors influencing the relations between Iran and the Zionist regime, designing potential future scenarios (2025–2035), assessing their likelihood and consequences, and proposing strategic responses. This descriptive-analytical study adopts a futurology approach using the scenario analysis method. The statistical population consisted of relevant scientific sources, and purposive sampling was employed. Secondary data were collected through a review of Persian and Latin sources (library and documentary). Findings indicate that key factors include ideology, the nuclear program, geopolitics, security, economy, cyber warfare, and the role of major powers. By integrating the moderating variable of “domestic political transformations in Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime,” four scenarios were designed: 1) Balance of Power World, 2) Diplomacy and Limited Tension World, 3) Hidden War World, and 4) Direct Confrontation World. Probability assessment reveals that the “Hidden War” scenario is highly probable, acting as a dynamic equilibrium resilient to political shocks. The “Diplomacy and Limited Tension” scenario is likely in the short term but unstable in the long term. The “Balance of Power” scenario has a low to medium probability, while the “Direct Confrontation” scenario has a low probability, though it remains a critical tail risk with catastrophic consequences. The conclusion suggests that the probability of widespread war is low, but indirect tensions will persist. Strategic responses are proposed for Iran

Abstract The present study aims to analyze the consequences of the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran on regional security, the balance of power in West Asia, and the responses of regional and international actors. The main research question is: "How can the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran be analyzed from the perspectives of network geopolitics and critical security, and what are its security and geopolitical consequences?" The research hypothesis posits that the short-term war by the Zionist regime against Iran, by disrupting the political, economic, and security networks of the region, intensifies long-term geopolitical consequences as well as human and regional security threats. The findings, utilizing a combination of network geopolitics (to analyze complex relations among regional and extra-regional actors) and critical security approaches (to examine human, social, and beyond-military consequences), along with qualitative analysis based on case studies, secondary sources, and content analysis of political and security data, demonstrate that the 12-Day War disrupted regional networks, weakened collective security and regional cooperation, and threatened the geopolitical stability of West Asia. This study emphasizes the importance of network-based analysis and a critical approach in understanding regional crises and provides strategies for strengthening collective security and preventive diplomacy.

Abstract In recent years, hedging theory has played a prominent role in analyzing the behavior of units in international politics. While in past studies, these behaviors were followed by countries in a haphazard manner, there have been no coherent theories to examine different patterns in the field. Now, with the changing environment of economic cooperation and structural changes in the international system, each country is pursuing its hedging path differently from the others. In this context, the research problem ahead is to analyze the hedging pattern in Iran and Saudi Arabia as two neighboring powers in the West Asian region and relatively similar political powers. Accordingly, the main question of the present study is: Based on what patterns of hedging do the two countries behave in economic diplomacy and what consequences does each of these patterns bring? The research findings indicate that Iran has moved towards a reactive hedging model in a situation where external pressures on the one hand and lack of decision-making coherence on the other have led the country to a level of reactivity to dominant global patterns. In contrast, the Saudi government, based on its development strategy, has adopted a coherent hedging model. At the same time, both models have been relatively implemented in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and their full realization depends on maintaining the status quo in the coming years. The research method of this article is based on the data analysis method and is based on a descriptive-analytical model.

Abstract Iran, relying on its geopolitical necessities and foundations—including its strategic and transit position, human and natural characteristics, and its historical centrality in the Islamic world—is considered a regional power in Southwest Asia. Given this description, global and extra-regional powers such as the United States and the Israeli regime—which are present in this region based on their self-interest—are striving either to bring Iran under their hegemony and domination, or to diminish and prevent Iran's independent behavior in Southwest Asia. Prioritizing the elimination of Iran as the leading pole of the Islamic world—which is attempting to counter their sphere of influence in regional countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—they seek to achieve their interests. A true understanding of the components, capabilities, and facilities of each country—in a word, its geopolitical foundations—on the one hand, and on the other hand, the formulation of goals, policies, and programs aimed at ensuring national security and national power, which is the same as geopolitical dignity and status, in fact serves as a guiding light for any international actor. Iran, with its geopolitical foundations influenced by its geography, has always been the focus of world countries, especially global powers, throughout history.
The political and strategic environment of the Islamic Republic is located within overlapping circles of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Southwest Asia. The unique nature of Iran after the Islamic Revolution throughout its historical periods is such that it can emerge and function as a regional power. It is obvious that for many reasons, including proximity to the Persian Gulf and centrality in the Islamic world, especially Shiism, these are among the most fundamental attachments of Iran. Iran's powerful presence on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean is the result of all the mentioned characteristics and is influenced by energy, the first revolution, and is the best evidence that Iran is at the expected level of this writing. However, the extensive presence of international powers and the clash of their interests with Iran's presence have created serious obstacles for what Iran deserves.
The United States has also been the main extra-regional actor and power influencing the security processes of West Asia, especially the Persian Gulf region, over the past four decades, and has planned and implemented various security schemes for this region. The expansion of military bases in the countries of this area and the frequent movement of American ships and submarines in the waters of the Persian Gulf are evidence of this importance. Moreover, specifically after September 11, in the US strategy, while energy issues and the Arab-Israeli conflict remained, communism gave way to terrorism. On the other hand, the Israeli regime, as a strategic partner of the United States, has shown great concern and sensitivity towards regional developments, and its political and intelligence apparatuses have precisely monitored and continue to monitor these developments. This is because the Israeli regime has faced significant and serious security constraints and challenges since its formation.
In Southwest Asia, Iran—due to its various geographical advantages, its adjacency to the world's geopolitical and geostrategic regions throughout different historical periods, its special transit position, its location within the strategic energy ellipse and other economic advantages, and especially its cultural centrality, its position as the center of Shiism, and its pivotal role in the Islamic world—can play a greater role than its national and geographical power. This role will be influential in regional politics and order, and if this role materializes and comes to fruition, it will be an important factor for enhancing Iran's position, organizing relations and the perspective of other regional countries toward Iran, and most importantly, for establishing order and progressing toward regional security in the future.
In this article, utilizing library documents and a descriptive-analytical method, we seek to answer the question of to what extent Iran's presence in Southwest Asia possesses the necessary geopolitical logic and necessity, and what are the geopolitical results and dimensions of Iran's independent behavior and presence in this region? Undoubtedly, Iran, by emphasizing its geopolitical characteristics, can play its special role in Southwest Asia.

Abstract The foreign policy of every state is shaped by a complex interplay of geopolitical determinants, strategic interests, and relative advantages within both regional and international systems. The Islamic Republic of Iran, owing to its unique geopolitical position, has experienced a new phase of regional interaction since the 1979 revolution. A pivotal yet often strained aspect of this engagement has been its relationship with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despite deep-seated historical, cultural, and geographical commonalities, relations between Iran and these Arab states over the past four decades have been characterized by a notable lack of strategic depth and stability. This instability is largely attributed to divergent security perceptions, interventions by extra-regional actors, and a chronic deficiency in technical and non-political cooperation frameworks.
Concurrently, the GCC countries, despite significant investment in healthcare infrastructure, grapple with pressing health challenges, particularly a rising burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These challenges are compounded by a scarcity of specialized medical personnel and a heavy reliance on expensive and often inaccessible treatment services from outside the region. In this context, leveraging Iran's proven comparative advantages in modern technologies, specifically within the field of nuclear medicine, presents a novel opportunity for functional cooperation and the strengthening of regional ties. Nuclear medicine, which relies on the production and clinical application of radiopharmaceuticals, is a critical tool for the early diagnosis and effective treatment of debilitating diseases, most notably various forms of cancer. According to the World Health Organization, the most prevalent cancers in the Gulf region—including breast, lung, colorectal, and liver cancer—require sophisticated diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Iran, building on its substantial research and technological infrastructure, holds a prominent position in the Middle East and North Africa region and ranks 17th globally in the fields of medicine and pharmaceuticals. This standing, combined with its indigenous production capabilities and expertise in radiopharmaceuticals, creates an unparalleled opportunity for technological collaboration with its neighbors. Given the global supply constraints for certain radiopharmaceuticals, their short half-lives necessitating immediate use, and significant cost implications, the development of nuclear medicine tourism emerges as a practical solution for patients with specific ailments.
The central research question of this study is: How can nuclear medicine, as a technological and therapeutic capability, serve as a catalyst for convergence between Iran and the GCC member states? To address this question, the present study utilizes David Mitrany's theory of functionalism as its analytical framework. It examines three key variables: the shared need for advanced healthcare (the independent variable), Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities (the intervening variable), and the consequent strengthening of regional cooperation and convergence (the dependent variable). The primary objective of this research is to elucidate the role of Iran's nuclear medicine capacities in promoting regional collaboration, focusing on technical, therapeutic, and infrastructural indicators. This core objective is supported by secondary goals: identifying healthcare needs of GCC states regarding NCDs; investigating Iran's prowess in producing and transferring nuclear medicine technologies; analyzing the feasibility of scientific cooperation and medical tourism based on the functionalist model; and evaluating the long-term impact of such collaborations on deepening political and economic relations.
Methodologically, the research employs a qualitative content analysis approach. Data were sourced from a rigorous examination of scientific documents, international reports, specialized nuclear medicine data, and semi-structured interviews with Iranian officials and experts in this domain. The collected data were meticulously analyzed through the lens of Mitrany's functionalist theory to explicate the relationship between shared needs, technological performance, and the potential for cooperation to expand to broader regional levels.
A systematic review of existing literature reveals a significant gap. Prior research on Iran-GCC relations has predominantly concentrated on security dimensions, geopolitical rivalries, and energy matters, largely neglecting the potential of non-political technical-functional partnerships. The review identifies two distinct and disconnected bodies of work: one focused on the technical and medical aspects of nuclear medicine, examining Iran's capabilities and the region's needs in isolation; and another centered on political-security analyses, often making cooperation contingent on resolving security dilemmas and overlooking the central role of non-political technologies. No comprehensive study has employed Mitrany's functionalist framework to specifically analyze how peaceful nuclear cooperation, particularly in medicine, could bridge the gap between these technical and political spheres.
The theoretical underpinning is Mitrany's classic functionalist theory (1943). In A Working Peace System, Mitrany posits that technical cooperation in apolitical fields—such as health—can, by fostering a "habit of cooperation," build trust and gradually create a "spill-over" effect, paving the way for collaboration in more sensitive political matters. Iran's advancements in nuclear medicine are substantial and internationally recognized. With 155 nuclear medicine centers and 200 gamma cameras, it ranks second in the region after Turkey in infrastructure. Iran is also one of the region's leading producers of radiopharmaceuticals, manufacturing 60 radiopharmaceuticals with 20 more in clinical trials. This progress, achieved despite significant international sanctions, underscores the nation's technological resilience. Advantages include specialized personnel trained over six decades, advanced imaging technologies like PET and SPECT, and cost-effective production of diagnostic and therapeutic radioisotopes, directly improving patient outcomes through early detection, diagnostic precision, and effective treatment.
Conversely, despite ambitious national programs for nuclear power, GCC states face significant lag in human resources and infrastructure necessary for advanced nuclear medicine. Data from the International Agency for Research on Cancer reveals a growing cancer burden, with Saudi Arabia accounting for nearly 75% of approximately 254,000 cases recorded in the Arab Gulf states over the past two decades. This escalating health crisis, characterized by high costs and reliance on foreign healthcare, creates a pressing common need—a cornerstone of Mitrany's theory.
Applying the functionalist framework, this study identifies several convergent components. First is the common need: the universal imperative to ensure public health and combat the shared threat of NCDs. Second is functional performance: the practical, problem-solving approach of addressing health needs through specific, non-political mechanisms like medical treatment and technology transfer. Third is the spill-over effect: the probability that successful technical cooperation will create precedents and institutional linkages, which can extend to other areas of economic and scientific interaction. Fourth is technical self-determination: the principle that functional organizations can be structured flexibly to meet immediate needs without imposing overarching political systems. Finally, voluntary cooperation is central: all states can participate based on self-perceived benefit, as all stand to gain from improved public health without compromising sovereignty.
In conclusion, this research demonstrates that Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities represent not merely a technical asset but a potent and untapped strategic instrument for fostering regional convergence. By framing this collaboration through a functionalist lens, the study provides a novel model for scientific diplomacy. It argues that by focusing on shared health imperatives, Iran and its Arab neighbors can bypass deep-seated political rivalries to build trust and interdependence. The findings strongly suggest that medical nuclear cooperation is a feasible, cost-effective, and politically viable mechanism to improve health indicators and lay the groundwork for deeper and more stable political and economic relationships in the Persian Gulf region. This approach fills a critical void between technical and security-focused studies and offers a pragmatic pathway to transform a point of contention into a platform for shared prosperity and peace.

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most complex bilateral relationships in the Persian Gulf region over the past five decades. These relations have continuously been influenced by a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors and have fluctuated between economic cooperation, geopolitical competition, and security tensions. Although relations between the two countries reached one of their most confrontational periods between 2016 and 2020, signs of de-escalation and a return to diplomacy have emerged since 2021, coinciding with political changes in both the United States and Iran. Utilizing a descriptive-explanatory method, drawing upon library and electronic sources, and employing the Constructivist framework, this study examines three possible patterns for the future of Iran-UAE relations: the Hobbesian model (confrontation and hostility), the Lockean model (managed competition), and the Kantian model (cooperation and friendship). The findings indicate that the most probable scenario for the future of bilateral relations is the model of managed competition. In the first model, namely the dominance of Hobbesian culture, relations between Iran and the UAE move toward increased tension, mistrust, and the possibility of military confrontation. The most significant domestic factor underlying this situation is the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran considers these islands an inseparable part of its territory, whereas the UAE claims sovereignty over them and has consistently sought to raise the issue in international forums. This historical dispute has persisted since the establishment of the UAE in 1971 and has become a significant symbol of political and identity-based competition between the two countries. From Tehran’s perspective, sovereignty over these islands is non-negotiable, whereas Abu Dhabi insists on resolving the issue through negotiations or international arbitration. At the regional level, geopolitical competition has also played a major role in the formation of Hobbesian culture. Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the UAE’s concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence increased substantially. Developments in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen war, and the expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and across the region were viewed by the UAE as threats to the regional balance of power. The Yemen war became the most important arena of indirect competition between the two countries. The UAE supported forces opposed to Ansar Allah, while Iran provided political and strategic support to the movement. Drone attacks on Abu Dhabi and reciprocal confrontations in Yemen further intensified mistrust between the two states. The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020 constituted another factor contributing to heightened tensions. Iran viewed this development as a threat to its national security and warned against the security and intelligence presence of Israel near its borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the expansion of military and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel could alter the regional security balance to Iran’s detriment. Consequently, the growing ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to improving Iran-UAE relations. At the international level, the UAE’s security dependence on the United States has also been a major factor in generating tensions. The UAE views the American military presence as a guarantee of its security, while Iran considers the presence of U.S. forces in the region a direct threat to its national security. American military bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Iran significantly exacerbated bilateral tensions in recent years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the UAE as a threat to regional stability, leading Abu Dhabi to consistently support international pressure against Tehran. In contrast, the second model, namely Lockean culture or managed competition, emphasizes the control of tensions and the preservation of limited interactions. This model is based on the assumption that both countries recognize the extremely high costs of direct confrontation and therefore seek to manage their differences. At the domestic level, the federal structure of the UAE plays an important role in this process. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which adopts a security-oriented and hardline approach toward Iran, Dubai and Sharjah favor maintaining economic relations with Tehran due to their strong dependence on trade and a non-oil economy. This divergence in perspectives has ensured that even during periods of political tension, bilateral trade relations have never been completely severed. At the regional level, several developments have contributed to reducing tensions. The reduction of the UAE’s military presence in Yemen, the initiation of security dialogues between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, and efforts to manage disputes through diplomatic channels are among the notable examples. The exchange of security and political delegations between the two capitals in recent years and the signing of border cooperation agreements demonstrated the determination of both sides to prevent further escalation. In addition, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 fostered a regional atmosphere conducive to de-escalation, encouraging the UAE to adopt a more balanced foreign policy. At the international level, the shift in U.S. policy following the inauguration of President Joe Biden also influenced this trend. Washington’s reduced support for the maximum pressure policy against Iran and efforts to revive nuclear negotiations prompted the UAE to reconsider its regional policies. Within this framework, Abu Dhabi also improved its relations with Qatar, Türkiye, and Syria and sought to establish itself as a more balanced regional actor. The third model, namely Kantian culture, represents the most optimistic scenario for the future of Iran-UAE relations. Under this model, the two countries move toward stable and friendly relations through economic cooperation, interdependence, and the reduction of security tensions. The most important driving force behind this process is the extensive economic interdependence between the two states. Over the past decades, the UAE, particularly Dubai, has played a crucial role in Iran’s foreign trade and has become one of Tehran’s most important economic partners. Thousands of Iranian companies operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade has experienced substantial growth in recent years. Economic interdependence has ensured that economic relations have never been completely interrupted, even during periods of peak political tension. As a regional commercial hub, Dubai possesses significant economic interests in maintaining relations with Iran. Furthermore, extensive Iranian investments in the UAE and the country’s role in Iran’s financial and commercial exchanges have created strong incentives for continued cooperation. At the regional level, a reduction in geopolitical tensions could facilitate the realization of this model. The end or de-escalation of the Yemen conflict, the improvement of Iran-Saudi relations, the growing role of regional mediators, and the expansion of regional economic cooperation are among the factors that could strengthen ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, if the UAE limits its security cooperation with Israel and focuses more on economic cooperation, some of Iran’s security concerns may be alleviated. At the international level, the success of nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran could provide a foundation for expanding economic and political cooperation between the two countries. The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that whenever tensions between Iran and the United States decreased, trade and investment between Iran and the UAE increased correspondingly. Under such circumstances, joint economic projects, the development of regional transportation corridors, and cooperation in the fields of energy and infrastructure could elevate bilateral relations to a new level. In conclusion, the study emphasizes that Iran-UAE relations possess a dual and multilayered nature in which economic cooperation and political competition coexist simultaneously. Although territorial disputes, security rivalries, and the UAE’s relations with the United States and Israel hinder the development of full strategic trust between the two countries, economic interdependence and the high costs of direct confrontation also prevent relations from evolving into comprehensive hostility. Therefore, the most probable scenario for the future of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi is the continuation of a pattern of “managed competition accompanied by limited cooperation.” Within this framework, while maintaining their political and security differences, both countries are likely to utilize economic and diplomatic interactions to prevent the escalation of tensions and avoid direct confrontation. Such a situation could preserve relative stability in the Persian Gulf and provide the basis for limited yet sustained cooperation between two important regional actors.

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.

Abstract Globalization and glocalization have significantly reshaped the landscape of international relations, introducing innovative diplomatic tools such as paradiplomacy and the strategic utilization of diaspora communities. Paradiplomacy, as a form of sub-state diplomacy, empowers non-central governments and diaspora groups to engage in cross-border interactions, complementing formal state diplomacy. The Iranian diaspora in Turkey serves as a compelling case study due to its ability to influence bilateral relations through cultural, economic, and political channels. This study explores the paradiplomatic capacities of the Iranian diaspora in Turkey and evaluates how these capacities can enhance Iran-Turkey relations.
The research addresses the central question: What paradiplomatic potential does the Iranian diaspora in Turkey possess, and how can it impact bilateral relations? The study posits that the Iranian diaspora holds considerable paradiplomatic capabilities that can foster stronger ties between the two nations. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can expand its influence in the region while simultaneously strengthening its bilateral ties with Turkey. This research aims to shed light on the role of Diasporas as informal yet significant contributors to international relations, particularly in the context of neighboring countries with shared historical and cultural ties.
The research employs a causal (cause-and-effect) approach to analyze the relationship between diaspora activities and their diplomatic impacts. Data collection was conducted through a combination of library research (academic articles, policy reports, and historical records) and semi-structured interviews with Iranian diaspora members in Turkey, as well as experts in international relations and diaspora studies. The qualitative analysis focuses on identifying key areas cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and political engagement where diaspora involvement can contribute to paradiplomatic efforts. This methodology ensures a comprehensive understanding of the Iranian diaspora’s potential and the challenges it faces in Turkey.
The findings highlight three primary dimensions in which the Iranian diaspora in Turkey can exercise paradiplomatic influence:
1-     Cultural Diplomacy:
The Iranian diaspora acts as a cultural bridge, promoting mutual understanding through language, art, literature, and academic exchanges. Iranian cultural associations in Turkey organize events such as Persian language workshops, art exhibitions, and cultural festivals that introduce Turkish society to Iranian heritage. These activities foster people-to-people connections and strengthen cultural ties between the two nations. Additionally, Iranian cuisine and cultural traditions have gained popularity in Turkey, further enhancing cultural diplomacy.
2-     Economic Diplomacy:
Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and business professionals in Turkey contribute significantly to trade and investment flows between the two countries. The diaspora facilitates business partnerships, joint ventures, and knowledge transfer, particularly in sectors such as tourism, technology, and manufacturing. For instance, Iranian-owned businesses in Turkey often serve as intermediaries for circumventing international sanctions, facilitating trade in goods such as petrochemicals, agricultural products, and handicrafts. This economic engagement not only bolsters bilateral trade but also creates opportunities for collaborative ventures.
3-     Political Engagement:
Certain members of the Iranian diaspora engage in lobbying efforts, think tank collaborations, and policy dialogues that indirectly shape diplomatic relations. Their dual familiarity with Iranian and Turkish political landscapes positions them as informal mediators capable of addressing shared challenges. For example, diaspora members have participated in initiatives to promote regional stability and counter negative narratives about Iran in Turkish media and political circles.
The study underscores the Iranian diaspora’s networking capabilities, transnational ties, and socio-economic influence, which position it as a valuable actor in paradiplomacy. However, the research also identifies challenges, such as political sensitivities, differing foreign policy priorities, and the lack of a cohesive strategy for diaspora engagement, which may limit the full realization of these potentials.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey represents a unique asset for both countries, offering opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations across cultural, economic, and political dimensions. The study identifies several key factors that contribute to the diaspora’s paradiplomatic effectiveness:
1-     Transnational Networks:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey maintains strong transnational networks that facilitate cultural exchange, economic collaboration, and political dialogue. These networks enable the diaspora to act as a bridge between Iranian and Turkish societies, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation.
2-     Shared Historical and Cultural Ties:
Iran and Turkey share a rich history of cultural and civilizational interactions, which the diaspora can leverage to foster closer relations. The diaspora’s efforts to highlight these shared legacies through events, publications, and media can counter divisive narratives and strengthen cultural bonds.
3-     Economic Contributions:
The diaspora’s economic activities, particularly in trade and investment, serve as a critical component of Iran-Turkey relations. By facilitating cross-border commerce and promoting Iranian products in Turkish markets, the diaspora contributes to the economic interdependence of the two nations.
4-     Cultural Representation:
The Iranian diaspora’s cultural initiatives, such as organizing Persian New Year (Nowruz) celebrations and establishing Persian language schools, enhance Iran’s soft power in Turkey. These activities not only promote Iranian culture but also improve Iran’s image among Turkish citizens.
Despite these strengths, the research highlights several challenges that need to be addressed to maximize the diaspora’s paradiplomatic potential. These include:
ü  Political Sensitivities:
The complex political dynamics between Iran and Turkey, including regional rivalries and differing foreign policy objectives, can create obstacles for diaspora engagement.
ü  Fragmentation within the Diaspora:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey is diverse in terms of socio-economic status, political affiliations, and motivations for migration. This diversity can hinder the formation of a cohesive and unified diaspora strategy.
ü  Resource Constraints:
Limited financial and institutional support from Iranian authorities restricts the diaspora’s ability to implement large-scale paradiplomatic initiatives.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey possesses significant paradiplomatic capacities that can enhance Iran-Turkey relations in cultural, economic, and political spheres. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can strengthen its regional influence and foster closer ties with Turkey. However, realizing the full potential of the diaspora requires addressing the identified challenges through targeted policies and initiatives.
Policy Recommendations:
1-     Develop a Comprehensive Diaspora Strategy:
The Iranian government should establish a clear and cohesive strategy for engaging the diaspora in Turkey. This strategy should include mechanisms for supporting cultural, economic, and political initiatives led by diaspora members.
2-     Enhance Institutional Support:
Strengthening the role of cultural attachés and other institutional representatives in Turkey can provide the diaspora with the resources and guidance needed to implement paradiplomatic projects effectively.
3-     Promote Cultural and Educational Exchanges:
Expanding cultural and educational programs, such as scholarships for Turkish students to study in Iran and vice versa, can deepen people-to-people connections and foster mutual understanding.
4-     Facilitate Economic Collaboration:
Encouraging joint ventures and trade partnerships between Iranian and Turkish businesses can leverage the diaspora’s economic influence to strengthen bilateral trade and investment.
5-     Address Political Challenges:
Diplomatic efforts should focus on reducing political tensions and building trust between Iranian and Turkish authorities, creating a more favorable environment for diaspora engagement.
By addressing these challenges and implementing the proposed recommendations, Iran can harness the paradiplomatic potential of its diaspora in Turkey to achieve strategic objectives and strengthen its regional position.
 
 
 

Abstract The concept of corridor-based geopolitical positioning plays a pivotal role in shaping national power and, by extension, national security. In geopolitical theory, such positioning refers to the strategic spatial configuration where power competition among geopolitical actors unfolds in relation to geographic space. When a state successfully leverages its corridor-based advantages in this competitive landscape, it gains geopolitical superiority over its rivals, thereby enhancing its national security. This study investigates the role of Iran’s corridor-type geopolitical position in the domain of air transportation, emphasizing its potential to serve as a global aerial corridor. Despite possessing a geographically advantageous location that could facilitate international air transit, Iran has yet to capitalize on this latent asset, while regional competitors have effectively harnessed similar advantages to their benefit.
Iran’s geographical location situates it at the crossroads of major continental axes—north-south and east-west—offering a unique opportunity to function as a strategic air transit hub. However, this potential remains underutilized due to a combination of infrastructural, political, and economic constraints. The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, relying on library-based documentary sources to assess Iran’s current air transport infrastructure and its active air corridors. The findings reveal that Iran’s geopolitical position has not yet translated into tangible power generation or enhanced national security. Nevertheless, if this position is strategically developed in alignment with Iran’s geographic capacities, it could significantly contribute to both power projection and national security.
Corridor-based positioning inherently generates power by linking demographic, economic, political, military, and cultural spheres of influence. When such positioning holds regional significance, it is classified as geopolitical; when it extends to global relevance, it becomes geostrategic. The aviation industry, by its very nature, is deeply embedded in geopolitical dynamics. Air corridors and transit routes not only facilitate economic exchange but also serve as instruments of strategic influence. The development of air hubs and the expansion of aerial connectivity can directly impact national security by fostering economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and regional integration.
Iran’s geopolitical location offers multiple opportunities to enhance its national power. The aviation sector, in particular, presents a compelling case for strategic investment. In 2019, global aviation statistics underscored the magnitude of this industry: 4.3 billion passengers were transported, accounting for 8.3 trillion revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs). Additionally, 58 million tons of air cargo were moved, equivalent to 231 billion freight ton kilometers (FTKs). On a daily basis, over 100,000 flights carried approximately 12 million passengers and $18 billion worth of goods. In total, 38 million commercial flights operated across 48,500 air routes, covering 54 million kilometers and accumulating 85 million flight hours. The aviation industry supported 65 million jobs and contributed 3.6% to global GDP, with an economic turnover of $2.7 trillion (Aviation Benefit, 2019:6).
These figures illustrate the strategic importance of air transit and its direct correlation with corridor-based geopolitical positioning. The volume and quality of transit flights are closely tied to a country’s ability to leverage its geographic location. Iran’s potential to serve as a transit hub—connecting northern, southern, eastern, and western air routes—remains largely untapped. By enhancing its air transport capabilities and offering competitive services to transit flights, Iran could generate substantial wealth and global prestige, both of which are critical to national security. According to projections, air travel is expected to double by 2034. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that passenger growth between the Middle East and Africa will continue to rise through 2022, presenting Iran with a strategic opportunity to capitalize on this trend for both economic and security gains.
Transit flights are not only indicators of security but also contributors to its formation. The fluid nature of national security—shaped by political, economic, and strategic variables—means that the quantity and quality of transit flights are influenced by broader geopolitical conditions. Air corridors and overflight routes can generate wealth, mitigate geopolitical isolation, and serve as strategic assets during periods of international sanctions. Activating Iran’s corridor-based position, a fixed geopolitical factor, through targeted policy measures and infrastructural development, can have a direct impact on national power and security.
The research findings underscore a critical gap between Iran’s potential and its current utilization of corridor-based geopolitical advantages. Despite possessing high transit appeal and significant geographic capacity, Iran has not effectively harnessed these assets to bolster its national security or economic development. Key indicators such as transit flight revenue, number of overflights, airport capacity, geopolitical crises, comparative overflight tariffs, exclusion from regional corridors, and the strategic behavior of rival states all point to a strong correlation between air transit and national security. Iran’s potential to increase its transit flight revenue far exceeds its current performance. This untapped wealth could serve as a continuous source of national resilience, directly influencing security, welfare, and national survival.
Several variables influence Iran’s ability to generate revenue from its air corridors. These include its corridor-based positioning, territorial expanse, airport capacities, overflight tariffs (which are currently high), route security, availability of parallel routes through neighboring countries, the prevalence of restricted airspaces, political factors such as sanctions and conflicts, and inadequate infrastructure, particularly in air navigation systems. Addressing these challenges through strategic planning and investment could unlock Iran’s latent potential as a regional and global air transit hub, thereby reinforcing its geopolitical standing and enhancing its national security.
In conclusion, the study highlights the strategic imperative of transforming Iran’s corridor-based geopolitical position into a source of national power. By aligning infrastructural development with geopolitical strategy, Iran can reposition itself within the global aviation network, mitigate regional isolation, and secure long-term economic and security benefits. The findings call for a comprehensive policy framework that integrates geopolitical foresight with aviation sector development, ensuring that Iran’s geographic advantages are no longer squandered but strategically leveraged for national gain. 

Abstract This article examines how population policies shape the balance of national power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Drawing on a mixed-methods design and a multi-dimensional understanding of national power (political, economic, military, technological and sociocultural capacities), the study investigates which policy requirements and mechanisms enable demographic dynamics to convert into sustainable national strength. The structure and tone of this abstract follow the organizational pattern used in the reference sample to ensure maximum alignment with scholarly expectations.
Population composition and spatial distribution are core determinants of a state’s resource base, human-capital potential, and long-term security. For Iran — given its extensive land borders, strategic corridors and varied regional capacities — demographic trends influence military mobilization potential, labor force adequacy, technological absorption, and socio-political resilience. Recognizing population policy as strategic statecraft, not merely a social program, is central to sustaining Iran’s position in a competitive regional environment.
The research seeks to identify and hierarchize the managerial, political, economic, educational, health, environmental and geographic requisites that mediate the effect of population policies on the national-power balance. The study proceeds from qualitative thematic mapping of expert knowledge to quantitative model testing, enabling both rich contextual insight and empirical validation of hypothesized causal paths.
The study synthesizes pronatalist / population-policy theory with concepts of national power and demographic security. It emphasizes both the quantitative (size, age-structure, spatial distribution) and qualitative (education, health, skills) dimensions of population, arguing that policy effectiveness depends on institutional capacity to mobilize demographic advantages into productive and security-relevant outcomes.
A convergent mixed-methods design was adopted. The qualitative strand involved purposive sampling of domain experts (minimum ten years’ experience in political science or population policy) and semi-structured interviews. Thematic analysis produced 82 initial codes, which were organized into 9 axial themes and consolidated into 4 higher-order meta-themes. Based on qualitative outputs, a questionnaire was developed for the quantitative strand; data were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) given the non-normal distribution of survey variables. Measurement quality was assessed via Content Validity Ratios (CVR) and Cronbach’s alpha to ensure instrument validity and reliability.
Interview analysis identified nine organizing themes grouped into four principal dimensions: (1) managerial & political-economic requirements; (2) educational, cultural & social requirements; (3) health, welfare & environmental requirements; and (4) geographic & demographic requirements. These dimensions encompass actionable elements such as institutional coordination, incentive systems for family formation, skills and education policies, reproductive and public health services, environmental sustainability, and regional spatial planning.
Validity and reliability metrics supported the instrument (dimension CVR values ranged approximately 0.64–0.76; Cronbach’s alpha values ranged ~0.73–0.81; overall construct validity ≈0.68; overall reliability ≈0.74). PLS-SEM path estimates reveal two central effects: geographic & demographic requirements significantly shape political/economic/social policy imperatives (β = 0.615, i.e., ≈61% influence), and managerial/political/economic requirements exert the largest direct effect on the national-power balance under population policy interventions (β = 0.662, i.e., ≈66%). These coefficients indicate that while spatial and demographic contexts set structural constraints and opportunities, managerial and politico-economic capacities are decisive in converting demographic potential into national power gains.
 
Principal challenges include fragmented governance, insufficient alignment of economic incentives with cultural contexts, environmental/resource constraints, and implementation bottlenecks. Opportunities emerge from strengthening human capital (education and health), deploying voluntary and culturally-sensitive incentive packages (housing, parental supports, childcare), enhancing regional retention through spatial planning, and mobilizing diaspora resources. The study highlights that coercive approaches are both ethically problematic and practically ineffective; voluntary, integrated and participatory policy packages yield greater legitimacy and sustainability.
Population policy can materially affect Iran’s balance of national power, but its success depends primarily on managerial capability and coherent politico-economic implementation rather than demographic change alone. Recommended priorities include: (1) institutional reforms to strengthen cross-sectoral implementation capacity; (2) economically sustainable, voluntary incentive mechanisms linked to housing, health and income stability; (3) long-term investments in education and skill formation to raise qualitative population potential; (4) continuous demographic monitoring and regional spatial planning  to optimize distributional effects; (5) environmental safeguards to preserve demographic dividends; and (6) constructive engagement with civil society and diaspora stakeholders. Treating population policy as strategic statecraft — integrated across ministries and anchored in evidence — is essential for translating demographic realities into durable national power.

Abstract The fall of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. military occupation of Iraq in March 2003 led to the emergence of regional competitions within the country's political and economic arena. As a result of the ensuing power vacuum in Iraq, regional rivalries between its two neighbors, Turkey and Iran, intensified. This study aims to explain the elements and variables influencing the escalation of Ankara's competition with Tehran in Iraq. Accordingly, the central question of this article is: What factors facilitated the expansion of competition between Turkey and Iran in Iraq from 2003 to 2020? The findings suggest that the power vacuum created after Saddam's fall, energy acquisition and its transit in the region, and the takeover of Iraqi markets due to reconstruction and economic needs resulting from war damages have been significant drivers of increased rivalry between Iran and Turkey. The strategic visions of both countries—Iran aiming to become the leading regional power by 2025 (1404 in the Iranian calendar) and Turkey by 2023—have placed them in a process of securing advantageous political and economic positions in the region, competing to become regional role models. This article employs an explanatory-analytical method and analyzes economic interaction statistics to explore the dimensions of Iran-Turkey competition in Iraq after 2003. The United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein were not simply regime‑changing events but a turning point that reshaped the geopolitical map of the Middle East in ways still unfolding. Iraq, geographically positioned between the Levant, Iran, the Pertion Gulf, and Anatolia, became a fragile state whose political order and economic resources turned into arenas for regional and international rivalry. Among the neighbors most directly involved, Iran and Turkey emerged as the primary competitors. Although both states share security concerns regarding terrorism, instability, and Kurdish separatism, their historical experience and national interests have largely driven them into forms of conflict rather than cooperation. The post‑2003 period created a particular context where overlapping political, economic, and energy considerations gave new intensity to long‑standing rivalries. 
This paper analyses the rivalry between Iran and Turkey in Iraq from 2003 to 2020 through the lens of international political economy, with particular emphasis on three interrelated factors: political influence over Iraq’s new state order, the struggle for energy resources and transit routes, and the attempt to dominate Iraq’s markets in the aftermath of war. The methodological approach is explanatory and analytical, relying on statistical data as well as secondary sources, while the theoretical perspective is inspired by Robert Gilpin’s neo‑realist interpretation of the global political economy. Gilpin’s framework is particularly relevant because it insists, against claims of globalization’s transcendence, that states remain the decisive agents in shaping both political and economic outcomes. 
Politically, the transformation inside Iraq after 2003 reversed the traditional Sunni dominance and elevated the Shiʿa population to the corridors of power. Before 1958, out of fifty‑nine cabinets, barely five Shiʿa ministers were ever appointed; after 2003, their dominance increased dramatically, producing not only a novel political landscape but also a fundamental shift in Iraq’s external alignments. For Iran this represented a major strategic opening, as it could rely on shared sectarian and religious ties as well as long‑standing networks built with clerics, parties, and militias. For Turkey, however, the change carried threatening implications. Ankara perceived the Shiʿa ascendancy as an extension of Iranian influence, thereby undermining the presence of actors closer to its own interests. The issue was compounded by the strengthening of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which, though initially favored by Washington, soon became an economic partner of Turkey itself, particularly through investment, trade, and energy deals. Yet this pragmatic partnership never eliminated the deeper strategic rivalry, as Ankara and Tehran positioned themselves as competitors in Baghdad’s fragile order. 
Energy constituted the second, and arguably the most strategic, ground of competition. Iraq holds around 141 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, equivalent to about 11 percent of world reserves, alongside 110 billion cubic feet of natural gas. For energy‑poor Turkey, the control and transit of these resources have long been a national priority. It is not coincidental that by the 1990s Turkish leaders floated claims over the oil fields of Kirkuk, expressing in thinly veiled terms how central northern Iraq’s hydrocarbons were too Turkish geostrategy. Iran, while possessing its own significant energy wealth, has consistently sought to integrate Iraq into a broader conception of energy corridors under its direction, including the so‑called Islamic pipeline project. However, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, especially after Washington’s exit from the nuclear agreement in 2018, rendered Iran unable to fully realize its ambitions. In contrast, Turkey through its refining corporation TÜPRAŞ and governmental agreements, embedded itself more deeply in Iraq’s oil economy.
The bargaining over oil pipelines, the struggle to capture contracts, and the political maneuvering within Baghdad’s evolving institutions are all part of one complex fabric of competitive state behavior. Iraq has therefore become not merely a post‑war fragile state but a laboratory of political economy rivalry in which neighboring states seek to maximize gains under the shadow of global sanctions, shifting alliances, and persistent insecurity. 
In conclusion, the Iraqi case between 2003 and 2020 underscores the resilience of state‑centric rivalry in the Middle East despite discourses of globalization and interdependence. Iran and Turkey have approached Iraq less as a partner and more as an arena where political influence, economic control, and energy access are contested in mutually exclusive terms. The evidence suggests that Iraq’s trajectory of development and stability will remain deeply conditioned by this rivalry, as neither state is likely to forgo opportunities to secure dominance. For international relations scholarship, the implication is that the interaction of politics and economics cannot be analyzed separately; what appears as trade or investment is simultaneously an expression of strategic rivalry. The post‑2003 history of Iraq therefore illustrates how the logic of the political economy of rivalry continues to define the regional order of West Asia. 
 
 
 

Abstract Donald Trump's presidency was marked by his distinctive and extensive use of the Twitter platform as a primary tool of communication, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. This approach challenged traditional diplomatic norms and created a novel space for analyzing the political discourse of world leaders. Simultaneously, U.S.-Iran relations during this period witnessed escalating tensions and profound complexities, a significant portion of which was reflected in Trump’s tweets. Understanding how power relations are constructed, negotiated, and represented in the digital political arena—especially by global leaders—has become increasingly important. The case study of Trump’s tweets regarding Iran offers a rich opportunity to analyze these dynamics of power. This study seeks to uncover the various layers through which power is exercised and represented in one of the most contentious international relationships of the contemporary era, by conducting a thematic analysis of these tweets. Main Research Question:
How are power relations represented and exercised in Donald Trump's social media messages about Iran? Sub-questions: How does Trump represent U.S. power, Iranian power (or its absence), and his own position as a global actor in contrast to Iran and international agreements (such as the JCPOA) in his tweets? What discursive strategies (e.g., threats, sanctions, negotiations) does Trump employ to establish, exercise, or alter power relations with Iran, and how do these strategies contribute to the portrayal of power dynamics? This study employs qualitative content analysis, specifically the thematic network analysis approach developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). This approach comprises six systematic phases that allow the researcher to identify, analyze, and report semantic patterns (themes) within qualitative data. These six phases—which will be elaborated in subsequent sections—include: familiarization with the data, initial coding, theme identification, theme network mapping, theme network analysis, and final report writing. In the following sections, the study will detail the steps taken to implement thematic analysis on the dataset of Donald Trump's tweets concerning Iran. First, the process of data familiarization and initial coding will be presented. Then, the procedures for identifying and refining themes and mapping the theme network will be explained. Next, the thematic network will be analyzed and interpreted in depth. Finally, the study concludes by presenting key findings, answering the research questions, and offering suggestions for future research. At this stage, a final review was conducted to ensure full coherence between the developed themes (listed in Table 3) and the set of initial codes (listed in Table 2). The objective was to ensure that all codes related to power relations were meaningfully incorporated into either basic or organizing themes, leaving no significant portion of the coded data unrepresented. This review confirmed that the developed themes effectively captured the coded data and conveyed their core meanings. Following this validation, the themes were organized based on logical and hierarchical relationships among them. This process involved identifying which themes were broader and more encompassing (organizing themes) and which ones reflected more specific aspects of those broader themes (basic themes). This initial arrangement set the stage for selecting the types of themes and mapping the final thematic network. Global Theme: In alignment with the main research question, the global theme of this analysis is defined as “The representation and exercise of power relations in Trump’s tweets about Iran.” This serves as the overarching conceptual framework that guides all subsequent analyses. Organizing Themes: The five main organizing themes presented in Table 3—”Displaying U.S. hegemony and directly threatening Iran”, “Undermining the past to construct present power: The JCPOA and the Obama administration”, “Applying maximum pressure: Sanctions and economic isolation”, “Delegitimizing the Iranian regime and supporting internal opposition”, and “Personalizing power and projecting Trump’s individual authority”—function as the structural pillars of the theme network. Each represents a major dimension of how Trump constructs and represents power in relation to Iran. Basic Themes: The basic themes listed under each organizing theme in Table 3 serve as more specific building blocks that elucidate the various dimensions and details of the organizing themes. These themes are more directly derived from the initial coding of the data. The thematic analysis of Donald Trump's tweets concerning Iran reveals that his discourse in this area is heavily centered on the projection and exercise of unilateral U.S. power and his own personal authority. Power relations are constructed and represented through a range of discursive strategies, the most prominent of which include military threats and intimidation, economic pressure via crippling sanctions, delegitimization of prior agreements and U.S. administrations, discrediting the Iranian regime, and the extreme personalization of foreign policy. This discourse constructs a binary, zero-sum worldview in which the power of one side necessarily entails the weakness of the other. Through Twitter, Trump sought to establish his narrative of U.S.-Iran relations as the dominant one—simultaneously functioning as a tool of public diplomacy and coercive pressure. This analysis demonstrates how social media can become an arena for the complex and at times contradictory performance of power at the level of global leadership.

Abstract With the increasing expansion of communication technologies and the increasing presence of users in cyberspace, social networks, especially Instagram, have created a fundamental transformation in human social, cultural, and political interactions. Instagram is considered one of the most widely used social networks in Iran and the world due to its diverse capabilities, visual appeal, and interactive features. However, along with communication and information opportunities, this network has also caused significant damage to human societies. The present study, using the pathology model and Levine force-field analysis, has identified and analyzed the positive and negative pressure forces of Instagram within the framework of a hybrid war against Iran. The results show that despite the filtering of this network in Iran after the events of 1401 AH, Instagram is still widely used by Iranian users and plays an effective role in shaping public opinion in creating social and political tension. In this regard, this network, as a tool at the disposal of the hegemonic system and political opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has helped to transform some social demands and protests into internal crises and psychological warfare by directing protests and conducting psychological operations on public minds. In addition, the lack of media literacy of users, the dissemination of biased news and information, and the inability to properly analyze content have exacerbated the damage and negative impact of this network on culture, social cohesion, and fundamental issues of Iranian society. According to the research findings, the negative pressure forces of Instagram in Iranian society operate beyond the positive pressure forces and have played a decisive role in creating social and political challenges, which reveals the need for intelligent management, promotion of media literacy, and the development of countermeasure strategies to reduce its negative effects. Today, social networks in cyberspace are one of the main platforms of human social life. As users of these networks, individuals are present in social networks using their smartphones and are in contact and interaction with human societies and play a role (Vorderer, Kohring, 2013; Matthes, 2022: 7). Cyberspace social networks have attractive and special features compared to other media, including the ability to interact and participate. This has led to their superiority and advantage, general popularity and great dependence of citizens of human societies on them. In the current situation, these networks have occupied a major and main part of gaining awareness, informing and entertaining people of human societies. As a result, these networks play a pivotal and effective role in human life and social developments (Mohammadi Khanghahi, Rezaei, 2019: 195). Since 2000, with the expansion of cyberspace, the global community has entered a new era of social life. The shock of the Covid-19 pandemic forced all people in human societies to enter the space of these social networks, and as a result, an important part of people's social life migrated to cyberspace (Haji Heydari, 2022: 26). One of the most popular social networks today is Instagram. Given the popularity of this network, this platform is used for various purposes, such as political purposes. Politicians and rival powers seek to create and launch Instagram accounts to attract people to their political campaigns (Liebhart, Bernhardt, 2017; Kwon, 2020: 2). Instagram, as a tool at the disposal of the hegemonic system, promotes the beliefs and thoughts accepted by this system and is used in hybrid wars as a tool in the service of media, information and psychological warfare against the target actor or country. Using this tool (Instagram) as a war tool is much less expensive than military tools and helps a lot in achieving the desired goal of the hegemonic regime and political opponents, in such a way that this regime uses this tool to bombard the target actor or country with information and imagery. In addition to publishing extremist literature, understatement and excerpts of information, this network uses prominent individuals, who are called celebrities, to give public opinion a direction in accordance with its goals. Therefore, the use of this tool by users of the target country also brings social, cultural, moral, ideological and political harm. By recognizing these harms and trying to increase user awareness, target countries can mitigate these harms. Therefore, these unresolved issues of Iranian society have become one of the main topics discussed in cyberspace social networks, especially Instagram, in such a way that this social network has become one of the main centers of command and direction for public opinion. Users and political opponents publish numerous posts and stories in this space daily and direct public opinion. The purpose of this research is to identify the damages of social networks, especially Instagram, in the hybrid war against Iran. As a result, in this research, the damages and weaknesses have been identified by identifying the positive and negative pressure forces of this platform regarding Iranian society. The scope of this pathology includes addressing the components of a phenomenon and examining its problems and dilemmas. Through this pathology, the problems and issues created by this platform (Instagram) are identified and then examined. As a result, the main and fundamental goal of this research is to take a step towards solving the problems and reducing the effectiveness of negative pressure forces by identifying the issues and problems of Instagram and preventing the problems from escalating. According to the quantitative findings and the approach (field-force analysis) of this research, the negative pressure forces from this network on Iranian society have caused the positive pressure forces of this network to weaken. Also, according to the approach of Levin's field-force analysis, the negative pressure force exerted on Iranian society by this platform is greater than the positive force, therefore it has led to an imbalance of pressure and a more pronounced negative characteristics of this platform in Iranian society. In this regard, in order to overcome the challenges and reduce the impact of negative forces and establish balance, appropriate approaches need to be adopted so that the negative forces reach their minimum level of impact. Considering that the most important negative pressure force of this network is cultural aggression, as a result, this tool in the hybrid war has initially targeted Iranian-Islamic culture and by influencing public opinion, especially the youth, has increased the influence of the ruling system and opposition groups in Iran, and has created a deep gap between the individuals of society and led to its division. Instagram, as a tool, has a butterfly effect on the minds of Iranian society and distances the society from its original values. It will also replace American culture with Iranian culture over time. In this regard, conscious measures need to be taken to neutralize these attacks. These measures must be of the same nature as these attacks themselves. In other words, for the measures taken to be effective, they must be soft measures. Such attacks cannot be resisted with hard and physical action. In any case, smart technologies require smart users. By being aware of how this space works, we can act more intelligently against future attacks.

Abstract Neighboring countries and neighborhood policy are fundamental components of the foreign policy of any country, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the deep and wide-ranging impacts these relationships have on various areas such as economic, security, cultural, and geopolitical aspects. In this regard, Iraq, with its unique geographical, economic, and political characteristics, holds special significance for Iran. Iran's neighborhood policy with Iraq, particularly after the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the emergence of a new republic in Iraq, has undergone significant changes. This article, based on the field observations of the authors and library studies from articles, books, theses, and reports, examines the role of Iraq in Iran’s neighborhood policy and analyzes the priority and position of Iraq within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq’s importance as Iran’s western neighbor is highlighted for multiple strategic and historical reasons, especially within the framework of Iran’s neighborhood policy. Iraq, with a border length of 1,609 kilometers with Iran, is one of Iran’s primary neighbors. The extensive border impacts the security and interactions between the two countries, which are influenced by the various types of border—land, riverine, and maritime. In addition to these geographical features, the demographics of the two countries are also remarkably similar. The predominant population of both countries consists of similar ethnic groups, and religious ties, especially among the Shi’a population, form deep cultural and social connections between the two nations. Iraq, as a country with vast oil reserves and a unique geopolitical position, plays a crucial role in both regional and global policies of Iran. Iraq’s oil reserves, being among the largest in the world, are a key factor in the economic interactions between the two countries. These oil resources can serve as an important element in economic and energy cooperation, potentially fostering long-term collaborative relationships. In terms of people-to-people interactions, over 10 million citizens travel between the two countries annually. This is a clear indicator of the strong social and cultural relationships that exist between Iran and Iraq. These exchanges, especially in religious and pilgrimage activities (such as travels to Karbala and Najaf), play a significant role in shaping the deep human and cultural ties between the two nations, which have a profound impact on bilateral relations. Beyond these features, Iraq also holds a special place in Iran’s regional policies. Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, and with the rise of Shiite political influence in Iraq, unprecedented opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged in Iraq. This shift has turned Iraq from a strategic rival into a strategic partner, playing a key role in reducing regional tensions. Iraq has been able to serve as an intermediary between Iran and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and has facilitated the expansion of bilateral cooperation across various domains, including security, economy, and politics. Compared to other neighboring countries, Iraq holds a unique position in terms of culture, religion, economy, and security. Due to shared cultural and religious attributes—particularly the Shi’a population in both countries—Iraq is considered a crucial strategic and cultural partner for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Iraq, with its geopolitical and economic position in the region, can act as a bridge between Iran and other Arab countries, as well as Western nations. Based on the SWOT model analysis, Iraq holds significant advantages over other Iranian neighbors. In this model, Iraq ranks highly in over twelve indicators as strengths (SO), which indicates the substantial potential for interaction with Iran. However, Iraq also faces challenges and threats, reflected in some of the weaknesses (WO) and threats (WT) categories. Nevertheless, Iraq possesses the potential to move from the level of priority to that of paramount importance in Iran’s neighborhood policy. As a result, Iraq occupies a position of particular importance within Iran's neighborhood policy and stands at the forefront of Iran’s neighbors. In terms of strategic, cultural, and economic significance, Iraq takes precedence over other neighbors. This priority could lead to expanded bilateral cooperation in various fields, ultimately strengthening Iran's position both regionally and internationally. Therefore, effectively utilizing the existing opportunities and addressing any disagreements could elevate Iran-Iraq relations from priority status to primary importance, thus preventing security threats and challenges.  

Abstract This article examines the relations between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from the perspective of critical geopolitical theory and attempts to explain the role of "connection" as a tool for advancing Iran's economic and geopolitical goals in the Eurasian region. With the expansion of economic globalization, developing countries such as Iran have turned to regional cooperation to gain benefits and competitive advantage in the global market. In the meantime, the Eurasian Economic Union, as one of the important economic blocs in the former Soviet region, has provided a basis for preferential trade and economic convergence, which Iran also seeks to exploit.
In the globalization environment, regionalism is proposed as a gradual path to opening up national economies and integrating them into the global economy. Due to its unique geopolitical location, Iran is located on the north-south and east-west transit highways and can become a hub for the transit of goods in the region. This location enables Iran to strengthen its geopolitical role while developing economic relations. Citing the theories of Parag Khanna, the article emphasizes that in the modern era, power and territory are no longer defined solely on the basis of geography, but the degree of connection of countries to transportation, energy, communications and trade networks has become more important.
The Eurasian Economic Union was formed on the basis of freedom of capital, trade, services and movement of goods and has strong infrastructure, skilled manpower and a geostrategic position between the East and the West. Russia, as the driving force of the union, plays a key role in advancing its goals. Member countries have provided the basis for extensive cooperation by creating a common market, harmonized customs laws and industrial and agricultural infrastructure. This union can provide suitable opportunities for Iran's exports and import needs, while at the same time connecting Iran to regional and global markets
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's change of approach from Westernization to Eurasianization, the groundwork was laid for the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union. As a regional power with huge oil, gas, and petrochemical resources and being located at the center of international transportation routes, Iran plays an important role in connecting East and Southeast Asia to Europe. This geopolitical position further strengthens the possibility of Iran becoming a transit and goods connection center and can lead to the promotion of Iran's regional and global trade.
Relying on the critical geopolitical theory, the article highlights the three main elements of power, space, and identity in the analysis of Iran-Eurasia relations:
*Power : In this theory, power is considered not only in the sense of hard power, but also as a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, influenced by the discourses and mentality of politicians. Relations between states and regional actors can also be analyzed based on the interaction of active and reactive forces.
*Space : Space in critical geopolitics is not simply a physical reality, but is the result of social and discursive boundaries created by actors to maintain their cohesion and identity. The importance of space in this theory goes back to its connection with time, power, and ideology.
*Identity : Identity in this framework is an epistemological and social construct that is formed through the process of othering (us and them). Geopolitical discourses usually produce enemies and highlight differences to establish their identity.
Together, these elements allow for a deeper analysis of Iran’s foreign policy and regional relations and show how discourses of power, space, and identity influence Iran’s policies and orientations towards the Eurasian Union.
Parag Khanna emphasizes in her book “Linkage” that power in the present era is measured by the degree to which countries are connected to global networks, not simply by their geographical size. She believes that by accepting interdependence and cooperation, a brighter and more connected future can be built for the world. In his article “Critical Geopolitics,” Ahmadipour also describes the evolution of the concept of geopolitics from a traditional approach to a critical and discursive approach, emphasizing the role of social, ideological, and identity factors in shaping foreign policy. Sadeghi et al., in their analysis of the approach, show how the elements of space, power, and identity play a role in regional policymaking and geopolitical competition.
In addition to economic opportunities, Iran’s cooperation with the Eurasian Union also brings challenges. On the one hand, Iran can use its geopolitical position to become a hub for connectivity and transit of goods in the region and benefit from the benefits of preferential trade and a common market. On the other hand, regional competition, international sanctions, and structural obstacles can challenge the convergence process. However, adopting a connectivity approach and utilizing geopolitical capacities can make Iran a key player in regional and global networks
The article concludes that in the era of globalization and the formation of network civilization, the geopolitical power of countries depends more than ever on the extent of their connectivity to transportation, energy, and trade networks. Given its strategic location and location in international corridors, Iran can strengthen its position in the Eurasian region by adopting a connectivity approach and utilizing critical geopolitical theory.This requires smart policymaking, strengthening transit infrastructure, and active cooperation with Eurasian Union member states. Ultimately, harnessing the power of connectivity and embracing interdependence will be a key strategy for advancing national interests and enhancing Iran’s geopolitical position in the 21st century.

Abstract Neighboring countries and neighborhood policy are fundamental components of the foreign policy of any country, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the deep and wide-ranging impacts these relationships have on various areas such as economic, security, cultural, and geopolitical aspects. In this regard, Iraq, with its unique geographical, economic, and political characteristics, holds special significance for Iran. Iran's neighborhood policy with Iraq, particularly after the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the emergence of a new republic in Iraq, has undergone significant changes. This article, based on the field observations of the authors and library studies from articles, books, theses, and reports, examines the role of Iraq in Iran’s neighborhood policy and analyzes the priority and position of Iraq within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq’s importance as Iran’s western neighbor is highlighted for multiple strategic and historical reasons, especially within the framework of Iran’s neighborhood policy. Iraq, with a border length of 1,609 kilometers with Iran, is one of Iran’s primary neighbors. The extensive border impacts the security and interactions between the two countries, which are influenced by the various types of border—land, riverine, and maritime. In addition to these geographical features, the demographics of the two countries are also remarkably similar. The predominant population of both countries consists of similar ethnic groups, and religious ties, especially among the Shi’a population, form deep cultural and social connections between the two nations. Iraq, as a country with vast oil reserves and a unique geopolitical position, plays a crucial role in both regional and global policies of Iran. Iraq’s oil reserves, being among the largest in the world, are a key factor in the economic interactions between the two countries. These oil resources can serve as an important element in economic and energy cooperation, potentially fostering long-term collaborative relationships. In terms of people-to-people interactions, over 10 million citizens travel between the two countries annually. This is a clear indicator of the strong social and cultural relationships that exist between Iran and Iraq. These exchanges, especially in religious and pilgrimage activities (such as travels to Karbala and Najaf), play a significant role in shaping the deep human and cultural ties between the two nations, which have a profound impact on bilateral relations. Beyond these features, Iraq also holds a special place in Iran’s regional policies. Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, and with the rise of Shiite political influence in Iraq, unprecedented opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged in Iraq. This shift has turned Iraq from a strategic rival into a strategic partner, playing a key role in reducing regional tensions. Iraq has been able to serve as an intermediary between Iran and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and has facilitated the expansion of bilateral cooperation across various domains, including security, economy, and politics. Compared to other neighboring countries, Iraq holds a unique position in terms of culture, religion, economy, and security. Due to shared cultural and religious attributes—particularly the Shi’a population in both countries—Iraq is considered a crucial strategic and cultural partner for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Iraq, with its geopolitical and economic position in the region, can act as a bridge between Iran and other Arab countries, as well as Western nations. Based on the SWOT model analysis, Iraq holds significant advantages over other Iranian neighbors. In this model, Iraq ranks highly in over twelve indicators as strengths (SO), which indicates the substantial potential for interaction with Iran. However, Iraq also faces challenges and threats, reflected in some of the weaknesses (WO) and threats (WT) categories. Nevertheless, Iraq possesses the potential to move from the level of priority to that of paramount importance in Iran’s neighborhood policy. As a result, Iraq occupies a position of particular importance within Iran's neighborhood policy and stands at the forefront of Iran’s neighbors. In terms of strategic, cultural, and economic significance, Iraq takes precedence over other neighbors. This priority could lead to expanded bilateral cooperation in various fields, ultimately strengthening Iran's position both regionally and internationally. Therefore, effectively utilizing the existing opportunities and addressing any disagreements could elevate Iran-Iraq relations from priority status to primary importance, thus preventing security threats and challenges.  

Abstract In the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, few nations have ascended as dramatically as China. Over the past few decades, China has transitioned from a largely agrarian economy to a dominant global economic powerhouse, now recognized as the second-largest economy in the world after the United States. This rapid economic development is accompanied by a commensurate rise in political clout, elevating China’s status as a central player in international relations. As a result, China’s role in the global order has undergone a significant transformation, influencing not only its regional neighbors but also the broader international community. This shift has profound implications, particularly for entities like the European Union (EU), which find themselves navigating new and complex dynamics in the face of China’s growing influence.
The European Union, as a unique political and economic entity composed of multiple member states, possesses a diverse range of interests and challenges in its relations with China. The EU's approach to China is shaped by its dual objectives: on one hand, to harness the economic opportunities presented by a burgeoning Chinese market and, on the other, to address pressing concerns related to human rights violations, security threats, and the broader geopolitical ramifications of China’s actions. The EU has embarked on a nuanced strategy to engage with China, seeking to balance economic cooperation with the need to uphold its values and principles, particularly in response to issues such as civil liberties, environmental standards, and the territorial integrity of nations.
This evolving relationship between the EU and China is not without its challenges. The EU must navigate a landscape filled with competing interests, both internally and externally. Member states of the EU have divergent views toward China based on their historical ties, economic dependencies, and individual strategic priorities. This fragmentation poses a significant challenge to forging a cohesive and effective European strategy toward China. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism and populism within several EU member states complicates the landscape, as these political movements often advocate for a more cautious or confrontational stance toward external powers, including China.
Parallel to these dynamics is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which finds itself in a unique position due to its strategic geographic location and vast natural resource wealth, particularly in oil and gas. Iran has recognized the potential benefits of fostering closer ties with China within the broader context of its foreign policy. The historical animosities stemming from Western sanctions have led Iran to seek alternative partnerships to bolster its economy and enhance its geopolitical standing. In recent years, Iran has made significant strides in deepening its engagements with China, viewing it as a priority partner capable of counterbalancing Western influence and providing vital economic support.
This burgeoning relationship is particularly pronounced in light of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Although the deal faced significant challenges, particularly after the United States’ withdrawal in 2018, China emerged as a crucial player in supporting Iran diplomatically and economically. Beijing’s involvement has fueled expectations in Tehran regarding Chinese investment in infrastructure, energy projects, and trade relations. As Iran grapples with the ramifications of international sanctions, the potential for a mutually beneficial partnership with China has become increasingly attractive.
However, this deepening relationship is not without its complexities and potential pitfalls. The shifting dynamics of international politics, including the EU's recalibration of its foreign policy toward China, could significantly impact Iran’s strategic calculations. As the EU seeks to reassert its influence in Asia through initiatives like the Global Gateway and its own Indo-Pacific strategy, Iran may face new diplomatic challenges. The EU is likely to weigh its economic interests in China against the value of a principled stance on issues like human rights and regional security, potentially complicating Iran's position.
Moreover, the broader geopolitical landscape marked by the U.S.-China rivalry adds another layer of complexity to the EU-Iran-China triangle. As the United States attempts to counter China's growing influence, it may adopt strategies that compel its allies, including EU members, to reassess their relationships with China. This could force Iran to navigate tenuous waters, balancing its partnerships with both China and the EU while remaining vigilant about being caught in the crossfire of great power competition.
This multifaceted interaction between the EU, China, and Iran brings us to the core objectives of this research. The first objective is to analyze the key political and economic strategies that the EU employs in its dealings with China. This investigation will focus on the EU's engagements, including trade partnerships, investment agreements, and collaborative initiatives aimed at addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health. Understanding these strategies allows for a comprehensive assessment of how the EU seeks to influence China while safeguarding its interests.
The second objective centers on examining the implications of the EU’s China policies on Iran's foreign and economic strategies. This involves scrutinizing how shifts in the EU’s approach toward China could impact Iran’s attempts to leverage its relations with Beijing for economic gains and strategic support in the context of its broader geopolitical ambitions. It is essential to consider how Iran perceives the EU’s stance toward China and whether this perception translates into strategic adjustments in its own foreign policy.
Ultimately, this research aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay among these three important geopolitical actors. By delving into the evolving relationships between the EU, China, and Iran, we can shed light on the possible future trajectories of their interactions and the impacts on regional and global stability. The goal is to offer insights that not only inform scholars and policymakers but also contribute to a more comprehensive dialogue about the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in this dynamic triad.
 
 
 
 
 

Abstract  
The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 marked a turning point in the political, social, and security developments of the West Asian region. This revolution not only transformed Iran's internal structures but also had extensive impacts on the power dynamics in the region. As a result of this transformation, the Axis of Resistance emerged as a politico-military movement. This axis, consisting of Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, Palestinian resistance groups, and other allied forces, has significantly influenced the balance of power by altering the strategies of regional and international players. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran, leveraging its ideological, geopolitical, and military capabilities, has played a crucial role in leading and expanding this axis.
To analyze the role of the Axis of Resistance and the changes it has brought to the region, neorealism, particularly the views of Kenneth Waltz, provides a suitable theoretical framework. This theory emphasizes that changes in the distribution of power and global and regional structures lead to the formation of strategic alliances and shifts in power dynamics. The Axis of Resistance, by weakening strategic rivals and strengthening regional alliances, has played a key role in redefining the regional order.
The Axis of Resistance, through its military power, active diplomacy, and security strategies, has altered the political landscape of the region and influenced the policies of Western and Arab countries. Some of its most significant effects include:
Role of the Axis of Resistance in Changing Security Strategies: The Axis of Resistance, as an influential force in the region, has impacted the security and military policies of various actors. By establishing military bases and supporting resistance groups, this axis has created effective deterrence against potential threats. These actions have not only strengthened Iran's security beyond its borders but also paved the way for countering the aggressive policies of the West and its regional allies.
Shift in the Regional Balance of Power: The Axis of Resistance has challenged the unilateral policies of the United States by creating new power poles in the region. Through increased military and political cooperation among regional actors, this axis has intensified existing rivalries and altered the balance of power. Countries that were previously dependent on U.S. policies are now seeking new relationships based on shared interests with Iran and resistance groups.
Consolidation of Iran’s Regional Influence: One of the key outcomes of the Axis of Resistance has been the expansion of Iran’s strategic depth in neighboring countries. By capitalizing on the power vacuums created by U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran has strengthened its presence in these nations. Support for resistance groups in Syria and Lebanon has further solidified Iran’s position as a regional power. This influence has not only ensured Iran’s national security but also enhanced its geopolitical standing at the regional and international levels.
Failure of Western Strategies in Regional Order Formation: The policies of the United States and its allies aimed at establishing a new regional order that sidelines Iran have encountered multiple obstacles. Western efforts to contain Iran through sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and support for internal opposition have failed to diminish its influence. Instead, the Axis of Resistance, through maintaining cohesion and coordination among its members, has shifted the balance of power in favor of Iran. This trend has led to the failure of Western strategies in shaping their desired regional order.
Increasing Regional Actors’ Inclination Towards the Axis of Resistance: In recent years, many regional players previously aligned with Western policies have gradually gravitated towards the Axis of Resistance. The success of this axis in countering security threats and maintaining regional stability has led some countries to show greater willingness to cooperate with Iran and its allies. This shift in approach has facilitated stronger regional cooperation and reduced regional dependence on the West.
The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the emergence of the Axis of Resistance have brought about fundamental changes in regional and international politics. By forming strategic alliances and supporting resistance groups, Iran has managed to shift the balance of power in its favor and reduce the traditional influence of major powers in the region. The Axis of Resistance, as a model of political and social convergence, has curbed the aggressive policies of its rivals and altered their security and military strategies. This process, in addition to strengthening Iran’s position, has paved the way for the formation of a multipolar order in West Asia. Overall, the Axis of Resistance has proven to be a significant force in shaping the political and security landscape of the region and influencing its future trajectory.
 
 
 

Abstract The question of this article is what are the most important challenges and limitations of cultural diplomacy between Iran and post-Saddam Iraq from 2003 to 2024? This research has been done with analytical-descriptive method with historical sociological approach to international relations and with library, internet and documentary techniques. The findings of this study showed that Iran has tried using the comprehensive discourse of historical relations with Iraqi Arabs in general and with Shiites in particular based on cultural and religious commonalities and an approach based on resistance against the development and hegemony of trans-regional powers, of course with the cooperation of the Iraqi government. , to create a suitable environment for cultural diplomacy and improving relations between the two nations. However, there have been challenges and obstacles in the way of cultural diplomacy between Iran and Iraq from 2003 to 2024, the most important of which are: the activities and negative role-playing of the American-Saudi media centered on Iran phobia in the region, the activities and destructive actions of Takfiri terrorist groups, especially ISIS. The formation and political-intellectual divisions between the Shiite organizations, especially the Sadr group and the rest of the Shiites, Shiite phobia in the region in the context of geocultural competition between the Shiite Crescent led by Iran and the Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia, the activeness of anti-Iranian currents in Iraq and the remnants of the Baath party. Foreign interventions in Iraqi affairs to make the government fragile, thecontinuationofsomepsychologicaleffectscausedbytheeffectsandconsequencesoftheIran-Iraqwar, thetwocountries'lackof seriouseffortstoexpandculturaldiplomacy toSunnifollowersand thelackofalong-termhorizonforcooperationbetweenthetwocountries

Abstract According to convergence theory, whose famous theorists are Raymond Aron and John Kenneth Galbraith, Great powers, despite their ideological differences, probably have similar behavior to each other regarding issues related to national security and maintaining interests. So, Iran and Saudi Arabia should be aware that being strong and cooperating is the only option for a bright future for these two countries and consequently the Middle East region. In this context, the author believes that everything that is happening in our region today is a background for the new order. From Brexit, widespread protests in Iran, and the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and shadow of Saudi Arabia over Yemen, to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan's control over Karabakh, and the control of a significant amount of the Gaza Strip by the Zionist regime. And what is important in the meantime is Iran's appropriate action to stay out of this competition. At the individual level of analysis, both countries have the main decision maker in the form of (leader / king). In terms of the region, it should be stated that these two can have the greatest impact on the security of the region. At the global level, America's focus from the Persian Gulf to the Asia Pacific can provide space for the creation of a bloc led by these two in the region with global influence. Iran and Saudi Arabia must be aware that the new world order is happening and all countries will pursue their interests at this time, and in the meantime, any country that falls into the trap of "internal unrest and foreign war" will be the loser in the future.
As a future study if the purpose of the research is to identify and evaluate the causal relationships and influence between factors, the structural method is more suitable, but if the purpose of the research is to produce and evaluate several different scenarios for the future, the extension method is more suitable. In this research, we present a combination of these two. In fact in this research, we identified the main drivers using the MicMac software, then obtained different scenarios using the morphological matrix, and finally we presented our prescriptive analytics and outlined the ways to achieve it.
The integrated (interdisciplinary) method tells us that since no single method has been able to be sufficient or complete on its own, it is better to use all possible methods to reach more convincing results and possibly discover the truth. So it can be concluded that the combination of realism and constructivism will have a favorable and balanced result. Whose foundations can be seen in the theory of realist constructivism, this approach can use cause and effect analysis and structural analysis in international relations and thus be an analytical and critical approach. In fact, flexibility can help us a lot, as Samuel Barkin uses this example in his book: In the sociology of science, paradigms are a bit like castles. The scientists are the knights in this metaphor, and the assumptions are the lords that the knights / scientists are sworn to defend. The strength of a paradigm can be measured by the number of scientists willing to defend its ramparts. Scientists tend to stay true to their assumptions, so that model castles successfully defend their inhabitants, until those inhabitants die. In this metaphor, one is more concerned with defending one's (fortress / paradigm) and defeating others than with building a bridge between them. In other words, the paradigms are different from each other and in conflict with each other, and we seek to overcome this issue.
What can be obtained from the historical investigation as well as the observation of current issues is that the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been influenced by various factors such as culture, religion, politics, economy and regional interests since ancient times. In general, the following three cases can be considered as the main turning points between the two countries. 1. The series of Arab-Iranian wars in the 7th century AD and the influence of Islam in Iran following the established communications. 2. The establishment of the Safavid government in the 16th century and the declaration of Shiism as the official religion of the country. 3: The impact of pan-Arabism movements and the Iranian revolution in the 20th century. In general, by examining the historical and contemporary relations of the two countries, we reached a set of events, trends, variables and actors. And finally, by examining the impact of these things on each other, we reached the drivers by which we were able to extract scenarios and finally presented our prescribed scenario and the solutions to achieve it.
It should be noted that after the mutual influence of 54 components on each other, the overall result was as follows:

America is the most prominent actor (influential variable) in this case.
The nuclear deal is very important.
The role of communication developments can be influential in the future.
The role of the Iranian society as a defeated actor is weak in these conflicts.

Finally, we present the recommendation of this research in the form of a short story.
In 2028, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an unprecedented level of cooperation and friendship. They solved the old problems and established a bloc like the European Union with a new approach by reducing dependence on oil. America also supported this process and canceled all sanctions in order not to lose its superior position over China. The resistance axis countries also achieved acceptable stability following the de-escalation of tensions, and the neighboring Arab countries improved their relations with Iran, and the Middle East region began its new path.
In the best case, the future of the two countries is stable competition and cooperation, and in the worst case, Iran will become weaker and more normal every day under Saudi Arabia, and finally, at the point of desperation, they will lead to a military conflict. In fact, what is considered desirable from the point of view of this prescriptive future research lies behind the issue that Iran and Saudi Arabia achieve convergence with each other, a convergence that both of them are at the peak of power, and finally we get the following results:

The two strong twin countries of Iran and Saudi Arabia will create peace and sustainable development in the region if they converge.
The roots of proxy wars and terrorist acts will dry up.
The problem of Palestine and Israel will be solved.
It is in the interest of Iran and Saudi Arabia to take full control of the Persian Gulf together so that not only the hands of the western countries are cut short, but also a vacuum is not created.
Creating an economic bloc that creates balance and benefit in the relationship between East and West.

 

Abstract  
Countries enter into an alliance considering that their interests are maintained in achieving a common goal. It can be said that countries that have enough power to achieve their goals or have regional and international power may act through alliances and enter alliances to reduce costs, reduce time, or justify their country's actions in interventions in other countries. Originally a regional military alliance, the United States reorganized NATO in 2008 to address the problem of power security (economic, political, and military) in Western Europe and the Mediterranean in a way that would suit its interests. be consistent from the Second World War. In 1949, 12 countries from North America and Western Europe signed the Washington Treaty and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Initially, the organization's main goal was to prevent Soviet expansionism. But NATO had two other goals: to prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and to encourage European political integration. After 73 years, NATO has grown to 30 member states through Eastern enlargement after 1991. This organization still plays an important role for international peace and stability and more so in the transatlantic region. In fact, NATO, which was a product of the era after the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the norms and rules of the game in the international system, faced an existential crisis and the lack of a strategic competitor in international interactions, the functional existential philosophy of NATO faced with fundamental challenges and even this question arose among NATO members and the international community that basically, what position will the organization that was created in the face of the Soviet threat have after the collapse of the Soviet Union? However, with the request of the United States of America and by understanding the global situation and the international system and recognizing their position through changes and changing their approach from military and defense approaches to political and social approaches, NATO members were able to guarantee their survival and implement the new NATO expansion strategy. To influence NATO's strategic-security. The concept of NATO expansion is based on the strategy of change while continuity, which is considered one of the transatlantic policies of the United States, and prescribes the necessity of increasing the scope of NATO in order to improve its strategic-security position. In the meantime, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as regional security subsystems have taken a special place in NATO's strategic vision. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf have been important for many reasons for the United States, which has an undeniable role in the expansion of NATO to this region. And for this reason, in recent years, this region has focused the most power and energy of the military and diplomatic apparatus of that country. What is important is the quality of order and security in the region. Analyzing the cooperation between NATO and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in the framework of the 2004 document, and the possibility of expanding this cooperation to the south, is an issue that the current research has addressed. The research believes that the future cooperation between NATO and the South, and specifically the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, will advance in the framework of dealing with new threats by helping to build a regional cooperative security model centered on Iran.
In general, the NATO Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will be open to all interested countries in the region who agree with the initiative's goals, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Within the framework of this initiative, the Atlantic Council treats each interested country based on its rightful status. In line with its interests in the Persian Gulf region, NATO established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to formalize its actions within the framework of the initiative's principles and goals. In this regard, NATO seeks to expand its influence in the region gradually and in stages, and does so within the framework of its programs.
 This initiative also complements NATO's special relationship with Mediterranean dialogue partner countries. In general, NATO has put the following measures in its agenda to achieve its goals within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative:
- Resolving regional conflicts, including the conflict between the Arabs and the Zionist regime;
- Encouraging and promoting regional economic cooperation;
- The adoption of a more stable and long-term approach by central foreign actors towards modernization and democratization in the region
- Removing restrictive commercial activities in the economic field with the aim of helping vulnerable countries and supporting the sustainable development process of the region
- Decisive actions regarding challenges such as drug or human trafficking and fighting widespread diseases such as AIDS in helping the countries of the region
- Encouraging support from states and nations interested in modernization and democratization in the region
When NATO announced its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in July 2004, it envisioned practical cooperation with the Middle East beyond the six GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the GCC countries) started. This initiative was welcomed by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf with a mixture of interest and suspicion. On the one hand, the rapidly evolving and volatile security environment in the Persian Gulf region certainly provided an opportunity for foreign actors to get involved and encourage and implement reforms. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has been looking for alternative approaches to escape the inherent instability of the past three decades. NATO was potentially an alternative. On the other hand, the initiative presented in the framework of NATO is nothing more than a mechanism by which the West can continue to control the region. Western policies were considered in the past. How NATO can help usher the region into a new security era remains to be seen.
 
 

Abstract The situation of the two countries Iraq and Iran is such that both are located in the Asian region and due to population growth, climate change and other natural and unnatural factors, on the one hand, they are facing a water crisis, and on the other hand, they are facing a self-sufficiency policy that this situation can to have an effect on the relations between the two countries which have been affected by geopolitical, political, cultural, economic and religious factors. Despite the importance of the relationship between water and food security and the need to identify the impact of its dimensions on the relationship between them, the institutions in charge of the two countries have many problems in formulating appropriate policies, which could be due to the lack of appropriate executive guidelines or lack of awareness of the importance of the issue. Therefore, the production of common structured knowledge in relation to food security and water resources that can create sufficient awareness, knowledge or ability in the target context is felt as urgent and necessary. This research aims to answer the question of what is the relationship between food security and available water resources in the Tigris and Euphrates watershed shared between Iran and Iraq?
In this article, the literature of the subject was first explained and the main challenges were identified through data collection. In data collection, experts' opinions and semi-open structured interviews were also used and efforts were made to fully identify the variables. In total, 56 variables were extracted through interviews and library studies. Fuzzy Delphi method was used to identify the most important issues affecting water resources between Iran and Iraq in common watersheds. The variables extracted based on the Delphi method have been investigated and analyzed using the structural analysis method in the MICMAC software environment. For this purpose, a 18x18 matrix was used to determine the status of each of them in the system.
Based on the findings, the strongest relationship between the influence and effectiveness of the variable "Importance of water resources for food security" is with the variable "Weakness of policy for water resources management", in which the influence of the variable "Importance of water resources for food security" is greater than its effectiveness. After that, the strongest relationship is the effect of this variable on "Iraq's internal unrest". This relationship shows that unrest and protests in Iraq are greatly affected by people's concern about their food security. Iraqi brokers believe that access to water resources is necessary to create employment. This comes from the fact that Iraq is a basic agricultural country and water is one of the main foundations of agriculture. This issue, together with the low level of water resources productivity, has caused the excessive withdrawal of water resources in the Tigris and Euphrates catchment basins, and little harvest from the existing water resources. Iraq's water needs for water resources that enter the country from upstream countries have made Iraqi politicians change the level of their cooperation with neighboring countries according to the level of addressing their concerns. The findings of the research also show that the level of "Iran's participation in Iraqi development projects" is closely related to solving their concerns in the field of food security. Therefore, it is considered that the quest for "food security" in Iraq is mutually influenced by the components of security and development.
The economic characteristics of Iran and Iraq indicate that agriculture is the basis of both countries. Therefore, the need for sustainable water resources is one of the main components and concerns of both countries. Both Iran and Iraq are located in the arid and semi-arid region of Southwest Asia, and the average rainfall in this region is lower than the global average. This has made water governance one of the areas emphasized by Iran and Iraq. Iran depends on the water resources of the western regions of the country to preserve the ecosystem of the central regions of the country and to develop agriculture, and Iraq also depends on the water resources that enter this country from the upstream countries of the Tigris and Euphrates basins for the supply of food and the protection and development of agriculture. . Although Turkey's share as an upstream country in supplying Iraq's water resources is much higher than Iran's, Iraq's high dependence on water resources has affected the country's hydropolitical relations with Iran. Structural analysis method has been used to explain the importance of food security on the relations between the two countries. It is of great importance to understand the degree and intensity of influence and influence in the structural interrelationships between variables to explain the position. - It shows that the mutual relations show that food security is related to the areas related to development and security in both countries and this shows the high importance of this topic in the relations between the two countries.
 

Abstract The purpose of this research was to examine the theory of political marketing in order to strengthen the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution. Based on the studies conducted, no scientific and comprehensive research has been done regarding the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution based on the theory of political marketing. Therefore, in this research, by using different approaches of political marketing theory, an attempt was made by explaining the science of political marketing and knowing its components and approaches in cases such as "preservation", "deepening" and "maintenance" of the product, a model to strengthen the external deepening of the revolution. Islamic should be presented. In line with the topic of discussion, the theory of political marketing was processed and planned and it is considered as one of the innovations of this research. In the continuation of the research, by reviewing the research literature and presenting the conceptual model of the research to the experts in this field, it has been tried to discover and analyze the most important challenges of the internal environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which can cause the failure of the strengthening of Islamic external deepening based on the theory of political marketing. be placed
One of the most important current challenges of the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution is the presentation of "another model" by the traditional Iranian rival Al-Saud. The political marketing strategy to deal with "fake" and "similar" products to the original product is branding. In fact, it can be said that Iran's best solution to confront the "other model" presented by Saudi Arabia is the branding of the Islamic Revolution. Branding of the Islamic Revolution provides a distinct identity from other similar products (another model) and in this way causes "retention", "deepening" and "maintenance" of the values of the Islamic Revolution in the target society. However, in front of the branding of the revolution, there are various challenges that are affected by the internal environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the primary and main condition for the success of the Islamic Republic of Iran in branding the revolution and its values is to overcome these challenges. Challenges such as economic weakness, corruption, and worldly tendencies of the power elites, etc. can cause the failure of brand-building of the Islamic Revolution.
  Political marketing also has a special emphasis on the role of the media and new communication tools in relation to the "maintenance" of the product in the target market. Political marketers believe that new communication tools can penetrate deep into societies by influencing their audience. In the discussion of the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution, the media and new communication tools can provide the basis for the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and thus play a vital role in the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution. The third strategy of political marketing is professional marketers, or in the interpretation of this research, deepening ambassadors, and as mentioned, they have a serious duty in the discussion of external deepening of the Islamic Revolution. The role of political marketers is important because new customers are needed to maintain a product in the market. The connection of this issue with the depth of the foreign sector is also due to the fact that in order to preserve and deepen the values of the Islamic Revolution, the scope of the audience of the values of the Islamic Revolution should increase.
The fourth and last strategy of political marketing to maintain and deepen the product is strategic marketing, which is designed based on Cutler's political marketing model. The fourth strategy includes three stages of environmental research, internal and external evaluations, and market segmentation. In environmental research, as it has been said, the absence of all-round elites from the target community of external deepening can make foreign deepening strategies ineffective due to the lack of accurate and correct information from the target community. Because these strategies have been determined through an Iranian perspective on the target society, and the reason for their failure will be the same Iranian perspective. Therefore, when in-depth experts want to examine and recognize the different contexts of the target society; They should first remove the Iranian glasses from their eyes and collect data based on the identity and cognitive platforms appropriate to the target environment and complete their aristocracy from the target society. Internal and external evaluations actually examine the most important weaknesses and strengths of the country exporting the product, and its message to foreign experts is to strengthen weaknesses and continue strengths. The third part of strategic marketing emphasizes on market segmentation, and its importance in the discussion of this research lies in warning foreign in-depth experts from adopting a single strategy for all segments of the target society, and this challenge is named in this research under the title of "sameness" damage. Is. In response to the main question of the research, how can using the political marketing theory strengthen the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution? It was also answered that by solving the challenges facing the research model, in strengthening the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution based on the theory of political marketing, we can reach our goals. As it was said, at least at the level of confronting the presentation of "another model" by Iran's traditional rival, Al Saud, based on the theory of political marketing, it can be countered by branding the Islamic Revolution. Another advantage of using this model in the discussion of external depth will be increasing the efficiency of the system and creating attractiveness for foreign audiences. In the end, it can be said that the condition of the success of this model in strengthening external deepening is the comprehensive and not selective action of the model presented in this research.

Abstract Foreign policy can be considered as a set of goals, plans, and actions aimed at safeguarding a country’s survival and enhancing its position in the international system. However, the concept of survival extends beyond mere physical existence; it encompasses other critical factors such as economic development, political security, and social stability. The key question is: What factors influence a country’s foreign policy decisions and how do these policies manifest themselves?
There are generally different approaches to answering this question. The first approach is related to structural realists, who assert that the factors influencing foreign policy are rooted in the macro levels and structures of the international system. In contrast to this view, another group of theories—regardless of the role of structural components—believes that internal factors within countries play a more decisive role in shaping foreign policy than structural factors. Finally, some other theories, instead of strictly separating the influence of structural (exogenous) and internal factors, emphasize the interaction between these two groups of factors and the impact of the structure through internal (endogenous) level factors.
Influential factors operate at two levels within the international system and geopolitics, ultimately shaping a country’s foreign policy. At the innermost layer, decision-makers play a pivotal role. Much of this layer operates through the constitutional mechanisms of countries. Notably, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains several principles and clauses that delineate the goals and priorities of its foreign policy.
 
Clause C of the second constitutional principle emphasizes the rejection of tyranny, oppression, and domination—a critical indicator within Iran’s system. Substantively, the constitution outlines rules governing the government, addressing the relationship between the government and the people. It emphasizes comprehensive public supervision over government affairs and regulates crucial matters within the political society. From the constitution’s content, we deduce its complete supremacy over all subjects, authorities, and laws. Given that this law establishes qualifications, it inherently surpasses all institutions and authorities listed therein. Consequently, no authority or institution should act contrary to the Constitution, as doing so would compromise its competence.
Foreign policy consists of four principles (principles 152 to 155). Even though foreign policy measures fall under the duties of the executive branch, their importance warrants an independent chapter. The constitution unequivocally rejects any form of hegemony in foreign policy, emphasizing the preservation of all-round independence and territorial integrity. It prioritizes defending the rights of all Muslims and maintaining non-commitment to hegemonic powers, promoting mutual peaceful relations. Additionally, the constitution designates non-belligerent countries as a crucial foreign policy goal. To this end, it prohibits any contract that would result in foreign domination over natural and economic resources or other national affairs.
 
Furthermore, within this chapter, the Islamic Republic of Iran upholds the ideal of human happiness across the global human society. It recognizes independence, freedom, and the rule of truth and justice as fundamental rights for all people worldwide. Despite avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other nations, Iran actively supports the rights-seeking struggles of the oppressed against arrogance wherever they occur.
Accordingly, fundamentalization is one of the most effective approaches in shaping and advancing the movement to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens against governmental authority. This issue has garnered significant attention within the realm of public law. One of the primary functions of public law is precisely to protect citizens’ rights and freedoms from government intervention.
 
Basicization, as defined and operationalized, involves elevating the value and status of laws and regulations—commonly referred to as “normal norms”—to align with the principles and validity of the constitution. Essentially, basicization grants these normal norms the same value and legal standing as constitutional norms. This process occurs through judicial proceedings and the application of legal interpretation tools.
The foundation and keyword of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran originate from Islamic beliefs and values, verses, narrations, valuable views of Imam Rahal (RA), and the leaders of the system. These principles align with the Constitution and emphasize preserving human dignity, realizing happiness, and promoting human well-being within the global community under the umbrella of peace. The foreign policy encompasses interactions with the world, security considerations, human freedom, and equality. It also underscores maintaining independence while rejecting domination.
 
Given the significance of this subject, the constitution of each country outlines and elucidates the foundational principles and strategic directions of foreign policy. Consequently, a clear vision and roadmap are established for various nations in this regard.
In the end, it should be pointed out that the Islamic Republic of Iran has made all efforts to secure national interests, prosperity, and security within the turbulent international system. This endeavor is pursued with a hopeful approach, aiming to achieve the lofty goals of the Islamic Revolution—a vision derived from the profound teachings of Imam Rahal (peace be upon him). The country’s foreign policy aligns with the deep insights of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khamenei Dam Zaleh Al-Ali.
“In this direction, the diplomatic system warmly welcomes the companionship, participation, and critical perspectives of society’s elites. Their collaboration contributes to achieving the country’s foreign policy objectives within a broad and consensus-based framework. The foreign policy apparatus remains committed to addressing issues closely tied to national interests and security at both macro and national levels. It actively seeks to prevent internal political disputes from encroaching upon foreign policy matters and emphasizes the importance of diplomacy in navigating these complex challenges.”
In particular, the provisions contained in the principles of the constitution have had a significant impact. Over the past four decades, different governments have employed various strategies to achieve the constitution’s stated goals, particularly in securing and guaranteeing national interests, including national security. They have embraced a comprehensive approach.
 
However, an important consideration for future researchers is to what extent the Islamic Republic of Iran’s system exemplifies the goal of promoting human happiness within the global human society—a society of which Iran is undeniably a part. Is this achievement fully realized? Reflecting on this matter may even prompt a reevaluation of certain constitutional principles related to Iran’s foreign policy.
 

Abstract The initiator of the politicization of water in most of the previously mentioned and the most profound findings is that water has become one of the important and influential factors in a region. It has been a key factor contributing to tension and conflicts between countries in the past and present, and it will continue to impact grazing policies in the future.
One of the characteristics of arid and semi-arid regions is the problem of water, its fragile ecosystems. That is, the pressures caused by dam construction, along with factors such as climate change and global warming, have increased this fragility.
Previously, some experts in the field of geopolitics claimed that in the future, water will replace oil as a rare and expensive commodity and will be the main focus of disputes and compromises in the coming decade. This claim has now been demonstrated following the large-scale implementation of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) in Turkey. We see this trend in the Middle East, especially in the countries that are along the path of the aforementioned water flow.
Today, the Middle East is witnessing a relative shift in the source of power from oil to water on one hand and mismanagement of its inter-basin governance on the other hand. This shift, coupled with the scarcity of this resource and global climate changes, has led Turkey to cede control over its water resources due to the implementation of the GAP megaproject. Turkey uses this as a bargaining chip to advance its developmental policies in the region, particularly in countries that rely on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, while simultaneously disregarding the repeated pleas of its neighbors (Iran, Syria, and Iraq) concerning water rights.
In addition, this plan has diminished the water resources flowing out of Turkey, resulting in detrimental consequences for the ecosystems of countries along the path of these water resources. It has led to environmental, economic, and social damages.
Therefore, according to the assertion of the Turkish government, which is grounded in the implementation of the GAP plan for sustainable economic development, this matter has been analyzed within the framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The conclusion is reached that while Turkey's hydraulic initiatives seem to offer water security across various sectors, the downside, from Copenhagen's perspective, is the creation of new security challenges for other stakeholders. The continued pursuit of Turkey's hydraulic strategy, regardless of the dimensions and the political, social, economic, and environmental impacts of this plan, is poised to have far-reaching and irreversible consequences.
And this vital resource has been turned into a means to gain political power and influence in Turkey. The reverse of the claim has been proven: the GAP project is in line with human-centered development and sustainable economic growth. However, it has been aimed at creating economic power, advancing political goals, and achieving blue hegemony. This process leads to multilateral damages with wide consequences in the countries affected by this project.
It is attempting to leverage its water resources against the oil resources of the Persian Gulf countries by defining and implementing numerous water projects through a hydraulic mission strategy. However, this approach disregards the environmental, social, economic, and political dimensions and consequences.
In such a way that the hydrological system of the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, which constitutes the vital artery of West Asia, has been disturbed. This process, from Copenhagen’s point of view, has created a potential basis and capacity for conflict and threats in the region. By reducing the amount of water input in the downstream section, it has caused environmental crises. Meanwhile, the effects of the environmental assessment reveal that the GAP project does not align with the internal governance of the countries and has extra-regional effects.
Therefore, on the one hand, making water security dependent on water resources outside the country effectively ties a part of national security to the region. The absence of management structures for joint exploitation and water governance has transformed it into a factor that contributes to crises between countries. In this context, it is possible to highlight the connection between the Turkish GAP project’s ideological understanding of politics and economy and the concept of security and sustainable development within the framework of the Copenhagen school.
In other words, considering that the ideological understanding of the principle of excellence and its reproduction prioritizes it over other factors. Elements such as the environment, economic growth, and social welfare, which define the concept of security and sustainable development in the Copenhagen school, become victims of this principle of project excellence. The GAP in Turkey, when security standards are reduced in various aspects, increases its structural ideological function in the public domain.
Concepts such as security, in all its aspects, undergo a fundamental transformation. This evolutionary change of the GAP project is related to the instability of the development space and the discourse of development and sustainable development worldwide. The GAP plan is largely a product of concepts, norms, and criteria borrowed from other places, without considering its compatibility with Turkey’s own internal conditions, sensitivities, concerns, and internal demands. As a result, many concepts, goals, and activities are in conflict with each other.
Using the descriptive-analytical method and library and media sources, this research seeks to answer the question: How will Turkey’s GAP project cause a crisis in the Middle East, especially in the downstream countries of this project? According to the Copenhagen school, the findings indicate that the implementation of the GAP project will result in the political dependence of downstream countries on Turkey. Additionally, it will lead to extensive damage and consequences in these countries, encompassing five security threats: environmental, social, economic, political, and military. These destructive consequences align with Turkey’s ideology, as it treats water as a source of power similar to oil.
In the meantime, Iran, together with the countries affected by the GAP plan, can form a regional confederation at two levels: "regional diplomacy" and "joint management of transboundary waters" to manage the environmental risks of the Turkish GAP plan. If regional diplomacy fails, Iran can pursue this issue legally through international organizations and The Hague Court.