The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract The relationship between tradition and modernity has long constituted one of the central debates in political and social thought, particularly within developing societies. In many such contexts, modernity has been introduced as an external and, at times, disruptive phenomenon, generating tensions within pre-existing cultural and institutional frameworks. In Iran, this tension has acquired distinctive characteristics following the Islamic Revolution, which established a political order grounded in religious values while simultaneously confronting the structural imperatives of a modern state and an increasingly globalized world. Despite the transformative aspirations of the Revolution, the dichotomy between tradition and modernity has persisted across multiple spheres of Iranian society, including politics, culture, and governance. The expansion of globalization in the past half-century has intensified this interaction, creating new arenas of contestation and dialogue between competing discourses. The present study seeks to examine how this dynamic interplay has influenced political development in post-revolutionary Iran.The central research question guiding this study is: How has the confrontation between tradition and modernity affected political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution?The study advances the hypothesis that, notwithstanding the enduring tension between traditional and modern paradigms, the emergence of a new discourse—rooted in national, indigenous, and religious values while remaining compatible with certain universal modern principles—has been both necessary and influential in fostering political development in Iran. Rather than viewing tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive, this research explores the possibility of their synthesis as a driver of institutional evolution and political participation.This study is situated within broader debates on political development, discourse theory, and modernization in non-Western societies. Traditional modernization theories often conceptualize development as a linear transition from traditional to modern forms. However, such binary frameworks have been increasingly criticized for neglecting local agency, cultural specificity, and the potential for hybrid models of governance. In the Iranian context, post-revolutionary political discourse has attempted to redefine modern political concepts—such as participation, legitimacy, civil society, and sovereignty—through a religious and indigenous lens. The interaction between revolutionary ideals and global political norms has produced a distinctive discursive field in which confrontation and adaptation coexist. The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on primary documentary sources, including official documents, scholarly works, and credible online materials. Through interpretive analysis, the study examines the evolution of political discourses after the Revolution and assesses their role in shaping institutional arrangements, public participation, and state–society relations. The qualitative method allows for an in-depth exploration of meanings, narratives, and ideological transformations rather than relying solely on quantitative indicators of political development. The findings indicate that the post-revolutionary political order in Iran has succeeded in articulating a distinctive ideological and political identity that resonates beyond its national boundaries, particularly among certain revolutionary and liberation-oriented movements. This development cannot be understood solely through the lens of conflict between tradition and modernity. Instead, it reflects a dynamic process of contestation, negotiation, and selective integration. The study reveals that the tension between traditional religious values and modern political institutions has not merely generated stagnation or regression. On the contrary, the interaction of competing discourses has contributed to the gradual transformation of political structures and practices. Electoral processes, constitutional mechanisms, public debate, and policy discourse have evolved within a framework that seeks to reconcile religious legitimacy with elements of modern governance.Globalization has further complicated this relationship by introducing new normative standards and communication networks. In response, Iranian political discourse has undergone adaptations aimed at preserving cultural authenticity while engaging with global modernity. This adaptive process has played a meaningful role in shaping the trajectory of political development, even as debates over identity, authority, and reform continue.The confrontation between tradition and modernity in post-revolutionary Iran should not be interpreted solely as a source of contradiction or paralysis. Rather, it has functioned as a catalyst for discursive innovation and institutional evolution. The emergence of a hybrid discourse—grounded in indigenous, national, and religious values while selectively incorporating modern political concepts—has been instrumental in advancing political development. Ultimately, the study concludes that political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution has been shaped not by the dominance of one paradigm over the other, but by the ongoing interaction between them. The future trajectory of Iran’s political development will likely depend on the continued capacity of its political discourse to mediate, reinterpret, and harmonize these two foundational forces.

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most complex bilateral relationships in the Persian Gulf region over the past five decades. These relations have continuously been influenced by a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors and have fluctuated between economic cooperation, geopolitical competition, and security tensions. Although relations between the two countries reached one of their most confrontational periods between 2016 and 2020, signs of de-escalation and a return to diplomacy have emerged since 2021, coinciding with political changes in both the United States and Iran. Utilizing a descriptive-explanatory method, drawing upon library and electronic sources, and employing the Constructivist framework, this study examines three possible patterns for the future of Iran-UAE relations: the Hobbesian model (confrontation and hostility), the Lockean model (managed competition), and the Kantian model (cooperation and friendship). The findings indicate that the most probable scenario for the future of bilateral relations is the model of managed competition. In the first model, namely the dominance of Hobbesian culture, relations between Iran and the UAE move toward increased tension, mistrust, and the possibility of military confrontation. The most significant domestic factor underlying this situation is the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran considers these islands an inseparable part of its territory, whereas the UAE claims sovereignty over them and has consistently sought to raise the issue in international forums. This historical dispute has persisted since the establishment of the UAE in 1971 and has become a significant symbol of political and identity-based competition between the two countries. From Tehran’s perspective, sovereignty over these islands is non-negotiable, whereas Abu Dhabi insists on resolving the issue through negotiations or international arbitration. At the regional level, geopolitical competition has also played a major role in the formation of Hobbesian culture. Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the UAE’s concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence increased substantially. Developments in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen war, and the expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and across the region were viewed by the UAE as threats to the regional balance of power. The Yemen war became the most important arena of indirect competition between the two countries. The UAE supported forces opposed to Ansar Allah, while Iran provided political and strategic support to the movement. Drone attacks on Abu Dhabi and reciprocal confrontations in Yemen further intensified mistrust between the two states. The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020 constituted another factor contributing to heightened tensions. Iran viewed this development as a threat to its national security and warned against the security and intelligence presence of Israel near its borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the expansion of military and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel could alter the regional security balance to Iran’s detriment. Consequently, the growing ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to improving Iran-UAE relations. At the international level, the UAE’s security dependence on the United States has also been a major factor in generating tensions. The UAE views the American military presence as a guarantee of its security, while Iran considers the presence of U.S. forces in the region a direct threat to its national security. American military bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Iran significantly exacerbated bilateral tensions in recent years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the UAE as a threat to regional stability, leading Abu Dhabi to consistently support international pressure against Tehran. In contrast, the second model, namely Lockean culture or managed competition, emphasizes the control of tensions and the preservation of limited interactions. This model is based on the assumption that both countries recognize the extremely high costs of direct confrontation and therefore seek to manage their differences. At the domestic level, the federal structure of the UAE plays an important role in this process. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which adopts a security-oriented and hardline approach toward Iran, Dubai and Sharjah favor maintaining economic relations with Tehran due to their strong dependence on trade and a non-oil economy. This divergence in perspectives has ensured that even during periods of political tension, bilateral trade relations have never been completely severed. At the regional level, several developments have contributed to reducing tensions. The reduction of the UAE’s military presence in Yemen, the initiation of security dialogues between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, and efforts to manage disputes through diplomatic channels are among the notable examples. The exchange of security and political delegations between the two capitals in recent years and the signing of border cooperation agreements demonstrated the determination of both sides to prevent further escalation. In addition, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 fostered a regional atmosphere conducive to de-escalation, encouraging the UAE to adopt a more balanced foreign policy. At the international level, the shift in U.S. policy following the inauguration of President Joe Biden also influenced this trend. Washington’s reduced support for the maximum pressure policy against Iran and efforts to revive nuclear negotiations prompted the UAE to reconsider its regional policies. Within this framework, Abu Dhabi also improved its relations with Qatar, Türkiye, and Syria and sought to establish itself as a more balanced regional actor. The third model, namely Kantian culture, represents the most optimistic scenario for the future of Iran-UAE relations. Under this model, the two countries move toward stable and friendly relations through economic cooperation, interdependence, and the reduction of security tensions. The most important driving force behind this process is the extensive economic interdependence between the two states. Over the past decades, the UAE, particularly Dubai, has played a crucial role in Iran’s foreign trade and has become one of Tehran’s most important economic partners. Thousands of Iranian companies operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade has experienced substantial growth in recent years. Economic interdependence has ensured that economic relations have never been completely interrupted, even during periods of peak political tension. As a regional commercial hub, Dubai possesses significant economic interests in maintaining relations with Iran. Furthermore, extensive Iranian investments in the UAE and the country’s role in Iran’s financial and commercial exchanges have created strong incentives for continued cooperation. At the regional level, a reduction in geopolitical tensions could facilitate the realization of this model. The end or de-escalation of the Yemen conflict, the improvement of Iran-Saudi relations, the growing role of regional mediators, and the expansion of regional economic cooperation are among the factors that could strengthen ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, if the UAE limits its security cooperation with Israel and focuses more on economic cooperation, some of Iran’s security concerns may be alleviated. At the international level, the success of nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran could provide a foundation for expanding economic and political cooperation between the two countries. The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that whenever tensions between Iran and the United States decreased, trade and investment between Iran and the UAE increased correspondingly. Under such circumstances, joint economic projects, the development of regional transportation corridors, and cooperation in the fields of energy and infrastructure could elevate bilateral relations to a new level. In conclusion, the study emphasizes that Iran-UAE relations possess a dual and multilayered nature in which economic cooperation and political competition coexist simultaneously. Although territorial disputes, security rivalries, and the UAE’s relations with the United States and Israel hinder the development of full strategic trust between the two countries, economic interdependence and the high costs of direct confrontation also prevent relations from evolving into comprehensive hostility. Therefore, the most probable scenario for the future of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi is the continuation of a pattern of “managed competition accompanied by limited cooperation.” Within this framework, while maintaining their political and security differences, both countries are likely to utilize economic and diplomatic interactions to prevent the escalation of tensions and avoid direct confrontation. Such a situation could preserve relative stability in the Persian Gulf and provide the basis for limited yet sustained cooperation between two important regional actors.

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.

Abstract The recent advancement of artificial intelligence must be understood as part of a broader transformation wherein digital infrastructures have moved from merely transmitting information to organizing meaning and adjudicating truth. In daily experience, search engines and social media once served as primary gateways to the world of information; now, large language models and generative systems have become interlocutors, interpreters, summarizers, and recommender, fundamentally reshaping the public sphere. For Iran, the stakes are high because the issue is not only what content AI produces but also which data it deems credible, which linguistic styles and historical narratives it reproduces, and which worldview it effectively imposes on users. Domestic policymaking in this domain often falls into a simplistic “opportunity/threat” binary or remains confined to general digital economy plans. Internationally, national strategies typically combine ethical principles, institutional flexibility, and a degree of functional ambiguity to balance innovation and regulatory intervention. For Iran, reliance on vague ethical declarations without enforceable mechanisms risks widening the gap between discourse and technical reality; conversely, rigid regulation without social participation, data infrastructure, and indigenous evaluation can stifle innovation and encourage circumvention. A framework that treats identity as a public policy issue and is technically and institutionally implementable is therefore an urgent necessity.

How can Iran, in the age of artificial intelligence, align technological development with the active preservation and creative renewal of its national identity (in its Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary configuration), without falling into cultural closure or harmful self-contained insularity?
This study advances a central policy proposition: by operationalizing a “cultural justice in AI” framework, supported by six interconnected policy pillars (spanning data sovereignty, indigenous evaluation benchmarks, participatory governance, and conditional international engagement) Iran can simultaneously foster responsible AI development and actively safeguard its national identity, thereby transforming potential algorithmic risks into opportunities for cultural resilience and creative renewal.
This study adopts an analytical and policy‑oriented methodology. It does not test a narrow empirical hypothesis but designs a decision‑ready framework suitable for translation into programs, standards, and institutional mechanisms within regulatory bodies. The analysis proceeds along three synergistic paths: a critical review of AI governance literature, with emphasis on the state’s dual role as facilitator of development and guarantor of risk mitigation; a focus on the specific characteristics of generative AI, which amplify risks such as hallucination, opacity, and unintended cultural homogenization; and the grounding of these discussions in Iran’s indigenous configuration of national identity, translating abstract governance concepts (data, benchmarks, auditing, accountability) into the language of identity‑laden domains (Persian language, historical memory, religious authority, revolutionary narrative, social cohesion).
The theoretical framework conceptualizes AI not as a neutral tool but as an “infrastructure of meaning” and a site of potential “data colonialism,” where cultural resources are extracted as raw material and returned as dominant stereotypes. Drawing on this critical lens, the study introduces the concept of “cultural justice in AI,” defined as the guarantee that Persian language, diverse dialects and expressive styles, and central narratives of history, religion, and revolution are not mere consumers of technological products but are actively present in the data layer, evaluation metrics, and decision‑making institutions. This perspective bridges infrastructure studies, critical data studies, and identity politics, emphasizing that cultural injustices often occur not in visible outputs but in the “invisibilities” of data collection, labeling, and weighting.
The analysis yields a multidimensional policy framework that moves beyond symbolic protection toward operational transparency and accountability. First, the study maps identity‑sensitive domains (such as religious authority and automated fatwa systems, Persian language and literature education, historical narrative generation, and content recommendation in mass media) and classifies them according to risk levels (very high, high, medium/low). This risk‑based approach guides the intensity of regulatory intervention: very high‑risk applications require licensing, mandatory human‑in‑the‑loop, pre‑ and post‑audit, and grievance mechanisms, while lower‑risk domains can operate under lighter, supervised self‑regulation.
Second, the article identifies three layers for translating the abstract notion of “identity risk” into actionable requirements: the data layer, where the creation and maintenance of high‑quality, diverse, and transparently documented Persian corpora are treated as public goods; the evaluation layer, where indigenous benchmarks are designed to assess not only technical fluency but also cultural‑identity dimensions such as distortion of religious concepts, ethnic stereotyping, and one‑sided historical narratives; and the institutional layer, where a participatory governance architecture is proposed. This includes a “Cultural Representation Council for AI,” a multi‑stakeholder body composed of linguists, historians, theologians, sociologists, and industry representatives, tasked with producing concrete audit protocols and data guidelines rather than general recommendations.
Third, six complementary policy pillars are detailed: (1) defining and institutionalizing sensitive identity domains and risk tiers; (2) building and reinforcing reliable Persian corpora and data assets as commons; (3) designing indigenous cultural‑identity evaluation benchmarks and regular auditing mechanisms; (4) embedding participatory governance and cultural representation within the regulatory structure; (5) enhancing interdisciplinary AI literacy across educational, media, and religious institutions; and (6) pursuing targeted, conditional international data diplomacy to influence global standards and avoid passive marginalization.
The discussion emphasizes that effective governance cannot rely solely on top‑down prohibition; it must be adaptive, learning‑oriented, and rooted in a political‑economic understanding of platform power. The framework advocates starting with policy pilots in selected domains, systematically gathering evidence, and iteratively revising rules, thereby maintaining innovation while ensuring accountability. It also warns that without deliberate investment in Persian data infrastructure and local evaluation tools, Iran risks becoming dependent on opaque foreign models that structurally embed alien cultural norms.
The intersection of artificial intelligence and national identity in Iran is a governance‑level challenge. As generative models become the primary mediators of meaning (affecting education, collective memory, religious practice, and entertainment) policy inaction effectively cedes authority to external standards and datasets. The study concludes that aligning AI development with the Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary identity requires simultaneous intervention in three layers: semantic infrastructure (data, models), assessment (evaluation, auditing), and institutions (participation, accountability). The proposed package (centered on cultural justice, data sovereignty, indigenous benchmarks, participatory governance, literacy, and data diplomacy) offers a path to transform AI from a threat of cultural homogenization into an instrument of dynamic identity preservation. Responsiveness, in the sense of clear data provenance, documented model assumptions, transparent evaluation procedures, and defined liability for high‑risk errors, serves as the unifying thread of this architecture. Ultimately, a learning‑based governance model that balances innovation with rigorous accountability can enable Iran to strengthen its digital sovereignty while actively and creatively renewing its national identity.

Abstract In the complex and pluralistic landscape of 21st-century international relations, media diplomacy has emerged as a foundational pillar and strategic instrument of foreign policy. This phenomenon, which in essence signifies the intelligent and targeted use of communication tools to manage a nation’s image and advance its national objectives on the global stage, is recognized as the primary arm for exercising soft power. In a world where public opinion plays a decisive role in legitimizing government policies, a country’s ability to narrate its own story, articulate its positions, and influence global perceptions has become a vital component of national power. Global media giants such as the BBC, Voice of America, Reuters, and the Associated Press are not merely news organizations; they function as diplomatic instruments that can shape the global agenda and serve the interests of their home countries by framing events and highlighting specific issues. This reciprocal and synergistic relationship between politicians and the media is an undeniable reality; politicians need the media to convey their messages and mobilize public support, while the media depends on political elites for access to primary news sources and firsthand analysis.
Following the fundamental transformations of 2003 and the collapse of the Ba’athist regime, Iraq faced an existential challenge in the international arena: the challenge of rebuilding its national image. To establish its position as an independent and effective actor in the region and the world, the new Iraq requires an active and dynamic presence in the global communication sphere. However, the central problem this research addresses is the country’s structural inability to effectively leverage media diplomacy. The roots of this failure are deep and multifaceted. On one hand, the legacy of decades of despotic Ba’ath party rule, which suppressed any growth of independent and professional media, has resulted in a historical vacuum and backwardness in Iraq’s media infrastructure. On the other hand, post-2003, the country has faced not only internal reconstruction challenges but also a continuous and negative media onslaught from some regional and Western networks, particularly American-Saudi media, which have further weakened its standing in global public opinion by presenting a stereotypical, distorted, and one-sided image of Iraq as an insecure, unstable, and sectarian-ridden nation. This situation has turned the necessity of formulating scientific and practical strategies for enhancing Iraq’s media diplomacy into an undeniable strategic priority.
Despite the critical importance of the subject, a review of the existing literature reveals a significant gap in academic work related to Iraq’s media diplomacy, which itself confirms the underdevelopment of this field in both practice and theory. Nevertheless, the few studies that have been conducted illuminate various dimensions of this challenge. For instance, previous research has emphasized the key role of media in the post-ISIS peace-building process while also analyzing its function in Iraq’s internal conflicts and crises. Other researchers have identified the structural and political obstacles hindering the emergence of independent media and have scrutinized the initial media dynamics following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The consensus from all this research points to one key commonality: the absence of a professional, independent, and capable media infrastructure is the primary and fundamental obstacle to Iraq playing a significant role in global diplomacy, and resolving this dilemma requires specific and operational solutions.
To achieve this goal, a deep exploration of the perspectives and experiences of elites was undertaken using a qualitative approach and the research method of thematic analysis. Accordingly, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty prominent experts, including veteran Iraqi diplomats, professors and specialists in communication sciences, and leading media activists. The selection of this purposive sample was aimed at gathering the collective wisdom of an elite group directly involved with Iraq’s foreign policy and media challenges. To ensure the scientific validity and reliability of the findings, the technique of researcher triangulation was employed, where the initial coding and analysis process was reviewed by a team of distinguished communication professors, ensuring the final analytical framework was agreed upon with high precision.
The rich findings from these interviews revealed three primary and interconnected strategies for advancing Iraq’s media diplomacy: producing desirable media content, adopting a desirable media strategy, and maintaining a media focus on major foreign policy issues. Among these, the production of professional and engaging content was identified as the cornerstone of any successful endeavor. According to the experts, desirable content must prioritize the maximum use of digital technologies and modern communication platforms to bypass traditional media filters and establish direct and effective communication with global audiences. Furthermore, the produced messages must adhere to global journalistic standards; that is, they must be clear, concise, accurate, reliable, and as impartial as possible to break down barriers of distrust and be heard in the competitive global information environment. Objectivity in covering events, precise and non-exaggerated descriptions, and presenting balanced views on controversial topics are necessary conditions for gaining and maintaining international credibility.
Beyond mere news reporting, the power of effective storytelling is a fundamental axis. This approach means shifting from a defensive and reactive stance to an active and innovative one in narrative construction. Instead of simply responding to the negative narratives of others, Iraq must create its own alternative and compelling narrative, built upon the vast cultural, civilizational, and historical capacities of its land. Highlighting the heritage of Mesopotamia, showcasing contemporary artistic and cultural achievements, focusing on success stories of reconstruction and peaceful coexistence, and utilizing the powerful tools of art can be the building blocks of this new narrative. Presenting a realistic image that acknowledges challenges while focusing on opportunities and positive prospects, alongside efforts to create a unified and coherent narrative from all government institutions, will prevent sending contradictory messages and project an image of a stable state. Increasing diversity in the form and content of messages to engage various audience segments and focusing on the positive aspects of Iraq’s historical relations with other nations will significantly strengthen the country’s content strategy.
In today’s world, media diplomacy for a country in Iraq’s position is not an option or a ceremonial tool, but a vital necessity and a guarantor of survival and progress in the international arena. Foreign policy without the backing of a powerful media that can explain its positions, defend its interests, and manage its image is highly inefficient and lacks influence. For Iraq to make its independent voice heard by the world, neutralize the biased and toxic narratives of its rivals, and reclaim its true position as a key player in the region and the world, it has no choice but to make a serious and long-term investment in rebuilding and developing its media system. This requires allocating resources, training specialized human capital, creating coordination between diplomatic and media institutions, and learning from successful global experiences. An intelligent and effective media presence can dramatically increase a country’s diplomatic weight and influence in global affairs. Therefore, enhancing media diplomacy must be placed on the agenda of Iraqi policymakers as a grand national project, so that the country can not only correct its distorted past image but also play an active, constructive, and leading role in resolving future crises and shaping a more stable future for its people and the region.

Abstract The Gaza crisis, particularly following the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation in October 2023, has become a turning point in regional developments, having wide-reaching effects on the security and geopolitical dynamics of the region. Evidence suggests that, prior to the Gaza crisis, Iran, as a key player in West Asia, had played a significant role in maintaining and reproducing the regional security order through supporting resistance groups, adopting deterrence policies, multilateral diplomacy, and balancing power. However, the Gaza crisis, with its expansion into Syria and Lebanon and the widespread use of hybrid warfare strategies, has reshaped the structure and nature of the regional order. This war not only escalated the historic conflicts between Palestinian resistance and the Israeli regime but also, by enhancing the role of new technologies (such as drones and information warfare), has introduced a new phase of complexity and power shift in the regional order. The Gaza crisis, while disrupting the regional power balance, has posed a serious challenge to Iran's geopolitical strategies for preserving its position. The crisis, by altering the regional power balance and increasing political and security pressures, has placed the Islamic Republic of Iran at risk of a new encirclement in a coalition of rival forces, in what can be described as "strategic isolation." The continued Gaza crisis, accompanied by new complexities and developments, particularly the use of advanced technologies and hybrid warfare strategies, seems to require Iran to shift from traditional methods to new strategic approaches. This research is significant in its ability to offer a deeper understanding of the power shifts in the region that have emerged after the Gaza crisis, which are markedly different from the past. It provides new insights into Iran's security and diplomatic strategies and explores the country's approaches to maintaining national security and determining the security order in the region. Furthermore, identifying effective tools and mechanisms for addressing new threats contributes to the study's importance, as it helps Iran's foreign policy escape the security trap of crisis cycles (the siege crisis). The novelty of this research lies in addressing the gap in prior studies by analyzing the impact of the Gaza crisis on the regional order in West Asia and Iran's role in reproducing this order. It also examines the long-term consequences of the Gaza crisis on regional power dynamics and Iran's future foreign policy strategies. Research Questions 1. How has the Gaza crisis impacted the power dynamics, roles of regional actors, and the structure of the security order in West Asia? 2. What security, diplomatic, and economic strategies can Iran adopt to preserve and enhance its regional position in the new regional order? Theoretical and Conceptual Framework To explain and analyze the situation of the regional order during the Gaza crisis and Iran's new strategies in addressing regional crises, the strategic rationality theory of John Mearsheimer, which falls under the theory of offensive realism, can be used. This multi-layered theoretical framework is designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the structural changes in Iran’s foreign and security policies in the region and how they adapt to new crisis conditions. Mearsheimer's strategic rationality is based on explanatory frameworks, including: 1. The need to redefine rationality in complex crisis situations. 2. Focusing on active deterrence through "smart power." 3. The distinction between risk and uncertainty in conflict situations. 4. Avoiding the maximization of benefits in crisis and conflict situations. Research Methodology This research is based on the paradigm of offensive realism and is applied in nature. It uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library-based and documentary techniques. Research Findings - The Gaza crisis and Iran's multi-layered security strategy - The power shift during the Gaza crisis - Iran's overall capabilities and new threats - The hidden cycle of regional actors’ actions - The expansion of hybrid warfare and its impact on changing the nature of conflicts against Iran Reproduction of Regional Order and Possible Strategies for the Islamic Republic of Iran Considering the regional changes, the Islamic Republic of Iran must move beyond traditional strategic frameworks and adopt new multi-layered strategies. These strategies should focus on combining hard, soft, and smart power and using hybrid warfare tools and flexible diplomacy to manage regional crises. In other words, to control the regional order based on a precise understanding of power relations and to change the cycle of power and the regional order, Iran’s new role and the design of a new deterrence system are essential. Given the regional transformations, it is clear that Iran must move from linear deterrence systems to non-linear deterrence, allowing all countries to apply this control system in complex and asymmetric environments. Conclusion This research, with its comprehensive approach and effort to accurately understand the current status of the region and security relations, clarifies how the Gaza crisis has impacted the regional order and what the best crisis management decisions for Iran are. Findings highlight that, for the first time, threats have reached Iran’s internal security layers and its core. In such a situation, achieving maximized benefit through strategic rationality is undesirable, and Iran must focus on creating absolute benefits and optimal conditions. Moreover, prioritizing economic issues for regional countries and focusing on development under political stability leads to a transformative power dynamic, whereas Iran, due to its different understanding of threats and severe economic sanctions, continues to view power dynamics through military security relations. Despite Israel’s attempts to bring competition and conflict into non-military, informational, and technological fields, the Islamic Republic responded with military operations that provided deterrence and confrontational capacity. This decision, based on strategic rationality, aimed to adopt strategies that allowed Iran to maintain its ability and capacity in the military arena. However, the general capabilities shift, the expansion of hybrid warfare, and its impact on the nature of conflicts against Iran is a significant event that could limit Iran’s role, especially as the Gaza crisis revealed that Israel has been able to create a long-term implicit security regime through a common threat of Iran in the region. This becomes critical when regional powers are silent and passive in the face of Tel Aviv's actions, placing them in a hidden balance with Israel. In such a scenario, Iran must adopt smart policies to strengthen the resistance axis and prevent new security alliances against itself.

Abstract Terrorism in today’s world has become a multidimensional phenomenon, and terrorism financing, as one of the fundamental challenges to the international security system, has targeted not only the domestic stability of countries but also collective security. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran, considering its geopolitical conditions and surrounding threats, has formulated criminal and preventive policies to combat this phenomenon. The present research has been conducted with the aim of analyzing Iran’s preventive approaches in combating terrorism financing and their alignment with the standards of international documents. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used, relying on the analysis of legal documents, domestic laws, and international conventions. Legislative challenges arising from the lack of a single and universal definition of the concept of terrorism have faced difficulties in the full implementation of international standards. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a country that has itself been a victim of terrorism, has designed a unique legislative model within this ambiguous context, which not only has not fallen behind global standards but has also introduced effective legislative innovations into its legal literature across many supervisory layers. With the understanding that definitional ambiguity can be used as a political lever against states, it has sought to localize norms. This national approach is, in fact, a reaction to attempts that intend to isolate legitimate regional resistances under the guise of terrorism. In international documents, including the 1999 New York Convention, special emphasis has been placed on the importance of tracking financial flows and identifying the identities of actors involved in transactions. The legal system of Iran, by accepting part of these norms and integrating them into domestic laws, has traversed a path in which financial institutions are defined as the front line of the combat. The country’s legislative transformation in the years 2007 and 2015 is considered a turning point in this path, which was carried out with the aim of directly criminalizing terrorism financing and creating legal frameworks for institutional supervision. In these laws, the traditional concepts of combating money laundering have expanded and extended to the sensitive field of terrorism financing. The main basis of the argument of this research is built on the assumption that prevention in the field of terrorism financing, before being a judicial matter, is a "supervisory and financial" process. In the past, the focus of the legislator was mainly on punishing the perpetrators after the commission of a crime, but with the legislative developments of recent decades, particularly by relying on the experiences gained from anti-money laundering laws and their elevation to the level of combating terrorism financing, this approach has undergone a fundamental change, and the legal system of Iran has not merely relied on passive modeling in designing preventive mechanisms. Prevention in Iran’s system is a combination of adhering to technical banking standards and maintaining ideological and political boundaries, which is reflected in the country’s criminal legislation; the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a combined approach (criminal and non-criminal) in which criminal prevention is highlighted through laws such as the "Counter-Terrorism Financing Law" passed in 2015 and its subsequent amendments in 2018. Studies show that despite the lack of formal accession to the 1999 New York Convention, Iran has integrated its key provisions into its domestic law. In this regard, a significant portion of the Iranian legislator’s efforts in drafting preventive rules has been focused on controlling suspicious financial flows. These preventive measures in Iran’s legal system, beyond mere criminalization, have proceeded to create supervisory structures to identify the roots of terrorism financing for terrorist groups. One of the key points that must be mentioned is the role of financial institutions and the responsibilities assigned to them in domestic laws. The Counter-Terrorism Financing Law, by utilizing previous legal experiences in the field of combating money laundering, has designed mechanisms that attempt to ensure alignment with global standards alongside the preservation of national authority. In fact, an analysis of the governing regulations shows that Iran’s approach, in the link between criminal measures and administrative supervisions, seeks to block existing gaps in the path of financing terrorist activities. However, the analyses of this research indicate that the existing challenges are not merely limited to legal texts and also have their own specific complexities in implementation. The article emphasizes that the Iranian policymaker, despite these challenges, has sought to design a framework compatible with national security by relying on domestic legal and jurisprudential (Fiqh) sources. In completion of the previous discussions, this research insists precisely on the point that the preventive system in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of an evolutionary legislative process, shaped in response to national security needs and international structural pressures. A comparison between the provisions of the 1999 Convention and domestic law indicates that the Iranian legislator has taken effective steps in the field of “criminal liability of legal persons,” which is aligned with global standards for combating terrorism financing. However, the article emphasizes that one of the main obstacles in the path of full implementation of these standards is the flexible yet ambiguous nature of the concepts mentioned in international documents. Furthermore, it should be noted that the position of the 1999 New York Convention within Iran’s legal system is one of the contentious focal points of this research. Although Iran has, in practice, reproduced many of the norms arising from this Convention in its national laws, its lack of formal accession stems from precise legal and political considerations regarding the definitions and instances of terrorism. This research clearly argues that the Iranian legal system, by adopting a "maximalist prevention" approach, has sought to combat terrorism financing networks without harming national sovereignty. From the perspective of this article, preventive measures are not limited solely to the criminal sphere; rather, they encompass a broader range of banking and financial supervisions in which the "Financial Intelligence Unit" (FIU) plays a pivotal role. The comparative study conducted in this research indicates that the Iranian model shares significant commonalities with the models prevalent in international conventions regarding the "supervision of natural and legal persons." Nevertheless, in the section of the definition of terrorism, conceptual gaps exist between what is recognized as a unified standard in international documents and what is accepted in domestic law. This research states that the Iranian legislator has preferred, instead of accepting external definitions, to interpret concepts based on its own legal principles in a manner that prevents political or legal abuses. Additionally, this article emphasizes that the fight against terrorism financing must be based on balanced international cooperation, such that the unilateralism of certain international financial institutions does not violate the rights of developing countries or countries under sanctions. In the final part of the analyses, we conclude that despite all legislative and executive challenges, the Iranian legal system has experienced a forward movement in aligning its structures with preventive requirements over the last decade. The creation of databases of persons at risk and the obligation of financial institutions to provide rapid reporting are among the achievements of this legislative process. The final emphasis is on the fact that terrorism grows in a context of financial concealment. Therefore, any step taken toward the transparency of financial flows is a step toward undermining the foundations of terrorism. The Iranian policymaker must guide this process with a proactive outlook so that the country, in its challenging regional environment, ensures its security as a law-abiding yet intelligent actor. Under the shadow of this integrated approach, a vision can be achieved in which the country’s financial system is not only secured against terrorism financing threats but also becomes a model for other developing countries. This research suggests that to exit interpretive deadlocks, there is a need for an international legal discourse based on a common and non-political definition of the concept of terrorism. Furthermore, expanding the scope of "preventive measures" without considering the legal differences between systems will lead to inefficiency at the implementation level. Therefore, the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran must continue to be based on strengthening the rule of law domestically, alongside active legal diplomacy in the international arena, to combat terrorism financing threats while utilizing legal capacities to preserve national interests.

Abstract Over the past two decades, China has undergone a profound transformation from a regionally focused actor into a globally influential power whose economic dynamism, technological advancement, and diplomatic activism have reshaped the international system. As Beijing’s material capabilities have expanded, so too has its ambition to redefine the norms, principles, and institutional arrangements governing global order. Central to this ambition is China’s effort to articulate and promote a distinct interpretation of "great power responsibility" a concept that diverges significantly from Western understandings of global leadership, intervention, and normative authority. Rather than framing responsibility in terms of military engagement, democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention, China emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, development-oriented cooperation, and multilateralism. This alternative framing has become a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy identity and a key instrument in its strategy to expand influence in critical regions, including the Middle East. The Middle East occupies a pivotal position in China’s strategic calculus. It is a region where Beijing’s core interests—energy security, connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis the United States—intersect. China’s growing presence in the Middle East is not merely a byproduct of economic expansion; it is a deliberate and carefully calibrated policy aimed at embedding China within the political, economic, and security architecture of the region. The question guiding this study is therefore: How has China employed the concept of great power responsibility to expand its influence in the Middle East in competition with the United States? Addressing this question requires a conceptual examination of China’s interpretation of great power responsibility, as well as an empirical analysis of its policies, initiatives, and diplomatic behavior in the region. China’s official discourse presents great power responsibility as a commitment to promoting stability, development, and mutually beneficial cooperation. This discourse gained renewed prominence following President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Governance Initiative in September 2025, which builds upon earlier frameworks such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Collectively, these initiatives articulate China’s vision for a more equitable and multipolar world order grounded in respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and inclusive multilateralism. In the Middle East, this vision translates into a foreign policy approach that seeks to avoid entanglement in regional conflicts while simultaneously expanding China’s economic footprint, diplomatic presence, and normative influence. China’s strategy in the Middle East rests on three foundational pillars. The first is energy security, as the region supplies more than 40 percent of Chinas crude oil imports. Ensuring stable access to energy resources is therefore a core national interest, and China has cultivated long-term partnerships with major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. These partnerships are framed not as extractive relationships but as mutually beneficial arrangements that contribute to regional stability and economic development an interpretation consistent with China’s development-oriented notion of responsibility. The second pillar is the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, which positions the Middle East as a critical hub for global connectivity. Through infrastructure investments, port development, digital cooperation, and financial integration, China seeks to embed regional economies within a broader Eurasian network centered on Beijing. The BRI is presented as a vehicle for shared prosperity, reflecting China’s claim that great power responsibility entails enabling development rather than imposing political conditions. In practice, BRI projects have deepened China’s economic interdependence with Middle Eastern states, thereby increasing Beijing’s leverage and influence. The third pillar is multilateralism and geopolitical balancing, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. China’s growing diplomatic engagement including its role in mediating the 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement illustrates Beijing’s attempt to position itself as a neutral, stabilizing actor capable of facilitating dialogue without imposing ideological agendas. This stands in contrast to Western approaches that often involve political conditionality or military intervention. By emphasizing neutrality, sovereignty, and non-interference, China seeks to differentiate its model of great power responsibility from that of the United States and present itself as a more acceptable partner to regional governments. China’s behavior in the Middle East demonstrates how the concept of great power responsibility functions as both a normative framework and a strategic tool. Beijing consistently portrays its actions as contributing to regional stability, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. For example, China’s diplomatic rhetoric surrounding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine emphasizes political solutions, humanitarian assistance, and respect for national sovereignty. Although China avoids direct military involvement, it leverages its economic influence and diplomatic channels to shape regional dynamics in ways that align with its long-term interests. The findings of this study, based on conceptual analysis and descriptive–analytical methodology, indicate that China’s approach to great power responsibility in the Middle East is characterized by pragmatism, restraint, and strategic opportunism. China seeks stability not out of altruism but because instability threatens its energy supply, investment environment, and regional partnerships. By respecting sovereignty and avoiding intervention, China appeals to regional governments wary of Western interference. Through development-oriented cooperation, China strengthens economic ties that gradually translate into political influence. And by promoting multilateralism, China challenges U.S. dominance while presenting itself as a constructive global actor. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has intensified efforts to expand both hard and soft power in the Middle East. Unlike Western powers that often invoke great power responsibility to justify military intervention or political pressure, China frames responsibility in terms of economic development, stability, and partnership. This alternative framing has resonated with many Middle Eastern states seeking diversification of external partnerships and greater autonomy from Western influence. China’s mediation efforts, economic diplomacy, and participation in regional forums further reinforce its image as a responsible major power committed to peaceful development. Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative represents the culmination of China’s evolving vision for global order. It emphasizes multilateralism, justice, and respect for civilizational diversity principles that challenge Western-centric models of governance. In the Middle East, these principles translate into policies aimed at reducing regional dependence on Western powers, strengthening China’s role as a key economic and diplomatic actor, and embedding the region within a multipolar global system. China’s growing influence is therefore not merely a consequence of economic expansion but a deliberate effort to reshape regional and global governance norms. In conclusion, China’s use of the concept of great power responsibility in the Middle East reflects a broader strategy to expand influence while avoiding the costs and risks associated with military intervention. By emphasizing sovereignty, development, and multilateralism, China presents itself as a benign and constructive actor, even as it pursues strategic objectives such as energy security, geopolitical balancing, and regional integration under the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach enables China to compete with the United States for influence in the Middle East while maintaining a narrative of peaceful rise and responsible leadership. Ultimately, China’s development-oriented interpretation of great power responsibility serves as both a normative justification and a practical mechanism for expanding its presence in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions.

Abstract This research critically examines the phenomenon of gender commodification and the expansion of the sex work economy within the context of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) rapid economic development. This specific model of development, contingent upon the swift influx of capital and expatriate labor, has engendered a complex societal structure. This paper posits that sex work in Dubai is a structural manifestation of prevailing macroeconomic priorities, globalizing forces, and the inherent contradictions embedded within the theoretical paradigms guiding economic policymaking. The commodification of gender in the UAE, set against the panorama of economic globalization—as is typical in other rapidly industrializing nations—is accompanied by intricate and often paradoxical economic, social, and cultural impacts. While the UAE is globally recognized as a premier nexus for commerce and tourism, its engagement with economic globalization has not only unlocked significant opportunities for investment and aggregate growth but has also precipitated profound transformations across its social and cultural spheres. The commodification of gender in the UAE presents distinct challenges owing to the nation's conservative Islamic culture. In contrast to other nations that have more overtly utilized sex work to attract tourism, the UAE has adopted a markedly more cautious strategy. Furthermore, economic globalization has facilitated the emergence and propagation of novel gender identities and representations within the Emirates. Although the UAE has consistently sought to capitalize on global economic opportunities for advancement, this trajectory has simultaneously introduced complexities such as gender commodification and its attendant cultural repercussions. This study concentrates on clarifying the multi-dimensional consequences of economic globalization on gender and sex work within the UAE, directly addressing the inquiry: How has economic globalization influenced the commodification of gender in the UAE? The central hypothesis of this case study is formulated as follows: Economic globalization, driven by the imperative for profit maximization and capital accumulation, has instigated the commodification of personsand the objectification of gender within the economic domain, thereby creating the structural conditions conducive to the prevalence of sex work as a means of establishing a capital-attracting and employment-generating industry. Economic globalization in the UAE, one of the most dynamic economies in the Gulf region, has exerted manifold influences across social, cultural, and gender stratifications. To dissect these shifts, this study adopts the theoretical lenses of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Structuralism from International Political Economy (IPE). These three perspectives are optimally suited to investigate the changes induced by globalization, particularly regarding gender dynamics and individual commodification in the UAE context. From a Realist standpoint, state behavior is fundamentally driven by the pursuit of national power preservation. Sex work may function, albeit perhaps unintentionally, by satisfying the demands of the international consumer base and maintaining an "attractive" milieu for foreign investment, thereby securing capital inflow and, consequently, national power. Liberalism prioritizes individual liberties and bodily autonomy. Under this framework, sex work, where it stems from voluntary choice, can be conceptualized as an individual economic decision aimed at income generation within a deregulated market. The primary friction emerges between the tenets of liberal market freedom and the constraints imposed by established traditional/Islamic legal norms. Adopting a Structuralist view, globalization is understood not as a process governed solely by state or corporate actors, but as unfolding within a complex structural matrix of power dynamics and socio-economic norms that actively shape those very actors. Structuralism illuminates the deepest strata of exploitation, directly linking sex work to the operational logic of Neoliberal Capitalism. This economic model engenders profound cleavages in class, gender, and ethnicity. The exploitation of migrant workers, especially those originating from the Global South, under precarious conditions is a direct outcome of these systemic global inequalities. A Structuralist solution mandates deep, transformative institutional reform.
 
The research findings underscore that due to the paramount importance states place on conforming to global economic integration—and their efforts to leverage globalization’s capacities, particularly through creating attractive incentives and bolstering infrastructure—capital has become the decisive variable. Maximizing capital attraction necessitates diversifying the means of production, including labor, which extends to women across various sectors. Integrating the theoretical synthesis of Realism, Liberalism, and Structuralism, this analysis demonstrates how the phenomenon of gender has been instrumentalized by the UAE within this globalizing process. The prevalence of sex work in the UAE, particularly Dubai, transcends being a mere social anomaly; it is a direct reflection of strategic economic policies and globalizing trajectories. The nation’s development-centric policies, focusing on foreign direct investment, tourism, and economic diversification, are engineered to secure maximal profitability with minimal governmental interference. Within this context, migrant labor, particularly female labor, is harnessed as a quantifiable economic input. Despite the UAE’s official repudiation of sex work, the underlying market-driven economic structure, exacerbated by lacunae in regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, provides an underlying substratum where this activity can indirectly thrive.
At the macro level, UAE policies exemplify a development paradigm where the imperatives of economic competition and increased global market share systematically outweigh considerations of social welfare and human dignity. This model, reliant on attracting international finance, facilitating tourism, and maximizing the deployment of migrant labor, not only perpetuates social divisions but actively intensifies gender and class disparities. Crucially, the UAE's status as a pivotal hub in the global economic system has diminished the efficacy of regulatory and oversight mechanisms against market pressures. Under these conditions, sex work, as an unavoidable byproduct of global economic integration, has proliferated in the absence of countervailing policy controls and protective frameworks.
From a policy analysis vantage point, the UAE's deepening dependency on market economics and international engagement, absent the cultivation of robust civil society institutions and protective safeguards, has precluded the establishment of a sustainable equilibrium between economic expansion and social equity. Dubai, acting as a global nexus for trade and tourism, has inadvertently fostered an environment where informal and illicit activities, including sex work, germinate within regulatory gaps, becoming embedded within the intricate economic fabric. This situation indicates that the governing structures, notwithstanding their success in capital aggregation, have yet to cultivate the institutional capacity required to manage the social externalities of globalization.
Consequently, ameliorating this situation mandates the enactment of comprehensive, multi-scalar policies designed to forge a congruence between economic advancement and the non-negotiable demands of social justice. Such reforms must encompass the reinforcement of legal strictures, the establishment of robust labor protection modalities, the pursuit of regional and international collaboration to combat human exploitation, and the drafting of enduring social policies. Absent these systemic adjustments, any strategy focused solely on economic growth will inevitably encounter intractable structural impediments over the long term. Ultimately, realizing a development blueprint that successfully integrates economic gains with fundamental social and humanistic principles will not only enhance the UAE's international standing but will also cultivate a more equitable and stable society for the future.
 
 

Abstract The natural gas industry, as one of the most significant strategic advantages of Iran’s economy, plays a pivotal role in advancing sustainable development—a form of development that extends beyond economic growth to encompass environmental protection, social justice, inclusive participation, and responsible governance. In the contemporary global discourse, sustainable development has emerged as a multidimensional paradigm that seeks to balance economic efficiency, environmental integrity, and social equity. Within this framework, energy resources—particularly natural gas as a relatively cleaner fossil fuel—are considered critical transitional assets for achieving long-term sustainability goals. From a Western theoretical perspective, sustainable development is closely associated with principles such as transparent and accountable governance, intergenerational equity, rational management of natural resources, environmental impact assessment, and meaningful stakeholder participation in policymaking processes. These principles emphasize the need to ensure that present development trajectories do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. At the same time, environmental stewardship, institutional coherence, and policy integration are regarded as essential components of sustainable energy governance. Parallel to these Western conceptualizations, Islamic teachings offer a complementary and normatively rich foundation for sustainable development. In Islamic thought, natural resources are viewed as divine trusts (amanah) bestowed upon humanity, obligating societies to exercise moderation (wasatiyyah) in resource exploitation and to avoid wastefulness (israf). Environmental protection, social justice, collective responsibility, and solidarity among the Muslim community (ummah) constitute core ethical principles that resonate strongly with contemporary sustainability discourses. Consequently, an Islamic approach to sustainable energy development underscores balance, ethical governance, cooperation, and the pursuit of collective welfare rather than narrow economic gains. The Islamic Republic of Iran, possessing the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, holds considerable potential to play a decisive role in regional and transregional energy architecture. Iran’s geostrategic location, combined with its vast gas resources, provides unique opportunities for enhancing energy cooperation, strengthening economic interdependence, and promoting energy diplomacy within the Islamic world and beyond. Natural gas, in this context, can function not only as an economic asset but also as a strategic instrument for fostering political dialogue, cultural exchange, and regional stability. Despite these significant advantages, Iran’s gas policymaking framework faces a range of structural and institutional challenges that have hindered the realization of sustainable development objectives. Among the most critical obstacles are fragmented governance structures, weak policy coordination, inconsistencies in decision-making processes, insufficient stakeholder engagement, and inadequate attention to strategic environmental assessments. These challenges have resulted in short-term, reactive policies that often prioritize immediate economic or political considerations over long-term sustainability goals. Furthermore, the absence of an integrated governance model has contributed to inefficiencies in energy planning and implementation. Overlapping institutional mandates, lack of transparency, and limited mechanisms for accountability have undermined policy coherence and reduced public trust. Environmental considerations, although formally acknowledged in policy documents, are frequently marginalized during implementation, leading to adverse ecological impacts and missed opportunities for aligning gas development with environmental justice principles. Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to address the central research question: What are the main obstacles and requirements for achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking, considering the country’s regional and transregional role? The core hypothesis of the research posits that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector requires more than merely removing institutional barriers. Rather, it necessitates the establishment of participatory governance structures, the formulation of long-term strategic visions, and the purposeful utilization of natural gas as a tool for strengthening economic, political, and cultural linkages with regional and transregional partners—particularly within the Islamic world. Methodologically, this research adopts a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in the theoretical framework of sustainable development. The study relies on library-based and documentary data, including academic literature, policy documents, official reports, and international frameworks related to energy governance and sustainability. To systematically examine the data, thematic analysis is employed as the primary analytical method. This approach enables the identification of recurring patterns, key themes, and underlying conceptual linkages relevant to sustainable gas policymaking and governance. The findings of the study reveal that structural reform in energy policymaking is a fundamental prerequisite for advancing sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector. Specifically, the results highlight the necessity of transitioning from fragmented and sectoral governance toward an integrated and unified governance model. Such a model would enhance policy coherence, reduce institutional conflicts, and facilitate long-term planning aligned with sustainability principles. Additionally, the research underscores the importance of strengthening transparency and accountability mechanisms within energy governance institutions. Transparent decision-making processes, access to information, and clear lines of responsibility are essential for improving policy effectiveness and ensuring that environmental and social considerations are adequately addressed. Enhanced accountability not only contributes to better governance outcomes but also fosters public trust and stakeholder confidence. Another key finding relates to stakeholder participation. The study demonstrates that inclusive and meaningful engagement of stakeholders—ranging from governmental bodies and private sector actors to local communities, environmental organizations, and academic institutions—plays a crucial role in promoting sustainable energy policies. Participatory governance enables the incorporation of diverse perspectives, reduces policy resistance, and enhances the legitimacy and social acceptance of energy projects. Moreover, the findings suggest that aligning Iran’s gas policy with broader objectives of the Islamic world can significantly contribute to achieving balanced and justice-oriented development. By framing natural gas cooperation within a shared ethical and cultural context, Iran can leverage its energy resources to promote solidarity, mutual benefit, and collective resilience among Muslim-majority countries. This approach not only reinforces Iran’s energy diplomacy but also integrates moral and normative dimensions into energy policymaking. Importantly, the study highlights the potential of integrating Western sustainable development frameworks with Islamic principles to create a hybrid and context-sensitive model of energy governance. Such a model recognizes the value of international best practices—such as environmental impact assessments, policy integration, and stakeholder engagement—while grounding them in indigenous cultural and religious values. This synthesis can enhance the legitimacy, adaptability, and effectiveness of sustainability-oriented policies in Iran and similar contexts. In conclusion, the research argues that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking requires a comprehensive and multidimensional strategy. This strategy should encompass institutional reform, participatory governance, long-term strategic planning, environmental justice, and proactive energy diplomacy. By adopting an integrated approach that draws upon both Western sustainability paradigms and Islamic ethical principles, Iran can transform its natural gas sector into a catalyst for balanced, indigenous, and justice-oriented development. The findings of this study offer both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, the research enriches the literature on sustainable energy governance by highlighting the compatibility and complementarity of Western and Islamic perspectives. Practically, it provides policymakers with actionable insights for revising and redesigning energy policies in a manner that aligns economic objectives with environmental protection, social equity, and regional cooperation. Ultimately, this study suggests that Iran’s natural gas resources, if governed sustainably and ethically, can serve as a powerful engine for national development and constructive engagement within the regional and global energy landscape. 

Abstract After achieving the status of a global superpower following the Second World War, and particularly subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America established the preservation and permanence of its hegemony as the most critical objective of its foreign policy. To this end, the country has leveraged a diverse array of strategies and tactics; ranging from sweeping economic sanctions, threatening or executing military strikes, media demonization, and the securitization of rivals and opponents, to more covert and drastic strategies such as coup-making. The present study addresses the central question: How and for what purpose was the coup-making strategy in Iran, targeting Mohammad Mosaddegh, placed on the agenda of United States foreign policy? The research attempts to elucidate the position of the coup as the ultimate, high-yield option within the hierarchy of tools used for maintaining American hegemony, by focusing on the Coup of 28 Mordad 1332 (August 19, 1953). The research method is descriptive-analytical, relying on documentary and library data. For the first time, the theoretical framework of the study employs the Conservation of Resources Theory (COR) from the field of managerial psychology, extending its application to International Relations and US foreign policy. According to this theory, actors (here, the US as the hegemon), when perceiving their valuable resources across three domains -personal (national self-esteem, American exceptionalism, ideological superiority), social (ally support, maintenance of unequal core-periphery relations), and structural (financial resources, military bases, access to oil and weaponry)- as being under threat or destruction, and when conventional tools (sanctions, military attack, demonization) lose their effectiveness, they resort to riskier and more aggressive behaviors. The key principle of this theory, loss aversion, precisely aligns with the behavior of US foreign policy when facing potential resource depletion: the loss of existing resources is far more painful than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently, the hegemon is willing to accept the risk of a coup to prevent a key country from exiting its sphere of influence.The research findings indicate that coup-making has been a structural and repetitive strategy in US foreign policy for the maintenance of hegemony, rather than an isolated or exceptional action. CIA documents, declassified in 2013, explicitly confirm that Operation Ajax was designed and executed "under CIA direction" and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy at the highest levels of government." The coup against Mosaddegh was placed on the table only after more overt tactics (negotiation, economic pressure, conditional aid, and securitizing Mosaddegh and his associates as communist-leaning) had reached a stalemate. The nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1330 (1951) and Mosaddegh’s Negative Equilibrium Policy simultaneously jeopardized the three categories of U.S. resources: 1.    Personal Resources: Challenging American exceptionalism and ideological superiority, rejecting Washington's mediation, and setting a precedent for independence that could be exported to other peripheral states. 2.    Social Resources: Threatening Iran's exit from the Western sphere of influence, thereby weakening the chain of US allies in the Middle East, and particularly undermining the position of the fledgling Israeli regime. 3.    Structural Resources: Jeopardizing the access of American and British oil companies to Iranian oil resources, the potential loss of Iran as a military-espionage base against the Soviet Union, and a decrease in American arms sales. When these threats could not be contained by conventional means, the U.S., adhering to the principle of loss aversion and accepting the high risk of a coup, executed Operation Ajax to reinstate the young Shah as a loyal ally. This move turned Iran into a primary platform for supplying the U.S. with economic, political, military, and geostrategic resources for three decades. Following the coup, 80% of Iran’s oil marketing remained in the hands of the Consortium of Western companies, Iran became one of the largest purchasers of American weaponry, and served as the frontline of containment against Communism in the region. The historical-comparative section of the study reveals that the 1953 coup was merely one instance of a recurring pattern. Since the nineteenth century, the United States has played a direct or supportive role in dozens of coups (some sources cite up to 81 successful and unsuccessful cases) across five continents: from Hawaii (1893), Cuba (1933), Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973), Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), Bolivia (2019), and many others. In all these instances, the common denominator has been the effort to prevent the exit of valuable resources from the hegemon's sphere of influence and to maintain the power imbalance in America's favor. The final conclusion of the research is that coup-making is not the "last resort" in US foreign policy doctrine, but rather a prudent, low-cost (relative to full-scale war), and quick-yielding option. It is activated precisely when the hegemon feels its key resources at the personal, social, and structural levels are under severe threat and overt tools have lost their efficacy. The 1953 coup served as a turning point for this strategy in the Middle East and sent a clear message to other peripheral governments: any attempt at genuine independence from the American hegemonic core-periphery system will be met with a decisive and severe response from the hegemon. Therefore, recognizing the pattern of U.S. coup-making is a strategic and scholarly imperative, not only for understanding contemporary Iranian history but also for any actor resisting U.S. hegemony.

Abstract  The impact of the Arab Spring on the dynamics of political society in the Arab world created a two-fold pattern of transformations: states undergoing structural transformations (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria) and societies witnessing limited transformations (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman). These events not only transformed the regional power architecture, but also had far-reaching geopolitical consequences, and the origins of these transformations, which were rooted in Arab structural crises, reflected the dialectical interaction of local grievances and transnational dynamics. This research seeks to answer the important question of why protest movements in Kuwait were ineffective in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Therefore, within the framework of the theoretical foundations of social constructionism, it must be acknowledged that although endogenous variables of sectarian conflicts, the bio-legal crisis of the Bedoons, the political hybrid structure, and exogenous factors of waves of regional unrest caused the emergence of synergistic mechanisms of protests in Kuwait, and although internal variables provided the basis for disharmony; transnational components played a decisive role in shaping the process of protest actions and the direction of revolutionary discourses and failed to bring about a revolution in Kuwait. This research, which was developed based on the descriptive-analytical method and the use of library and document collection tools, indicates that although Kuwait's foreign policy was somewhat neutral; It benefits from the importance of working with the United States to ensure the stability of the region and protect it from any potential security threats, whether from regional conflicts or foreign interventions, as the United States has focused on strengthening its relations with the Gulf states, including Kuwait, through security and diplomatic cooperation and supporting regional defense against any threat. The Arab Spring was a wave of protests and uprisings in late 2010 that spread across the Muslim world, challenging long-standing authoritarian regimes. The movement began with widespread dissatisfaction with political repression, corruption, and economic problems, particularly high unemployment and declining living standards. Kuwait, meanwhile, was affected by these developments and experienced significant political unrest during the Arab Spring, accompanied by widespread protests and demands for a process of government reform. These movements occurred mainly in 2011-2012 and were rooted in public dissatisfaction with corruption, lack of political accountability, and demands for constitutional reform. Among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait has a remarkable history of political liberalization and a gradual transition to democracy, which began in the 1990s and has had a relatively stable process, but it faces serious structural obstacles. Kuwait was the first country in the region to have an elected and appointed parliament and a constitution stipulating certain freedoms and civil rights after gaining independence in the early 1960s. Constructivism: emerged as an important theoretical approach in international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly after the Cold War. This theory argues that many aspects of international relations are constructed through shared ideas, norms, and identities rather than being determined solely by material forces. The identities and interests of states and other actors are not fixed, but are shaped through social interactions. This view challenges traditional theories such as realism and liberalism, which often view state behavior as driven by material interests or power dynamics. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, official documents, and field data.  Data collection tools include: - Content analysis of diplomatic documents - Interviews with experts in international relations - An examination of the political and social conditions in Kuwait during and after the Arab Spring. Political reforms in Kuwait over the past 14 years have played a dual role in stabilizing the state, amid a constant tension between parliamentary constitutionalism and traditional dynastic authority. On the one hand, measures such as increasing the share of women in parliament (to 6 seats in 2022) and strengthening oversight institutions have strengthened the legitimacy of the system. By attracting the support of the urban middle class and educated elite, these reforms contained the instability caused by the Arab Spring; Kuwait was the only Gulf state to continue holding regular elections during this period. However, the showy nature of some reforms, especially after 2014, has deepened structural crises. The repeated suspension of parliament (11 times from 2006 to 2023) on security or legal grounds has not only created legislative deadlock but also exacerbated the discursive gap between the government and civil society. Kuwait's most important challenges after the Arab Spring: The community of al-Badun, Communications and media - organizing protesters and conveying messages, Widespread structural corruption, The role of social movements in Kuwait since 2006, The anti-oppression Islamist discourse of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Socialization of Arab people from each other and regional influences, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as an opportunity for democracy, The impact of the Arab Spring revolutions on Kuwait's national security. The findings show that: 1.     Domestic factors §  Economic discontent: Economic problems and corruption fueled public protests, using economic demands as a pretext for demonstrations. §  Political movements: The unification of various parties against the government and calls for the prime minister's removal represented a broad political movement. §  Disputes in governance: Internal tensions among the political elite and family disputes within the ruling family led to political instability. §  Electoral changes: Reforms in electoral districts, which protesters believed were a threat to democracy, increased tensions. §  Support for democracy: Kuwaitis are proud of their democratic institutions and see corruption as a threat to these institutions, a sentiment that has united the opposition. 2.     External factors §  Presence of youth: Educated and active youth on social media played a key role in organizing protests in the region and in Kuwait. §  Role of global powers: Western countries, especially the United States, supported authoritarian regimes instead of effectively supporting democracy, which contributed to the failure of the movements. §  Political and economic impacts: Inefficient political management and economic inequalities in various countries exacerbated dissatisfaction and, as a result, the emergence of uprisings. §  Israel had a significant influence on the decisions of Western countries to support authoritarian regimes in the region and prevent democratic developments. §  In Kuwait, popular demonstrations due to dissatisfaction with the government were suppressed, and the United States, instead of directly intervening, supported the governments to prevent fundamental changes. These policies increased tensions and public dissatisfaction. US cooperation with Kuwait during the Arab Spring did not have much impact on political changes in the country. Kuwait, as one of the relatively free states in the Persian Gulf, attempted to avoid unrest by adopting a neutral approach and maintaining stability. The United States focused on protecting its own interests rather than directly intervening. As a result, political changes in Kuwait were largely driven by domestic pressures and social discontent rather than external influences.  

Abstract The rapid expansion of the digital economy has fundamentally transformed the nature of economic power and competition in the international system, particularly in regions seeking to reduce structural dependence on traditional resources. In the Persian Gulf, the digital economy has increasingly become a strategic domain through which states pursue economic diversification, enhance competitiveness, and project geo-economic influence. Among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as the two most prominent actors in shaping the regional digital landscape. Their ambitious national visions and large-scale investments in digital infrastructure, innovation ecosystems, and advanced technologies have turned the digital economy into a key arena of geo-economic competition between them.
This emerging competition is deeply embedded in each country’s broader development strategy. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 places the digital economy at the core of its efforts to transform the Kingdom into a diversified, knowledge-based economy. Massive investments in data centers, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, fintech, and e-government platforms are intended not only to modernize domestic economic structures, but also to position Saudi Arabia as a regional digital hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Projects such as NEOM and the rapid expansion of digital public services signal Riyadh’s ambition to leverage scale, state capacity, and regulatory power to attract global technology firms and foster indigenous digital capabilities.
By contrast, the United Arab Emirates has pursued a more market-driven and globally integrated digital strategy, building on its early-mover advantages in logistics, finance, and services. Through initiatives such as Smart Dubai, digital free zones, and progressive regulatory frameworks for fintech, blockchain, and artificial intelligence, the UAE has cultivated an innovation-friendly environment that appeals to international investors, startups, and multinational technology companies. Its emphasis on agility, openness, and public–private partnerships has enabled it to consolidate its position as a regional gateway for digital trade and services, reinforcing its geo-economic influence despite a smaller domestic market compared to Saudi Arabia.
Taken together, the digital economy has become a central arena of strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reflecting broader shifts in power, competitiveness, and economic governance within the Gulf. While their competition has accelerated regional digital transformation and reduced reliance on hydrocarbons, it also highlights diverging models of state-led versus market-oriented digital development. The outcome of this rivalry will not only shape the future economic trajectories of the two countries, but also influence the structure of the digital economy across the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East.
This study examines how the digital economy has evolved into a field of geo-economic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and analyzes the similarities and differences in their strategic approaches. The central argument of the research is that while both countries share the common objective of attaining regional leadership in the digital economy, their distinct political–economic structures, market capacities, and governance models have produced divergent strategic pathways and comparative advantages. The UAE has largely pursued an open and network-based strategy, emphasizing regulatory flexibility, international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and the development of digital service hubs. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has adopted a more state-centered and domestically oriented strategy, relying on large-scale public investment, national champions, and technology localization policies supported by its substantial domestic market.
Methodologically, the study employs a comparative analytical framework to assess the digital economy strategies of the two countries across key indicators, including digital competitiveness, investment in information and communication technologies, innovation capacity, and the contribution of the digital sector to gross domestic product. By drawing on official policy documents, international indices, and economic data, the research provides a systematic comparison of how each state operationalizes digital transformation as a tool of geo-economic power.
The findings suggest that this competition has reshaped economic roles and hierarchies within the Persian Gulf region. The UAE has consolidated its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, and platform-based economies, while Saudi Arabia has leveraged scale, state capacity, and long-term investment to build a more self-reliant digital ecosystem. Beyond bilateral rivalry, this dynamic illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies function as strategic instruments of influence, shaping patterns of regional integration, economic dependency, and power projection in the Gulf and beyond.
The findings of this study indicate that geo-economic competition in the digital economy has significantly reshaped economic roles and strategic priorities within the Persian Gulf. Rather than following a uniform model of digital transformation, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have institutionalized distinct development paths that reflect their broader political–economic structures. This divergence has intensified competition over regional leadership, digital standard-setting, and the attraction of capital, talent, and innovation, thereby redefining the contours of economic influence in the Gulf region.
At the national level, the UAE has strengthened its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, artificial intelligence, and platform-based economies by emphasizing openness, regulatory agility, and global connectivity. Its integration into international digital networks has enabled the country to act as an intermediary between global technology markets and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has leveraged its demographic scale, fiscal capacity, and centralized governance to construct a more state-driven and domestically anchored digital ecosystem, prioritizing national digital champions, data sovereignty, and long-term technological self-sufficiency.
At the regional and systemic levels, this evolving rivalry illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies have become central instruments of power projection and economic statecraft. The competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only influences patterns of regional integration and economic dependency but also shapes the future governance of the digital economy in the Persian Gulf. As such, the digital domain has emerged as a critical arena in which economic diversification, strategic autonomy, and regional leadership are actively contested.
 

Abstract The government has a strategic and fundamental role in development. Successful agents of development are only development-oriented and efficient governments that try to bring the country to this goal by using various tools and policies. Qatar has also emerged as an important player in regional and international politics and has been able to achieve remarkable success in the field of economic, social and human development and become one of the richest countries in the world with a high global per capita income level. This research seeks to answer the question of "what role the government has played in the development of Qatar?"  The assumption of the research is that according to the development-oriented government model, the government has been able to play an effective role in Qatar's progress with various development strategies and programs. Using a descriptive-analytical research method and relying on Adrian Leftwich's theory of the developmental state, we conclude that the government in this country, led by Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani and then Sheikh Tamim, has had the characteristics of a developmental state model in both domestic and foreign policy, and with various economic, monetary, trade, educational, and investment strategies, it has been able to pave the way for economic and human development in this country and achieve significant progress. Reformist measures and the implementation of an ambitious economic development program, along with intelligent investments in international capital markets, have enabled the Qatari government to become one of the leading players in the world economy, while escaping the risk of collapse during the Arab revolutions. Also, the aforementioned government has obtained suitable opportunities for activities in the tourism, agriculture, and trade industries by using the huge revenues from the sale of natural resources and has become one of the developed countries in the world. Since the adoption of the Qatar National Vision 2030 in 2008, the country has experienced economic prosperity and development in various fields. According to this plan, by 2030, by diversifying the economy, the growth of the non-oil sector will increase, and the government will create a knowledge-based economy that is in harmony with the global economy and in line with strengthening the private sector. Qatar's economic development strategy is based on investing oil revenues and underground resources in development projects, so that the country can create a new structure and model for economic, social and cultural development in accordance with this vision document. The Qatar Investment Authority and the Qatar Foundation, led by Sheikha Muza, help the government increase its political influence in global investment trends and processes, while using the revenues from this trade in its economic, social and cultural development strategy at the level of the Arabian Peninsula, the region, the Arab world and, more importantly, at the international level. As a result, Qatar has achieved a remarkable position in terms of economic indicators and human development. Therefore, based on Leftwich’s developmental state model, the elites and the governance system of Qatar have been able to be effective in advancing the economic development of their country by intelligently and realistically understanding the dynamics of the global power system, by defining their global position in the national Vision 2030 program, and by appropriate economic, monetary, educational reforms, trade and investment policies. Also, The Qatari government is using the national strategy of artificial intelligence to benefit its economy, and according to the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country is set to become a "Smart Qatar" and develop a digital economy in the country. As a result, the application of artificial intelligence has not only increased the power of the bureaucracy and the Qatari government over citizens, but also increased the government's competitiveness in the international community.  This country has been able to stand on the world map with bureaucracy and institutional synergy in the Al Thani family and in a society where there is no union, syndicate or civil society organization to confront and oppose Sheikh Hamad's independence of action. In the international arena, Qatar has pursued national interests on a broader scale within the framework of a balanced, active and opportunity-creating foreign policy, and its efforts in the field of peace have been effective. Therefore, by proving the hypothesis of the present research, we conclude that the developmentalist government of Qatar has been able to become a visible regional and global actor with diverse strategies. As stated in the text of the research, the main task of developmentalist governments is to provide conditions for economic growth and development in the domestic and international arenas. The developmentalist government of Qatar, as part of the largest exporters of gas and oil in the world, has acquired enormous wealth, which has resulted in increased income and economic growth, as well as the opportunity to develop infrastructure and human capital. Of course, like most countries on the southern edge of the Persian Gulf, this country is also involved in a structural challenge between rapid economic growth and political underdevelopment.

Abstract The term narco-terrorism was first introduced in 1983 by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry to describe violent actions undertaken by drug traffickers against state institutions. Over time, the concept has evolved to capture the complex and increasingly intertwined relationship between terrorism and illicit drug economies. In contemporary security studies, terrorism is no longer understood solely as a state-centric or ideologically rigid phenomenon. Instead, it has assumed non-state, transnational, and hybrid forms shaped by globalization, political instability, economic inequality, and weak governance. The convergence of terrorism and narcotics trafficking has transformed many extremist organizations into financially self-sustaining entities capable of conducting prolonged campaigns of violence. Afghanistan, due to decades of conflict, institutional fragility, and its major role in global narcotics production, has become one of the most prominent arenas for narcoterrorism. Within this context, ISIS-K has emerged as a critical destabilizing actor, challenging the Taliban’s authority and complicating efforts toward state-building and governance consolidation. Narco-terrorism is composed of two interdependent features: organized political violence and systematic engagement in the production, trafficking, or taxation of narcotics. Terrorist groups involved in narco-terrorism utilize drug revenues to finance recruitment, acquire weapons, sustain territorial presence, and exert coercive control over populations. As a result, narco-terrorism directly undermines state sovereignty, rule of law, and institutional legitimacy.In Afghanistan, the narcotics economy has long flourished due to limited state capacity, widespread poverty, and persistent insecurity. Armed groups have repeatedly exploited this economy to secure financial resources. Although ISIS-K presents itself as ideologically distinct from other militant actors, it has demonstrated pragmatic engagement with narcotics-related activities, either through direct involvement or indirect cooperation with trafficking networks. This involvement has enabled ISIS-K to pose a challenge the Taliban not only through violence but also by weakening the important economic foundations for effective governance. Existing literature identifies narco-terrorism as a multidimensional threat with far-reaching consequences. Studies focusing on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) illustrate how narcotics revenues sustain long-term insurgent campaigns and facilitate transnational criminal activities. Research on Central Asia highlights the role of narco-terrorist networks in undermining regional multilateralism and security cooperation, particularly in politically fragile environments. Comparative analyses of the Middle East and Latin America identify groups such as ISIS, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as prominent examples of narco-terrorist organizations. These studies emphasize that narco-terrorism generates security, political, economic, and social challenges that extend beyond national borders. However, scholarly attention to ISIS-K’s specific role in obstructing the Taliban’s state-building process remains limited, underscoring the need for focused analysis. This study draws upon the Frustration–Aggression Theory to explain the mechanisms of recruitment and violence within extremist organizations. Originally formulated by John Dollard in the late 1930s, the theory posits that persistent frustration arising from unmet expectations or perceived injustice produces aggressive behavior. When institutional mechanisms fail to address grievances, individuals may turn to violence as an alternative means of expression and redress. In Afghanistan, prolonged conflict, economic deprivation, social marginalization, and political exclusion have created fertile ground for extremist recruitment. ISIS-K capitalizes on these conditions by offering financial incentives, ideological narratives, and a sense of purpose to disaffected individuals. This dynamic transforms individual frustration into organized violence and reinforces the group’s capacity to challenge state-building efforts. Narco-terrorism can be categorized into several forms. Genuine narco-terrorism involves direct participation by terrorist groups in drug trafficking to finance militant activities. Criminal narco-terrorism prioritizes profit, with drug syndicates employing terror tactics to intimidate governments and rivals. State-sponsored narco-terrorism emerges when governments support or tolerate terrorist groups engaged in narcotics trafficking to achieve strategic objectives.Additionally, fabricated narco-terrorism refers to the political manipulation of narco-terrorist narratives, while instrumental narcoterrorism conceptualizes drug trafficking as a tool to weaken governance and social order. ISIS-K’s activities in Afghanistan most closely resemble genuine and instrumental narco-terrorism, as the group exploits the narcotics economy to destabilize governance and undermine Taliban authority. The Taliban’s state-building project faces significant obstacles that are intensified by ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities. From a security perspective, persistent attacks undermine public safety, erode public confidence, and stretch the Taliban’s limited security capabilities. Economically, ISIS-K’s involvement in narcotics trafficking distorts local economies, fuels corruption, and deprives the Taliban of potential revenues needed for governance and service provision.Politically, ISIS-K challenges the Taliban’s legitimacy by presenting itself as a more ideologically uncompromising alternative. This strategy has enabled the group to attract dissatisfied Taliban members, particularly when financial incentives are offered. Socially, continued violence exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, undermining social cohesion and complicating nation-building efforts. These dynamics collectively weaken the Taliban’s capacity to consolidate authority and establish effective governance Although Afghanistan’s instability has deep historical roots, its current intensification is closely linked to the U.S. military withdrawal and the resulting political plan. Within this context, the rivalry between ISIS-K and the Taliban represents a crucial security challenge with significant regional implications, extending to I.R of Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite the Taliban’s claims for combating ISIS-K, persistent governance deficits and limited institutional capacity hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities continue to pose serious threats to the Taliban’s state-building process and to regional stability more broadly. Prolonged delays in governance consolidation are likely to exacerbate security, political, economic, social, and environmental risks, increasing the likelihood of broader regional instability. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that extend beyond military responses to include economic development, political inclusion, and sustained regional cooperation.

Abstract  
The grounds for China's active presence in the Central Asian region were provided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of the regional governments. In addition to geopolitical proximity, Beijing has put the continuation and expansion of relations with Central Asian countries and an increasing presence, especially in the energy equations of the region, on the agenda, and has sought to develop influence in the layers of power in Central Asia, which, in addition to helping China become the future leading power in the region, can provide the necessary grounds for expanding Beijing's power on the international stage. The region's proximity to China's western borders, rich energy resources, the region's consumer market, the region's need to attract foreign investment, the activity of the Uyghurs in the region, and the geographical location of Central Asia, which provides China with the possibility of establishing connections with Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe, are among the attractions that have increased Beijing's attention to this region. China sees Central Asia as an important region that can develop its economic growth through trade routes and meet China’s need for hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the stability and economic development of neighboring states in Central Asia are considered an important prerequisite for ensuring stability and security in China’s western regions.
China’s doctrine towards Central Asia can be seen as having three main aspects: The first aspect is rooted in China’s history, which has always considered Central Asia as the first bulwark for its security on its western borders. The possibility of instability in Xinjiang has always been an intellectual concern for Chinese statesmen. The seven million Muslims in this region, who are mainly Turks and Uyghurs, feel closer to the Muslim ethnic groups of Central Asia than to the Han Chinese. The autonomous and Uyghur-populated Xinjiang region is highly vulnerable to separatist tendencies and anti-Chinese propaganda. The second aspect, or economic dimension, of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia involves efforts to create a free Central Asian zone in order to improve China’s economy and security. The economic development of Central Asia can be both attractive and dangerous for China’s backward and remote regions bordering the region. Chinese leaders, especially after the Tiananmen Square unrest in 1989, realized the importance of investment for the economic growth of these regions. The third pillar of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia stems from its increasing desire to play a role in the global security system. In order for China to have an effective and prominent presence on the world stage, it must first be able to assert its voice in the Central Asian region. In a short time, China has become the most important player in the Central Asian energy equation and has been able to direct a significant part of the region’s energy resources to its consumer market, which is the largest in the world, through extensive investments. China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia mainly has three dimensions. First, establishing long-term energy relations with the region through economic integration and developing trade relations; Second, the construction of direct pipelines carrying oil and gas from producing countries in the region to China, and third, the reduction of the role of greedy trans-regional countries in the governments of Central Asia. China has become the dominant economic power in the Central Asian region by implementing a comprehensive, long-term and targeted planning. Its extensive economic presence and influence in the Central Asian region in the three areas of energy exchanges, trade relations and investment in the economic infrastructure of Central Asia have played an important role in developing the country's economic influence in the region and have narrowed the space for the entry and role of actors such as Russia and Iran. The result of these developments, namely China's rise and dominance in the Central Asian economy, has led some analysts to speak of a "Chinese Marshall Plan" by Beijing for Central Asia, which is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan of the United States of America after the end of World War II. The interpretation of this symbolic interpretation and historical simulation is to pay attention to a long-term trend and planning by the Chinese to create a capable market for purchasing Chinese products, ensuring energy security and increasing China's economic influence in the Central Asian region, which has significantly changed and transformed the geoeconomic picture of this region.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of an American presence in Central Asia became very serious for China when the United States invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. In the wake of this event, Central Asian states sought to develop their strategic, military, and economic relations with Washington, but China’s response to this issue was proactive; meaning that Beijing sought to redouble its efforts in the region, and did so by developing bilateral security agreements with regional countries and strengthening the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China’s strategy in this regard has been to present Beijing as a real and reliable security partner for Central Asian states, thereby providing them with a reliable alternative to developing military and security cooperation with the United States. Since 2002, China has signed a series of military and security agreements with Central Asian countries, including providing $3 million in military aid to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, an extradition agreement with these two countries, an agreement on cooperation in combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the opening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s “Regional Counter-Terrorism Center” in Tashkent, and the holding of annual joint exercises with Central Asian countries under the title “Peace Mission.” The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the formation of new republics in Central Asia opened up new opportunities for Beijing’s leaders to develop political, economic, and military relations with the Central Asian republics and thereby regain their former interests in the region. Beijing’s top priority in Central Asia is economic and trade, and investment in oil and gas fields. As the largest investor in Central Asia, China has focused on infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative. Two international corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative pass through Central Asia, connecting China to the Middle East, South Asia and Europe. Apart from its economic importance, Central Asia plays an important role for Beijing from a security perspective. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, China became interested in the issue of border security. However, due to China’s increasing global influence, monitoring the region is very important given its proximity to China and Russia. The insecurity on the borders of Xinjiang and the fight against religious extremists have led Beijing to expand its relations with Central Asian countries, and in this regard, Chinese authorities are taking steps to ensure regional security and ensure internal stability, especially in the western regions of China.
 

Abstract In the contemporary international system, trade and transit corridors have become a critical arena for economic competition, enhancing political influence, and ensuring national security. Iran's unparalleled geographical position at the crossroads of three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—has historically established it as a "communication bridge" and the "corridor heartland" of the world, to the extent that some researchers refer to Iran as the "geopolitical center of the world." However, developments over the past decade reveal a concerning paradox: while geographically situated at the nexus of the most vital transit routes, Iran is, in practice, being excluded or bypassed from the main regional corridor channels such as China's "Belt and Road," the "Middle Corridor," and the "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)." This research seeks to answer the central question of what Iran's performance in regional corridor initiatives has been and what consequences it has entailed. To analyze this issue, the research employs the theoretical framework of "Geopolinomics." Developed by Demko, Wood, and Kazi, this theory posits that in the 21st century, the power game is not solely reliant on geography and politics (geopolitics) or geography and economy (geo-economics), but rather is shaped by the tripartite and dynamic interaction of geography, politics, and economy. From this perspective, factors such as transportation corridors, energy routes, and ports function as the "arteries" and "nodes" of power in the "New Great Game." Consequently, a country's success in the "war of corridors" depends not merely on its geographical location, but also on its capacity for economic diplomacy, creating efficient infrastructure, and attracting investment into these integrated projects. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library and documentary sources. The researchers collected, classified, and analyzed data from existing books, scientific articles, research projects, and reports from reputable domestic and foreign institutions (such as the Iran Chamber Research Center and the Rahnegare journal) to scrutinize Iran's performance in various corridors. The primary focus has been on examining seven major regional corridors, including: the Belt and Road Initiative (China), the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the North-South Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, the Development Road Corridor, and the Resistance Corridor. The findings of the research clearly indicate that Iran has failed to capitalize on its geographical advantage to play a pivotal role in the corridors. This failure can be traced back to two categories of factors: domestic and external. Domestic factors include weaknesses in both hard and soft infrastructure (such as delays in completing critical railways like Chabahar-Zahedan and Rasht-Astara), inefficient economic governance and cumbersome bureaucracy, the prioritization of security-political considerations over economic interests in foreign policy, and ambiguity regarding political and economic stability for foreign investors. External factors encompass international sanctions, which have both disrupted investment within Iran and increased the risk of cooperation with it for other countries; competition among major powers (such as U.S. efforts to replace Iran with alternative corridors like IMEC); and intense regional competition (particularly with Turkey and Azerbaijan within the framework of the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur project). As a result of these factors, Iran is losing its position in most corridors. For example, within China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus is being developed instead of passing through Iranian territory. The North-South Corridor project is also facing severe delays due to domestic infrastructure problems and sanctions. Simultaneously, regional competitors such as Turkey, through active diplomacy and investment in infrastructure, are increasingly becoming transit hubs. Ultimately, the research arrives at the key conclusion that the main hypothesis of the study is confirmed: the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite possessing unique geopolitical advantages, has failed to secure a deserving share of regional corridors due to a combination of domestic challenges and external pressures. The consequence of this situation will be nothing less than "geopolitical isolation." This isolation manifests itself in the weakening of the national economy (loss of transit revenues and job creation opportunities), a reduction in the security coefficient (strengthening of competitors' positions and regional encirclement), and the gradual erosion of Iran's soft power and regional influence. The research warns that geographical advantages are not permanent and can be eroded if neglected. The authors emphasize that escaping this impasse requires a paradigm shift in national strategy: transitioning from a foreign policy based solely on security-political priorities to an active and pragmatic economic diplomacy, increasing transparency in the business environment, accelerating the completion of critical infrastructure projects, and striving for de-escalation in international relations. Otherwise, if the current trend continues, the risk of Iran's complete removal from the future communicative and economic map of Eurasia and its transformation into a "geopolitical island" will not be far-fetched.  

Abstract The ever-increasing expansion of the soft and cultural power of Islam and the growing trend towards Islam, especially in European and American societies, against the material logic of Western civilization, has caused a kind of desperation, passivity and helplessness among far-right politicians and Western racists and has forced them to All historical and civilizational capacities have been used in various layers of social causes (political, social, cultural, historical, security, etc.), the causes of discourse - worldview and the causes of conflicting metaphors - myths between the two civilizations of the West and Islam, making Islam the first class enemy of identity, western civilization and values and create a wave of Islamophobia and anti-Islamism in western societies. Especially after the September 11 incident, due to bad media propaganda, public opinion has been affected and insulting Muslims and Islamic holy things has been placed at the top of racist movements and has created a new type of racism under the concept of Islamophobia. "Islamophobia" is a combination of Islam and phobia, and phobia means an irrational and unreasonable aversion or fear of something. The question that arises from the combination of these two words is that what is the reason for this unreasonable fear or dislike of Islam in the western society and in the minds of western people? Can superficial social, political, cultural and economic reasons alone have a convincing answer for the cause of this problem? Or what is happening in the upper layers of Western societies, both European and American, is rooted in the lower layers of the mind and history of man and Western society? Finding the causes of Islamophobia and anti-Islamism is so important and necessary that day by day we witness the intensification of such thoughts and behaviors not only in the minds of experts but also in the social context and among ordinary people of Western societies in the face of Islam and millions of Muslims.According to this, the main goal of the research is the causal layered analysis of Islamophobia in the West, and in this regard, its secondary goals are to explain the objective/litany layers and to identify and analyze the layers of causal systems, discourse-worldview and myth-metaphor of the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the West. For this purpose, the main research question isThe roots and causes of the spread of Islamophobia in the West based on the method of causal layered Analysis include what causes and factors?
And the sub-questions are
1- How can the objective signs of the spread of Islamophobia in the West be analyzed in recent decades?
2- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of causal systems (economic, social, political, cultural, security, etc.)?
3- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of the worldview-discourse system?
4- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of the myth-metaphor system?
This research seeks to collect and analyze data by using the method of causal layered analysis as a suitable method to analyze cultural-social events in future studies, and also by two methods of environmental survey of texts and interviews with experts, and to the research questions to answer.
Based on the investigations carried out during the current research, among the causes of Islamophobia in different layers and levels, we can include such things as the increase in the Muslim population in the West and the depiction of this issue as a cultural-security threat, the false belief and understanding of Islam by Westerners and the confrontation with it, the growth of takfiri movements in the Islamic world and the occurrence of terrorist incidents in the West Media deception in order to justify the interventionism of the West in the Islamic world, the rise of extreme right-wing parties in the West, the growth of political Islam in the Islamic world and the international system, the fundamental fear of the possibility of Islamists gaining power in the political arena, the financial crisis of the West due to the presence of Muslim immigrants, the growth of political Islam and the endangerment of the economic interests of the West in the energy center of the world (Persian Gulf), made of Islam and the East as the West (otherization), cultural and historical conflict between Islam and the West, defensive reaction of Muslims against Western modernity, culture of xenophobia in the West, cultural decline and crisis of spirituality in Western civilization, discourse weakness of The West against Islamic logic, belief in the apocalyptic battle (war of civilizations), belief in the centrality and superiority of the West and the Western race, belief in the system of liberal democracy as an unrivaled intellectual system in the world, etc.
The findings of the research show that the roots and causes of Islamophobia in the West include a range of issues from objective layers and political, social causal systems, etc. to discourse-worldview and myth-metaphor layers. The theorization and social expansion of Islamophobia in the West is not an action but a passive and desperate reaction against the growing wave of Islamism that has challenged the foundations of the West (in its historical, cultural and discursive sense) and The future of this process will expand more and more and will turn from Islamophobia to anti-Islamism.
 
 
 

Abstract The contemporary Islamic world is currently navigating a profound ideological and structural competition between divergent models of governance, each attempting to redefine the intricate relationship between religion, the state, and the multifaceted demands of modernity. This research focuses on the emergence and consolidation of the "Neo-Traditional National State" model, particularly as manifested in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has positioned itself as a sophisticated alternative to the "Islamic Caliphate Revival" model advocated by various Salafist and political Islam movements. Historically, the failure of secular Arab nationalism and the subsequent vacuum left by the decline of Pan-Arabism led to the rise of utopian movements that envisioned a return to the early Caliphate as a solution to social and political crises. Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and more recently ISIS, capitalized on this vacuum, proposing a model where Sharia precedes the state and an exclusionary "Ummatic" identity replaces national sovereignty. In direct contrast, the UAE has sought to transcend this dichotomy by synthesizing tradition with functional modernization. The core objective of this study is to analyze how the UAE has successfully navigated the constraints of radical Salafist ideology to establish a governance structure that achieves high levels of economic development and functional legitimacy while remaining anchored in indigenous traditions. To facilitate this analysis, the research employs the theoretical framework of Imre Lakatos’ "Research Programs," which allows for a structural deconstruction of these governance models into a "Hard Core" of non-negotiable principles and a "Protective Belt" of flexible auxiliary hypotheses. In the case of the UAE’s neo-traditionalist model, the hard core is defined by national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the preservation of a patriarchal, sheikhly governing structure, while the protective belt is composed of a pragmatic and tolerant interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence known as Fiqh al-Maqasid (the Jurisprudence of Higher Objectives).
This Lakatosian framework reveals that while the caliphate model possesses a rigid hard core predicated on the absolute primacy of نص (text) over the state, the UAE model utilizes Fiqh al-Maqasid to ensure the state’s survival and prosperity. This jurisprudential paradigm, heavily influenced by the Maliki school and the writings of Imam Al-Shatibi, focuses on the "Higher Objectives" of religion—namely the preservation of life, intellect, religion, property, and lineage—rather than a literalist adherence to historical legal forms. A pivotal figure in this intellectual project is Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, whose "Neo-Traditionalist" discourse provides the theological justification for the state''s policies. Bin Bayyah’s philosophy advocates for a "Theology of Obedience" and Fiqh al-Waqi (the jurisprudence of reality), which emphasizes that scholars should renounce direct political interference to maintain social order and prevent فتنه (fitna or chaos). By establishing institutions like the "Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies" and the "Emirates Fatwa Council," the UAE has effectively centralized religious authority, creating a defensive layer that protects the state from the encroachment of radical political Islam while simultaneously legitimizing its modernization agenda. This approach has facilitated the transition of the state''s legitimacy from a purely ideological or charismatic basis to a "functional" or "performance-based" legitimacy. In this model, the government''s authority is sustained by its tangible success in delivering economic growth, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and transforming the nation into a global hub for logistics, aviation, and technology.
Furthermore, the research highlights that the UAE''s "strait diplomacy" and strategic foreign policy, exemplified by the Abraham Accords in 2020, are not merely political calculations but are presented through a neo-traditionalist lens as religious imperatives for peace and the preservation of human life. The state utilizes concepts like the "New Alliance of Virtue" (Hilf al-Fudul al-Jadid) to frame international cooperation and interfaith dialogue as traditional Islamic values, thereby mitigating the internal friction often caused by rapid globalization. However, the study identifies several critical structural risks that could challenge the long-term viability of this model. The reliance on a top-down, authoritarian-consultative (Shura-based) structure may eventually face pressure from the rising civil demands of an increasingly educated and globally-connected domestic population. There is also the persistent risk of a "neo-fundamentalist" backlash; if the state is perceived as disregarding traditional "red lines" of Islamic identity in its quest for secular efficiency or regional normalization, it could trigger a reactive radicalization within certain social segments. Additionally, the unique demographic composition of the UAE, where a vast expatriate majority resides alongside a native minority, presents ongoing challenges for the preservation of a cohesive national identity amidst the forces of radical secularism or religious conservatism.
In summary, the UAE’s evolution into a neo-traditional national state demonstrates a successful integration of religious tradition and modern governance, offering a functional alternative to the institutional failures of radical political Islam. The model proves that religion, when interpreted through the lens of Maslahah (public interest) and Fiqh al-Maqasid, can serve as a catalyst for national development rather than an obstacle. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this program depends on the state''s ability to manage the delicate equilibrium between its "Hard Core" of patriarchal sovereignty and its "Protective Belt" of religious flexibility. The findings suggest that for the neo-traditional model to remain progressive, it must continue to evolve its consultative mechanisms to accommodate emerging civil expectations while maintaining the theological rigor required to sustain its legitimacy within the broader Islamic world. This research provides a theoretical framework for understanding the interaction between religion and the state in newly developing Islamic nations, concluding that the survival of such models hinges on their capacity to balance national interests with religious heritage in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

Abstract Linguistic discussions and their applications in the study of texts and speeches facilitate a systematic reading of the materials. By applying rigorous linguistic tools, researchers can move beyond surface-level readings to uncover the pragmatic intentions, illocutionary forces, and perlocutionary effects that shape audience perceptions and societal responses. Within this broad domain, John Searle's speech act theory emerges as a particularly influential paradigm, originally building upon J.L. Austin's foundational work in How to Do Things with Words (1962). Searle, in his seminal text Speech Acts (1969) and subsequent elaborations like Expression and Meaning (1979), refines the taxonomy into five core categories of illocutionary acts: assertives (which commit the speaker to the truth of a represented proposition, such as stating facts or describing events), expressives (which articulate the speaker's psychological state or attitude toward a propositional content, like praising or lamenting), directives (which attempt to compel the hearer to perform an action, through commands, requests, or suggestions), commissives (which obligate the speaker to a future course of action, such as promises or vows), and declaratives (which effect a change in institutional reality simply by virtue of their utterance, like declaring war or baptizing). This research aims to apply John Searle's speech act theory in analyzing Ayatollah Khamenei's Friday prayer sermons delivered after the martyrdom of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, addressing the following questions: According to John Searle's speech act theory, what speech acts did Ayatollah Khamenei employ in his Friday sermon? What does the frequency of these acts signify?  The methodology used in this article is a mixed-methods approach, encompassing both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The data collection method was purposive sampling and content validity was conducted based on a single focus group. The findings were presented in both descriptive and explanatory formats. The descriptive findings of the article show that among the speech acts of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the most speech acts were declarative speech acts. In other words, out of the total of 87 speech acts, 43 cases, which include 49.42 percent, were Assertive. In second place, the Expressive speech acts with 23 cases, i.e. 26.43 percent, expresses the speaker's feeling about the world. In this sermon, the directive speech act is in the next place. This speech act with 14 speech fragments, 16.10 percent, indicates that the speaker puts the listener in the performance of a task and forces him to do something. The Commissive speech act, with a frequency of 5 cases and 5.75 percent, indicates that the speaker intends to commit himself to perform an action in the future. Finally, the declarative act includes speech acts that, by expressing them, create real changes in the world, which has the lowest frequency in this sermon with only 2 cases and 2.30 percent. Therefore, the findings of the study indicate that in leadership speech, Assertive act had the highest frequency and declarative act had the lowest frequency. The frequency of Assertive act was 49.42 percent, Expressive speech act was 26.43 percent, Directive act was 16.10 percent, Commissive act was 5.75 percent, and declarative act was 2.30 percent. Also, in the explanatory findings of the research, the rereading of this sermon according to John Searle's speech act theory showed that in this sermon, all five types of speech acts emphasized by Searle, including declarative, affective, persuasive, commitment, and declaration, can be found among the speech fragments. The reason why declarative acts are used most frequently in this sermon is that Ayatollah Khamenei, as the leader of the world's Shiites, in the religious-political sphere, considers the interests of the country and the resistance front, and his speeches reflect a deep look at political and cultural issues. Considering the context and circumstances that have arisen, the existence of crises, seditions, and specific political conditions prevailing in the region, and the impact of this on Iran as well as the resistance front in Islamic countries, the delivery of these sermons by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution can pave the way for the right choice in the path and movement of the people and officials, as well as the resistance movements in Islamic countries, including Lebanon, Palestine, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and help them make appropriate decisions in their policies. The findings of this study, as a feedback on the Friday prayer sermon of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, within the framework of Searle's speech act theory, indicate that the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei, as the religious-political leader of Iran and the Resistance Front, have provided his audience with the opportunity to strengthen their spirit of defiance and all-round resistance by choosing the right path and making effective decisions. The honesty in his speech and his frank and uncompromising expression, in explaining current events correctly and without exaggeration, has played an important role in enlightening society and has created the basis for a good and sincere relationship between the Leader of the Revolution and the people under his command in Iran and the Resistance Front. The high frequency of assertive acts among Ayatollah Khamenei's speech acts suggests that when delivering this sermon, he sought to fulfill the duty of enlightening and raising societal awareness regarding recent events, including the recent assassinations that led to the martyrdom of Ismail Haniyeh (2024-5-31) and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah(2024-10-4), as well as Iran's missile strikes  against Israel (Promise of Truth 1 & 2)(2024-4-13, 2024-10-01), in his capacity as the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Resistance Front.

Abstract This article examines the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. The country has been the scene of confrontation between various and conflicting ideologies over the past two centuries. Supporters of these ideologies have undertaken political struggles at various levels, from discursive confrontation to armed struggle, to achieve political power and implement their ideological goals. Meanwhile, political Islam, as an ideology, has faced the stability and sustainability of Afghanistan's political systems with many problems since the beginning.
Developments in Afghanistan over the past two centuries have paved the way for the emergence of political and intellectual ideologies, including political Islam. The country has been the focus of major, extra-regional, regional, and neighboring powers due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position, but the entry of the British, followed by the Russians and the West led by the United States over the past 200 years, has further highlighted the discussion of political Islam in Afghanistan. Political ideologies have taken shape in the context of political, social, economic, and cultural developments, influenced by the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of the nation-state process, class contradictions, and religious and ethnic differences. Political Islam emerged as a political ideology in competition with ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and democracy. Political Islam was a response to the intellectual and political conditions of the 19th century and the expansion of Western ideas and political systems.
Afghanistan, like other Islamic and non-Islamic countries, has witnessed the emergence and growth of various movements and ideologies. Regarding the grounds for the emergence of political Islam, thinkers have mentioned various reasons: Fouad Ajami cites the failure of secular elites, Theda Skocpol cites the lack of political participation, Nikki Keddie and Gilles Kepel cite the crisis of the petite bourgeoisie, and Michael Fischer cites oil dollars and unequal development and the effects of cultural decline. Political Islam, with its approach to the Islamic state, is attributed to the first government of early Islam, but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 is considered a turning point for the resurgence of Islamism after a period of decline. In essence, political Islam is considered the reconstruction of society based on Islamic rules, and this discourse, in opposition and contradiction to all traditional and modern discourses that prohibit the combination of religion and politics, has been considered. Political Islam is not only a struggle against modernism, but also a reaction against injustices, bullying, and inequalities in Islamic societies. Political Islam is understood as Islam that is justice-seeking, development-oriented, worldly, authoritarian, civilization-building, realistic, revolutionary and reformist, science and reason-based, progressive, fighting against domination, system-building, and pragmatic.
The main question of this research is to investigate the political and social contexts of the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. According to the data, it is hypothesized that the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan is rooted in the ideas and thoughts of Sayyid Jamal al-Din. Furthermore, political Islam with different tendencies has been influenced by the views of Turkish political Islam by Mahmud Tarzi, Sufi political Islam by the Mujaddidi and Gailani families, and Deobandi political Islam by Indian teachers. However, in its modern sense, it entered Afghanistan with the return of Al-Azhar University of Egypt graduates with the intellectual line of the Muslim Brotherhood and the return of Qom seminary students from Iran with Shia views. The current research is exploratory and uses the historical sociology method with a descriptive and analytical approach. The present article, with a descriptive and analytical approach, falls into the category of theoretical and applied research. The documentary technique has been used for data collection. For data analysis, text analysis patterns in historical sociology have been used, drawing on the views of Charles Wright Mills. These topics are discussed in detail in the theoretical framework section. Historical sociology is a method that, by examining the past, seeks to understand how the formation and emergence of phenomena and transformations of societies occur over time. By analyzing macro political and social patterns, this method understands the complex processes that shape social structures.
The discussion of Islamic political movements began with Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi, born in 1838, coinciding with the first British invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequently, through the efforts of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in Egypt, it gradually grew and expanded in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Later, figures such as Hassan al-Banna and Muhammad Rashid Rida founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Simultaneously, Maulana Maududi initiated his Islamic thought in British India, emphasizing the realization of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic Sharia, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan party in 1941.
 

Abstract Over the past two decades, the international system has undergone profound structural transformations, marked notably by the relative decline of United States hegemony and the rise of emerging economic and geopolitical actors. These shifts have necessitated a critical reassessment of power balance theories and regional analytical frameworks, emphasizing the increasing complexity of global governance and the emergence of a multipolar international order. Eurasia, due to its central geographical location, vast energy resources, and extensive transit networks, has emerged as a strategic hub that plays a decisive role in redefining global influence and facilitating the redistribution of power among regional and extraregional actors. This region, therefore, is no longer merely a passive conduit for international trade and energy flows but has become a key arena for strategic maneuvering and geopolitical competition. Historically, international transport infrastructure in the Global South was predominantly designed to serve Western powers, prioritizing resource extraction and the export of raw materials to industrial centers in Europe and North America over the economic and social needs of local populations. Railways and maritime routes in regions such as India, Africa, and the Middle East were constructed to integrate local economies into global value chains controlled by Western actors, often reinforcing dependency and limiting the strategic autonomy of the host states. However, in recent decades, a new wave of infrastructure projects in Eurasia has challenged this paradigm, demonstrating that large-scale transport networks can simultaneously serve economic, political, and strategic purposes, enhancing the capabilities of regional powers while constraining traditional U.S. influence. Among the most significant initiatives are the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The INSTC, developed since 2000 with the participation of Iran, Russia, and India, integrates multimodal transport routes—combining maritime and overland pathways—to reduce the transit time for goods between Europe and India by approximately 15 to 20 days, while lowering transportation costs by roughly 30 percent. Beyond its economic benefits, the corridor functions as a strategic instrument, allowing Russia and Iran to enhance their autonomy from Western-controlled routes and exert greater influence in regional logistics and energy flows. This initiative exemplifies how infrastructure development can be leveraged as a tool of regional power, altering the balance of influence in Eurasia. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, similarly represents a transformative approach to regional connectivity. Encompassing over 130 countries, the BRI has facilitated massive investments in transport, logistics, and energy infrastructure, establishing a dense network of strategic corridors that strengthen China’s influence in a multipolar international system. These projects not only increase China’s direct foreign investment in participating countries but also encourage engagement by major global investors, including Western actors, reshaping the patterns of global capital flow and economic interdependence. Rail and road connections between China and Iran, for example, have reduced maritime transit times from 20 days to approximately 15 days over land, creating new economic arteries that can significantly affect regional power dynamics and the strategic autonomy of participating states. This study’s theoretical framework is anchored in three complementary perspectives: hard and soft power, balance of power, and the theory of emerging multipolar order. From a power perspective, large-scale infrastructure projects such as the INSTC and BRI are considered instruments of structural power. By lowering transportation costs and reducing transit times, these corridors enhance the economic and logistical capacities of Eurasian actors, while associated institutional and financial mechanisms reinforce their political and economic autonomy. The integration of hard and soft power elements in these projects increases the strategic leverage of China, Russia, Iran, and India, establishing a direct link between infrastructural capabilities and geopolitical influence. Within the balance of power framework, structural realism underscores that security and survival in an anarchic international system depend on the creation of equilibrium among major actors. New Eurasian transit corridors, by providing independent alternatives to Western-dominated routes, strengthen regional capabilities and facilitate the redistribution of power at both regional and global levels. These developments, therefore, not only generate tangible economic benefits but also reshape the strategic environment, limiting the influence of the United States and enabling a more diversified and resilient global order. The study finds that both the INSTC and the BRI operate simultaneously as economic drivers and strategic tools. The INSTC has created significant economic and geopolitical opportunities for India, Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan, allowing these states to play a more proactive role in regional power redistribution and reinforcing their strategic positions. The BRI, through extensive investment in transit and logistical infrastructure, not only enhances economic capacities but also strengthens political leverage, fosters institutional independence, and creates parallel financial mechanisms. Together, these initiatives facilitate the emergence of a more balanced multipolar architecture in Eurasia and accelerate the transition away from unipolar dominance. Overall, the research demonstrates that contemporary Eurasian infrastructure projects, by establishing transport networks independent of Western control, have the potential to shift the global economic and political center of gravity toward this continent. Eurasia is no longer solely a transit region; it functions as a strategic and geopolitical lever capable of redefining global governance and power relations. These initiatives exemplify how infrastructure can transcend conventional economic roles to become instruments of smart power, increasing the strategic autonomy of regional actors and shaping the architecture of a multipolar world order. The ongoing expansion of these corridors suggests that Eurasia will increasingly serve as a decisive center of gravity in global politics, with implications for trade, energy, and security across multiple regions. In conclusion, the study highlights the transformative impact of large-scale transport infrastructure on the global balance of power. By enabling regional actors to circumvent traditional Western-controlled routes, the INSTC and BRI enhance regional autonomy, facilitate economic growth, and provide the strategic means to influence global governance. These projects underscore the interplay between economic infrastructure and geopolitical power, demonstrating how Eurasia’s emerging network of corridors is reshaping the international system. The findings suggest that the strategic centrality of Eurasia is set to increase, with infrastructure serving as both an enabler of economic development and a decisive instrument of geopolitical strategy, ultimately contributing to the emergence of a multipolar global order.

Abstract The concept of corridor-based geopolitical positioning plays a pivotal role in shaping national power and, by extension, national security. In geopolitical theory, such positioning refers to the strategic spatial configuration where power competition among geopolitical actors unfolds in relation to geographic space. When a state successfully leverages its corridor-based advantages in this competitive landscape, it gains geopolitical superiority over its rivals, thereby enhancing its national security. This study investigates the role of Iran’s corridor-type geopolitical position in the domain of air transportation, emphasizing its potential to serve as a global aerial corridor. Despite possessing a geographically advantageous location that could facilitate international air transit, Iran has yet to capitalize on this latent asset, while regional competitors have effectively harnessed similar advantages to their benefit.
Iran’s geographical location situates it at the crossroads of major continental axes—north-south and east-west—offering a unique opportunity to function as a strategic air transit hub. However, this potential remains underutilized due to a combination of infrastructural, political, and economic constraints. The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, relying on library-based documentary sources to assess Iran’s current air transport infrastructure and its active air corridors. The findings reveal that Iran’s geopolitical position has not yet translated into tangible power generation or enhanced national security. Nevertheless, if this position is strategically developed in alignment with Iran’s geographic capacities, it could significantly contribute to both power projection and national security.
Corridor-based positioning inherently generates power by linking demographic, economic, political, military, and cultural spheres of influence. When such positioning holds regional significance, it is classified as geopolitical; when it extends to global relevance, it becomes geostrategic. The aviation industry, by its very nature, is deeply embedded in geopolitical dynamics. Air corridors and transit routes not only facilitate economic exchange but also serve as instruments of strategic influence. The development of air hubs and the expansion of aerial connectivity can directly impact national security by fostering economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and regional integration.
Iran’s geopolitical location offers multiple opportunities to enhance its national power. The aviation sector, in particular, presents a compelling case for strategic investment. In 2019, global aviation statistics underscored the magnitude of this industry: 4.3 billion passengers were transported, accounting for 8.3 trillion revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs). Additionally, 58 million tons of air cargo were moved, equivalent to 231 billion freight ton kilometers (FTKs). On a daily basis, over 100,000 flights carried approximately 12 million passengers and $18 billion worth of goods. In total, 38 million commercial flights operated across 48,500 air routes, covering 54 million kilometers and accumulating 85 million flight hours. The aviation industry supported 65 million jobs and contributed 3.6% to global GDP, with an economic turnover of $2.7 trillion (Aviation Benefit, 2019:6).
These figures illustrate the strategic importance of air transit and its direct correlation with corridor-based geopolitical positioning. The volume and quality of transit flights are closely tied to a country’s ability to leverage its geographic location. Iran’s potential to serve as a transit hub—connecting northern, southern, eastern, and western air routes—remains largely untapped. By enhancing its air transport capabilities and offering competitive services to transit flights, Iran could generate substantial wealth and global prestige, both of which are critical to national security. According to projections, air travel is expected to double by 2034. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that passenger growth between the Middle East and Africa will continue to rise through 2022, presenting Iran with a strategic opportunity to capitalize on this trend for both economic and security gains.
Transit flights are not only indicators of security but also contributors to its formation. The fluid nature of national security—shaped by political, economic, and strategic variables—means that the quantity and quality of transit flights are influenced by broader geopolitical conditions. Air corridors and overflight routes can generate wealth, mitigate geopolitical isolation, and serve as strategic assets during periods of international sanctions. Activating Iran’s corridor-based position, a fixed geopolitical factor, through targeted policy measures and infrastructural development, can have a direct impact on national power and security.
The research findings underscore a critical gap between Iran’s potential and its current utilization of corridor-based geopolitical advantages. Despite possessing high transit appeal and significant geographic capacity, Iran has not effectively harnessed these assets to bolster its national security or economic development. Key indicators such as transit flight revenue, number of overflights, airport capacity, geopolitical crises, comparative overflight tariffs, exclusion from regional corridors, and the strategic behavior of rival states all point to a strong correlation between air transit and national security. Iran’s potential to increase its transit flight revenue far exceeds its current performance. This untapped wealth could serve as a continuous source of national resilience, directly influencing security, welfare, and national survival.
Several variables influence Iran’s ability to generate revenue from its air corridors. These include its corridor-based positioning, territorial expanse, airport capacities, overflight tariffs (which are currently high), route security, availability of parallel routes through neighboring countries, the prevalence of restricted airspaces, political factors such as sanctions and conflicts, and inadequate infrastructure, particularly in air navigation systems. Addressing these challenges through strategic planning and investment could unlock Iran’s latent potential as a regional and global air transit hub, thereby reinforcing its geopolitical standing and enhancing its national security.
In conclusion, the study highlights the strategic imperative of transforming Iran’s corridor-based geopolitical position into a source of national power. By aligning infrastructural development with geopolitical strategy, Iran can reposition itself within the global aviation network, mitigate regional isolation, and secure long-term economic and security benefits. The findings call for a comprehensive policy framework that integrates geopolitical foresight with aviation sector development, ensuring that Iran’s geographic advantages are no longer squandered but strategically leveraged for national gain. 

Abstract As one of the most important functional regions in the world, the Persian Gulf region holds a significant position in the power equations and regional arrangements, particularly in terms of politics, economy, and security. The importance of this region for governments throughout history has been a platform for political and military competitions and challenges, to the extent that most wars and security conflicts have taken place in this regional systemOman is one of the important and influential Arab countries - a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council - in the Persian Gulf regional system, which has traditionally been one of Iran’s most important allies over the centuries. Despite having many cultural and civilizational similarities with other Persian Gulf actors, this country has different and distinctive characteristics, especially in its foreign policy approaches. Since the mid-1980s, Omani policy has been to adopt a policy of neutrality and build multi-layered friendships with regional and international actors, and they have generally refrained from directly engaging in issues that have a thorny aspect. Political realism has led Omanis to a position where they have simultaneously been able to establish appropriate relations between opposing and rival actors, such as the United States and Iran, China and India, and Iran and Saudi Arabia. The policy of avoiding tension is so deeply rooted in the foundations of Omani foreign policy that the country made non-interference in alignments against Iran one of its main conditions for joining the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it has striven to maintain it to this day. Omanis do not have the same financial and oil resources as their neighbors and do not play a role in the energy market. Accordingly, they are trying to take full advantage of the confrontation between Iran and the West. In this regard, they are trying to be the axis of energy transfer from Central Asia to other regions and, given their strategic location in the Sea of ​​Oman and the Makran region, take on the role of a "strategic actor". To achieve this goal, they are trying to create multi-layered and diverse interactions and play the role of a "mediating actor", and in this regard, Omanis have been among the most active countries present at regional and international conferences and meetings. In this regard, this research aims to examine the behavioral patterns of this country and its consequences within the framework of the foundations of Oman's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf regional system, given the importance and influence of Oman. Considering this issue, it can be said that the foundations of Oman's foreign policy, even after Sultan Qaboos, have been relatively stable based on political realism, the use of strategic-geopolitical capacities, and complex interactions with other actors. On this basis, despite the dynamics, developments, and changes in power equations and the occurrence of crises at the regional level, Oman's foreign policy in the regional system has continued in an independent, impartial, and balanced manner within the framework of intelligent diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral dialogues and cooperation in various economic, political, and security fields actively and systematically. These behavioral patterns have ultimately introduced this country as an active actor in the Persian Gulf regional system and have paved the way for enhancing the country's position in the Persian Gulf-Middle East regional system and the international system. This article aims to explain the trends and foundations of Oman's foreign policy in achieving this positioning by raising the question of what conditions exist in Muscat's foreign policy for achieving this goal. It is of the opinion that the country's performance in the three areas of desire, capacity, and acceptance for regional positioning over the past decade has prepared the ground for this role. Focusing on this question, the results of this article show that in the area of ​​desire, Muscat's foreign policy, due to avoiding ideological attitudes and replacing realistic leaders, has sought growth and progress, expanding interaction, and ultimately gaining a position at the regional level. Today, Oman's declared programs at various levels and the volume of exchanges of this country in this region indicate its serious desire for regional positioning. In the area of ​​capacities, which can be seen in investments, exchanges, and political and economic relations in the region, Oman's economic power and the expansion of economic influence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region clearly demonstrate the conditions for playing a role. In the current period, few researchers doubt Oman's economic, cultural, and political developments. In the area of ​​acceptance, Oman has been able to gain the satisfaction of the countries of the region. In the theoretical field, factors such as realism, tolerance, political neutrality, etc., have made Oman attractive. In practical terms, the huge volume of exchanges between regional countries and political mediations between regional countries, especially in relation to Iran, and above all the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic, and European and Western countries, can be evaluated in this context. Therefore, the series of developments that have taken place indicate that Oman's regional positioning has been moving forward in the last decade and, despite the change in the country's internal leadership, it has still been a source of playing an effective role in filling the gaps within the region in the regional order of the Persian Gulf, and has also been able to be a reliable source for political and security exchanges between the region and the level of the international system and the role of great powers in this region. In this study, an attempt was made to address how this role is instilled using the theoretical foundations of regional positioning; although these relations and this path were not and are not without challenges. The fragility of the region's security structure, polar divisions over fundamental regional crises such as the Palestinian issue and border disputes, and excessive expectations from regional rivals for Oman to take a clear and unilateral direction in times of crisis are the most important obstacles, the management of which by Muscat in the future could be a reflection of the success or failure of this country's regional positioning 

Abstract Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey have fluctuated from cooperation to competition since their inception. The perception of Turkey as a relatively secular country, allied with the West and a member of NATO has made it a challenging player in the intellectual structure of Iranian decision-makers. The two countries have different ideas about regional role, regional order, and regional leadership. Tehran’s threatening perception of the Zangezur Corridor and Israel’s growing influence in Turkey and Azerbaijan have exacerbated pessimism in this regard. At the same time, the historical relations between the two neighboring countries and cooperation in economic fields are considered a pivotal factor in advancing Iran's neighborhood policy and regional economic diplomacy. The experience of cooperation in the Qatar crisis and the referendum in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in 2017 also showed that Tehran and Ankara have common interests, at least in some thematic areas. The main question of this article is what factor has led to the sinusoidal fluctuation in Iran-Turkey relations between 2011 and 2023. This article is descriptive-analytical, and the required information was collected through library methods and reference to reliable internet sources. Instead of relying on the pattern of formation of cooperation and competition in a priori and predetermined formats, the present study uses an a posteriori and structuralist approach, which believes that relationships are formed in a context of bilateral and multilateral interactions. Under the influence of intellectual and normative structures, relations between Iran and Turkey have tended towards strategic competition and confrontation rather than cooperation. Ankara's policy of active presence in the Levant and Persian Gulf subsystems has been accompanied by entry into Tehran's traditional sphere of influence, making conflict of interests between the two sides inevitable. In Syria, Ankara has refused to normalize relations with the central government and, by continuing its presence on Syrian soil and providing multi-layered support to the opposition, has created a serious challenge to the restoration of the Assad government's sovereignty as a strategic ally of Iran. In Iraq, Turkey has also assumed a historical responsibility to protect the country's Sunni and Turkmen minorities, having crossed Iran's red lines in Iraq on numerous occasions. What adds to the complexity of this situation is the continued direct Turkish military presence in northern Syria and Iraq and the lack of a clear perspective for changing this situation. The dominance of the confrontational approach in bilateral relations has also overshadowed the prospects for achieving cooperation. Rather than being in line with the long-term goals and interests of both sides, the cooperation that has been formed has its roots in environmental requirements, including the gaps in Turkey's relations with the United States and Europe, as well as the preference for profits from trade with Iran under sanctions, and has at times led Tehran and Ankara to adopt a tactical cooperation strategy. The crisis-ridden economy, the confrontation with the United States, and the Kurdish issue in general have affected Tehran and Ankara, albeit to different degrees. The second Karabakh war in 2020, as well as Azerbaijan's recent advances in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, have changed the dynamics in the region in Turkey's favor, adding to Tehran's threatening perception of the developments. From the perspective of Iranian officials, Israel's increased influence in the South Caucasus region, especially its strategic relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan, along with the normalization and improvement of Ankara's relations with Tel Aviv, have also contributed to the insecurity of Iran's northern borders. The power vacuum resulting from Russia's presence in the Ukrainian war also intensifies the scope of the conflicts between Tehran and Ankara in Syria and Karabakh. Therefore, Iran and Turkey's different perceptions and understandings of security and threats in the Levant and the Persian Gulf have been the factor behind the fluctuation in bilateral relations, which are mainly confrontational and competitive, and less cooperative. In such circumstances, the economic relations between the two sides, under conditions of sanctions and some environmental opportunities resulting from the activism of rival or challenging identities, including tactical cooperation in the Qatar crisis, the Kurdistan Regional Government referendum, and cooperation during the 2016 coup, act as a moderator of the aforementioned mainstream. The perceptions and understandings of security and threat have been the factor in establishing various forms of Hobbesian (confrontation), Lockean (competition), and Kantian (cooperation) culture in Iran-Turkey relations during the period under discussion. In the positive aspect of establishing a desirable regional order, numerous cases of conflict and divergence of interests between Iran and Turkey are visible, including in the Syrian and Karabakh crises. In cases of attempts to prevent the establishment of an undesirable regional order, the two sides have reached a kind of tactical cooperation in the form of negative and passive action. Some economic areas of bilateral interactions have also had an intermediate status as a gray area of ​​relations.