The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract The research article meticulously examines the function, objectives, and institutional mechanisms of systematic sexual violence and enslavement perpetrated by the terrorist organization ISIS (Islamic State) across territories under its control in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. This period, encompassing the rise, consolidation, and eventual territorial collapse of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, was marked by widespread crimes against humanity. Among these atrocities, systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, and the enslavement of women and girls—particularly from the Yazidi, Shia, and Christian communities—constituted a central pillar of ISIS's governance and military strategy. Rather than being incidental consequences of armed conflict, these practices were deliberately organized, bureaucratically regulated, and ideologically justified, making them an integral component of ISIS's state-building project and its broader strategy of domination over conquered populations.
The central problem motivating this study is the proposition that these grave sexual crimes were not opportunistic acts committed by undisciplined fighters or spontaneous manifestations of wartime violence. Instead, they represented a calculated, institutionalized, and multifunctional policy designed to advance ISIS's political, ideological, military, demographic, and economic objectives. Consequently, the primary research question asks: What strategic objectives did ISIS seek to achieve through the systematic perpetration of rape and sexual enslavement in territories under its control, and how did these practices contribute to the establishment, consolidation, and maintenance of the Caliphate's system of governance and domination?
The article advances the hypothesis that sexual violence functioned as a multidimensional strategic instrument simultaneously employed to: (1) propagate terror and intimidation among local populations; (2) engineer demographic transformation through the control of women's reproductive capacity, thereby facilitating ethnic and religious cleansing; (3) strengthen internal cohesion by providing sexual access as a material and symbolic reward for fighters; and (4) humiliate, fragment, and ultimately destroy the collective social, cultural, and religious identity of targeted minority communities, especially the Yazidis, through the systematic degradation of women. Beyond these functions, sexual slavery also generated financial resources through the commodification and trafficking of enslaved women, further embedding sexual violence within the political economy of the ISIS Caliphate. The systematic character of these crimes is demonstrated by concrete historical evidence, including the assault on Sinjar on 3 August 2014, during which approximately 6,800 Yazidi women and girls were abducted, catalogued, transported, distributed, and traded in organized slave markets operating under standardized pricing mechanisms, illustrating both the bureaucratic sophistication and economic rationality underlying ISIS's system of sexual exploitation.
The research employs an explanatory qualitative methodology based on documentary analysis and qualitative content analysis of authoritative secondary sources. The principal empirical materials consist of reports produced by the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, investigations conducted by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and a broad body of peer-reviewed academic scholarship addressing conflict-related sexual violence, genocide, terrorism, and gendered violence. To demonstrate the institutionalized nature of these crimes, the analysis examines recurring behavioral patterns, including official religious fatwas legitimizing sexual slavery, formal administrative directives issued by senior ISIS authorities, organizational regulations governing the ownership and transfer of captives, and the establishment of regulated slave markets in urban centers such as Mosul and Raqqa. Collectively, these sources reveal a high degree of organizational planning rather than isolated criminal conduct.
The theoretical framework integrates the concepts of Sexual Property, Hegemonic Masculinity, and Sexual Objectification with broader perspectives drawn from structural inequality theory, feminist security studies, genocide studies, and the political economy of armed conflict. This interdisciplinary framework enables the study to situate ISIS's sexual violence within wider historical patterns of patriarchal domination while simultaneously explaining how extremist ideology transformed pre-existing gender hierarchies into an institutionalized system of governance. The article further develops previous scholarship by demonstrating that sexual violence operated not merely as an expression of misogyny but as a strategic mechanism linking ideological control, military coercion, demographic engineering, economic extraction, and symbolic domination.
The findings demonstrate unequivocally that sexual violence occupied a central position within ISIS's overall strategy rather than representing conventional criminality or undisciplined battlefield behavior. First, it functioned as a weapon of terror and social destruction. Sexual assault deliberately targeted women as symbolic bearers of communal honor, enabling ISIS to terrorize entire populations, accelerate forced displacement, and dismantle the social cohesion of conquered communities. The destruction of family structures and communal trust significantly facilitated territorial conquest and long-term political control.
Second, sexual violence served as an instrument of genocide and demographic engineering. By exercising control over women's reproductive capacity and imposing the ideological identity of ISIS upon future generations through patrilineal descent, the organization sought to eradicate minority identities while permanently transforming the demographic composition of occupied territories. The deliberate targeting of Yazidi women, recognized internationally as constituting genocidal conduct, exemplifies the strategic relationship between sexual violence and ethnic cleansing.
Third, sexual violence reinforced hegemonic masculinity and organizational cohesion. Participation in sexual enslavement symbolized military success, masculine dominance, and ideological commitment. Access to enslaved women functioned as a powerful incentive for recruitment, rewarded battlefield participation, strengthened loyalty to commanders, and fostered solidarity among fighters. Sexual domination therefore became an important mechanism through which ISIS reproduced internal discipline and reinforced collective identity.
Finally, sexual violence became deeply embedded within the political economy of the Caliphate through the commodification of women as transferable property. Female captives were systematically registered, classified, priced, exchanged, inherited, and sold, transforming human bodies into economic assets capable of generating financial revenue while simultaneously reinforcing ideological claims regarding ownership, hierarchy, and domination. This institutionalization of sexual exploitation reflected the practical implementation of the concepts of Sexual Property and Sexual Objectification, whereby women were reduced to movable capital subject to bureaucratic administration and market exchange.
Analytically, these findings indicate that ISIS successfully integrated long-standing gender inequalities, sectarian discrimination, and extremist religious interpretations into a coherent institutional framework capable of simultaneously producing political authority, economic resources, military cohesion, demographic transformation, and ideological legitimacy. Sexual violence thus became a foundational instrument of governance rather than a peripheral consequence of armed conflict.
The research concludes that systematic sexual violence within the ISIS Caliphate constituted a deliberate and highly organized weapon of war employed to consolidate territorial control, ensure ideological reproduction, generate economic resources, reshape demographic realities, and eliminate the collective identities of targeted minority populations. These crimes were legitimized through extremist jurisprudence, administered through bureaucratic institutions, and implemented according to formal organizational procedures, demonstrating that sexual violence represented an essential component of ISIS's governance model rather than an exceptional or incidental phenomenon. The findings therefore contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between terrorism, gender-based violence, genocide, and institutionalized systems of domination, while emphasizing the necessity of recognizing systematic sexual violence as a core mechanism of political power in extremist organizations.

Abstract The phenomenon of commodity smuggling, as one of the most persistent and, at the same time, most understudied issues in the economic and social history of Iran during the Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, has consistently played a decisive role in the transformations of the southern ports of the Persian Gulf. Adopting a historical-sociological approach and drawing upon Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, the present study examines the process of formation, institutionalization, and consequences of commodity smuggling networks in the northern ports of the Persian Gulf during the first half of the twentieth century. The central problématique of this research is that smuggling in this region, contrary to prevailing perceptions that regard it merely as an economic and marginal phenomenon, is in fact the result of a triple convergence: the inefficient fiscal and customs policies of the central government, the distinctive socio-livelihood structures of the coastal communities of southern Iran, and the targeted interventions of colonial powers, particularly Britain. This triple interaction laid the groundwork for the emergence of an organized, multi-layered network of smuggling of strategic commodities—including arms, silver coinage, tea, sugar, grains, and livestock—which not only disrupted the legal flow of trade but also gradually became an inseparable component of the livelihood patterns, power structures, and socio-political relations of Iran's southern coasts.
The research methodology adopted in this study is historical-analytical, grounded in the examination of archival documents, annual reports of British political representatives in the Persian Gulf, contemporary press sources including the newspaper Habl al-Matin, and field observations of British officials such as Lorimer. These rich sources have made it possible to reconstruct in detail the operational mechanisms of smuggling, to identify the principal actors—including local merchants, tribal sheikhs, customs officials, British agents, and transregional family-commercial networks—and to delineate the multifaceted consequences of this phenomenon for the economy, security, demography, and social structure of the region. Documented evidence from major ports such as Bushehr, Bandar Lengeh, Mohammara (Khorramshahr), Bandar Abbas, Kish, and other smaller coastal settlements attests to the pervasiveness and depth of smuggling networks at all economic and administrative levels of the region.
The theoretical framework of this research is grounded in Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, which analyzes societies within the framework of the global capitalist system, characterized by an unequal division of labor among core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral regions. According to this theory, core countries, by virtue of their economic, political, and technological preponderance, determine the rules governing trade and financial exchanges, while peripheral regions are predominantly positioned as suppliers of raw materials and as consumer markets for goods manufactured in the core. Within this structure, during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, Iran—particularly in the context of its southern ports—occupied a semi-peripheral or even peripheral position, with its economic relations being largely shaped by the interests and policies of colonial powers, especially Britain. From this perspective, the smuggling networks in the southern ports of Iran cannot be interpreted merely as a local reaction to customs policies or legal restrictions; rather, these networks constituted integral components of the informal mechanisms of exchange within the global economy, which emerged against the backdrop of structural cleavages between the core and the periphery, and ultimately served to reproduce dependency and inequality.
The research findings indicate that smuggling in the Persian Gulf ports during the first half of the twentieth century exhibited considerable diversity and complexity, with each commodity domain leaving its own specific consequences. In the monetary and financial sphere, the global decline in silver prices, coupled with the large-scale smuggling of Iranian silver coinage to India, led to a significant depletion of the country's silver reserves and the devaluation of the national currency. As Lorimer's observations reveal, the prevailing currency in the southern ports of Iran was not the Iranian qiran, but rather the Indian rupee and the pound sterling—a situation that exacerbated the monetary crisis and rendered the Iranian government increasingly dependent on foreign financial markets. The newspaper Habl al-Matin also issued warnings in this regard, urging that changes be made to the state's coinage system to stem the outflow of silver. In the security domain, arms smuggling assumed far more serious dimensions. From the 1880s onward, the systematic inflow of weapons from Muscat, Kuwait, and Bahrain—often conducted with the overt or tacit support of British political agents—enabled the tribes and confederacies of the south to acquire considerable military power, effectively marginalizing the central government's supervisory authority. Reports indicate that in the year 1318 AH (1900 CE), alone in the port of Bushehr, approximately fifty thousand firearms were in the hands of the populace—a figure that attests to a profound decline in state authority and the emergence of a kind of local security order closely intertwined with the interests of foreign powers.
This phenomenon transcended a mere economic infraction, leading to a fundamental reorganization of the region's socio-economic geography. The smuggling of consumer goods such as sugar, tea, and grains—exacerbated by the incomplete implementation of trade monopoly laws, widespread administrative corruption, and collusion among customs officials—disrupted legitimate commerce and inflicted substantial losses upon local merchants. Free ports under the control of Arab sheikhs (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Trucial States) became primary entry points for smuggled commodities, while Iranian agricultural products were illicitly exported to these destinations. This bidirectional flow upset the regional trade balance, heightened the livelihood dependency of the population on informal activities, and set the stage for the large-scale migration of merchants, seafarers, and skilled laborers from Iranian ports to the southern shores of the Persian Gulf.
Consequently, historic Iranian ports such as Bandar Lengeh, Bushehr, Kish, and Bandar Abbas experienced economic recession, population decline, and infrastructural deterioration, whereas the ports and sheikhdoms of the southern littoral emerged as new hubs of commerce and transit. Institutional and political factors further intensified this trajectory: the corruption of customs agents and local governors, the regulatory weakness of the central government, and the direct intervention of Britain—which, through its support for allied sheikhs and facilitation of smuggling, circumvented Iran's formal economic mechanisms and reinforced the region's dependence on the colonial economy.
Within the framework of Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, smuggling reflected Iran's semi-peripheral and peripheral position within the structure of the global economy. Smuggling networks were not opportunistic reactions but rather adaptive mechanisms employed by local communities in response to structural pressures—mechanisms that, while sustaining livelihoods in the short term, ultimately consolidated dependency, weakened governance institutions, and transferred economic advantages in favor of core economies in the long run. The study concludes that smuggling in the southern ports of Iran constituted a multifaceted and structural phenomenon, deeply embedded in asymmetrical power relations at the local, national, and global levels. Re-examining this historical process is of critical importance for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the state, society, and the global economy in the borderlands and coastal regions of the Islamic world. It further underscores the necessity of historical-sociological studies grounded in the world-systems approach and the utilization of local archives and multilingual sources for a more precise reconstruction of socio-economic networks in peripheral regions.

Abstract Introduction :The West Asia region, referred to in geopolitical literature as both the cradle of ancient civilizations and the epicenter of contemporary crises, has consistently played a pivotal role in global security and economic equations. Owing to its possession of the world's largest proven oil and gas reserves, its location at the crossroads of three continents, and its numerous flashpoints of tension, West Asia has historically been the primary arena for great-power rivalries. For the past seven decades, the United States — relying on an extensive network of military bases, a formidable naval fleet, and a web of security treaties with key regional states — had managed to establish an unparalleled hegemony over this region. However, the rise of the People's Republic of China as an emerging economic and political power on the international stage has fundamentally challenged this long-standing structure.
The central research question this study seeks to answer is: "How has China's multidimensional influence in the West Asia region during the 2021–2025 period affected the strategies, priorities, and practical actions of the United States in this region?" In response, the core hypothesis posits that, unlike the traditional U.S. approach based on military interventions, direct force presence, and unilateral security ordering, China — by leveraging economic soft power, multilateral diplomacy, and massive infrastructure investments — has succeeded in constraining Washington's strategic space in the region, compelling it to undertake a profound reassessment of its policies. The significance and necessity of this research lie in its precise depiction of emerging trends in West Asia's regional order, its provision of an analytical framework for better understanding international system dynamics in the era of power transition, and its assistance to policymakers and regional studies scholars in more accurately assessing plausible future scenarios.

Theoretical Framework :To analyze the escalating rivalry between these two major powers in West Asia, this study employs Offensive Realism as its primary theoretical framework. This theory, systematically articulated by John Mearsheimer in his seminal work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, rests on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic, lacking any overarching sovereign authority to resolve disputes; (2) great powers inherently possess offensive military capabilities that can be used to threaten others; (3) states can never be certain of others' intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of states; and (5) states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative power. Within this framework, China's emergence and its steadily growing economic, technological, and military capabilities are interpreted as a serious threat to U.S. regional and global hegemony. Moreover, China's pragmatic and non-confrontational approach — built on the principle of "win-win cooperation" and avoidance of direct military engagement — has created favorable conditions for its penetration into domains previously regarded as America's exclusive sphere of influence.Conceptually, key notions such as "Balance of Power," "Hegemony," "Economic Diplomacy," "Complex Interdependence," and "Great Strategic Rivalry" are employed in this research. Furthermore, to more accurately explain China's behavior, the concept of "Smart Power" — combining hard and soft power — has been utilized. By successfully integrating economic investments (economic hard power), provision of regional public goods (soft power), and maintaining neutrality in regional states' internal conflicts (diplomatic smart power), China has demonstrated a novel model of influence that has been insufficiently addressed in earlier theoretical literature.

Research Methodology: This study is designed and conducted using a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method. Data collection is based on content analysis of authoritative scientific documents, strategic reports from reputable international institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Crisis Group (ICG), annual U.S. Department of Defense reports on China's military power, and official statements by senior officials from both countries and regional states. The study's timeframe is deliberately limited to the years 2021–2025 to enable precise examination of current developments and the short-to-medium-term effects of China's active presence in the region. To ensure validity and reliability, the triangulation method has been employed, whereby data are collected and cross-referenced from multiple sources and through various approaches. The coding and content analysis process has been conducted systematically using thematic categorization. In this context, five dimensions of China's influence in West Asia have been identified and subjected to in-depth analysis: (1) economic dimension (trade, investment, and energy); (2) political-diplomatic dimension (bilateral and multilateral relations and mediation); (3) technological-infrastructural dimension (construction projects, communication networks, and technology transfer); (4) security-military dimension (training cooperation, arms sales, and joint exercises); and (5) cultural-public dimension (public diplomacy and academic exchanges). Correspondingly, U.S. responses in each of these domains have been categorized and explained separately.

Research Findings:The research findings indicate that during 2021–2025, China, through the adoption of a smart, multi-layered, and forward-looking strategy, has established a steadily growing and sustainable presence in West Asia that extends far beyond mere economic relations. In the economic dimension: In addition to securing a stable flow of oil and gas from major producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, China has undertaken large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure projects, including the construction and management of modern ports (such as Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi), development of high-speed rail networks, establishment of special economic zones and industrial parks, and expansion of advanced communication networks and the Internet of Things. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — as the largest infrastructure investment project in human history — has played a central role in linking the economic interests of regional countries with China's economy and creating transregional value chains. By 2023, China's trade volume with Gulf Cooperation Council countries exceeded $300 billion, more than double the trade volume of these countries with the United States in the same year. In the political and diplomatic dimension: By adopting a policy of "active neutrality" in regional conflicts and strengthening strategic bilateral relations with key regional actors — including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt — China has succeeded in presenting itself as a cross-factional, trustworthy, and independent player free from the region's identity-based and religious disputes. The most significant event in this domain was Beijing's historic mediation in the normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, which, through the signing of a tripartite statement in Beijing, created a dramatic shift in the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf and West Asia. This move demonstrated China's emerging capacity for engagement in complex security conflicts and signified the decline of the traditional U.S. role as the region's sole hegemonic mediator.


Discussion and Analysis of Results: The results derived from the findings clearly demonstrate that China's growing multidimensional influence in West Asia has unprecedentedly challenged the United States' long-standing hegemony. This challenge is not only manifest in the economic sphere — reducing America's share of regional energy markets and infrastructure projects — but is equally pronounced in strategic and diplomatic domains. On the one hand, Washington — which in recent decades, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, had adopted the "Pivot to Asia" or "Rebalancing toward East Asia" strategy centered on containing China — now confronts a new and paradoxical reality: China has not only emerged as a dominant power in its traditional sphere of influence in East Asia, but has also established new and extensive bases of influence in the heart of America's vital sphere, i.e., West Asia. This situation places the White House in a strategic dilemma: any withdrawal or reduction of presence from the region will be interpreted as ceding strategic space to the rival, while any direct military confrontation or engagement could incur enormous financial, human, and diplomatic costs. In response to this existential challenge, the United States has undertaken a series of diverse measures, including: (1) significantly increasing military and economic aid to its long-standing regional allies, particularly Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain; (2) attempting to revive regional security pacts, such as the creation of a joint naval fleet under the "Combined Forces" banner in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; (3) intensive diplomacy to normalize Israel's relations with Arab states through the Abraham Accords; (4) intensifying economic and technological sanctions against Chinese companies and institutions active in the region; and (5) striving to design and present alternative projects to the Belt and Road Initiative, such as the "Build Back Better World" (B3W) scheme and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). However, evidence suggests that purely confrontational and security-oriented strategies no longer possess their former efficacy, and the U.S. is gradually compelled to accept the reality of the multipolarization of the regional order and China's effective role alongside other powers.

Conclusion:Based on the comprehensive analyses conducted in this study, the escalating rivalry between China and the United States in West Asia is not a temporary or fleeting phenomenon but rather a tangible reflection of profound and fundamental changes in the global balance of power and the transition from a unipolar order to a multipolar-multi-actor one. China, skillfully utilizing economic tools, long-term infrastructure investments, non-confrontational diplomacy, and a win-win cooperation approach, is redefining its role from a marginal actor and mere energy supplier to an effective, influential, and even decisive player in West Asia's security and political equations. In contrast, the United States — accustomed for decades to exclusive, unilateral, and coercive role-playing in this region — now faces an unprecedented historical scenario that demands fundamental adjustments to its traditional strategies, reduced reliance on military interventions, and adaptation to the new regional and global order.

Abstract The Palestinian Question has remained one of the most protracted and contentious international conflicts since the early twentieth century. Beyond its territorial dimension, it encompasses issues of international law, human rights, statehood, diplomacy, regional security, and great-power competition. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a country with deep historical, political, and strategic ties to the Middle East, France has consistently sought to position itself as an influential diplomatic actor in the management of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. French governments have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to international law, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel within the framework of the two-state solution. Nevertheless, despite this normative discourse, numerous observers have argued that French foreign policy demonstrates a persistent inconsistency between official declarations and practical implementation. France simultaneously condemns Israeli settlement expansion, supports Palestinian self-determination, and advocates international humanitarian law while maintaining extensive diplomatic, military, technological, and economic cooperation with Israel. These contradictions have generated significant academic debate regarding the real motivations underlying French policy toward Palestine. Objective This study aims to examine France's approach to the Palestinian Question by analyzing the consistency between its diplomatic discourse and foreign policy practices. Specifically, the research evaluates French policy through three principal dimensions: human rights, the two-state solution, and Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories. The study seeks to answer the following research question: What approach has France adopted toward the Palestinian Question, and to what extent are its declared principles reflected in its practical foreign policy? The principal hypothesis argues that although French diplomacy officially promotes a balanced position between supporting Palestinian statehood and guaranteeing Israel's security, its practical policies reveal a considerable divergence between rhetoric and action. This divergence largely reflects France's strategic interests rather than its declared normative commitments. Theoretical Framework The study employs Classical Realism as its analytical framework. Classical Realism views states as rational actors operating within an anarchic international system where national interests, security, power, and survival constitute the primary objectives of foreign policy. Ethical principles and international norms are regarded as secondary considerations whenever they conflict with strategic interests. Within this framework, France's behavior toward Palestine is interpreted as a rational balancing strategy designed to maximize national interests while preserving diplomatic flexibility. French policy seeks simultaneously to maintain strategic relations with Israel, preserve historical influence in the Arab world, strengthen France's international diplomatic status, and reinforce its role as an independent European power. Consequently, the apparent contradiction between official discourse and practical policy is understood not as policy inconsistency but as the predictable outcome of realist calculations. Methodology The research adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology based on documentary and library research. Primary and secondary sources include scholarly books, peer-reviewed journal articles, official publications of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, reports issued by the French Senate and National Assembly, European Union documents, international legal instruments, and recent academic literature in both English and French. Data were analyzed through qualitative content analysis, enabling the identification of recurring patterns in French diplomatic discourse and comparison with practical policy implementation across different historical periods and policy domains. Findings The findings indicate that French policy toward Palestine has evolved significantly over the past seven decades while preserving an underlying strategic continuity. During the 1950s and early 1960s, France maintained exceptionally close military and strategic cooperation with Israel, largely driven by regional security concerns, the Suez Crisis, and the Algerian War. Following the rise of Arab nationalism and the increasing geopolitical importance of Arab energy resources, French foreign policy gradually shifted toward a more balanced diplomatic position under President Charles de Gaulle. Since then, France has consistently advocated a negotiated political settlement based upon the establishment of two independent states. However, closer examination demonstrates that French diplomacy frequently prioritizes strategic considerations over normative commitments. Regarding human rights, France regularly condemns civilian casualties, humanitarian crises, violations of international humanitarian law, and deteriorating living conditions within the occupied Palestinian territories. French diplomatic institutions actively support humanitarian assistance and repeatedly emphasize the protection of civilians and respect for international law. Nevertheless, these declarations have rarely been accompanied by concrete political or economic measures capable of influencing Israeli policy. Military cooperation, technological partnerships, intelligence exchanges, and commercial relations with Israel have continued despite repeated criticism of Israeli actions. The study further demonstrates that France's support for the two-state solution represents one of the clearest examples of the gap between rhetoric and practice. While successive French governments have repeatedly described the two-state framework as the only viable solution to the conflict, France historically refrained from formally recognizing the State of Palestine despite acknowledging the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. According to the analysis presented in this article, recent French announcements concerning possible recognition of Palestine should be interpreted primarily as diplomatic instruments intended to preserve French influence within a changing regional geopolitical environment rather than as evidence of a fundamental transformation in French foreign policy. The analysis of Israeli settlement activities reveals a similar pattern. France consistently considers settlements established in territories occupied since 1967 to be illegal under international law and has supported several European Union initiatives designed to distinguish Israel proper from settlements in the occupied territories. However, implementation has remained limited, and bilateral agreements between France and Israel generally lack sufficiently explicit territorial restrictions. Consequently, practical cooperation frequently continues without fully enforcing the legal distinction officially advocated by French diplomacy. Discussion The evidence presented throughout this study demonstrates that French foreign policy cannot be adequately understood solely through normative approaches emphasizing human rights or international law. Instead, Classical Realism provides a more convincing explanation by highlighting the central role of national interests and strategic calculations. France continuously attempts to reconcile several competing objectives: maintaining close relations with Israel, preserving political influence throughout the Arab world, protecting economic and security interests, reinforcing European diplomatic leadership, and projecting itself as an independent international mediator distinct from United States policy. This multidimensional balancing strategy inevitably generates contradictions between discourse and practice. Rather than representing isolated inconsistencies, these contradictions constitute structural features of French foreign policy. Human rights advocacy, support for Palestinian statehood, criticism of settlement expansion, and commitment to international law coexist with pragmatic diplomatic restraint whenever stronger measures might jeopardize broader strategic interests. The article further argues that recent regional transformations—including shifting Arab alliances, increasing American influence, evolving security dynamics, and changing geopolitical competition—have reinforced France's pragmatic approach. Conclusion This study concludes that France's approach to the Palestinian Question is best characterized as pragmatic classical realism rather than principled normative diplomacy The persistent discrepancy between official rhetoric and practical behavior is particularly visible in France's responses to human rights violations, recognition of Palestinian statehood, and Israeli settlement expansion. French diplomacy therefore illustrates how middle powers frequently employ normative discourse to reinforce international legitimacy while simultaneously pursuing strategic objectives through cautious and interest-based foreign policy. Ultimately, France's policy toward Palestine reflects an enduring effort to preserve diplomatic influence, maintain regional balance, and maximize national interests within an increasingly complex international system. As long as these strategic considerations remain unchanged, the gap between French discourse and practice is likely to continue shaping its approach to one of the world's longest-standing international conflicts.

Abstract Diplomatic missions in contemporary international relations serve functions far beyond formal ceremonial duties, consular assistance, and official state-to-state communication. Historically, embassies have frequently operated as pivotal nodes for clandestine intelligence gathering, covert political operations, network building among political and societal elites, and structural influence operations designed to advance the strategic national interests of the sending state. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the bilateral relationship between Tehran and Washington underwent an unprecedented paradigm shift. Iran transitioned almost overnight from a principal strategic partner and sub-regional pillar of American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf under the Pahlavi monarchy into an ideological, discursive, and geopolitical challenger opposing U.S. hegemony.
Losing a crucial geopolitical asset prompted Washington to deploy a multifaceted array of diplomatic, economic, military, and covert instruments to manage, destabilize, or re-orient the trajectory of the nascent Islamic Republic. Central to these clandestine efforts was the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Following the November 4, 1979, takeover of the embassy by Iranian university students ("Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line")—an event later termed the "Second Revolution"—thousands of classified, secret, and top-secret intelligence cables, diplomatic correspondence, personality profiles, and operational memoranda were uncovered and meticulously reconstructed. Despite the historical, empirical, and theoretical significance of these primary source documents (commonly referred to as the "Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den"), existing academic literature has predominantly treated them in fragmented ways, focusing selectively on isolated dimensions such as cultural diplomacy, educational initiatives, or specific political events. Consequently, there remains a prominent theoretical and empirical gap regarding a comprehensive, systematic model that synthesizes the overarching structural pattern of post-revolutionary American infiltration in Iran. To address this gap, this study formulates and addresses the core research question: What was the structural pattern of U.S. infiltration in post-revolutionary Iran based on the primary documents retrieved from the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran?
Methodology:This research adopts a qualitative methodological framework utilizing inductive qualitative content analysis. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, which focuses primarily on word frequencies and statistical metrics, qualitative content analysis emphasizes extracting overt and latent thematic structures, contextual meanings, and operational patterns embedded within textual data. The inductive approach was deliberately selected because it allows conceptual categories and analytical models to emerge directly from the raw primary data without imposing a pre-determined, rigid theoretical matrix that might constrain or distort empirical findings.
The empirical data source comprises the complete corpus of diplomatic cables, intelligence reports, inter-agency communications, and operational records published across multiple volumes by the Center for Publication of the Islamic Revolution Documents, the Institute for Political Studies and Research, and the comprehensive digital repository of the Espionage Den documents (usdoc.ir). The analytical procedure followed a rigorous three-phase protocol:
Preparation Phase: Formulating research objectives, defining analytical units (paragraphs, operational directives, and thematic entries), and selecting all relevant post-revolutionary documents.
Organization Phase: Executing open coding, extracting key textual units, assigning conceptual tags/labels, and iteratively grouping lower-order concepts into coherent sub-categories and main categories.
Reporting Phase: Synthesizing the emerging thematic categories into an integrated structural model and deriving qualitative inferences.
To ensure analytical rigor and validity, the coding process underwent peer debriefing and cross-coder verification, ensuring that extracted concepts directly corresponded to the primary archival materials.
Results and Findings: The inductive content analysis reveals that the pattern of U.S. infiltration in post-revolutionary Iran operates as a multi-layered, interconnected structural matrix structured around three primary pillars: Goals of Infiltration, Targets (Audience) of Infiltration, and Dimensions (Mechanisms) of Infiltration.
A. Goals of Infiltration
The primary documents indicate that U.S. strategic objectives evolved dynamically in response to on-the-ground political realities in post-revolutionary Iran:
Regime Overthrow: In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, intelligence documents reveal active attempts to establish communication channels with elements of the former Pahlavi regime and exile figures (such as Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of the monarchy) to finance, guide, or facilitate counter-revolutionary movements aimed at overthrowing the new political order.
Behavioral Modification and Normalization: As U.S. analysts acknowledged the resilience of the revolutionary state and the impossibility of immediate regime change, the objective shifted toward behavioral modification. Washington sought to infiltrate and cultivate moderate religious, political, and military factions to influence decision-making processes, neutralize radical anti-American orientations, and promote a pragmatic, pro-Western administration before the new constitution and state structures could fully consolidate.
Geopolitical Power Balance against the Soviet Union: Driven by Cold War imperatives, U.S. policy aimed to prevent Soviet encroachment into Iran. U.S. strategists calculated that even if post-revolutionary Iran ceased to be an active American ally, preventing Soviet strategic insertion into Iran's political and economic space remained a vital national security objective.
B. Targets (Audience) of Infiltration
The empirical findings classify the targets of U.S. infiltration into four distinct categories:
State Actors and Political Elites: U.S. intelligence targeted key figures within the provisional government and emerging state apparatus. Documents detail deliberate, step-by-step recruitment operations—such as contacting Abolhassan Banisadr in Paris under the guise of an economic consultancy firm with a monthly retainer fee, as well as maintaining direct channels with figures like Abbas Amir-Entezam. Intelligence assets were also embedded among remaining Western-leaning administrative managers. Furthermore, documents highlight clandestine contacts with prominent opposition clerical figures, notably Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari.
Formal Political Structures and State Institutions: Interventions focused on gaining structural access to critical state organs through the Provisional Government and targeting strategic media facilities, such as acquiring granular technical data on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) transmitters, power generators, and broadcast infrastructure.
Political Parties and Factions: U.S. operatives maintained dual-track communications, engaging both official ruling factions and opposition political organizations—including monarchist elements and leftist groups—to create leverage and destabilize the government.
General Public and Mass Consciousness: Efforts focused on shaping public perception through psychological operations and international broadcasting networks, particularly the Voice of America (VOA), which was strategically leveraged as an authoritative news source and morale booster for opposition groups.
C. Dimensions of Infiltration
The operational mechanisms of infiltration were deployed across two main domains:
Soft (Software) Infiltration: Emphasized cultural, educational, and linguistic instruments. Priority was given to expanding English language instruction—characterized in intelligence documents as a key soft-power weapon—fostering academic exchanges through the Ministry of Science to recruit Iranian youths, arranging international exchange programs for Muslim students and clerics to reframe religious narratives, and conducting targeted psychological warfare via VOA broadcasts.
Hard (Hardware) Infiltration: Leveraged military, intelligence, and economic pressure points. On the military front, U.S. strategy focused on maintaining intelligence exchanges, cultivating relationships with senior military officers reliant on American technical expertise and spare parts, and offering selective arms sales. Economically, U.S. officials exploited Iran's post-revolutionary economic disruptions, banking instabilities, and trade vulnerabilities, while encouraging American businessmen to maintain financial dependencies with pro-Western Iranian capitalists for political leverage.
Conclusion:The systematic analysis of the former U.S. Embassy documents demonstrates that post-revolutionary American infiltration in Iran was neither an ad-hoc set of isolated diplomatic encounters nor merely standard intelligence gathering. Rather, it constituted a highly organized, institutionalized, and multi-dimensional operational framework designed to preserve American hegemony in the strategically vital Persian Gulf. By operating across hard and soft dimensions and targeting elite actors, formal institutions, opposition parties, and public perception, the U.S. sought either to dismantle the revolutionary state or forcibly adjust its strategic orientation to align with Western interests.
These empirical findings provide critical historical insights into the mechanics of foreign intervention during political transitions. Furthermore, the framework developed in this study offers valuable policy and analytical lessons for sovereign nations hosting foreign diplomatic missions, highlighting how legitimate diplomatic infrastructure can be weaponized for strategic infiltration and political engineering.

Abstract The central research question of this study is: How does Xi Jinping’s operational code shape China’s foreign policy orientation, particularly toward the Islamic Republic of Iran? The article advanced the hypothesis that Xi Jinping’s operational code is neither aimed at overthrowing the liberal international order nor based on direct ideological confrontation with the United States. Rather, it reflects a gradual and pragmatic effort to expand China’s power, influence, and strategic autonomy within the existing international system through the selective use of international institutions, rules, and mechanisms. This approach enables China to compete with the United States while avoiding costly, full-scale confrontation and to calibrate its relations with countries such as Iran primarily on the basis of national interests and cost–benefit calculations. The findings of the study support this hypothesis. They indicate that Xi Jinping perceives the political environment as predominantly cooperative and consistently attributes cooperative intentions to other actors. At the same time, he believes that a profound historical transformation is underway in international relations and that China is capable of playing an active role in shaping this transformation. However, his score on this dimension is relatively moderate, suggesting that he does not regard historical developments as highly predictable. Furthermore, in dealing with international conflicts, Xi demonstrates a clear preference for peaceful settlement, while victory, stalemate, and surrender rank respectively as secondary options. Based on the operational code profile of Xi Jinping, the characteristics associated with his leadership style, and the historical evolution, opportunities, and challenges of Iran–China relations, several strategic implications for Iran’s policy toward China can be identified. First, it appears that China studies in Iran have often been shaped more by conventional assumptions than by rigorous empirical analysis. A widespread perception among many Iranian foreign policy elites is that China seeks to dismantle the liberal international order and that the Middle East constitutes a central pillar of this strategy. The present study, however, demonstrates that Xi Jinping’s personality profile is characterized by a preference for compromise and negotiated solutions rather than direct confrontation with the United States. Developments on the ground likewise support this conclusion. China has consistently sought to manage its strategic competition with the United States while avoiding direct conflict. Consequently, China’s Middle East policy—and, by extension, its policy toward Iran—should be understood as a function of its broader global strategy. Equally important, the Middle East occupies a lower strategic priority in Chinese foreign policy than China’s immediate neighborhood in the Asia-Pacific and even Central Asia. Another important finding emerging from Xi Jinping’s personality profile, which reinforces the previous point, is his preference for avoiding tension. In the Middle East, and particularly with regard to Iran, China generally opposes escalatory policies and prioritizes the preservation of state stability. This helps explain why Beijing simultaneously supported the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while also backing the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in Yemen. In essence, irrespective of the ideological orientation of governments, China seeks to cooperate with and support established state authorities whenever possible. Iran should therefore recognize that China is unlikely to become involved in situations that Beijing perceives as unnecessarily escalatory. China’s balancing strategy in the Middle East—including its simultaneous engagement with Tehran and Riyadh prior to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries—can also be understood within this broader framework. At the same time, China’s critique of the anarchic nature of the international system may create important opportunities for Iran. In pursuit of a more favorable international order and the maximization of its national interests, China has adopted a strategy of gradual institutional transformation. This strategy has involved establishing non-Western institutions while simultaneously seeking a greater role within long-standing international organizations. Such developments provide Iran with opportunities to expand cooperation with China through these institutional frameworks. Moreover, the convergence between Chinese initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the "Go West" strategy—and Iran’s "Look East" policy offers additional prospects for strengthening bilateral relations. Xi Jinping’s belief in the strategic importance of non-military sources of power, reflected in his concept of comprehensive security, represents another important opportunity for Iran. Xi adopts a holistic understanding of security that extends beyond military considerations. As discussed earlier, Chinese policymakers regard development as the foundation of security, which explains the central role of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. This perspective provides a strong basis for expanding developmental cooperation between Tehran and Beijing. Furthermore, given China’s acute security concerns regarding ethnic terrorism in its northwestern provinces and Iran’s experience in confronting similar threats, the two countries also possess significant potential for cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Finally, the findings underscore the importance of assigning greater strategic priority to the Look East policy and a broader Asia-oriented approach in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the principal weaknesses of Iran’s Look East policy has been its largely instrumental and secondary character. Rather than being pursued as a long-term strategic orientation, engagement with Asia has frequently been employed as a means of balancing against the West. This approach has not only constrained and fragmented Iran’s relations with Asian countries but has also increased the likelihood of Iran becoming a bargaining instrument in the strategic calculations of other powers. Accordingly, a stronger commitment to multilateralism, improved relations with a wider range of major powers, and the adoption of a hedging strategy would reduce the risk of falling into such a strategic trap.

Abstract The realization of a society’s political, social, and civilizational aspirations depends largely on its capacity to establish and preserve sustainable security. This issue assumes particular importance in the Islamic Republic of Iran because of the value-oriented character of the Islamic Revolution, its civilizational objectives, and the persistence of multilayered internal and external threats. National security cannot therefore be understood merely as a static condition or as the result of military capability alone. It should instead be regarded as a continuous, multidimensional, and governance-dependent process. Broader understandings of security also show that its provision requires both formal institutions and the conscious participation of social actors. Accordingly, the present study examines the role of believers in the governance of national security and defense in the Islamic Republic of Iran through an analysis of the Qur’anic addresses beginning with “O you who have believed” (Yā ayyuhā alladhīna āmanū). The central question is: What position do believers, as the direct addressees of these verses, occupy in providing, preserving, and promoting national security and defense? The main hypothesis is that the Qur’anic addresses do not define believers as passive elements. Rather, they portray them as responsible and influential actors whose role begins with preparedness and preventive vigilance and extends to resistance, participation in defense, countering infiltration, protecting confidential information, and confronting psychological and cognitive warfare. Sustainable security is therefore understood as the outcome of interaction among state guidance, institutional capacity, and the responsible participation of the believing community. The epistemological foundation of the study is the Qur’an as a source of individual and social guidance. The repeated address “O you who have believed” indicates that faith in Qur’anic logic is not merely an inward condition, but also a social and responsibility-generating identity. Several such verses concern preparedness, border vigilance, enemy recognition, secrecy, resistance, steadfastness, and rejection of hostile domination, thereby providing a basis for analyzing believers’ role in security and defense governance. Previous studies have examined either governance and national security or the jurisprudential, exegetical, and educational dimensions of these Qur’anic addresses. None has systematically analyzed believers’ role in national security and defense governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This research integrates governance, national security and defense, and Qur’anic discourse. The study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach. Data were collected through library research using the Qur’an, recognized commentaries, lexical sources, books, and scholarly articles. Attride-Stirling’s thematic network analysis was employed at three levels: basic, organizing, and global themes. All verses containing the address “O you who have believed” were extracted, and concepts related to national security and defense were coded. Thirteen directly relevant verses were selected and organized into a thematic network. The themes were then interpreted through the model of “movement” derived from the philosophy of Allameh Tabataba’i. The theoretical framework is structured around six components: origin, destination, mover, motive force, time, and place. The origin is the worldly sphere in which human beings fulfill individual and collective obligations. The destination is the attainment of a good and pure life and proximity to God. The mover is the community of believers, whose will and social action advance the security-building process. The motive force consists of piety, remembrance of God, hope for salvation, and belief in divine assistance. The temporal context is the glorious era of the Islamic Republic, while the spatial context is Islamic Iran as the arena of religious state-building and governance based on Islamic values. The findings indicate that the role of believers can be analyzed at three levels. The first concerns the prewar stage and includes preparedness, vigilance, and prevention. At this level, the Qur’anic verses emphasize readiness, deterrence, border protection, and avoidance of negligence. The command to “be patient, outdo others in patience, and remain stationed” connects individual endurance with collective cohesion. The concept of murābaṭah refers not only to guarding frontiers but also to coordinating social and defensive capacities. Likewise, the command to “take your precautions” highlights continuous vigilance and preventive action. Another major finding is the necessity of protecting secrets and blocking channels of enemy infiltration. The verses prohibiting the disclosure of confidential matters to outsiders, intimate friendship with enemies, and hostile domination show that information security is a fundamental component of defense governance. Unregulated relations with hostile actors may lead to information leakage, weakened deterrence, and increased vulnerability. The Qur’anic warning concerning possible threats through family relations indicates that public responsibility and collective security must prevail over personal attachment in sensitive circumstances. The second level concerns direct confrontation and war. Perseverance, steadfastness, and collective resistance are central at this stage. The command to “be patient” refers to enduring hardship, while “outdo others in patience” indicates surpassing the enemy in resilience. The prohibition against turning one’s back on the enemy and the command to “stand firm” stress operational cohesion, psychological stability, and continuity of resistance. Resistance is therefore not an emotional reaction, but an organized practice based on discipline, will, and collective responsibility. Threat prioritization also emerges as an important principle. The command to confront the nearest hostile forces indicates the necessity of addressing immediate threats and avoiding the dispersion of resources. Similarly, the instruction to advance in separate groups or collectively demonstrates flexibility in force organization. Depending on the threat, the believing community may employ limited operational units or comprehensive public mobilization. Defensive structures must therefore correspond to the type of threat and the strategic environment. The third level concerns the multidimensional nature of hostility. Hostile action is not confined to the military sphere, but operates through belief, conduct, and language. The denial of truth, practical pressure and expulsion, and verbal hostility constitute a multilayered pattern of confrontation. National security and defense governance must therefore encompass military, media, cognitive, cultural, informational, and ideological dimensions. The Qur’anic warning that only part of hostility appears in speech while more remains concealed points to the need to avoid superficial assessments and examine hidden strategies and intentions. Spiritual and moral factors are also decisive. Remembering divine blessings and assistance strengthens morale under difficult conditions. Freedom from fear of blame protects believers against psychological pressure, propaganda, and induced doubt. Piety is not merely an individual virtue; it is a mechanism for regulating power. It prevents defensive capability from departing from justice and becoming a means of domination or aggression. Remembrance of God likewise reinforces determination and psychological resilience. In conclusion, the Qur’anic addresses “O you who have believed” present a comprehensive model of the role of believers in national security and defense governance. This role begins with preparedness and preventive vigilance, includes secrecy and counter-infiltration, develops into organized resistance during conflict, and extends to enemy recognition and confrontation with psychological and cognitive warfare. Believers in the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran should therefore be regarded as part of the social structure through which security is produced and sustained, while their participation complements formal institutions. Security and defense governance becomes more sustainable and effective when the participation of the believing community is integrated with state guidance, institutional organization, piety, justice, and social responsibility. Such a framework can reduce vulnerability, strengthen deterrence, preserve independence, and advance Islamic Iran, in the glorious era of the Islamic Republic, toward a good and pure life and proximity to God.

Abstract The relationship between tradition and modernity has long constituted one of the central debates in political and social thought, particularly within developing societies. In many such contexts, modernity has been introduced as an external and, at times, disruptive phenomenon, generating tensions within pre-existing cultural and institutional frameworks. In Iran, this tension has acquired distinctive characteristics following the Islamic Revolution, which established a political order grounded in religious values while simultaneously confronting the structural imperatives of a modern state and an increasingly globalized world. Despite the transformative aspirations of the Revolution, the dichotomy between tradition and modernity has persisted across multiple spheres of Iranian society, including politics, culture, and governance. The expansion of globalization in the past half-century has intensified this interaction, creating new arenas of contestation and dialogue between competing discourses. The present study seeks to examine how this dynamic interplay has influenced political development in post-revolutionary Iran.The central research question guiding this study is: How has the confrontation between tradition and modernity affected political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution?The study advances the hypothesis that, notwithstanding the enduring tension between traditional and modern paradigms, the emergence of a new discourse—rooted in national, indigenous, and religious values while remaining compatible with certain universal modern principles—has been both necessary and influential in fostering political development in Iran. Rather than viewing tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive, this research explores the possibility of their synthesis as a driver of institutional evolution and political participation.This study is situated within broader debates on political development, discourse theory, and modernization in non-Western societies. Traditional modernization theories often conceptualize development as a linear transition from traditional to modern forms. However, such binary frameworks have been increasingly criticized for neglecting local agency, cultural specificity, and the potential for hybrid models of governance. In the Iranian context, post-revolutionary political discourse has attempted to redefine modern political concepts—such as participation, legitimacy, civil society, and sovereignty—through a religious and indigenous lens. The interaction between revolutionary ideals and global political norms has produced a distinctive discursive field in which confrontation and adaptation coexist. The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on primary documentary sources, including official documents, scholarly works, and credible online materials. Through interpretive analysis, the study examines the evolution of political discourses after the Revolution and assesses their role in shaping institutional arrangements, public participation, and state–society relations. The qualitative method allows for an in-depth exploration of meanings, narratives, and ideological transformations rather than relying solely on quantitative indicators of political development. The findings indicate that the post-revolutionary political order in Iran has succeeded in articulating a distinctive ideological and political identity that resonates beyond its national boundaries, particularly among certain revolutionary and liberation-oriented movements. This development cannot be understood solely through the lens of conflict between tradition and modernity. Instead, it reflects a dynamic process of contestation, negotiation, and selective integration. The study reveals that the tension between traditional religious values and modern political institutions has not merely generated stagnation or regression. On the contrary, the interaction of competing discourses has contributed to the gradual transformation of political structures and practices. Electoral processes, constitutional mechanisms, public debate, and policy discourse have evolved within a framework that seeks to reconcile religious legitimacy with elements of modern governance.Globalization has further complicated this relationship by introducing new normative standards and communication networks. In response, Iranian political discourse has undergone adaptations aimed at preserving cultural authenticity while engaging with global modernity. This adaptive process has played a meaningful role in shaping the trajectory of political development, even as debates over identity, authority, and reform continue.The confrontation between tradition and modernity in post-revolutionary Iran should not be interpreted solely as a source of contradiction or paralysis. Rather, it has functioned as a catalyst for discursive innovation and institutional evolution. The emergence of a hybrid discourse—grounded in indigenous, national, and religious values while selectively incorporating modern political concepts—has been instrumental in advancing political development. Ultimately, the study concludes that political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution has been shaped not by the dominance of one paradigm over the other, but by the ongoing interaction between them. The future trajectory of Iran’s political development will likely depend on the continued capacity of its political discourse to mediate, reinterpret, and harmonize these two foundational forces.

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most complex bilateral relationships in the Persian Gulf region over the past five decades. These relations have continuously been influenced by a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors and have fluctuated between economic cooperation, geopolitical competition, and security tensions. Although relations between the two countries reached one of their most confrontational periods between 2016 and 2020, signs of de-escalation and a return to diplomacy have emerged since 2021, coinciding with political changes in both the United States and Iran. Utilizing a descriptive-explanatory method, drawing upon library and electronic sources, and employing the Constructivist framework, this study examines three possible patterns for the future of Iran-UAE relations: the Hobbesian model (confrontation and hostility), the Lockean model (managed competition), and the Kantian model (cooperation and friendship). The findings indicate that the most probable scenario for the future of bilateral relations is the model of managed competition. In the first model, namely the dominance of Hobbesian culture, relations between Iran and the UAE move toward increased tension, mistrust, and the possibility of military confrontation. The most significant domestic factor underlying this situation is the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran considers these islands an inseparable part of its territory, whereas the UAE claims sovereignty over them and has consistently sought to raise the issue in international forums. This historical dispute has persisted since the establishment of the UAE in 1971 and has become a significant symbol of political and identity-based competition between the two countries. From Tehran’s perspective, sovereignty over these islands is non-negotiable, whereas Abu Dhabi insists on resolving the issue through negotiations or international arbitration. At the regional level, geopolitical competition has also played a major role in the formation of Hobbesian culture. Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the UAE’s concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence increased substantially. Developments in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen war, and the expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and across the region were viewed by the UAE as threats to the regional balance of power. The Yemen war became the most important arena of indirect competition between the two countries. The UAE supported forces opposed to Ansar Allah, while Iran provided political and strategic support to the movement. Drone attacks on Abu Dhabi and reciprocal confrontations in Yemen further intensified mistrust between the two states. The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020 constituted another factor contributing to heightened tensions. Iran viewed this development as a threat to its national security and warned against the security and intelligence presence of Israel near its borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the expansion of military and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel could alter the regional security balance to Iran’s detriment. Consequently, the growing ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to improving Iran-UAE relations. At the international level, the UAE’s security dependence on the United States has also been a major factor in generating tensions. The UAE views the American military presence as a guarantee of its security, while Iran considers the presence of U.S. forces in the region a direct threat to its national security. American military bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Iran significantly exacerbated bilateral tensions in recent years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the UAE as a threat to regional stability, leading Abu Dhabi to consistently support international pressure against Tehran. In contrast, the second model, namely Lockean culture or managed competition, emphasizes the control of tensions and the preservation of limited interactions. This model is based on the assumption that both countries recognize the extremely high costs of direct confrontation and therefore seek to manage their differences. At the domestic level, the federal structure of the UAE plays an important role in this process. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which adopts a security-oriented and hardline approach toward Iran, Dubai and Sharjah favor maintaining economic relations with Tehran due to their strong dependence on trade and a non-oil economy. This divergence in perspectives has ensured that even during periods of political tension, bilateral trade relations have never been completely severed. At the regional level, several developments have contributed to reducing tensions. The reduction of the UAE’s military presence in Yemen, the initiation of security dialogues between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, and efforts to manage disputes through diplomatic channels are among the notable examples. The exchange of security and political delegations between the two capitals in recent years and the signing of border cooperation agreements demonstrated the determination of both sides to prevent further escalation. In addition, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 fostered a regional atmosphere conducive to de-escalation, encouraging the UAE to adopt a more balanced foreign policy. At the international level, the shift in U.S. policy following the inauguration of President Joe Biden also influenced this trend. Washington’s reduced support for the maximum pressure policy against Iran and efforts to revive nuclear negotiations prompted the UAE to reconsider its regional policies. Within this framework, Abu Dhabi also improved its relations with Qatar, Türkiye, and Syria and sought to establish itself as a more balanced regional actor. The third model, namely Kantian culture, represents the most optimistic scenario for the future of Iran-UAE relations. Under this model, the two countries move toward stable and friendly relations through economic cooperation, interdependence, and the reduction of security tensions. The most important driving force behind this process is the extensive economic interdependence between the two states. Over the past decades, the UAE, particularly Dubai, has played a crucial role in Iran’s foreign trade and has become one of Tehran’s most important economic partners. Thousands of Iranian companies operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade has experienced substantial growth in recent years. Economic interdependence has ensured that economic relations have never been completely interrupted, even during periods of peak political tension. As a regional commercial hub, Dubai possesses significant economic interests in maintaining relations with Iran. Furthermore, extensive Iranian investments in the UAE and the country’s role in Iran’s financial and commercial exchanges have created strong incentives for continued cooperation. At the regional level, a reduction in geopolitical tensions could facilitate the realization of this model. The end or de-escalation of the Yemen conflict, the improvement of Iran-Saudi relations, the growing role of regional mediators, and the expansion of regional economic cooperation are among the factors that could strengthen ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, if the UAE limits its security cooperation with Israel and focuses more on economic cooperation, some of Iran’s security concerns may be alleviated. At the international level, the success of nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran could provide a foundation for expanding economic and political cooperation between the two countries. The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that whenever tensions between Iran and the United States decreased, trade and investment between Iran and the UAE increased correspondingly. Under such circumstances, joint economic projects, the development of regional transportation corridors, and cooperation in the fields of energy and infrastructure could elevate bilateral relations to a new level. In conclusion, the study emphasizes that Iran-UAE relations possess a dual and multilayered nature in which economic cooperation and political competition coexist simultaneously. Although territorial disputes, security rivalries, and the UAE’s relations with the United States and Israel hinder the development of full strategic trust between the two countries, economic interdependence and the high costs of direct confrontation also prevent relations from evolving into comprehensive hostility. Therefore, the most probable scenario for the future of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi is the continuation of a pattern of “managed competition accompanied by limited cooperation.” Within this framework, while maintaining their political and security differences, both countries are likely to utilize economic and diplomatic interactions to prevent the escalation of tensions and avoid direct confrontation. Such a situation could preserve relative stability in the Persian Gulf and provide the basis for limited yet sustained cooperation between two important regional actors.

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.

Abstract The recent advancement of artificial intelligence must be understood as part of a broader transformation wherein digital infrastructures have moved from merely transmitting information to organizing meaning and adjudicating truth. In daily experience, search engines and social media once served as primary gateways to the world of information; now, large language models and generative systems have become interlocutors, interpreters, summarizers, and recommender, fundamentally reshaping the public sphere. For Iran, the stakes are high because the issue is not only what content AI produces but also which data it deems credible, which linguistic styles and historical narratives it reproduces, and which worldview it effectively imposes on users. Domestic policymaking in this domain often falls into a simplistic “opportunity/threat” binary or remains confined to general digital economy plans. Internationally, national strategies typically combine ethical principles, institutional flexibility, and a degree of functional ambiguity to balance innovation and regulatory intervention. For Iran, reliance on vague ethical declarations without enforceable mechanisms risks widening the gap between discourse and technical reality; conversely, rigid regulation without social participation, data infrastructure, and indigenous evaluation can stifle innovation and encourage circumvention. A framework that treats identity as a public policy issue and is technically and institutionally implementable is therefore an urgent necessity.

How can Iran, in the age of artificial intelligence, align technological development with the active preservation and creative renewal of its national identity (in its Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary configuration), without falling into cultural closure or harmful self-contained insularity?
This study advances a central policy proposition: by operationalizing a “cultural justice in AI” framework, supported by six interconnected policy pillars (spanning data sovereignty, indigenous evaluation benchmarks, participatory governance, and conditional international engagement) Iran can simultaneously foster responsible AI development and actively safeguard its national identity, thereby transforming potential algorithmic risks into opportunities for cultural resilience and creative renewal.
This study adopts an analytical and policy‑oriented methodology. It does not test a narrow empirical hypothesis but designs a decision‑ready framework suitable for translation into programs, standards, and institutional mechanisms within regulatory bodies. The analysis proceeds along three synergistic paths: a critical review of AI governance literature, with emphasis on the state’s dual role as facilitator of development and guarantor of risk mitigation; a focus on the specific characteristics of generative AI, which amplify risks such as hallucination, opacity, and unintended cultural homogenization; and the grounding of these discussions in Iran’s indigenous configuration of national identity, translating abstract governance concepts (data, benchmarks, auditing, accountability) into the language of identity‑laden domains (Persian language, historical memory, religious authority, revolutionary narrative, social cohesion).
The theoretical framework conceptualizes AI not as a neutral tool but as an “infrastructure of meaning” and a site of potential “data colonialism,” where cultural resources are extracted as raw material and returned as dominant stereotypes. Drawing on this critical lens, the study introduces the concept of “cultural justice in AI,” defined as the guarantee that Persian language, diverse dialects and expressive styles, and central narratives of history, religion, and revolution are not mere consumers of technological products but are actively present in the data layer, evaluation metrics, and decision‑making institutions. This perspective bridges infrastructure studies, critical data studies, and identity politics, emphasizing that cultural injustices often occur not in visible outputs but in the “invisibilities” of data collection, labeling, and weighting.
The analysis yields a multidimensional policy framework that moves beyond symbolic protection toward operational transparency and accountability. First, the study maps identity‑sensitive domains (such as religious authority and automated fatwa systems, Persian language and literature education, historical narrative generation, and content recommendation in mass media) and classifies them according to risk levels (very high, high, medium/low). This risk‑based approach guides the intensity of regulatory intervention: very high‑risk applications require licensing, mandatory human‑in‑the‑loop, pre‑ and post‑audit, and grievance mechanisms, while lower‑risk domains can operate under lighter, supervised self‑regulation.
Second, the article identifies three layers for translating the abstract notion of “identity risk” into actionable requirements: the data layer, where the creation and maintenance of high‑quality, diverse, and transparently documented Persian corpora are treated as public goods; the evaluation layer, where indigenous benchmarks are designed to assess not only technical fluency but also cultural‑identity dimensions such as distortion of religious concepts, ethnic stereotyping, and one‑sided historical narratives; and the institutional layer, where a participatory governance architecture is proposed. This includes a “Cultural Representation Council for AI,” a multi‑stakeholder body composed of linguists, historians, theologians, sociologists, and industry representatives, tasked with producing concrete audit protocols and data guidelines rather than general recommendations.
Third, six complementary policy pillars are detailed: (1) defining and institutionalizing sensitive identity domains and risk tiers; (2) building and reinforcing reliable Persian corpora and data assets as commons; (3) designing indigenous cultural‑identity evaluation benchmarks and regular auditing mechanisms; (4) embedding participatory governance and cultural representation within the regulatory structure; (5) enhancing interdisciplinary AI literacy across educational, media, and religious institutions; and (6) pursuing targeted, conditional international data diplomacy to influence global standards and avoid passive marginalization.
The discussion emphasizes that effective governance cannot rely solely on top‑down prohibition; it must be adaptive, learning‑oriented, and rooted in a political‑economic understanding of platform power. The framework advocates starting with policy pilots in selected domains, systematically gathering evidence, and iteratively revising rules, thereby maintaining innovation while ensuring accountability. It also warns that without deliberate investment in Persian data infrastructure and local evaluation tools, Iran risks becoming dependent on opaque foreign models that structurally embed alien cultural norms.
The intersection of artificial intelligence and national identity in Iran is a governance‑level challenge. As generative models become the primary mediators of meaning (affecting education, collective memory, religious practice, and entertainment) policy inaction effectively cedes authority to external standards and datasets. The study concludes that aligning AI development with the Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary identity requires simultaneous intervention in three layers: semantic infrastructure (data, models), assessment (evaluation, auditing), and institutions (participation, accountability). The proposed package (centered on cultural justice, data sovereignty, indigenous benchmarks, participatory governance, literacy, and data diplomacy) offers a path to transform AI from a threat of cultural homogenization into an instrument of dynamic identity preservation. Responsiveness, in the sense of clear data provenance, documented model assumptions, transparent evaluation procedures, and defined liability for high‑risk errors, serves as the unifying thread of this architecture. Ultimately, a learning‑based governance model that balances innovation with rigorous accountability can enable Iran to strengthen its digital sovereignty while actively and creatively renewing its national identity.

Abstract In the complex and pluralistic landscape of 21st-century international relations, media diplomacy has emerged as a foundational pillar and strategic instrument of foreign policy. This phenomenon, which in essence signifies the intelligent and targeted use of communication tools to manage a nation’s image and advance its national objectives on the global stage, is recognized as the primary arm for exercising soft power. In a world where public opinion plays a decisive role in legitimizing government policies, a country’s ability to narrate its own story, articulate its positions, and influence global perceptions has become a vital component of national power. Global media giants such as the BBC, Voice of America, Reuters, and the Associated Press are not merely news organizations; they function as diplomatic instruments that can shape the global agenda and serve the interests of their home countries by framing events and highlighting specific issues. This reciprocal and synergistic relationship between politicians and the media is an undeniable reality; politicians need the media to convey their messages and mobilize public support, while the media depends on political elites for access to primary news sources and firsthand analysis.
Following the fundamental transformations of 2003 and the collapse of the Ba’athist regime, Iraq faced an existential challenge in the international arena: the challenge of rebuilding its national image. To establish its position as an independent and effective actor in the region and the world, the new Iraq requires an active and dynamic presence in the global communication sphere. However, the central problem this research addresses is the country’s structural inability to effectively leverage media diplomacy. The roots of this failure are deep and multifaceted. On one hand, the legacy of decades of despotic Ba’ath party rule, which suppressed any growth of independent and professional media, has resulted in a historical vacuum and backwardness in Iraq’s media infrastructure. On the other hand, post-2003, the country has faced not only internal reconstruction challenges but also a continuous and negative media onslaught from some regional and Western networks, particularly American-Saudi media, which have further weakened its standing in global public opinion by presenting a stereotypical, distorted, and one-sided image of Iraq as an insecure, unstable, and sectarian-ridden nation. This situation has turned the necessity of formulating scientific and practical strategies for enhancing Iraq’s media diplomacy into an undeniable strategic priority.
Despite the critical importance of the subject, a review of the existing literature reveals a significant gap in academic work related to Iraq’s media diplomacy, which itself confirms the underdevelopment of this field in both practice and theory. Nevertheless, the few studies that have been conducted illuminate various dimensions of this challenge. For instance, previous research has emphasized the key role of media in the post-ISIS peace-building process while also analyzing its function in Iraq’s internal conflicts and crises. Other researchers have identified the structural and political obstacles hindering the emergence of independent media and have scrutinized the initial media dynamics following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The consensus from all this research points to one key commonality: the absence of a professional, independent, and capable media infrastructure is the primary and fundamental obstacle to Iraq playing a significant role in global diplomacy, and resolving this dilemma requires specific and operational solutions.
To achieve this goal, a deep exploration of the perspectives and experiences of elites was undertaken using a qualitative approach and the research method of thematic analysis. Accordingly, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty prominent experts, including veteran Iraqi diplomats, professors and specialists in communication sciences, and leading media activists. The selection of this purposive sample was aimed at gathering the collective wisdom of an elite group directly involved with Iraq’s foreign policy and media challenges. To ensure the scientific validity and reliability of the findings, the technique of researcher triangulation was employed, where the initial coding and analysis process was reviewed by a team of distinguished communication professors, ensuring the final analytical framework was agreed upon with high precision.
The rich findings from these interviews revealed three primary and interconnected strategies for advancing Iraq’s media diplomacy: producing desirable media content, adopting a desirable media strategy, and maintaining a media focus on major foreign policy issues. Among these, the production of professional and engaging content was identified as the cornerstone of any successful endeavor. According to the experts, desirable content must prioritize the maximum use of digital technologies and modern communication platforms to bypass traditional media filters and establish direct and effective communication with global audiences. Furthermore, the produced messages must adhere to global journalistic standards; that is, they must be clear, concise, accurate, reliable, and as impartial as possible to break down barriers of distrust and be heard in the competitive global information environment. Objectivity in covering events, precise and non-exaggerated descriptions, and presenting balanced views on controversial topics are necessary conditions for gaining and maintaining international credibility.
Beyond mere news reporting, the power of effective storytelling is a fundamental axis. This approach means shifting from a defensive and reactive stance to an active and innovative one in narrative construction. Instead of simply responding to the negative narratives of others, Iraq must create its own alternative and compelling narrative, built upon the vast cultural, civilizational, and historical capacities of its land. Highlighting the heritage of Mesopotamia, showcasing contemporary artistic and cultural achievements, focusing on success stories of reconstruction and peaceful coexistence, and utilizing the powerful tools of art can be the building blocks of this new narrative. Presenting a realistic image that acknowledges challenges while focusing on opportunities and positive prospects, alongside efforts to create a unified and coherent narrative from all government institutions, will prevent sending contradictory messages and project an image of a stable state. Increasing diversity in the form and content of messages to engage various audience segments and focusing on the positive aspects of Iraq’s historical relations with other nations will significantly strengthen the country’s content strategy.
In today’s world, media diplomacy for a country in Iraq’s position is not an option or a ceremonial tool, but a vital necessity and a guarantor of survival and progress in the international arena. Foreign policy without the backing of a powerful media that can explain its positions, defend its interests, and manage its image is highly inefficient and lacks influence. For Iraq to make its independent voice heard by the world, neutralize the biased and toxic narratives of its rivals, and reclaim its true position as a key player in the region and the world, it has no choice but to make a serious and long-term investment in rebuilding and developing its media system. This requires allocating resources, training specialized human capital, creating coordination between diplomatic and media institutions, and learning from successful global experiences. An intelligent and effective media presence can dramatically increase a country’s diplomatic weight and influence in global affairs. Therefore, enhancing media diplomacy must be placed on the agenda of Iraqi policymakers as a grand national project, so that the country can not only correct its distorted past image but also play an active, constructive, and leading role in resolving future crises and shaping a more stable future for its people and the region.

Abstract The Gaza crisis, particularly following the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation in October 2023, has become a turning point in regional developments, having wide-reaching effects on the security and geopolitical dynamics of the region. Evidence suggests that, prior to the Gaza crisis, Iran, as a key player in West Asia, had played a significant role in maintaining and reproducing the regional security order through supporting resistance groups, adopting deterrence policies, multilateral diplomacy, and balancing power. However, the Gaza crisis, with its expansion into Syria and Lebanon and the widespread use of hybrid warfare strategies, has reshaped the structure and nature of the regional order. This war not only escalated the historic conflicts between Palestinian resistance and the Israeli regime but also, by enhancing the role of new technologies (such as drones and information warfare), has introduced a new phase of complexity and power shift in the regional order. The Gaza crisis, while disrupting the regional power balance, has posed a serious challenge to Iran's geopolitical strategies for preserving its position. The crisis, by altering the regional power balance and increasing political and security pressures, has placed the Islamic Republic of Iran at risk of a new encirclement in a coalition of rival forces, in what can be described as "strategic isolation." The continued Gaza crisis, accompanied by new complexities and developments, particularly the use of advanced technologies and hybrid warfare strategies, seems to require Iran to shift from traditional methods to new strategic approaches. This research is significant in its ability to offer a deeper understanding of the power shifts in the region that have emerged after the Gaza crisis, which are markedly different from the past. It provides new insights into Iran's security and diplomatic strategies and explores the country's approaches to maintaining national security and determining the security order in the region. Furthermore, identifying effective tools and mechanisms for addressing new threats contributes to the study's importance, as it helps Iran's foreign policy escape the security trap of crisis cycles (the siege crisis). The novelty of this research lies in addressing the gap in prior studies by analyzing the impact of the Gaza crisis on the regional order in West Asia and Iran's role in reproducing this order. It also examines the long-term consequences of the Gaza crisis on regional power dynamics and Iran's future foreign policy strategies. Research Questions 1. How has the Gaza crisis impacted the power dynamics, roles of regional actors, and the structure of the security order in West Asia? 2. What security, diplomatic, and economic strategies can Iran adopt to preserve and enhance its regional position in the new regional order? Theoretical and Conceptual Framework To explain and analyze the situation of the regional order during the Gaza crisis and Iran's new strategies in addressing regional crises, the strategic rationality theory of John Mearsheimer, which falls under the theory of offensive realism, can be used. This multi-layered theoretical framework is designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the structural changes in Iran’s foreign and security policies in the region and how they adapt to new crisis conditions. Mearsheimer's strategic rationality is based on explanatory frameworks, including: 1. The need to redefine rationality in complex crisis situations. 2. Focusing on active deterrence through "smart power." 3. The distinction between risk and uncertainty in conflict situations. 4. Avoiding the maximization of benefits in crisis and conflict situations. Research Methodology This research is based on the paradigm of offensive realism and is applied in nature. It uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library-based and documentary techniques. Research Findings - The Gaza crisis and Iran's multi-layered security strategy - The power shift during the Gaza crisis - Iran's overall capabilities and new threats - The hidden cycle of regional actors’ actions - The expansion of hybrid warfare and its impact on changing the nature of conflicts against Iran Reproduction of Regional Order and Possible Strategies for the Islamic Republic of Iran Considering the regional changes, the Islamic Republic of Iran must move beyond traditional strategic frameworks and adopt new multi-layered strategies. These strategies should focus on combining hard, soft, and smart power and using hybrid warfare tools and flexible diplomacy to manage regional crises. In other words, to control the regional order based on a precise understanding of power relations and to change the cycle of power and the regional order, Iran’s new role and the design of a new deterrence system are essential. Given the regional transformations, it is clear that Iran must move from linear deterrence systems to non-linear deterrence, allowing all countries to apply this control system in complex and asymmetric environments. Conclusion This research, with its comprehensive approach and effort to accurately understand the current status of the region and security relations, clarifies how the Gaza crisis has impacted the regional order and what the best crisis management decisions for Iran are. Findings highlight that, for the first time, threats have reached Iran’s internal security layers and its core. In such a situation, achieving maximized benefit through strategic rationality is undesirable, and Iran must focus on creating absolute benefits and optimal conditions. Moreover, prioritizing economic issues for regional countries and focusing on development under political stability leads to a transformative power dynamic, whereas Iran, due to its different understanding of threats and severe economic sanctions, continues to view power dynamics through military security relations. Despite Israel’s attempts to bring competition and conflict into non-military, informational, and technological fields, the Islamic Republic responded with military operations that provided deterrence and confrontational capacity. This decision, based on strategic rationality, aimed to adopt strategies that allowed Iran to maintain its ability and capacity in the military arena. However, the general capabilities shift, the expansion of hybrid warfare, and its impact on the nature of conflicts against Iran is a significant event that could limit Iran’s role, especially as the Gaza crisis revealed that Israel has been able to create a long-term implicit security regime through a common threat of Iran in the region. This becomes critical when regional powers are silent and passive in the face of Tel Aviv's actions, placing them in a hidden balance with Israel. In such a scenario, Iran must adopt smart policies to strengthen the resistance axis and prevent new security alliances against itself.

Abstract Terrorism in today’s world has become a multidimensional phenomenon, and terrorism financing, as one of the fundamental challenges to the international security system, has targeted not only the domestic stability of countries but also collective security. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran, considering its geopolitical conditions and surrounding threats, has formulated criminal and preventive policies to combat this phenomenon. The present research has been conducted with the aim of analyzing Iran’s preventive approaches in combating terrorism financing and their alignment with the standards of international documents. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used, relying on the analysis of legal documents, domestic laws, and international conventions. Legislative challenges arising from the lack of a single and universal definition of the concept of terrorism have faced difficulties in the full implementation of international standards. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a country that has itself been a victim of terrorism, has designed a unique legislative model within this ambiguous context, which not only has not fallen behind global standards but has also introduced effective legislative innovations into its legal literature across many supervisory layers. With the understanding that definitional ambiguity can be used as a political lever against states, it has sought to localize norms. This national approach is, in fact, a reaction to attempts that intend to isolate legitimate regional resistances under the guise of terrorism. In international documents, including the 1999 New York Convention, special emphasis has been placed on the importance of tracking financial flows and identifying the identities of actors involved in transactions. The legal system of Iran, by accepting part of these norms and integrating them into domestic laws, has traversed a path in which financial institutions are defined as the front line of the combat. The country’s legislative transformation in the years 2007 and 2015 is considered a turning point in this path, which was carried out with the aim of directly criminalizing terrorism financing and creating legal frameworks for institutional supervision. In these laws, the traditional concepts of combating money laundering have expanded and extended to the sensitive field of terrorism financing. The main basis of the argument of this research is built on the assumption that prevention in the field of terrorism financing, before being a judicial matter, is a "supervisory and financial" process. In the past, the focus of the legislator was mainly on punishing the perpetrators after the commission of a crime, but with the legislative developments of recent decades, particularly by relying on the experiences gained from anti-money laundering laws and their elevation to the level of combating terrorism financing, this approach has undergone a fundamental change, and the legal system of Iran has not merely relied on passive modeling in designing preventive mechanisms. Prevention in Iran’s system is a combination of adhering to technical banking standards and maintaining ideological and political boundaries, which is reflected in the country’s criminal legislation; the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a combined approach (criminal and non-criminal) in which criminal prevention is highlighted through laws such as the "Counter-Terrorism Financing Law" passed in 2015 and its subsequent amendments in 2018. Studies show that despite the lack of formal accession to the 1999 New York Convention, Iran has integrated its key provisions into its domestic law. In this regard, a significant portion of the Iranian legislator’s efforts in drafting preventive rules has been focused on controlling suspicious financial flows. These preventive measures in Iran’s legal system, beyond mere criminalization, have proceeded to create supervisory structures to identify the roots of terrorism financing for terrorist groups. One of the key points that must be mentioned is the role of financial institutions and the responsibilities assigned to them in domestic laws. The Counter-Terrorism Financing Law, by utilizing previous legal experiences in the field of combating money laundering, has designed mechanisms that attempt to ensure alignment with global standards alongside the preservation of national authority. In fact, an analysis of the governing regulations shows that Iran’s approach, in the link between criminal measures and administrative supervisions, seeks to block existing gaps in the path of financing terrorist activities. However, the analyses of this research indicate that the existing challenges are not merely limited to legal texts and also have their own specific complexities in implementation. The article emphasizes that the Iranian policymaker, despite these challenges, has sought to design a framework compatible with national security by relying on domestic legal and jurisprudential (Fiqh) sources. In completion of the previous discussions, this research insists precisely on the point that the preventive system in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of an evolutionary legislative process, shaped in response to national security needs and international structural pressures. A comparison between the provisions of the 1999 Convention and domestic law indicates that the Iranian legislator has taken effective steps in the field of “criminal liability of legal persons,” which is aligned with global standards for combating terrorism financing. However, the article emphasizes that one of the main obstacles in the path of full implementation of these standards is the flexible yet ambiguous nature of the concepts mentioned in international documents. Furthermore, it should be noted that the position of the 1999 New York Convention within Iran’s legal system is one of the contentious focal points of this research. Although Iran has, in practice, reproduced many of the norms arising from this Convention in its national laws, its lack of formal accession stems from precise legal and political considerations regarding the definitions and instances of terrorism. This research clearly argues that the Iranian legal system, by adopting a "maximalist prevention" approach, has sought to combat terrorism financing networks without harming national sovereignty. From the perspective of this article, preventive measures are not limited solely to the criminal sphere; rather, they encompass a broader range of banking and financial supervisions in which the "Financial Intelligence Unit" (FIU) plays a pivotal role. The comparative study conducted in this research indicates that the Iranian model shares significant commonalities with the models prevalent in international conventions regarding the "supervision of natural and legal persons." Nevertheless, in the section of the definition of terrorism, conceptual gaps exist between what is recognized as a unified standard in international documents and what is accepted in domestic law. This research states that the Iranian legislator has preferred, instead of accepting external definitions, to interpret concepts based on its own legal principles in a manner that prevents political or legal abuses. Additionally, this article emphasizes that the fight against terrorism financing must be based on balanced international cooperation, such that the unilateralism of certain international financial institutions does not violate the rights of developing countries or countries under sanctions. In the final part of the analyses, we conclude that despite all legislative and executive challenges, the Iranian legal system has experienced a forward movement in aligning its structures with preventive requirements over the last decade. The creation of databases of persons at risk and the obligation of financial institutions to provide rapid reporting are among the achievements of this legislative process. The final emphasis is on the fact that terrorism grows in a context of financial concealment. Therefore, any step taken toward the transparency of financial flows is a step toward undermining the foundations of terrorism. The Iranian policymaker must guide this process with a proactive outlook so that the country, in its challenging regional environment, ensures its security as a law-abiding yet intelligent actor. Under the shadow of this integrated approach, a vision can be achieved in which the country’s financial system is not only secured against terrorism financing threats but also becomes a model for other developing countries. This research suggests that to exit interpretive deadlocks, there is a need for an international legal discourse based on a common and non-political definition of the concept of terrorism. Furthermore, expanding the scope of "preventive measures" without considering the legal differences between systems will lead to inefficiency at the implementation level. Therefore, the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran must continue to be based on strengthening the rule of law domestically, alongside active legal diplomacy in the international arena, to combat terrorism financing threats while utilizing legal capacities to preserve national interests.

Abstract Over the past two decades, China has undergone a profound transformation from a regionally focused actor into a globally influential power whose economic dynamism, technological advancement, and diplomatic activism have reshaped the international system. As Beijing’s material capabilities have expanded, so too has its ambition to redefine the norms, principles, and institutional arrangements governing global order. Central to this ambition is China’s effort to articulate and promote a distinct interpretation of "great power responsibility" a concept that diverges significantly from Western understandings of global leadership, intervention, and normative authority. Rather than framing responsibility in terms of military engagement, democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention, China emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, development-oriented cooperation, and multilateralism. This alternative framing has become a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy identity and a key instrument in its strategy to expand influence in critical regions, including the Middle East. The Middle East occupies a pivotal position in China’s strategic calculus. It is a region where Beijing’s core interests—energy security, connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis the United States—intersect. China’s growing presence in the Middle East is not merely a byproduct of economic expansion; it is a deliberate and carefully calibrated policy aimed at embedding China within the political, economic, and security architecture of the region. The question guiding this study is therefore: How has China employed the concept of great power responsibility to expand its influence in the Middle East in competition with the United States? Addressing this question requires a conceptual examination of China’s interpretation of great power responsibility, as well as an empirical analysis of its policies, initiatives, and diplomatic behavior in the region. China’s official discourse presents great power responsibility as a commitment to promoting stability, development, and mutually beneficial cooperation. This discourse gained renewed prominence following President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Governance Initiative in September 2025, which builds upon earlier frameworks such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Collectively, these initiatives articulate China’s vision for a more equitable and multipolar world order grounded in respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and inclusive multilateralism. In the Middle East, this vision translates into a foreign policy approach that seeks to avoid entanglement in regional conflicts while simultaneously expanding China’s economic footprint, diplomatic presence, and normative influence. China’s strategy in the Middle East rests on three foundational pillars. The first is energy security, as the region supplies more than 40 percent of Chinas crude oil imports. Ensuring stable access to energy resources is therefore a core national interest, and China has cultivated long-term partnerships with major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. These partnerships are framed not as extractive relationships but as mutually beneficial arrangements that contribute to regional stability and economic development an interpretation consistent with China’s development-oriented notion of responsibility. The second pillar is the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, which positions the Middle East as a critical hub for global connectivity. Through infrastructure investments, port development, digital cooperation, and financial integration, China seeks to embed regional economies within a broader Eurasian network centered on Beijing. The BRI is presented as a vehicle for shared prosperity, reflecting China’s claim that great power responsibility entails enabling development rather than imposing political conditions. In practice, BRI projects have deepened China’s economic interdependence with Middle Eastern states, thereby increasing Beijing’s leverage and influence. The third pillar is multilateralism and geopolitical balancing, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. China’s growing diplomatic engagement including its role in mediating the 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement illustrates Beijing’s attempt to position itself as a neutral, stabilizing actor capable of facilitating dialogue without imposing ideological agendas. This stands in contrast to Western approaches that often involve political conditionality or military intervention. By emphasizing neutrality, sovereignty, and non-interference, China seeks to differentiate its model of great power responsibility from that of the United States and present itself as a more acceptable partner to regional governments. China’s behavior in the Middle East demonstrates how the concept of great power responsibility functions as both a normative framework and a strategic tool. Beijing consistently portrays its actions as contributing to regional stability, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. For example, China’s diplomatic rhetoric surrounding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine emphasizes political solutions, humanitarian assistance, and respect for national sovereignty. Although China avoids direct military involvement, it leverages its economic influence and diplomatic channels to shape regional dynamics in ways that align with its long-term interests. The findings of this study, based on conceptual analysis and descriptive–analytical methodology, indicate that China’s approach to great power responsibility in the Middle East is characterized by pragmatism, restraint, and strategic opportunism. China seeks stability not out of altruism but because instability threatens its energy supply, investment environment, and regional partnerships. By respecting sovereignty and avoiding intervention, China appeals to regional governments wary of Western interference. Through development-oriented cooperation, China strengthens economic ties that gradually translate into political influence. And by promoting multilateralism, China challenges U.S. dominance while presenting itself as a constructive global actor. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has intensified efforts to expand both hard and soft power in the Middle East. Unlike Western powers that often invoke great power responsibility to justify military intervention or political pressure, China frames responsibility in terms of economic development, stability, and partnership. This alternative framing has resonated with many Middle Eastern states seeking diversification of external partnerships and greater autonomy from Western influence. China’s mediation efforts, economic diplomacy, and participation in regional forums further reinforce its image as a responsible major power committed to peaceful development. Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative represents the culmination of China’s evolving vision for global order. It emphasizes multilateralism, justice, and respect for civilizational diversity principles that challenge Western-centric models of governance. In the Middle East, these principles translate into policies aimed at reducing regional dependence on Western powers, strengthening China’s role as a key economic and diplomatic actor, and embedding the region within a multipolar global system. China’s growing influence is therefore not merely a consequence of economic expansion but a deliberate effort to reshape regional and global governance norms. In conclusion, China’s use of the concept of great power responsibility in the Middle East reflects a broader strategy to expand influence while avoiding the costs and risks associated with military intervention. By emphasizing sovereignty, development, and multilateralism, China presents itself as a benign and constructive actor, even as it pursues strategic objectives such as energy security, geopolitical balancing, and regional integration under the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach enables China to compete with the United States for influence in the Middle East while maintaining a narrative of peaceful rise and responsible leadership. Ultimately, China’s development-oriented interpretation of great power responsibility serves as both a normative justification and a practical mechanism for expanding its presence in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions.

Abstract Takfiri Salafis, as one of the long-standing intellectual schools in Islamic history, have consistently confronted the Islamic world with numerous upheavals and problems. From within this current emerged Neo-Salafism, which, through the discursive confrontation of "Takfir" (excommunication), created an identity-based confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Problem Statement) The necessity of understanding this intellectual school and the groups arising from it, such as ISIS, leads to the importance of unity in the Islamic world. (Necessity) Various theories can be applied to the consequences of Salafi-Takfirism; since Salafi-Takfirism possesses the elements of a discourse, it can be analyzed within the framework of the "Discourse Theory" of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Accordingly, this research answers the question: "On what discursive confrontations are Neo-Salafi currents based for their identity-based confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran?" The paradigm governing this research is qualitative and has proceeded by adopting a descriptive-analytical method utilizing library and documentary data. The research hypothesis answers: "The Neo-Salafi school of thought, which considers itself indebted to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, is the ideological origin of contemporary extremist groups that identify themselves through the 'othering' of Shi'ism and consider this confrontation to be the 'Greater Jihad'." The findings of the research show that political Salafism threatens national interests to the extent that the most important "ideological" components of the Islamic Revolution, such as reducing Shi'a-Sunni and Arab-Non-Arab divides, and conversely, emphasizing the Islam-Zionism conflict, are threatened by Salafis. Problem Statement and Necessity
Takfiri Salafis, as a historical current in the Islamic world, have always been a factor of instability and conflict. The emergence of Neo-Salafi currents in the contemporary era and the actions of groups like ISIS reveal the necessity of understanding the ideology and objectives of these currents for preserving the unity of the Islamic world. Theoretical Framework
This research utilizes the "Discourse Theory" of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to analyze the subject. Based on this, discourses gain identity in confrontation with each other, and key concepts of this theory include "Nodal Point (Central Signifier)", "Articulation", "Othering", "Antagonism", and "Chain of Equivalence". The Neo-Salafi discourse fosters its cohesion and continuity through othering and creating an "Other" (Shi'a/Iran). Intellectual Foundations of Neo-Salafism
The intellectual origin of this current goes back to Ibn Taymiyyah, who laid the theoretical foundations for excommunicating others by expanding the concept of disbelief (Kufr) and restricting the concept of faith (Iman). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab revived this thought in the 12th century AH (18th century CE) and transformed it into a political-military movement. Contemporary Neo-Salafis (Takfiri-Jihadist), inspired by these two, have adopted a more extreme approach. Research Findings
The research findings are presented along four axes: Components of the Salafi-Takfiri Discourse in the Othering of Shi'ism: The ontology of this discourse is based on a rigid duality (Self/Islam vs. Other/Disbelief). Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, "Shi'ism" was reinforced as the primary Other and identity-builder for the Neo-Salafi discourse. Using the "Chain of Equivalence", they overlook differences among Salafi groups (such as al-Qaeda and ISIS) and unite them against the common enemy (Shi'ism). Identity-Based Confrontation of the Neo-Salafis: Confrontation with Shi'ism is not merely a religious difference but the main factor for the continuity and identity cohesion of these currents. The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a Shi'a power transformed this confrontation into an ideological and geopolitical challenge. Neo-Salafis, by excommunicating Shi'a, forbid any interaction with them and have engaged in practical opposition to Iran's influence in the region. The Nodal Point of Neo-Salafism in Confrontation with Shi'a Islam: The nodal point of this discourse is "Return to the Pious Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Salih) through Takfiri-Jihadi means". This nodal point articulates elements such as the implementation of Sharia (with an extremist interpretation), excommunication of Shi'a, offensive jihad, and opposition to non-Salafi governments. The Islamic Republic of Iran is represented as the "Superior Other" of this discourse, simultaneously symbolizing "Shi'a heresy (Bid'ah)", "non-Divine government" (due to Velayat-e Faqih), and "regional expansionism". Discursive Confrontation and Its Manifestations: This confrontation has been pursued in practice by various Neo-Salafi groups: Al-Qaeda: Formed with a focus on Shi'a othering and with direct/indirect support from powers like the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to act against the influence of Iran and Shi'a. Taliban: With origins in the Deobandi school (influenced by Wahhabism), are strongly anti-Shi'a. Saudi Arabia's goal in supporting the Taliban was to create a pivotal point in competing with Iran's influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. ISIS (Daesh): Shi'a-phobia was the central axis of this group's ideology and actions. They emerged through the widespread excommunication of Shi'a and by leveraging political projects of foreign powers (e.g., plans for Iraq's partition) and carried out massacres of Shi'a. ISIS considered the Islamic Republic of Iran its main enemy. ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K): As a remnant of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan, continues terrorist attacks against Shi'a and aims to re-establish the Caliphate in the historical geography of Khorasan. Conclusion
Takfiri Neo-Salafi currents, by othering Shi'ism and the Islamic Republic of Iran, have engaged in an identity-based and discursive confrontation with it. This confrontation is rooted in the ideological foundations of Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd al-Wahhab and has been reinforced by the geopolitical objectives of regional and extra-regional powers. The discursive confrontation of these currents is based on the nodal point of "Return to the Salaf through Takfiri-Jihadi methods" and the creation of an anti-Shi'a and anti-Iranian "Chain of Equivalence" that introduces Iran as the epicenter of deviation and the main threat to the Islamic world. Understanding this discourse is essential for comprehending regional developments and neutralizing its threats.

Abstract This research critically examines the phenomenon of gender commodification and the expansion of the sex work economy within the context of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) rapid economic development. This specific model of development, contingent upon the swift influx of capital and expatriate labor, has engendered a complex societal structure. This paper posits that sex work in Dubai is a structural manifestation of prevailing macroeconomic priorities, globalizing forces, and the inherent contradictions embedded within the theoretical paradigms guiding economic policymaking. The commodification of gender in the UAE, set against the panorama of economic globalization—as is typical in other rapidly industrializing nations—is accompanied by intricate and often paradoxical economic, social, and cultural impacts. While the UAE is globally recognized as a premier nexus for commerce and tourism, its engagement with economic globalization has not only unlocked significant opportunities for investment and aggregate growth but has also precipitated profound transformations across its social and cultural spheres. The commodification of gender in the UAE presents distinct challenges owing to the nation's conservative Islamic culture. In contrast to other nations that have more overtly utilized sex work to attract tourism, the UAE has adopted a markedly more cautious strategy. Furthermore, economic globalization has facilitated the emergence and propagation of novel gender identities and representations within the Emirates. Although the UAE has consistently sought to capitalize on global economic opportunities for advancement, this trajectory has simultaneously introduced complexities such as gender commodification and its attendant cultural repercussions. This study concentrates on clarifying the multi-dimensional consequences of economic globalization on gender and sex work within the UAE, directly addressing the inquiry: How has economic globalization influenced the commodification of gender in the UAE? The central hypothesis of this case study is formulated as follows: Economic globalization, driven by the imperative for profit maximization and capital accumulation, has instigated the commodification of personsand the objectification of gender within the economic domain, thereby creating the structural conditions conducive to the prevalence of sex work as a means of establishing a capital-attracting and employment-generating industry. Economic globalization in the UAE, one of the most dynamic economies in the Gulf region, has exerted manifold influences across social, cultural, and gender stratifications. To dissect these shifts, this study adopts the theoretical lenses of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Structuralism from International Political Economy (IPE). These three perspectives are optimally suited to investigate the changes induced by globalization, particularly regarding gender dynamics and individual commodification in the UAE context. From a Realist standpoint, state behavior is fundamentally driven by the pursuit of national power preservation. Sex work may function, albeit perhaps unintentionally, by satisfying the demands of the international consumer base and maintaining an "attractive" milieu for foreign investment, thereby securing capital inflow and, consequently, national power. Liberalism prioritizes individual liberties and bodily autonomy. Under this framework, sex work, where it stems from voluntary choice, can be conceptualized as an individual economic decision aimed at income generation within a deregulated market. The primary friction emerges between the tenets of liberal market freedom and the constraints imposed by established traditional/Islamic legal norms. Adopting a Structuralist view, globalization is understood not as a process governed solely by state or corporate actors, but as unfolding within a complex structural matrix of power dynamics and socio-economic norms that actively shape those very actors. Structuralism illuminates the deepest strata of exploitation, directly linking sex work to the operational logic of Neoliberal Capitalism. This economic model engenders profound cleavages in class, gender, and ethnicity. The exploitation of migrant workers, especially those originating from the Global South, under precarious conditions is a direct outcome of these systemic global inequalities. A Structuralist solution mandates deep, transformative institutional reform.
 
The research findings underscore that due to the paramount importance states place on conforming to global economic integration—and their efforts to leverage globalization’s capacities, particularly through creating attractive incentives and bolstering infrastructure—capital has become the decisive variable. Maximizing capital attraction necessitates diversifying the means of production, including labor, which extends to women across various sectors. Integrating the theoretical synthesis of Realism, Liberalism, and Structuralism, this analysis demonstrates how the phenomenon of gender has been instrumentalized by the UAE within this globalizing process. The prevalence of sex work in the UAE, particularly Dubai, transcends being a mere social anomaly; it is a direct reflection of strategic economic policies and globalizing trajectories. The nation’s development-centric policies, focusing on foreign direct investment, tourism, and economic diversification, are engineered to secure maximal profitability with minimal governmental interference. Within this context, migrant labor, particularly female labor, is harnessed as a quantifiable economic input. Despite the UAE’s official repudiation of sex work, the underlying market-driven economic structure, exacerbated by lacunae in regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, provides an underlying substratum where this activity can indirectly thrive.
At the macro level, UAE policies exemplify a development paradigm where the imperatives of economic competition and increased global market share systematically outweigh considerations of social welfare and human dignity. This model, reliant on attracting international finance, facilitating tourism, and maximizing the deployment of migrant labor, not only perpetuates social divisions but actively intensifies gender and class disparities. Crucially, the UAE's status as a pivotal hub in the global economic system has diminished the efficacy of regulatory and oversight mechanisms against market pressures. Under these conditions, sex work, as an unavoidable byproduct of global economic integration, has proliferated in the absence of countervailing policy controls and protective frameworks.
From a policy analysis vantage point, the UAE's deepening dependency on market economics and international engagement, absent the cultivation of robust civil society institutions and protective safeguards, has precluded the establishment of a sustainable equilibrium between economic expansion and social equity. Dubai, acting as a global nexus for trade and tourism, has inadvertently fostered an environment where informal and illicit activities, including sex work, germinate within regulatory gaps, becoming embedded within the intricate economic fabric. This situation indicates that the governing structures, notwithstanding their success in capital aggregation, have yet to cultivate the institutional capacity required to manage the social externalities of globalization.
Consequently, ameliorating this situation mandates the enactment of comprehensive, multi-scalar policies designed to forge a congruence between economic advancement and the non-negotiable demands of social justice. Such reforms must encompass the reinforcement of legal strictures, the establishment of robust labor protection modalities, the pursuit of regional and international collaboration to combat human exploitation, and the drafting of enduring social policies. Absent these systemic adjustments, any strategy focused solely on economic growth will inevitably encounter intractable structural impediments over the long term. Ultimately, realizing a development blueprint that successfully integrates economic gains with fundamental social and humanistic principles will not only enhance the UAE's international standing but will also cultivate a more equitable and stable society for the future.
 
 

Abstract The natural gas industry, as one of the most significant strategic advantages of Iran’s economy, plays a pivotal role in advancing sustainable development—a form of development that extends beyond economic growth to encompass environmental protection, social justice, inclusive participation, and responsible governance. In the contemporary global discourse, sustainable development has emerged as a multidimensional paradigm that seeks to balance economic efficiency, environmental integrity, and social equity. Within this framework, energy resources—particularly natural gas as a relatively cleaner fossil fuel—are considered critical transitional assets for achieving long-term sustainability goals. From a Western theoretical perspective, sustainable development is closely associated with principles such as transparent and accountable governance, intergenerational equity, rational management of natural resources, environmental impact assessment, and meaningful stakeholder participation in policymaking processes. These principles emphasize the need to ensure that present development trajectories do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. At the same time, environmental stewardship, institutional coherence, and policy integration are regarded as essential components of sustainable energy governance. Parallel to these Western conceptualizations, Islamic teachings offer a complementary and normatively rich foundation for sustainable development. In Islamic thought, natural resources are viewed as divine trusts (amanah) bestowed upon humanity, obligating societies to exercise moderation (wasatiyyah) in resource exploitation and to avoid wastefulness (israf). Environmental protection, social justice, collective responsibility, and solidarity among the Muslim community (ummah) constitute core ethical principles that resonate strongly with contemporary sustainability discourses. Consequently, an Islamic approach to sustainable energy development underscores balance, ethical governance, cooperation, and the pursuit of collective welfare rather than narrow economic gains. The Islamic Republic of Iran, possessing the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, holds considerable potential to play a decisive role in regional and transregional energy architecture. Iran’s geostrategic location, combined with its vast gas resources, provides unique opportunities for enhancing energy cooperation, strengthening economic interdependence, and promoting energy diplomacy within the Islamic world and beyond. Natural gas, in this context, can function not only as an economic asset but also as a strategic instrument for fostering political dialogue, cultural exchange, and regional stability. Despite these significant advantages, Iran’s gas policymaking framework faces a range of structural and institutional challenges that have hindered the realization of sustainable development objectives. Among the most critical obstacles are fragmented governance structures, weak policy coordination, inconsistencies in decision-making processes, insufficient stakeholder engagement, and inadequate attention to strategic environmental assessments. These challenges have resulted in short-term, reactive policies that often prioritize immediate economic or political considerations over long-term sustainability goals. Furthermore, the absence of an integrated governance model has contributed to inefficiencies in energy planning and implementation. Overlapping institutional mandates, lack of transparency, and limited mechanisms for accountability have undermined policy coherence and reduced public trust. Environmental considerations, although formally acknowledged in policy documents, are frequently marginalized during implementation, leading to adverse ecological impacts and missed opportunities for aligning gas development with environmental justice principles. Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to address the central research question: What are the main obstacles and requirements for achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking, considering the country’s regional and transregional role? The core hypothesis of the research posits that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector requires more than merely removing institutional barriers. Rather, it necessitates the establishment of participatory governance structures, the formulation of long-term strategic visions, and the purposeful utilization of natural gas as a tool for strengthening economic, political, and cultural linkages with regional and transregional partners—particularly within the Islamic world. Methodologically, this research adopts a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in the theoretical framework of sustainable development. The study relies on library-based and documentary data, including academic literature, policy documents, official reports, and international frameworks related to energy governance and sustainability. To systematically examine the data, thematic analysis is employed as the primary analytical method. This approach enables the identification of recurring patterns, key themes, and underlying conceptual linkages relevant to sustainable gas policymaking and governance. The findings of the study reveal that structural reform in energy policymaking is a fundamental prerequisite for advancing sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector. Specifically, the results highlight the necessity of transitioning from fragmented and sectoral governance toward an integrated and unified governance model. Such a model would enhance policy coherence, reduce institutional conflicts, and facilitate long-term planning aligned with sustainability principles. Additionally, the research underscores the importance of strengthening transparency and accountability mechanisms within energy governance institutions. Transparent decision-making processes, access to information, and clear lines of responsibility are essential for improving policy effectiveness and ensuring that environmental and social considerations are adequately addressed. Enhanced accountability not only contributes to better governance outcomes but also fosters public trust and stakeholder confidence. Another key finding relates to stakeholder participation. The study demonstrates that inclusive and meaningful engagement of stakeholders—ranging from governmental bodies and private sector actors to local communities, environmental organizations, and academic institutions—plays a crucial role in promoting sustainable energy policies. Participatory governance enables the incorporation of diverse perspectives, reduces policy resistance, and enhances the legitimacy and social acceptance of energy projects. Moreover, the findings suggest that aligning Iran’s gas policy with broader objectives of the Islamic world can significantly contribute to achieving balanced and justice-oriented development. By framing natural gas cooperation within a shared ethical and cultural context, Iran can leverage its energy resources to promote solidarity, mutual benefit, and collective resilience among Muslim-majority countries. This approach not only reinforces Iran’s energy diplomacy but also integrates moral and normative dimensions into energy policymaking. Importantly, the study highlights the potential of integrating Western sustainable development frameworks with Islamic principles to create a hybrid and context-sensitive model of energy governance. Such a model recognizes the value of international best practices—such as environmental impact assessments, policy integration, and stakeholder engagement—while grounding them in indigenous cultural and religious values. This synthesis can enhance the legitimacy, adaptability, and effectiveness of sustainability-oriented policies in Iran and similar contexts. In conclusion, the research argues that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking requires a comprehensive and multidimensional strategy. This strategy should encompass institutional reform, participatory governance, long-term strategic planning, environmental justice, and proactive energy diplomacy. By adopting an integrated approach that draws upon both Western sustainability paradigms and Islamic ethical principles, Iran can transform its natural gas sector into a catalyst for balanced, indigenous, and justice-oriented development. The findings of this study offer both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, the research enriches the literature on sustainable energy governance by highlighting the compatibility and complementarity of Western and Islamic perspectives. Practically, it provides policymakers with actionable insights for revising and redesigning energy policies in a manner that aligns economic objectives with environmental protection, social equity, and regional cooperation. Ultimately, this study suggests that Iran’s natural gas resources, if governed sustainably and ethically, can serve as a powerful engine for national development and constructive engagement within the regional and global energy landscape. 

Abstract After achieving the status of a global superpower following the Second World War, and particularly subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America established the preservation and permanence of its hegemony as the most critical objective of its foreign policy. To this end, the country has leveraged a diverse array of strategies and tactics; ranging from sweeping economic sanctions, threatening or executing military strikes, media demonization, and the securitization of rivals and opponents, to more covert and drastic strategies such as coup-making. The present study addresses the central question: How and for what purpose was the coup-making strategy in Iran, targeting Mohammad Mosaddegh, placed on the agenda of United States foreign policy? The research attempts to elucidate the position of the coup as the ultimate, high-yield option within the hierarchy of tools used for maintaining American hegemony, by focusing on the Coup of 28 Mordad 1332 (August 19, 1953). The research method is descriptive-analytical, relying on documentary and library data. For the first time, the theoretical framework of the study employs the Conservation of Resources Theory (COR) from the field of managerial psychology, extending its application to International Relations and US foreign policy. According to this theory, actors (here, the US as the hegemon), when perceiving their valuable resources across three domains -personal (national self-esteem, American exceptionalism, ideological superiority), social (ally support, maintenance of unequal core-periphery relations), and structural (financial resources, military bases, access to oil and weaponry)- as being under threat or destruction, and when conventional tools (sanctions, military attack, demonization) lose their effectiveness, they resort to riskier and more aggressive behaviors. The key principle of this theory, loss aversion, precisely aligns with the behavior of US foreign policy when facing potential resource depletion: the loss of existing resources is far more painful than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently, the hegemon is willing to accept the risk of a coup to prevent a key country from exiting its sphere of influence.The research findings indicate that coup-making has been a structural and repetitive strategy in US foreign policy for the maintenance of hegemony, rather than an isolated or exceptional action. CIA documents, declassified in 2013, explicitly confirm that Operation Ajax was designed and executed "under CIA direction" and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy at the highest levels of government." The coup against Mosaddegh was placed on the table only after more overt tactics (negotiation, economic pressure, conditional aid, and securitizing Mosaddegh and his associates as communist-leaning) had reached a stalemate. The nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1330 (1951) and Mosaddegh’s Negative Equilibrium Policy simultaneously jeopardized the three categories of U.S. resources: 1.    Personal Resources: Challenging American exceptionalism and ideological superiority, rejecting Washington's mediation, and setting a precedent for independence that could be exported to other peripheral states. 2.    Social Resources: Threatening Iran's exit from the Western sphere of influence, thereby weakening the chain of US allies in the Middle East, and particularly undermining the position of the fledgling Israeli regime. 3.    Structural Resources: Jeopardizing the access of American and British oil companies to Iranian oil resources, the potential loss of Iran as a military-espionage base against the Soviet Union, and a decrease in American arms sales. When these threats could not be contained by conventional means, the U.S., adhering to the principle of loss aversion and accepting the high risk of a coup, executed Operation Ajax to reinstate the young Shah as a loyal ally. This move turned Iran into a primary platform for supplying the U.S. with economic, political, military, and geostrategic resources for three decades. Following the coup, 80% of Iran’s oil marketing remained in the hands of the Consortium of Western companies, Iran became one of the largest purchasers of American weaponry, and served as the frontline of containment against Communism in the region. The historical-comparative section of the study reveals that the 1953 coup was merely one instance of a recurring pattern. Since the nineteenth century, the United States has played a direct or supportive role in dozens of coups (some sources cite up to 81 successful and unsuccessful cases) across five continents: from Hawaii (1893), Cuba (1933), Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973), Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), Bolivia (2019), and many others. In all these instances, the common denominator has been the effort to prevent the exit of valuable resources from the hegemon's sphere of influence and to maintain the power imbalance in America's favor. The final conclusion of the research is that coup-making is not the "last resort" in US foreign policy doctrine, but rather a prudent, low-cost (relative to full-scale war), and quick-yielding option. It is activated precisely when the hegemon feels its key resources at the personal, social, and structural levels are under severe threat and overt tools have lost their efficacy. The 1953 coup served as a turning point for this strategy in the Middle East and sent a clear message to other peripheral governments: any attempt at genuine independence from the American hegemonic core-periphery system will be met with a decisive and severe response from the hegemon. Therefore, recognizing the pattern of U.S. coup-making is a strategic and scholarly imperative, not only for understanding contemporary Iranian history but also for any actor resisting U.S. hegemony.

Abstract  The impact of the Arab Spring on the dynamics of political society in the Arab world created a two-fold pattern of transformations: states undergoing structural transformations (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria) and societies witnessing limited transformations (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman). These events not only transformed the regional power architecture, but also had far-reaching geopolitical consequences, and the origins of these transformations, which were rooted in Arab structural crises, reflected the dialectical interaction of local grievances and transnational dynamics. This research seeks to answer the important question of why protest movements in Kuwait were ineffective in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Therefore, within the framework of the theoretical foundations of social constructionism, it must be acknowledged that although endogenous variables of sectarian conflicts, the bio-legal crisis of the Bedoons, the political hybrid structure, and exogenous factors of waves of regional unrest caused the emergence of synergistic mechanisms of protests in Kuwait, and although internal variables provided the basis for disharmony; transnational components played a decisive role in shaping the process of protest actions and the direction of revolutionary discourses and failed to bring about a revolution in Kuwait. This research, which was developed based on the descriptive-analytical method and the use of library and document collection tools, indicates that although Kuwait's foreign policy was somewhat neutral; It benefits from the importance of working with the United States to ensure the stability of the region and protect it from any potential security threats, whether from regional conflicts or foreign interventions, as the United States has focused on strengthening its relations with the Gulf states, including Kuwait, through security and diplomatic cooperation and supporting regional defense against any threat. The Arab Spring was a wave of protests and uprisings in late 2010 that spread across the Muslim world, challenging long-standing authoritarian regimes. The movement began with widespread dissatisfaction with political repression, corruption, and economic problems, particularly high unemployment and declining living standards. Kuwait, meanwhile, was affected by these developments and experienced significant political unrest during the Arab Spring, accompanied by widespread protests and demands for a process of government reform. These movements occurred mainly in 2011-2012 and were rooted in public dissatisfaction with corruption, lack of political accountability, and demands for constitutional reform. Among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait has a remarkable history of political liberalization and a gradual transition to democracy, which began in the 1990s and has had a relatively stable process, but it faces serious structural obstacles. Kuwait was the first country in the region to have an elected and appointed parliament and a constitution stipulating certain freedoms and civil rights after gaining independence in the early 1960s. Constructivism: emerged as an important theoretical approach in international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly after the Cold War. This theory argues that many aspects of international relations are constructed through shared ideas, norms, and identities rather than being determined solely by material forces. The identities and interests of states and other actors are not fixed, but are shaped through social interactions. This view challenges traditional theories such as realism and liberalism, which often view state behavior as driven by material interests or power dynamics. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, official documents, and field data.  Data collection tools include: - Content analysis of diplomatic documents - Interviews with experts in international relations - An examination of the political and social conditions in Kuwait during and after the Arab Spring. Political reforms in Kuwait over the past 14 years have played a dual role in stabilizing the state, amid a constant tension between parliamentary constitutionalism and traditional dynastic authority. On the one hand, measures such as increasing the share of women in parliament (to 6 seats in 2022) and strengthening oversight institutions have strengthened the legitimacy of the system. By attracting the support of the urban middle class and educated elite, these reforms contained the instability caused by the Arab Spring; Kuwait was the only Gulf state to continue holding regular elections during this period. However, the showy nature of some reforms, especially after 2014, has deepened structural crises. The repeated suspension of parliament (11 times from 2006 to 2023) on security or legal grounds has not only created legislative deadlock but also exacerbated the discursive gap between the government and civil society. Kuwait's most important challenges after the Arab Spring: The community of al-Badun, Communications and media - organizing protesters and conveying messages, Widespread structural corruption, The role of social movements in Kuwait since 2006, The anti-oppression Islamist discourse of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Socialization of Arab people from each other and regional influences, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as an opportunity for democracy, The impact of the Arab Spring revolutions on Kuwait's national security. The findings show that: 1.     Domestic factors §  Economic discontent: Economic problems and corruption fueled public protests, using economic demands as a pretext for demonstrations. §  Political movements: The unification of various parties against the government and calls for the prime minister's removal represented a broad political movement. §  Disputes in governance: Internal tensions among the political elite and family disputes within the ruling family led to political instability. §  Electoral changes: Reforms in electoral districts, which protesters believed were a threat to democracy, increased tensions. §  Support for democracy: Kuwaitis are proud of their democratic institutions and see corruption as a threat to these institutions, a sentiment that has united the opposition. 2.     External factors §  Presence of youth: Educated and active youth on social media played a key role in organizing protests in the region and in Kuwait. §  Role of global powers: Western countries, especially the United States, supported authoritarian regimes instead of effectively supporting democracy, which contributed to the failure of the movements. §  Political and economic impacts: Inefficient political management and economic inequalities in various countries exacerbated dissatisfaction and, as a result, the emergence of uprisings. §  Israel had a significant influence on the decisions of Western countries to support authoritarian regimes in the region and prevent democratic developments. §  In Kuwait, popular demonstrations due to dissatisfaction with the government were suppressed, and the United States, instead of directly intervening, supported the governments to prevent fundamental changes. These policies increased tensions and public dissatisfaction. US cooperation with Kuwait during the Arab Spring did not have much impact on political changes in the country. Kuwait, as one of the relatively free states in the Persian Gulf, attempted to avoid unrest by adopting a neutral approach and maintaining stability. The United States focused on protecting its own interests rather than directly intervening. As a result, political changes in Kuwait were largely driven by domestic pressures and social discontent rather than external influences.  

Abstract The rapid expansion of the digital economy has fundamentally transformed the nature of economic power and competition in the international system, particularly in regions seeking to reduce structural dependence on traditional resources. In the Persian Gulf, the digital economy has increasingly become a strategic domain through which states pursue economic diversification, enhance competitiveness, and project geo-economic influence. Among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as the two most prominent actors in shaping the regional digital landscape. Their ambitious national visions and large-scale investments in digital infrastructure, innovation ecosystems, and advanced technologies have turned the digital economy into a key arena of geo-economic competition between them.
This emerging competition is deeply embedded in each country’s broader development strategy. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 places the digital economy at the core of its efforts to transform the Kingdom into a diversified, knowledge-based economy. Massive investments in data centers, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, fintech, and e-government platforms are intended not only to modernize domestic economic structures, but also to position Saudi Arabia as a regional digital hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Projects such as NEOM and the rapid expansion of digital public services signal Riyadh’s ambition to leverage scale, state capacity, and regulatory power to attract global technology firms and foster indigenous digital capabilities.
By contrast, the United Arab Emirates has pursued a more market-driven and globally integrated digital strategy, building on its early-mover advantages in logistics, finance, and services. Through initiatives such as Smart Dubai, digital free zones, and progressive regulatory frameworks for fintech, blockchain, and artificial intelligence, the UAE has cultivated an innovation-friendly environment that appeals to international investors, startups, and multinational technology companies. Its emphasis on agility, openness, and public–private partnerships has enabled it to consolidate its position as a regional gateway for digital trade and services, reinforcing its geo-economic influence despite a smaller domestic market compared to Saudi Arabia.
Taken together, the digital economy has become a central arena of strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reflecting broader shifts in power, competitiveness, and economic governance within the Gulf. While their competition has accelerated regional digital transformation and reduced reliance on hydrocarbons, it also highlights diverging models of state-led versus market-oriented digital development. The outcome of this rivalry will not only shape the future economic trajectories of the two countries, but also influence the structure of the digital economy across the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East.
This study examines how the digital economy has evolved into a field of geo-economic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and analyzes the similarities and differences in their strategic approaches. The central argument of the research is that while both countries share the common objective of attaining regional leadership in the digital economy, their distinct political–economic structures, market capacities, and governance models have produced divergent strategic pathways and comparative advantages. The UAE has largely pursued an open and network-based strategy, emphasizing regulatory flexibility, international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and the development of digital service hubs. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has adopted a more state-centered and domestically oriented strategy, relying on large-scale public investment, national champions, and technology localization policies supported by its substantial domestic market.
Methodologically, the study employs a comparative analytical framework to assess the digital economy strategies of the two countries across key indicators, including digital competitiveness, investment in information and communication technologies, innovation capacity, and the contribution of the digital sector to gross domestic product. By drawing on official policy documents, international indices, and economic data, the research provides a systematic comparison of how each state operationalizes digital transformation as a tool of geo-economic power.
The findings suggest that this competition has reshaped economic roles and hierarchies within the Persian Gulf region. The UAE has consolidated its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, and platform-based economies, while Saudi Arabia has leveraged scale, state capacity, and long-term investment to build a more self-reliant digital ecosystem. Beyond bilateral rivalry, this dynamic illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies function as strategic instruments of influence, shaping patterns of regional integration, economic dependency, and power projection in the Gulf and beyond.
The findings of this study indicate that geo-economic competition in the digital economy has significantly reshaped economic roles and strategic priorities within the Persian Gulf. Rather than following a uniform model of digital transformation, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have institutionalized distinct development paths that reflect their broader political–economic structures. This divergence has intensified competition over regional leadership, digital standard-setting, and the attraction of capital, talent, and innovation, thereby redefining the contours of economic influence in the Gulf region.
At the national level, the UAE has strengthened its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, artificial intelligence, and platform-based economies by emphasizing openness, regulatory agility, and global connectivity. Its integration into international digital networks has enabled the country to act as an intermediary between global technology markets and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has leveraged its demographic scale, fiscal capacity, and centralized governance to construct a more state-driven and domestically anchored digital ecosystem, prioritizing national digital champions, data sovereignty, and long-term technological self-sufficiency.
At the regional and systemic levels, this evolving rivalry illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies have become central instruments of power projection and economic statecraft. The competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only influences patterns of regional integration and economic dependency but also shapes the future governance of the digital economy in the Persian Gulf. As such, the digital domain has emerged as a critical arena in which economic diversification, strategic autonomy, and regional leadership are actively contested.
 

Abstract The government has a strategic and fundamental role in development. Successful agents of development are only development-oriented and efficient governments that try to bring the country to this goal by using various tools and policies. Qatar has also emerged as an important player in regional and international politics and has been able to achieve remarkable success in the field of economic, social and human development and become one of the richest countries in the world with a high global per capita income level. This research seeks to answer the question of "what role the government has played in the development of Qatar?"  The assumption of the research is that according to the development-oriented government model, the government has been able to play an effective role in Qatar's progress with various development strategies and programs. Using a descriptive-analytical research method and relying on Adrian Leftwich's theory of the developmental state, we conclude that the government in this country, led by Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani and then Sheikh Tamim, has had the characteristics of a developmental state model in both domestic and foreign policy, and with various economic, monetary, trade, educational, and investment strategies, it has been able to pave the way for economic and human development in this country and achieve significant progress. Reformist measures and the implementation of an ambitious economic development program, along with intelligent investments in international capital markets, have enabled the Qatari government to become one of the leading players in the world economy, while escaping the risk of collapse during the Arab revolutions. Also, the aforementioned government has obtained suitable opportunities for activities in the tourism, agriculture, and trade industries by using the huge revenues from the sale of natural resources and has become one of the developed countries in the world. Since the adoption of the Qatar National Vision 2030 in 2008, the country has experienced economic prosperity and development in various fields. According to this plan, by 2030, by diversifying the economy, the growth of the non-oil sector will increase, and the government will create a knowledge-based economy that is in harmony with the global economy and in line with strengthening the private sector. Qatar's economic development strategy is based on investing oil revenues and underground resources in development projects, so that the country can create a new structure and model for economic, social and cultural development in accordance with this vision document. The Qatar Investment Authority and the Qatar Foundation, led by Sheikha Muza, help the government increase its political influence in global investment trends and processes, while using the revenues from this trade in its economic, social and cultural development strategy at the level of the Arabian Peninsula, the region, the Arab world and, more importantly, at the international level. As a result, Qatar has achieved a remarkable position in terms of economic indicators and human development. Therefore, based on Leftwich’s developmental state model, the elites and the governance system of Qatar have been able to be effective in advancing the economic development of their country by intelligently and realistically understanding the dynamics of the global power system, by defining their global position in the national Vision 2030 program, and by appropriate economic, monetary, educational reforms, trade and investment policies. Also, The Qatari government is using the national strategy of artificial intelligence to benefit its economy, and according to the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country is set to become a "Smart Qatar" and develop a digital economy in the country. As a result, the application of artificial intelligence has not only increased the power of the bureaucracy and the Qatari government over citizens, but also increased the government's competitiveness in the international community.  This country has been able to stand on the world map with bureaucracy and institutional synergy in the Al Thani family and in a society where there is no union, syndicate or civil society organization to confront and oppose Sheikh Hamad's independence of action. In the international arena, Qatar has pursued national interests on a broader scale within the framework of a balanced, active and opportunity-creating foreign policy, and its efforts in the field of peace have been effective. Therefore, by proving the hypothesis of the present research, we conclude that the developmentalist government of Qatar has been able to become a visible regional and global actor with diverse strategies. As stated in the text of the research, the main task of developmentalist governments is to provide conditions for economic growth and development in the domestic and international arenas. The developmentalist government of Qatar, as part of the largest exporters of gas and oil in the world, has acquired enormous wealth, which has resulted in increased income and economic growth, as well as the opportunity to develop infrastructure and human capital. Of course, like most countries on the southern edge of the Persian Gulf, this country is also involved in a structural challenge between rapid economic growth and political underdevelopment.

Abstract The term narco-terrorism was first introduced in 1983 by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry to describe violent actions undertaken by drug traffickers against state institutions. Over time, the concept has evolved to capture the complex and increasingly intertwined relationship between terrorism and illicit drug economies. In contemporary security studies, terrorism is no longer understood solely as a state-centric or ideologically rigid phenomenon. Instead, it has assumed non-state, transnational, and hybrid forms shaped by globalization, political instability, economic inequality, and weak governance. The convergence of terrorism and narcotics trafficking has transformed many extremist organizations into financially self-sustaining entities capable of conducting prolonged campaigns of violence. Afghanistan, due to decades of conflict, institutional fragility, and its major role in global narcotics production, has become one of the most prominent arenas for narcoterrorism. Within this context, ISIS-K has emerged as a critical destabilizing actor, challenging the Taliban’s authority and complicating efforts toward state-building and governance consolidation. Narco-terrorism is composed of two interdependent features: organized political violence and systematic engagement in the production, trafficking, or taxation of narcotics. Terrorist groups involved in narco-terrorism utilize drug revenues to finance recruitment, acquire weapons, sustain territorial presence, and exert coercive control over populations. As a result, narco-terrorism directly undermines state sovereignty, rule of law, and institutional legitimacy.In Afghanistan, the narcotics economy has long flourished due to limited state capacity, widespread poverty, and persistent insecurity. Armed groups have repeatedly exploited this economy to secure financial resources. Although ISIS-K presents itself as ideologically distinct from other militant actors, it has demonstrated pragmatic engagement with narcotics-related activities, either through direct involvement or indirect cooperation with trafficking networks. This involvement has enabled ISIS-K to pose a challenge the Taliban not only through violence but also by weakening the important economic foundations for effective governance. Existing literature identifies narco-terrorism as a multidimensional threat with far-reaching consequences. Studies focusing on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) illustrate how narcotics revenues sustain long-term insurgent campaigns and facilitate transnational criminal activities. Research on Central Asia highlights the role of narco-terrorist networks in undermining regional multilateralism and security cooperation, particularly in politically fragile environments. Comparative analyses of the Middle East and Latin America identify groups such as ISIS, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as prominent examples of narco-terrorist organizations. These studies emphasize that narco-terrorism generates security, political, economic, and social challenges that extend beyond national borders. However, scholarly attention to ISIS-K’s specific role in obstructing the Taliban’s state-building process remains limited, underscoring the need for focused analysis. This study draws upon the Frustration–Aggression Theory to explain the mechanisms of recruitment and violence within extremist organizations. Originally formulated by John Dollard in the late 1930s, the theory posits that persistent frustration arising from unmet expectations or perceived injustice produces aggressive behavior. When institutional mechanisms fail to address grievances, individuals may turn to violence as an alternative means of expression and redress. In Afghanistan, prolonged conflict, economic deprivation, social marginalization, and political exclusion have created fertile ground for extremist recruitment. ISIS-K capitalizes on these conditions by offering financial incentives, ideological narratives, and a sense of purpose to disaffected individuals. This dynamic transforms individual frustration into organized violence and reinforces the group’s capacity to challenge state-building efforts. Narco-terrorism can be categorized into several forms. Genuine narco-terrorism involves direct participation by terrorist groups in drug trafficking to finance militant activities. Criminal narco-terrorism prioritizes profit, with drug syndicates employing terror tactics to intimidate governments and rivals. State-sponsored narco-terrorism emerges when governments support or tolerate terrorist groups engaged in narcotics trafficking to achieve strategic objectives.Additionally, fabricated narco-terrorism refers to the political manipulation of narco-terrorist narratives, while instrumental narcoterrorism conceptualizes drug trafficking as a tool to weaken governance and social order. ISIS-K’s activities in Afghanistan most closely resemble genuine and instrumental narco-terrorism, as the group exploits the narcotics economy to destabilize governance and undermine Taliban authority. The Taliban’s state-building project faces significant obstacles that are intensified by ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities. From a security perspective, persistent attacks undermine public safety, erode public confidence, and stretch the Taliban’s limited security capabilities. Economically, ISIS-K’s involvement in narcotics trafficking distorts local economies, fuels corruption, and deprives the Taliban of potential revenues needed for governance and service provision.Politically, ISIS-K challenges the Taliban’s legitimacy by presenting itself as a more ideologically uncompromising alternative. This strategy has enabled the group to attract dissatisfied Taliban members, particularly when financial incentives are offered. Socially, continued violence exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, undermining social cohesion and complicating nation-building efforts. These dynamics collectively weaken the Taliban’s capacity to consolidate authority and establish effective governance Although Afghanistan’s instability has deep historical roots, its current intensification is closely linked to the U.S. military withdrawal and the resulting political plan. Within this context, the rivalry between ISIS-K and the Taliban represents a crucial security challenge with significant regional implications, extending to I.R of Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite the Taliban’s claims for combating ISIS-K, persistent governance deficits and limited institutional capacity hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities continue to pose serious threats to the Taliban’s state-building process and to regional stability more broadly. Prolonged delays in governance consolidation are likely to exacerbate security, political, economic, social, and environmental risks, increasing the likelihood of broader regional instability. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that extend beyond military responses to include economic development, political inclusion, and sustained regional cooperation.

Abstract  
The grounds for China's active presence in the Central Asian region were provided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of the regional governments. In addition to geopolitical proximity, Beijing has put the continuation and expansion of relations with Central Asian countries and an increasing presence, especially in the energy equations of the region, on the agenda, and has sought to develop influence in the layers of power in Central Asia, which, in addition to helping China become the future leading power in the region, can provide the necessary grounds for expanding Beijing's power on the international stage. The region's proximity to China's western borders, rich energy resources, the region's consumer market, the region's need to attract foreign investment, the activity of the Uyghurs in the region, and the geographical location of Central Asia, which provides China with the possibility of establishing connections with Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe, are among the attractions that have increased Beijing's attention to this region. China sees Central Asia as an important region that can develop its economic growth through trade routes and meet China’s need for hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the stability and economic development of neighboring states in Central Asia are considered an important prerequisite for ensuring stability and security in China’s western regions.
China’s doctrine towards Central Asia can be seen as having three main aspects: The first aspect is rooted in China’s history, which has always considered Central Asia as the first bulwark for its security on its western borders. The possibility of instability in Xinjiang has always been an intellectual concern for Chinese statesmen. The seven million Muslims in this region, who are mainly Turks and Uyghurs, feel closer to the Muslim ethnic groups of Central Asia than to the Han Chinese. The autonomous and Uyghur-populated Xinjiang region is highly vulnerable to separatist tendencies and anti-Chinese propaganda. The second aspect, or economic dimension, of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia involves efforts to create a free Central Asian zone in order to improve China’s economy and security. The economic development of Central Asia can be both attractive and dangerous for China’s backward and remote regions bordering the region. Chinese leaders, especially after the Tiananmen Square unrest in 1989, realized the importance of investment for the economic growth of these regions. The third pillar of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia stems from its increasing desire to play a role in the global security system. In order for China to have an effective and prominent presence on the world stage, it must first be able to assert its voice in the Central Asian region. In a short time, China has become the most important player in the Central Asian energy equation and has been able to direct a significant part of the region’s energy resources to its consumer market, which is the largest in the world, through extensive investments. China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia mainly has three dimensions. First, establishing long-term energy relations with the region through economic integration and developing trade relations; Second, the construction of direct pipelines carrying oil and gas from producing countries in the region to China, and third, the reduction of the role of greedy trans-regional countries in the governments of Central Asia. China has become the dominant economic power in the Central Asian region by implementing a comprehensive, long-term and targeted planning. Its extensive economic presence and influence in the Central Asian region in the three areas of energy exchanges, trade relations and investment in the economic infrastructure of Central Asia have played an important role in developing the country's economic influence in the region and have narrowed the space for the entry and role of actors such as Russia and Iran. The result of these developments, namely China's rise and dominance in the Central Asian economy, has led some analysts to speak of a "Chinese Marshall Plan" by Beijing for Central Asia, which is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan of the United States of America after the end of World War II. The interpretation of this symbolic interpretation and historical simulation is to pay attention to a long-term trend and planning by the Chinese to create a capable market for purchasing Chinese products, ensuring energy security and increasing China's economic influence in the Central Asian region, which has significantly changed and transformed the geoeconomic picture of this region.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of an American presence in Central Asia became very serious for China when the United States invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. In the wake of this event, Central Asian states sought to develop their strategic, military, and economic relations with Washington, but China’s response to this issue was proactive; meaning that Beijing sought to redouble its efforts in the region, and did so by developing bilateral security agreements with regional countries and strengthening the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China’s strategy in this regard has been to present Beijing as a real and reliable security partner for Central Asian states, thereby providing them with a reliable alternative to developing military and security cooperation with the United States. Since 2002, China has signed a series of military and security agreements with Central Asian countries, including providing $3 million in military aid to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, an extradition agreement with these two countries, an agreement on cooperation in combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the opening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s “Regional Counter-Terrorism Center” in Tashkent, and the holding of annual joint exercises with Central Asian countries under the title “Peace Mission.” The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the formation of new republics in Central Asia opened up new opportunities for Beijing’s leaders to develop political, economic, and military relations with the Central Asian republics and thereby regain their former interests in the region. Beijing’s top priority in Central Asia is economic and trade, and investment in oil and gas fields. As the largest investor in Central Asia, China has focused on infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative. Two international corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative pass through Central Asia, connecting China to the Middle East, South Asia and Europe. Apart from its economic importance, Central Asia plays an important role for Beijing from a security perspective. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, China became interested in the issue of border security. However, due to China’s increasing global influence, monitoring the region is very important given its proximity to China and Russia. The insecurity on the borders of Xinjiang and the fight against religious extremists have led Beijing to expand its relations with Central Asian countries, and in this regard, Chinese authorities are taking steps to ensure regional security and ensure internal stability, especially in the western regions of China.
 

Abstract In the contemporary international system, trade and transit corridors have become a critical arena for economic competition, enhancing political influence, and ensuring national security. Iran's unparalleled geographical position at the crossroads of three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—has historically established it as a "communication bridge" and the "corridor heartland" of the world, to the extent that some researchers refer to Iran as the "geopolitical center of the world." However, developments over the past decade reveal a concerning paradox: while geographically situated at the nexus of the most vital transit routes, Iran is, in practice, being excluded or bypassed from the main regional corridor channels such as China's "Belt and Road," the "Middle Corridor," and the "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)." This research seeks to answer the central question of what Iran's performance in regional corridor initiatives has been and what consequences it has entailed. To analyze this issue, the research employs the theoretical framework of "Geopolinomics." Developed by Demko, Wood, and Kazi, this theory posits that in the 21st century, the power game is not solely reliant on geography and politics (geopolitics) or geography and economy (geo-economics), but rather is shaped by the tripartite and dynamic interaction of geography, politics, and economy. From this perspective, factors such as transportation corridors, energy routes, and ports function as the "arteries" and "nodes" of power in the "New Great Game." Consequently, a country's success in the "war of corridors" depends not merely on its geographical location, but also on its capacity for economic diplomacy, creating efficient infrastructure, and attracting investment into these integrated projects. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library and documentary sources. The researchers collected, classified, and analyzed data from existing books, scientific articles, research projects, and reports from reputable domestic and foreign institutions (such as the Iran Chamber Research Center and the Rahnegare journal) to scrutinize Iran's performance in various corridors. The primary focus has been on examining seven major regional corridors, including: the Belt and Road Initiative (China), the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the North-South Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, the Development Road Corridor, and the Resistance Corridor. The findings of the research clearly indicate that Iran has failed to capitalize on its geographical advantage to play a pivotal role in the corridors. This failure can be traced back to two categories of factors: domestic and external. Domestic factors include weaknesses in both hard and soft infrastructure (such as delays in completing critical railways like Chabahar-Zahedan and Rasht-Astara), inefficient economic governance and cumbersome bureaucracy, the prioritization of security-political considerations over economic interests in foreign policy, and ambiguity regarding political and economic stability for foreign investors. External factors encompass international sanctions, which have both disrupted investment within Iran and increased the risk of cooperation with it for other countries; competition among major powers (such as U.S. efforts to replace Iran with alternative corridors like IMEC); and intense regional competition (particularly with Turkey and Azerbaijan within the framework of the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur project). As a result of these factors, Iran is losing its position in most corridors. For example, within China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus is being developed instead of passing through Iranian territory. The North-South Corridor project is also facing severe delays due to domestic infrastructure problems and sanctions. Simultaneously, regional competitors such as Turkey, through active diplomacy and investment in infrastructure, are increasingly becoming transit hubs. Ultimately, the research arrives at the key conclusion that the main hypothesis of the study is confirmed: the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite possessing unique geopolitical advantages, has failed to secure a deserving share of regional corridors due to a combination of domestic challenges and external pressures. The consequence of this situation will be nothing less than "geopolitical isolation." This isolation manifests itself in the weakening of the national economy (loss of transit revenues and job creation opportunities), a reduction in the security coefficient (strengthening of competitors' positions and regional encirclement), and the gradual erosion of Iran's soft power and regional influence. The research warns that geographical advantages are not permanent and can be eroded if neglected. The authors emphasize that escaping this impasse requires a paradigm shift in national strategy: transitioning from a foreign policy based solely on security-political priorities to an active and pragmatic economic diplomacy, increasing transparency in the business environment, accelerating the completion of critical infrastructure projects, and striving for de-escalation in international relations. Otherwise, if the current trend continues, the risk of Iran's complete removal from the future communicative and economic map of Eurasia and its transformation into a "geopolitical island" will not be far-fetched.