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The Journal of Fundamental and Applied Studies in the Islamic World is an open-access scholarly publication managed by the Iranian Association of Geopolitics in collaboration with the Institute for Islamic  World Futures Studies. Utilizing a double-blind peer review process and adhering to the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) principles, the journal publishes original research in political science, international relations, regional studies, geopolitics, and future studies related to the Islamic world. All submissions are evaluated for originality using HamYab and Samim Noor plagiarism detection tools and are rigorously reviewed by expert referees.  (Read More ...)


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An Investigation of the Impact of Knowledge-Based Economic Factors on Inclusive Growth in Selected Islamic Countries

Pages 32-59

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2025.479454.1383

mohammad ghaffary fard, seyed hasan ghavami, omid Haidari

Abstract Background and purpose: The concept of inclusive growth has become one of the new concepts in the economic literature of countries and has attracted much attention in recent decades. Many economists in different countries around the world have focused on it. In the definition provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, urban growth refers to the creation of new economic opportunities for all segments of society, including marginalized and poor communities. In other words, in inclusive economic growth, the poor segment of society benefits more from economic growth compared to other income groups in society (Sadeqi, 2013: 206). Therefore, it can be claimed that in the present era, in all economic societies, any progress and development are influenced by the advancement of science and knowledge. The evolution of all economic variables, inclusive growth, national welfare, infrastructure development, and the evolution of economic cycles is dependent on knowledge. Any economic variable and activity that is accompanied by knowledge leads to significant development and progress in economic systems. Therefore, it can be said that a knowledge-based economy affects all economic dimensions and is one of the fundamental factors in development, growth, productivity, efficiency, and welfare.
The main issue in this research is that one of the fundamental goals of countries and governments has always been achieving high welfare and economic growth, as well as reducing poverty and inequality. However, despite high economic growth in some countries, poverty and inequality have not decreased. Many studies, including Kuznets (1995), have shown that economic growth is accompanied by inequality and income distribution and does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction and inequality. For this reason, the concept of inclusive growth has been raised in the economic literature of development, which aims to benefit all members of society, including the poor, from the benefits of growth. In other words, inclusive growth focuses on simultaneous growth and equality (Mozaffari Pour, 2020:2). One of the influential factors in inclusive growth is a knowledge-based economy, which means a knowledge-based economy can promote innovation, socialization, self-entrepreneurship, technological advancement, and structural evolution in important economic sectors, improve the efficiency of production factors, and achieve sustainable development. A knowledge-based economy is mainly based on the use of ideas rather than relying on physical capabilities. According to the World Bank's definition, a knowledge-based economy is based on four components: knowledge, education, innovation, and incentive system, each of which plays a significant role in inclusive growth, national welfare, and economic progress.
In this research, titled "The Impact of Components of Knowledge-Based Economy on Inclusive Growth in Selected Islamic Countries," the researcher aims to identify the components of a knowledge-based economy and provide answers to the following questions: Is there a relationship between a knowledge-based economy and inclusive growth in selected Islamic countries?
Can a knowledge-based economy increase inclusive growth and bring about changes in it?
Due to the importance and necessity of the mentioned subject to achieve the goal based on the data panel method, this issue has been addressed. In this research, after presenting the introduction and theoretical foundations, the background of the research will be examined, and then the research method will be explained. Finally, after performing calculations and data analysis based on the data panel method, the subject will be summarized and concluded
Method : This research is based on an analytical-descriptive method. Initially, based on library documents and resources, including books and scientific articles, a literature review was conducted to extract the research framework and analytical model. In the next stage, for the inference and testing of hypotheses and answering research questions, the desired statistical information from published documents by statistical agencies and organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for the period 2006 to 2020, were collected and processed. Following the examination of the impact of knowledge economy factors on inclusive growth in selected Islamic countries, a panel data approach was used, combining different periods and using the FMOLS method and Eviews11 software
Findings : This research aimed to determine the impact of the components of the knowledge-based economy on overall growth in selected Islamic countries using panel data from 2006 to 2020. The components of the knowledge-based economy (education and human resource development, innovation system, information infrastructure, and economic incentives and institutional frameworks) were considered as explanatory variables, while overall growth (employment and productivity, economic growth, education, health, environmental sustainability, poverty and inequality, and gender equality) was considered as the dependent variable. Additionally, variables such as inflation, foreign investment, and goods exports were considered as control variables. The FMOLS (Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares) method was used to analyze the data using the EVIEWS software. Necessary tests, such as unit root tests to determine the stationarity of the data, and the Kaio co-integration test and panel data models with fixed effects and random effects were conducted. Based on the results obtained from Model A, it is evident that there is a significant and long-term relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, as indicated by the coefficient of determination (R2) of 94%. This shows that the independent variables explain 94% of the variations in the dependent variable. Furthermore, the component of education and human resource development has a positive and significant relationship with overall growth in selected Islamic countries. With a 1% increase in education and human resource development, overall growth will increase by 0.412%. Similarly, the composite index of 16 other variables also has a significant impact on overall growth.
Innovation and inventions also have a positive and meaningful impact on overall growth, with a 1% increase in the innovation system resulting in a 0.159% increase in overall growth. The index of information and technological infrastructures also has a positive impact on overall growth, with a 1% increase in these infrastructures leading to a 0.035% increase in overall growth. However, economic incentives have a significant negative relationship with overall growth, with a 1% increase in economic incentives and institutional frameworks resulting in a 0.117% decrease in overall growth in selected Islamic countries. Therefore, the three components of a knowledge-based economy, namely education and human resource development, innovation system, and information infrastructures, all have a positive impact on overall growth in selected Islamic countries, with education and human resources having the greatest influence. Based on the results obtained from the above model, where overall growth is the dependent variable and the composite index of knowledge-based economy is the independent variable, as well as inflation, logarithm of foreign investment, and logarithm of exports as control variables, it can be concluded that there is a significant long-term relationship between these variables, with the determination coefficient (R2 = 0.92) indicating that 92% of the variations in the dependent variable (overall growth) can be explained by the independent and control variables. Among the explanatory variables, the composite index of the knowledge-based economy has a significant positive effect on long-term growth, with a 1% increase in this variable leading to a 0.281% increase in overall growth. This means that as long as the economy in selected Islamic countries is based on knowledge, information, and technology, there will be an increase in overall growth. Similarly, variables such as gross domestic product and foreign investment have a positive impact on overall growth, but with a 1% increase in gross domestic product and foreign investment, there is a 0.084% and 0.002% increase in overall growth, respectively. On the other hand, the inflation variable has a significant negative effect on overall growth in selected Islamic countries, with a 1% increase in inflation resulting in a 0.003% decrease in overall growth.

Islamic World

The Impact of the Tradition–Modernity Dichotomy on Political Development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.472744.1372

Masoumeh , Mohammadi, Mojtaba Maghsoudi, Mohammad, Taheri Kenkhdari

Abstract The relationship between tradition and modernity has long constituted one of the central debates in political and social thought, particularly within developing societies. In many such contexts, modernity has been introduced as an external and, at times, disruptive phenomenon, generating tensions within pre-existing cultural and institutional frameworks. In Iran, this tension has acquired distinctive characteristics following the Islamic Revolution, which established a political order grounded in religious values while simultaneously confronting the structural imperatives of a modern state and an increasingly globalized world. Despite the transformative aspirations of the Revolution, the dichotomy between tradition and modernity has persisted across multiple spheres of Iranian society, including politics, culture, and governance. The expansion of globalization in the past half-century has intensified this interaction, creating new arenas of contestation and dialogue between competing discourses. The present study seeks to examine how this dynamic interplay has influenced political development in post-revolutionary Iran.The central research question guiding this study is: How has the confrontation between tradition and modernity affected political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution?The study advances the hypothesis that, notwithstanding the enduring tension between traditional and modern paradigms, the emergence of a new discourse—rooted in national, indigenous, and religious values while remaining compatible with certain universal modern principles—has been both necessary and influential in fostering political development in Iran. Rather than viewing tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive, this research explores the possibility of their synthesis as a driver of institutional evolution and political participation.This study is situated within broader debates on political development, discourse theory, and modernization in non-Western societies. Traditional modernization theories often conceptualize development as a linear transition from traditional to modern forms. However, such binary frameworks have been increasingly criticized for neglecting local agency, cultural specificity, and the potential for hybrid models of governance. In the Iranian context, post-revolutionary political discourse has attempted to redefine modern political concepts—such as participation, legitimacy, civil society, and sovereignty—through a religious and indigenous lens. The interaction between revolutionary ideals and global political norms has produced a distinctive discursive field in which confrontation and adaptation coexist. The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on primary documentary sources, including official documents, scholarly works, and credible online materials. Through interpretive analysis, the study examines the evolution of political discourses after the Revolution and assesses their role in shaping institutional arrangements, public participation, and state–society relations. The qualitative method allows for an in-depth exploration of meanings, narratives, and ideological transformations rather than relying solely on quantitative indicators of political development. The findings indicate that the post-revolutionary political order in Iran has succeeded in articulating a distinctive ideological and political identity that resonates beyond its national boundaries, particularly among certain revolutionary and liberation-oriented movements. This development cannot be understood solely through the lens of conflict between tradition and modernity. Instead, it reflects a dynamic process of contestation, negotiation, and selective integration. The study reveals that the tension between traditional religious values and modern political institutions has not merely generated stagnation or regression. On the contrary, the interaction of competing discourses has contributed to the gradual transformation of political structures and practices. Electoral processes, constitutional mechanisms, public debate, and policy discourse have evolved within a framework that seeks to reconcile religious legitimacy with elements of modern governance.Globalization has further complicated this relationship by introducing new normative standards and communication networks. In response, Iranian political discourse has undergone adaptations aimed at preserving cultural authenticity while engaging with global modernity. This adaptive process has played a meaningful role in shaping the trajectory of political development, even as debates over identity, authority, and reform continue.The confrontation between tradition and modernity in post-revolutionary Iran should not be interpreted solely as a source of contradiction or paralysis. Rather, it has functioned as a catalyst for discursive innovation and institutional evolution. The emergence of a hybrid discourse—grounded in indigenous, national, and religious values while selectively incorporating modern political concepts—has been instrumental in advancing political development. Ultimately, the study concludes that political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution has been shaped not by the dominance of one paradigm over the other, but by the ongoing interaction between them. The future trajectory of Iran’s political development will likely depend on the continued capacity of its political discourse to mediate, reinterpret, and harmonize these two foundational forces.

Islamic World

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates: From Cooperation to Competition

Pages 60-87

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.564800.1547

Seyed Hamzeh Safavi, Seyed Ali Nejat

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most complex bilateral relationships in the Persian Gulf region over the past five decades. These relations have continuously been influenced by a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors and have fluctuated between economic cooperation, geopolitical competition, and security tensions. Although relations between the two countries reached one of their most confrontational periods between 2016 and 2020, signs of de-escalation and a return to diplomacy have emerged since 2021, coinciding with political changes in both the United States and Iran. Utilizing a descriptive-explanatory method, drawing upon library and electronic sources, and employing the Constructivist framework, this study examines three possible patterns for the future of Iran-UAE relations: the Hobbesian model (confrontation and hostility), the Lockean model (managed competition), and the Kantian model (cooperation and friendship). The findings indicate that the most probable scenario for the future of bilateral relations is the model of managed competition. In the first model, namely the dominance of Hobbesian culture, relations between Iran and the UAE move toward increased tension, mistrust, and the possibility of military confrontation. The most significant domestic factor underlying this situation is the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran considers these islands an inseparable part of its territory, whereas the UAE claims sovereignty over them and has consistently sought to raise the issue in international forums. This historical dispute has persisted since the establishment of the UAE in 1971 and has become a significant symbol of political and identity-based competition between the two countries. From Tehran’s perspective, sovereignty over these islands is non-negotiable, whereas Abu Dhabi insists on resolving the issue through negotiations or international arbitration. At the regional level, geopolitical competition has also played a major role in the formation of Hobbesian culture. Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the UAE’s concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence increased substantially. Developments in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen war, and the expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and across the region were viewed by the UAE as threats to the regional balance of power. The Yemen war became the most important arena of indirect competition between the two countries. The UAE supported forces opposed to Ansar Allah, while Iran provided political and strategic support to the movement. Drone attacks on Abu Dhabi and reciprocal confrontations in Yemen further intensified mistrust between the two states. The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020 constituted another factor contributing to heightened tensions. Iran viewed this development as a threat to its national security and warned against the security and intelligence presence of Israel near its borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the expansion of military and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel could alter the regional security balance to Iran’s detriment. Consequently, the growing ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to improving Iran-UAE relations. At the international level, the UAE’s security dependence on the United States has also been a major factor in generating tensions. The UAE views the American military presence as a guarantee of its security, while Iran considers the presence of U.S. forces in the region a direct threat to its national security. American military bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Iran significantly exacerbated bilateral tensions in recent years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the UAE as a threat to regional stability, leading Abu Dhabi to consistently support international pressure against Tehran. In contrast, the second model, namely Lockean culture or managed competition, emphasizes the control of tensions and the preservation of limited interactions. This model is based on the assumption that both countries recognize the extremely high costs of direct confrontation and therefore seek to manage their differences. At the domestic level, the federal structure of the UAE plays an important role in this process. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which adopts a security-oriented and hardline approach toward Iran, Dubai and Sharjah favor maintaining economic relations with Tehran due to their strong dependence on trade and a non-oil economy. This divergence in perspectives has ensured that even during periods of political tension, bilateral trade relations have never been completely severed. At the regional level, several developments have contributed to reducing tensions. The reduction of the UAE’s military presence in Yemen, the initiation of security dialogues between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, and efforts to manage disputes through diplomatic channels are among the notable examples. The exchange of security and political delegations between the two capitals in recent years and the signing of border cooperation agreements demonstrated the determination of both sides to prevent further escalation. In addition, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 fostered a regional atmosphere conducive to de-escalation, encouraging the UAE to adopt a more balanced foreign policy. At the international level, the shift in U.S. policy following the inauguration of President Joe Biden also influenced this trend. Washington’s reduced support for the maximum pressure policy against Iran and efforts to revive nuclear negotiations prompted the UAE to reconsider its regional policies. Within this framework, Abu Dhabi also improved its relations with Qatar, Türkiye, and Syria and sought to establish itself as a more balanced regional actor. The third model, namely Kantian culture, represents the most optimistic scenario for the future of Iran-UAE relations. Under this model, the two countries move toward stable and friendly relations through economic cooperation, interdependence, and the reduction of security tensions. The most important driving force behind this process is the extensive economic interdependence between the two states. Over the past decades, the UAE, particularly Dubai, has played a crucial role in Iran’s foreign trade and has become one of Tehran’s most important economic partners. Thousands of Iranian companies operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade has experienced substantial growth in recent years. Economic interdependence has ensured that economic relations have never been completely interrupted, even during periods of peak political tension. As a regional commercial hub, Dubai possesses significant economic interests in maintaining relations with Iran. Furthermore, extensive Iranian investments in the UAE and the country’s role in Iran’s financial and commercial exchanges have created strong incentives for continued cooperation. At the regional level, a reduction in geopolitical tensions could facilitate the realization of this model. The end or de-escalation of the Yemen conflict, the improvement of Iran-Saudi relations, the growing role of regional mediators, and the expansion of regional economic cooperation are among the factors that could strengthen ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, if the UAE limits its security cooperation with Israel and focuses more on economic cooperation, some of Iran’s security concerns may be alleviated. At the international level, the success of nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran could provide a foundation for expanding economic and political cooperation between the two countries. The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that whenever tensions between Iran and the United States decreased, trade and investment between Iran and the UAE increased correspondingly. Under such circumstances, joint economic projects, the development of regional transportation corridors, and cooperation in the fields of energy and infrastructure could elevate bilateral relations to a new level. In conclusion, the study emphasizes that Iran-UAE relations possess a dual and multilayered nature in which economic cooperation and political competition coexist simultaneously. Although territorial disputes, security rivalries, and the UAE’s relations with the United States and Israel hinder the development of full strategic trust between the two countries, economic interdependence and the high costs of direct confrontation also prevent relations from evolving into comprehensive hostility. Therefore, the most probable scenario for the future of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi is the continuation of a pattern of “managed competition accompanied by limited cooperation.” Within this framework, while maintaining their political and security differences, both countries are likely to utilize economic and diplomatic interactions to prevent the escalation of tensions and avoid direct confrontation. Such a situation could preserve relative stability in the Persian Gulf and provide the basis for limited yet sustained cooperation between two important regional actors.

Explaining the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach

Pages 90-116

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.238091

Mohsen Keshvarian Azad, Mehrshad Ghafarizade

Abstract The growing global power of the People's Republic of China and its efforts for superiority in power-generating resources in the international arena have made it particularly important to explain the role of other countries in its global approach. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its regional position and influence, geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages, and its role in the power structure in the international system, is of great importance to the great powers in different eras and to China in the current state of the world system. Also, the development of growing relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China as a result of the commonalities and structural requirements of the international system, the capabilities of various areas of cooperation, and emerging common areas has led to increased attention to the relations between these two countries in the international arena. The purpose of this article is to explain the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and examines the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and the strategies branching from it.
This study employs an experiential epistemology and an analytical-explanatory method, gathering credible evidence through empirical methods to elucidate the reality and relationships between variables. The research design began with an initial idea and evolved as the researcher's understanding of the subject deepened. Data were collected through library research. In this method, sources related to the research are studied and the necessary evidence is prepared in the form of the index card and analyzed using a Qualitative method.
Analysis of China's choices, political actions, and economic actions in the global arena indicate that the country has adopted a partnership-oriented approach to developing its global relations. Within the framework of the partnership-oriented approach, after the end of the Cold War, China has established a network of global and multidimensional partnerships that serves as a guiding framework for foreign policy and the center of its strategy for developing economic and political cooperation with other countries in the world. In the first step, it signed strategic partnership documents with various countries. In the second step, it sought to deepen partnerships with various countries in the world by creating foreign policy initiatives .In the third step, along with other dimensions of partnership-oriented cooperation, it promoted institutional cooperation to strengthen partnerships in the world.
China's global approach is indeed partnership, which is in contrast to the US's alliance approach. China's partnership approach includes; bilateral strategic partnership, partnership in the form of Chinese initiatives and institutions, and partnership in economic, political-security and specific Practical areas including energy, technology, digital and investment. China’s political-security partnership approach in the region is in its early stages compared to economic partnership, and the status of its long-term security commitments to the countries in the region is unclear. In fact, Beijing, in continuation of its energy security and investment policy in the region, seeks to play a diplomatic and security role in West Asian affairs. In the cultural sphere, it is also trying to expand its influence in the region with political and financial support and the establishment of cultural institutions.
China's partnership-oriented approach with West Asian governments is being pursued in the economic, political-security and cultural fields. The signing of strategic partnership documents with regional governments and the effective role in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative demonstrate the prominence of the West Asian region in China's partnership-oriented approach.
In this framework, Iran plays an important role. Strategies such as the “South-South Strategy”, “Hedging Strategy” and Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Health Silk Road, the Digital Silk Road, the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative are in line with China’s partnership-oriented approach, in which Iran’s role is prominent due to its geopolitical location, energy security and Iran and China similar views on international political and security issues. China promotes a multipolar world order through institutions and rules in which other civilizations and worldviews, such as Iran, have a special position. The Islamic Republic of Iran and China have similar views on global political and economic blocs to move from the rules of the liberal order to a new order.
For example, Iran has a special place alongside other major countries in the region in Beijing’s balanced approach. In addition to developing China’s relations with the Persian Gulf countries, cooperation with Iran is also on the agenda of the Chinese government, and Beijing has a balanced view of cooperation with Iran compared to other countries in the West Asian region.
Iran’s geopolitical and strategic location in Central Asia, Europe, and Africa and direct access to international waterways have given it a special place in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the “Digital Silk Road,” the “Health Silk Road,” the “Global Development Initiative,” the “Global Security Initiative,” and the “Global Civilization Initiative”.
The structural requirements of the international system have forced China to adopt new partnership-based strategies such as; searching for a like-minded partner outside the liberal order, diversifying markets, industrial strategy and creating new investment axes in the world and creating a supply chain independent of the West to neutralize the US sanctions policy. In each of these strategies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has an important position for China. In order to escape the US containment policy, China has developed relations with like-minded governments, developed relations with governments outside the US alliance network, activated and expanded the development of regional organizations and groups.
Iran is one of the countries that can help China to implement the above strategy. China has tried to expand trade relations with other regions of the world and diversify global supply chains, in which countries of the global south, including Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and West Asia, including Iran, play a decisive role. China is seeking to create a supply chain independent of the sphere of influence of the United States and its allies in the world. The investment policy on clean and renewable energy and electric vehicles is at the center of Beijing's policy. China needs a strategic partner in the sanctions sectors to escape US pressure. Given the similar conditions of Iran and China in this sector, the country needs a long-term strategic partner like Iran.
The US containment policy through new plans and alliances at the global level (QUAD and AQUOS) and the region (Abraham Pact aimed at normalizing relations between the regime-Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia) as well as the multidimensional interaction of the regional rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran with China are among the obstacles to the development of cooperation between Tehran and Beijing.
Within the framework of China's partnership-oriented approach, the initiatives and strategies that China has developed in various fields to guide foreign policy in the world prescribe principles, foundations, and actions in China's foreign policy that both have potential capacities for cooperation with Iran. At the same time, China needs Iran's current role and position in the international system to better implement them. Iran has a special position in the aforementioned initiative and China's partnership-oriented policies in the economic and political sectors of China towards West Asia. By developing specific programs in various fields, Iran's role in China's grand strategies in the West Asia region can be improved.

Islamic World

From Adversary to Amity: A Narrative Analysis of the Transformation of Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards the Taliban

Pages 118-145

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.238092

Bahareh Davoodi, Yousof Qorashi

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.


The Why and Functions of Saudi Arabia's Political Opposition Social Networks; A Case Study of Salafi and Neo-Salafist Takfiri Groups

Pages 146-177

Khalilollah Sardarnia, Ali Roohimale

Abstract During the last two decades, social networks have become one of the most influential arenas for the redefinition of relations between authoritarian governments and opposition forces. In Saudi Arabia, where formal political participation is limited, media institutions are centrally controlled, and religious legitimacy remains a decisive element of state authority, digital platforms have created a new environment for political, religious, and ideological activism. The expansion of Twitter/X, Telegram, YouTube, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram has enabled oppositional actors to bypass the constraints of conventional political organization and to communicate with domestic, regional, and transnational audiences. This transformation is especially significant in the case of Salafi opposition currents, because these groups are rooted in religious discourse while at the same time they increasingly depend on modern communication technologies to reproduce their identity, mobilize followers, and challenge official narratives. The present study examines the why and functions of social networks in the activism of Saudi Arabia's political opposition, focusing specifically on two currents: Salafi-Takfiri groups and Neo-Salafi groups. Although both currents emerge from the broader Salafi intellectual environment, they differ fundamentally in their political language, degree of radicalism, relationship to violence, and methods of digital mobilization. Salafi-Takfiri groups generally adopt a confrontational and exclusionary discourse based on strict religious dualisms, delegitimization of the Saudi political order, and militant interpretations of religious duty. By contrast, Neo-Salafi groups tend to employ a softer reformist language, a more moderate critique of political and religious authority, and a strategy of gradual discursive influence rather than open violent confrontation. The study therefore seeks to explain not only why these groups have moved toward social networks, but also how the same digital environment produces different forms of political and ideological practice. The central research problem is based on the tension between the Saudi state's restrictive political structure and the relative communicative openness offered by social media platforms. The main question is: what roles and functions do social networks perform for Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi opposition currents in the field of political activism? The secondary questions examine how these platforms assist in the reproduction of oppositional meanings, the mobilization of supporters, the production of religious-political legitimacy, the management of psychological operations, and the creation of hidden or semi-open networks. The main assumption of the research is that social networks, due to their interactive, transnational, low-cost, and rapidly distributive nature, have transformed the weight and effectiveness of Salafi opposition currents in Saudi Arabia. They have allowed these currents to construct alternative identities, organize dispersed audiences, and exert discursive pressure on the Saudi political and religious establishment. The theoretical framework of the study combines several perspectives in order to explain the phenomenon at structural, communicative, and ideological levels. The theory of the public sphere helps conceptualize social networks as an alternative arena in which actors excluded from official political institutions can express dissatisfaction and produce counter-discourses. Habermas's theory of communicative action is used to examine how arguments, religious references, and claims to truth and legitimacy are formulated in digital interaction. Castells's theory of the network society explains how power in the information age is organized through flows of communication and how oppositional actors function as nodes in transnational networks. Framing theory is used to analyze how political events, state repression, foreign policy, religious authority, and social grievances are interpreted differently by Takfiri and Neo-Salafi currents. Finally, online radicalization theory helps clarify the ways in which closed digital communities, emotional content, ideological repetition, and algorithmic visibility may intensify radical tendencies among some users while also opening possibilities for counter-radical and reformist discourse. Methodologically, this research follows a descriptive-analytical and comparative design. It is based on documentary analysis, qualitative content analysis, and digital discourse analysis. The data consist of publicly available online content, media samples, posts, messages, and behavioral patterns produced by Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi groups across social networks and related digital spaces. The study uses a non-interventionist approach: the researcher did not interact with the actors or influence the production of content, but analyzed existing outputs available in open sources, websites, channels, and social media accounts. The sampling strategy is purposeful and theoretical rather than statistical. Accounts and channels were selected because they had explicit or implicit links with one of the two currents under study, showed identifiable political and ideological positions toward the Saudi state and official religious institutions, and maintained a sufficient level of activity during the period considered. The analysis was carried out in three complementary stages. First, documentary and library analysis was used to clarify the conceptual framework and the existing literature on social networks, digital opposition, Salafism, radicalism, and Saudi politics. Second, digital discourse analysis was applied to identify the linguistic structures, ideological metaphors, binary oppositions, religious justifications, and framing patterns used in online content. Third, qualitative content analysis was conducted through open, axial, and selective coding. The unit of analysis was the content segment, meaning each tweet, post, channel message, text, or media item that carried a recognizable message about the political, ideological, or organizational role of social networks. Through this process, major categories such as delegitimization of the government, radical religious mobilization, soft reformism, digital recruitment, transnational networking, and symbolic identity construction were extracted and interpreted in relation to the theoretical framework. The findings show that social networks now operate as the most important field of digital activism for Saudi Salafi opposition currents. These networks are not merely technical tools for communication; rather, they function as the central infrastructure for producing political meaning, reconstructing religious identity, mobilizing audiences, and challenging official legitimacy. In the closed and authoritarian structure of Saudi Arabia, social networks serve as an alternative public sphere where dissatisfaction can be expressed, oppositional narratives can be reproduced, and ideological conflicts can become visible beyond the limits of state-controlled media. This function is particularly important because Saudi opposition groups have limited access to formal institutions, legal party activity, independent mass media, and public protest. Digital platforms therefore compensate for institutional closure by offering speed, anonymity, reach, and symbolic visibility. The research identifies three main functions of social networks for these opposition currents. The first is political. Social networks are used to challenge the legitimacy of the Saudi government, criticize official institutions, highlight perceived failures in domestic and foreign policy, and produce rival narratives regarding issues such as Yemen, Syria, relations with Western powers, and the role of official religious bodies. The second is ideological. Both currents use social networks to reproduce Salafi identity, but they do so in sharply different ways. Takfiri groups emphasize radical religious interpretations, sharp distinctions between belief and unbelief, emotional religious symbols, and narratives of betrayal and confrontation. Neo-Salafi groups emphasize reformist interpretations, legal-religious argumentation, moderate criticism, and the need to correct political and religious performance without necessarily rejecting the entire political order. The third function is organizational and communicative. Digital platforms reduce the cost of mobilization, enable dispersed networking, facilitate hidden or semi-hidden coordination, and allow actors to maintain activity even under security pressure through encrypted channels, shifting accounts, and flexible patterns of communication. The comparison between Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi currents demonstrates two opposing patterns of digital activism. Salafi-Takfiri groups use a closed, polarized, and confrontational communicative style. Their discourse is often based on binary classifications such as faith/unbelief, truth/falsehood, loyalty/betrayal, and Islam/enemy of Islam. They frame the Saudi government and its religious institutions as illegitimate, corrupt, or hostile to authentic religion, and they address audiences who are more likely to be frustrated, marginalized, or already receptive to radical frames. Their digital activity is therefore associated with delegitimization, emotional mobilization, clandestine networking, and, in some cases, the normalization of extremist interpretations. However, from 2018 to 2024 their level of activity shows an initial increase followed by gradual decline. This decline is related to intensified security pressure, platform restrictions, account removals, disruption of communication channels, and the increasing difficulty of maintaining open radical content on major platforms. Neo-Salafi currents follow a different trajectory. Their discourse is more open, argumentative, and reformist. Rather than relying on broad takfir or direct calls for violent confrontation, they use religious-political reasoning, moderate criticism, and social concerns to build credibility among broader audiences. Their messages often address governance, rights, religious authority, social restrictions, arrests, reform, and the moral responsibilities of rulers and scholars. Because this discourse is less openly violent and more compatible with the language of reform, Neo-Salafi groups have been able to maintain a more stable and growing digital presence between 2018 and 2024. They appeal not only to radicalized young users, but also to religiously oriented middle-class audiences, educated users, and individuals seeking a critical yet non-militant alternative to official discourse. In this sense, Neo-Salafism increasingly appears as a soft digital opposition that competes with both the state narrative and the radical Takfiri narrative. The study also shows that digital platforms shape the form of the message itself. Twitter/X is used for rapid political reaction, hashtag activism, framing of current events, and public confrontation. Telegram is more suitable for semi-closed circulation, hidden networking, and the preservation of content under pressure. YouTube enables longer ideological explanation, sermons, lectures, and narrative construction. WhatsApp and similar messaging applications are useful for interpersonal circulation, emotional mobilization, and the spread of short persuasive messages. Instagram and Facebook, although less central in some Salafi circles, contribute to visual framing, symbolic presentation, and the dissemination of simplified messages to wider audiences. Thus, each platform has a specific communicative logic, and opposition actors adapt their content according to the affordances, risks, and audiences of each digital space. Overall, the findings indicate that social networks have become the main arena of discursive competition among the Saudi Salafi opposition. The field is characterized by the relative retreat of radical Takfiri currents and the gradual strengthening of Neo-Salafi currents as a more sustainable form of soft digital opposition. This does not mean that radical discourse has disappeared; rather, it has become more fragmented, cautious, encrypted, and difficult to observe openly. At the same time, reformist Neo-Salafi discourse has benefited from its ability to remain visible, interact with wider audiences, and present itself as a religiously grounded but politically moderate critique. The future of Saudi opposition activism will therefore depend not only on state control and platform governance, but also on the ability of each current to adapt its language, organization, and identity to the changing architecture of cyberspace. The conclusion of the research is that social networks play a decisive role in the political, religious, and social activism of Saudi opposition forces. They create an alternative public sphere, provide tools for identity reconstruction, enable the circulation of counter-narratives, and transform the relationship between ideology and political action. For Salafi-Takfiri currents, digital platforms provide opportunities for radical framing, hidden networking, and ideological mobilization, although these opportunities are increasingly restricted by surveillance and platform regulation. For Neo-Salafi currents, they provide a more durable space for reformist criticism, audience expansion, and the formation of a soft opposition discourse. Consequently, understanding Saudi political opposition today requires close attention to the digital environment where legitimacy, authority, religion, and resistance are continuously contested.

Islamic World

Artificial Intelligence and National Identity in Iran: Perspectives and Policymaking Imperatives

Pages 178-207

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245618

Seyed Mehdi Hosseini Taghiabad, Behrouz Ghezel

Abstract The recent advancement of artificial intelligence must be understood as part of a broader transformation wherein digital infrastructures have moved from merely transmitting information to organizing meaning and adjudicating truth. In daily experience, search engines and social media once served as primary gateways to the world of information; now, large language models and generative systems have become interlocutors, interpreters, summarizers, and recommender, fundamentally reshaping the public sphere. For Iran, the stakes are high because the issue is not only what content AI produces but also which data it deems credible, which linguistic styles and historical narratives it reproduces, and which worldview it effectively imposes on users. Domestic policymaking in this domain often falls into a simplistic “opportunity/threat” binary or remains confined to general digital economy plans. Internationally, national strategies typically combine ethical principles, institutional flexibility, and a degree of functional ambiguity to balance innovation and regulatory intervention. For Iran, reliance on vague ethical declarations without enforceable mechanisms risks widening the gap between discourse and technical reality; conversely, rigid regulation without social participation, data infrastructure, and indigenous evaluation can stifle innovation and encourage circumvention. A framework that treats identity as a public policy issue and is technically and institutionally implementable is therefore an urgent necessity. How can Iran, in the age of artificial intelligence, align technological development with the active preservation and creative renewal of its national identity (in its Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary configuration), without falling into cultural closure or harmful self-contained insularity? This study advances a central policy proposition: by operationalizing a “cultural justice in AI” framework, supported by six interconnected policy pillars (spanning data sovereignty, indigenous evaluation benchmarks, participatory governance, and conditional international engagement) Iran can simultaneously foster responsible AI development and actively safeguard its national identity, thereby transforming potential algorithmic risks into opportunities for cultural resilience and creative renewal. This study adopts an analytical and policy‑oriented methodology. It does not test a narrow empirical hypothesis but designs a decision‑ready framework suitable for translation into programs, standards, and institutional mechanisms within regulatory bodies. The analysis proceeds along three synergistic paths: a critical review of AI governance literature, with emphasis on the state’s dual role as facilitator of development and guarantor of risk mitigation; a focus on the specific characteristics of generative AI, which amplify risks such as hallucination, opacity, and unintended cultural homogenization; and the grounding of these discussions in Iran’s indigenous configuration of national identity, translating abstract governance concepts (data, benchmarks, auditing, accountability) into the language of identity‑laden domains (Persian language, historical memory, religious authority, revolutionary narrative, social cohesion). The theoretical framework conceptualizes AI not as a neutral tool but as an “infrastructure of meaning” and a site of potential “data colonialism,” where cultural resources are extracted as raw material and returned as dominant stereotypes. Drawing on this critical lens, the study introduces the concept of “cultural justice in AI,” defined as the guarantee that Persian language, diverse dialects and expressive styles, and central narratives of history, religion, and revolution are not mere consumers of technological products but are actively present in the data layer, evaluation metrics, and decision‑making institutions. This perspective bridges infrastructure studies, critical data studies, and identity politics, emphasizing that cultural injustices often occur not in visible outputs but in the “invisibilities” of data collection, labeling, and weighting. The analysis yields a multidimensional policy framework that moves beyond symbolic protection toward operational transparency and accountability. First, the study maps identity‑sensitive domains (such as religious authority and automated fatwa systems, Persian language and literature education, historical narrative generation, and content recommendation in mass media) and classifies them according to risk levels (very high, high, medium/low). This risk‑based approach guides the intensity of regulatory intervention: very high‑risk applications require licensing, mandatory human‑in‑the‑loop, pre‑ and post‑audit, and grievance mechanisms, while lower‑risk domains can operate under lighter, supervised self‑regulation. Second, the article identifies three layers for translating the abstract notion of “identity risk” into actionable requirements: the data layer, where the creation and maintenance of high‑quality, diverse, and transparently documented Persian corpora are treated as public goods; the evaluation layer, where indigenous benchmarks are designed to assess not only technical fluency but also cultural‑identity dimensions such as distortion of religious concepts, ethnic stereotyping, and one‑sided historical narratives; and the institutional layer, where a participatory governance architecture is proposed. This includes a “Cultural Representation Council for AI,” a multi‑stakeholder body composed of linguists, historians, theologians, sociologists, and industry representatives, tasked with producing concrete audit protocols and data guidelines rather than general recommendations. Third, six complementary policy pillars are detailed: (1) defining and institutionalizing sensitive identity domains and risk tiers; (2) building and reinforcing reliable Persian corpora and data assets as commons; (3) designing indigenous cultural‑identity evaluation benchmarks and regular auditing mechanisms; (4) embedding participatory governance and cultural representation within the regulatory structure; (5) enhancing interdisciplinary AI literacy across educational, media, and religious institutions; and (6) pursuing targeted, conditional international data diplomacy to influence global standards and avoid passive marginalization. The discussion emphasizes that effective governance cannot rely solely on top‑down prohibition; it must be adaptive, learning‑oriented, and rooted in a political‑economic understanding of platform power. The framework advocates starting with policy pilots in selected domains, systematically gathering evidence, and iteratively revising rules, thereby maintaining innovation while ensuring accountability. It also warns that without deliberate investment in Persian data infrastructure and local evaluation tools, Iran risks becoming dependent on opaque foreign models that structurally embed alien cultural norms. The intersection of artificial intelligence and national identity in Iran is a governance‑level challenge. As generative models become the primary mediators of meaning (affecting education, collective memory, religious practice, and entertainment) policy inaction effectively cedes authority to external standards and datasets. The study concludes that aligning AI development with the Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary identity requires simultaneous intervention in three layers: semantic infrastructure (data, models), assessment (evaluation, auditing), and institutions (participation, accountability). The proposed package (centered on cultural justice, data sovereignty, indigenous benchmarks, participatory governance, literacy, and data diplomacy) offers a path to transform AI from a threat of cultural homogenization into an instrument of dynamic identity preservation. Responsiveness, in the sense of clear data provenance, documented model assumptions, transparent evaluation procedures, and defined liability for high‑risk errors, serves as the unifying thread of this architecture. Ultimately, a learning‑based governance model that balances innovation with rigorous accountability can enable Iran to strengthen its digital sovereignty while actively and creatively renewing its national identity.

Foreign Policy of the Twelfth Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran Towards the Taliban (1396-1400)

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 14 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245542

omid azizyan, meysam mantashloo

Abstract This research examines the influence of the foreign policy of the twelfth government of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Afghanistan, the special focus of the research will be on changing the approach of the twelfth government towards the Taliban and the role of Iran in the Afghan peace process. Also, Iran has tried to play a constructive role in the peace process of Afghanistan, which has also influenced the position of the Taliban. This research helps to better understand the dynamics of Iran's foreign policy in the region and the challenges facing it. The main question of the research is, what effect has the foreign policy of the 12th government of Iran had on the process of developments in Afghanistan, especially in relation to the Taliban? It seems that Iran's foreign policy in this period, while supporting the process of peace and stability in Afghanistan, has tried to maintain its national interests by adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to the developments in this country and the re-emergence of the Taliban. The research method of this research is library, analytical and descriptive, which was done by using reliable domestic and foreign sources. To compile the research, the set of regional security theories and crisis management theories have been used in a consolidated manner. The research findings show that Iran's foreign policy in this period was formed based on the principles of constructive interaction, economic diplomacy and multilateralism.

inter-regionalism; China's economic cooperation model and regional order in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (2004-2024)

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 14 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245544

Ashkan Golafshan

Abstract The People's Republic of China is known as a country whose status in the international system has been continuously improved and has entered into competition with other powers of the international system. China's continuous economic growth has caused a change in the economic agenda of the government in creating an approach to development and consolidation of power in the structures of international political economy, especially in the sensitive region of West Asia. this research tries to address the basic question of what effect China's economic policies towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have had on the relations of the council members. The research hypothesis is designed with a qualitative method and an explanatory approach in such a way that the inter-regional relations between China and the members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have led to the formation of a network of relations between the members of the Council, which has strengthened the level of cooperation, competition and interdependence between the members. Therefore, in this research, an attempt is made to investigate the influence of the field of inter-regionalism on the indicators of cooperation and competition in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

Explaining the Dimensions and Components of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Regionalism Strategy during the Transition of the International System

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 14 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245545

Rahbar Talei hur, Amirhosein mehdipour

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its location in the West Asia region and proximity to Central Asia and the Caucasus, requires an optimal regionalization strategy. Consequently, this research has been conducted with the aim of providing a scientific and analytical explanation of the dimensions and key components of the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy within the context of the ongoing transition in the international system. The main research question is as follows: within the theoretical framework of Neorealism and under the specific conditions of the transition of the international system, how can Iran's regionalization strategy and its components be delineated? In response to this question, the hypothesis is formulated that the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy can be operationalized across five dimensions—political, security, economic, and socio-cultural—with specific components in each dimension. Employing an explanatory-analytical approach and utilizing library resources, policy documents, and up-to-date regional evidence, this study has identified and evaluated these dimensions and components. The results indicate that the combination and synergy of these five dimensions, while enhancing Iran's resilience and balancing power, will provide new opportunities for elevating the country's status as a pivotal actor in the emerging regional order.

Crimes Against Women in the ISIS Caliphate: Organized Rape as a Weapon of War in the Reassertion of Dominance

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 14 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245547

Sajad Bahrami Moghadam, Amir Bayzidi, reza simbar

Abstract This article investigates the purpose and function of systematic sexual violence committed by the terrorist group ISIS (Daesh) in the occupied territories of Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. Evidence suggests these crimes were not merely the result of wartime chaos or individual acts, but rather an integral part of an organized policy designed to instill terror, alter demographic composition, reward ISIS fighters, and humiliate religious and ethnic minorities.The core issue addressed is that ISIS's sexual crimes were not isolated individual acts or mere byproducts of war, but instead constituted an essential element of an organized strategy. The article’s central research question is: What was ISIS’s objective in raping women in its controlled territories, and how did this practice fit into the group’s overarching strategy?This study employs an explanatory research method, with data collected through a documentary review, analysis of reports from the United Nations and human rights organizations, and examination of other relevant academic articles.The findings reveal that sexual violence in ISIS’s strategy went far beyond an ordinary crime. Supported by religious edicts (fatwas) and the organization of slave markets, it functioned as a powerful ideological tool. These acts were simultaneously used to create widespread terror, alter the demographic structure, provide rewards for fighters, and systematically humiliate ethnic and religious minorities.Ultimately, the article concludes that these actions were rooted in the region's historical and cultural patriarchal norms, and that sexual violence served as a multi-purpose instrument in ISIS’s strategy for expanding its domination and control.

The role of nuclear medicine capability on convergence between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 14 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245548

Hasan Asadollahpour, Norouzi Firuz, Rasoul, Mohammad Hossein Fallah

Abstract Focusing on Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities and its role in strengthening regional convergence, the present study analyzes the technical, therapeutic, and policy dimensions of cooperation between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries. Relying on the framework of Mittrani's functionalist theory, the present study seeks to examine how cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine, especially in the production and use of radiopharmaceuticals, can deepen regional relations and promote convergence between Iran and neighboring countries. The research method used is qualitative content analysis, which was conducted through a review of scientific documents, international reports, and interviews with Iranian experts in the field of nuclear medicine. The findings indicate that Iran, by taking advantage of its technological advantages in the production of radiopharmaceuticals and providing cost-effective medical services, can act as a hub for scientific and technical cooperation in the region. Such cooperation not only leads to the improvement of health indicators in the Persian Gulf countries, but also paves the way for knowledge networking, information exchange, and the development of medical tourism. Accordingly, strengthening scientific cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine can be considered as an efficient tool for expanding political and economic interactions in the region.

Scenario Analysis of Iran-Israel Relations (2025-2035): Identifying Key Factors, Designing Future Scenarios, and Proposing Strategic Responses

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 15 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245620

Amin SadeqiBakyani,

Abstract This research was conducted with the aim of identifying the key factors influencing the relations between Iran and the Zionist regime, designing potential future scenarios (2025–2035), assessing their likelihood and consequences, and proposing strategic responses. This descriptive-analytical study adopts a futurology approach using the scenario analysis method. The statistical population consisted of relevant scientific sources, and purposive sampling was employed. Secondary data were collected through a review of Persian and Latin sources (library and documentary). Findings indicate that key factors include ideology, the nuclear program, geopolitics, security, economy, cyber warfare, and the role of major powers. By integrating the moderating variable of “domestic political transformations in Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime,” four scenarios were designed: 1) Balance of Power World, 2) Diplomacy and Limited Tension World, 3) Hidden War World, and 4) Direct Confrontation World. Probability assessment reveals that the “Hidden War” scenario is highly probable, acting as a dynamic equilibrium resilient to political shocks. The “Diplomacy and Limited Tension” scenario is likely in the short term but unstable in the long term. The “Balance of Power” scenario has a low to medium probability, while the “Direct Confrontation” scenario has a low probability, though it remains a critical tail risk with catastrophic consequences. The conclusion suggests that the probability of widespread war is low, but indirect tensions will persist. Strategic responses are proposed for Iran

Assessing how China utilizes the concept of "great power responsibility" to expand its influence in the Middle East

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 17 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.555494.1534

Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, Sarbast Muhammad, Mokhtar Salehi

Abstract China is one of the world's great powers, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, one of the world's great military powers, and in the economic sphere, it controls about 15% of the world's economy after the United States. In the last two decades, following stunning economic growth, China has been trying to redefine the world order. Beijing is trying to improve its position in the global system in competition with the United States with a different logic from the West, in the light of partnership agreements with different countries, and presenting a different concept of "great power responsibility". The Middle East region has an important place in China's achievement of its strategic goal. The question of this research is how China has expanded its influence in this region in competition with the United States by taking advantage of the concept of great power responsibility towards the Middle East region. The findings of this study, which were obtained by utilizing the conceptualization of great power responsibility from China's perspective as well as the descriptive-analytical research method, indicate that China, while seeking stability in the Middle East, is trying to secure its economic and political interests by respecting the sovereignty of the countries in the region and "peaceful development" and expand its influence in this region in competition with the United States.

"The 12-Day War of the Zionist Regime Against Iran: Analyzing Geopolitical and Regional Security Consequences Based on a Networked and Critical Approach in International Relations"

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 20 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.245934

Morteza Bandari, HASAN Mohammadi, Abdolreza Alishahi

Abstract The present study aims to analyze the consequences of the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran on regional security, the balance of power in West Asia, and the responses of regional and international actors. The main research question is: "How can the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran be analyzed from the perspectives of network geopolitics and critical security, and what are its security and geopolitical consequences?" The research hypothesis posits that the short-term war by the Zionist regime against Iran, by disrupting the political, economic, and security networks of the region, intensifies long-term geopolitical consequences as well as human and regional security threats. The findings, utilizing a combination of network geopolitics (to analyze complex relations among regional and extra-regional actors) and critical security approaches (to examine human, social, and beyond-military consequences), along with qualitative analysis based on case studies, secondary sources, and content analysis of political and security data, demonstrate that the 12-Day War disrupted regional networks, weakened collective security and regional cooperation, and threatened the geopolitical stability of West Asia. This study emphasizes the importance of network-based analysis and a critical approach in understanding regional crises and provides strategies for strengthening collective security and preventive diplomacy.

The impact of China's influence on the U.S. strategy in the West Asia region from 2021 to 2025

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 21 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246023

Mohammadreza Hatamvand, Rahmat Hajimineh, شفیعی Shafie

Abstract China, as an emerging power in the world, has rapidly increased its influence in the West Asia region. Since the rise of communism in China, the country has established strong relations with several countries in the region. Now Beijing seen as a serious competitor to the hegemony of the United States. The growing economy, military power, market productivity, and the so-called non-interventionist approach provide China with a powerful leverage for further engagement with countries in West Asia. China's ambitions in West Asia are not limited to oil, gas, and markets; this region also holds strategic importance, and the "Belt and Road Initiative" encompasses all aspects of it. Currently, China's expanding diplomatic, economic, and military power has become a serious threat to the United States. The goal of this research is to examine the dimensions of China's increasing influence on regional security and its impact on changing U.S. policies toward this region. In this context, the main research question is: How has China's growing influence in West Asia affected the shift in U.S. strategy in the region from 2021 to 2025? This study, based on a methodology and approach grounded in qualitative and descriptive-analytical methods, analyzes how China's influence has raised concerns in the United States regarding West Asia and has led to a revival of U.S. influence and presence through a return to the region, economic diplomacy, technological diplomacy, and the adoption of new multilayered alliance-building policies in the region between 2021 and 2025.

Analysis of the Deterrent Measures of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Maintaining Public Order and Security

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 25 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246231

akbar pourat, esmaeil abdollahia, maryam safaee

Abstract This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategies and deterrent measures employed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran to preserve public order and security. The study is situated within the evolving paradigm of security studies, which has expanded from traditional state-centric military defense to encompass broader concepts of "human security" and hybrid warfare. The article posits that the IRGC has developed a unique, multi-layered model of deterrence to address Iran's complex security challenges. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic position in West Asia, faces a multifaceted array of threats, ranging from conventional military risks and cross-border terrorist groups to more nuanced challenges such as cultural infiltration, cognitive warfare, media propaganda, cyber-attacks, and economic sanctions. Theoretical Framework and Methodology The study employs a mixed-methods research approach, combining qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative phase utilized a two-round Delphi method, involving semi-structured interviews and theoretical content analysis with 14 security and defense experts from relevant state institutions. This phase identified key dimensions, components, and themes related to the IRGC's management of terrorist crimes. The quantitative phase involved a closed questionnaire, derived from the Delphi findings, which was distributed to security experts and mid-level IRGC managers. Respondents rated the importance of various factors using a four-point Likert scale. Data analysis was performed using Friedman's test and Kendall's coefficient of concordance to rank the factors and measure the level of expert consensus.

Media development and foreign policy: Exploring strategies to enhance Iraq's media diplomacy

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 26 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246244

Hatef Pourrashidi, Ali Asghar, Ahmadzadeh

Abstract In order to exert influence in the international arena, the new Iraq needs to have a more active presence in the field of global foreign policy and communication. This will enable the country to advance its national interests across various levels. The lack of media development during Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and the Baath party regime has had lasting effects, leaving the Iraqi government without a defined strategy in media and public diplomacy. Despite the increasing importance of media power in foreign policy as a form of soft power over the past few decades, which has become a key indicator of a country's diplomatic prowess, Iraq has lagged behind. This study, based on the analysis of interviews with 20 Iraqi media, communication, and diplomatic experts, aims to explore potential solutions for enhancing Iraqi media diplomacy and elevating its standing. The findings suggest that creating tailored media content, implementing a targeted media strategy, and directing media focus towards foreign policy matters are key steps that can enhance Iraq's media diplomacy.

Revisiting the Concept of Power in Islam and Its Relation to Realist Theory in International Relations

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 27 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246298

amirhosein valipourrad

Abstract Power is a fundamental concept in International Relations, particularly in Realist theory. While Realism defines power mainly in terms of survival, security, the balance of power, and national interest, Islamic thought incorporates material, ethical, normative, and divine dimensions into its understanding of power. This study examines the extent to which the Islamic conception of power overlaps with the realist perspective and identifies the areas in which it requires refinement. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a refinement (tanqīḥ) and purification (tahdhīb) approach, the article comparatively analyzes the concept of power in Realism and Islamic thought. The analysis is based on an interpretation of Islam that views power within the framework of justice, deterrence, legitimate defense, legitimacy, and moral responsibility. The findings show that Islam recognizes the necessity of power for maintaining security, deterrence, and the survival of the political community, thus sharing common ground with some realist assumptions. However, it rejects the realist view of power as an autonomous end based on the continuous accumulation of domination. Instead, it defines power through the principles of justice, human dignity, legitimacy, moral responsibility, divine purpose, and restrictions on the use of force. Given the diversity of Islamic interpretations concerning jihad, relations with non-Muslims, and the exercise of power, the study adopts a defensive–deterrent perspective as its analytical framework. It concludes that Islamic power emerges from the interaction of material capabilities, moral legitimacy, and divine purpose, providing a refined and context-based framework for understanding power in International Relations.

Analysis of the Deterrent Measures of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Maintaining Public Order and Security

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 27 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246299

akbar pourat, esmaeil abdollahia, maryam safaee

Abstract This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategies and deterrent measures employed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran to preserve public order and security. The study is situated within the evolving paradigm of security studies, which has expanded from traditional state-centric military defense to encompass broader concepts of "human security" and hybrid warfare. The article posits that the IRGC has developed a unique, multi-layered model of deterrence to address Iran's complex security challenges. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic position in West Asia, faces a multifaceted array of threats, ranging from conventional military risks and cross-border terrorist groups to more nuanced challenges such as cultural infiltration, cognitive warfare, media propaganda, cyber-attacks, and economic sanctions.
Theoretical Framework and Methodology The study employs a mixed-methods research approach, combining qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative phase utilized a two-round Delphi method, involving semi-structured interviews and theoretical content analysis with 14 security and defense experts from relevant state institutions. This phase identified key dimensions, components, and themes related to the IRGC's management of terrorist crimes. The quantitative phase involved a closed questionnaire, derived from the Delphi findings, which was distributed to security experts and mid-level IRGC managers. Respondents rated the importance of various factors using a four-point Likert scale. Data analysis was performed using Friedman's test and Kendall's coefficient of concordance to rank the factors and measure the level of expert consensus.

Political Aspects of the Annulment and Enforcement of the ICSID Arbitration Awards with an Emphasis on Its Consequences for Iran

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 29 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246462

Mojtaba Horri

Abstract This article provides a comparative study of the challenges of annulment and enforcement of arbitral awards issued by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Given the increasing importance of international arbitration in investment disputes and the pivotal role of ICID in this field, it is essential to have a proper understanding of the legal mechanisms governing the annulment and enforcement of ICID awards. This study first examines the mechanisms and legal foundations of annulment of awards in the ICID system itself, and then, with a comparative approach, examines the domestic laws of different countries, especially Iran, and the approach of arbitral tribunals in other legal systems regarding the recognition and enforcement of these awards. In this regard, key concepts such as the rules governing jurisdiction, manifest violation of procedure, and grounds for annulment of awards in ICID, as well as the conditions and obstacles to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in national systems, will be analyzed. The main goal of this research is to provide a comprehensive picture of the current situation and the challenges ahead in the annulment and implementation of the ICSID votes, and to provide solutions to facilitate the fair and effective implementation processes of these votes at the international level.

The Cycle of Political Instability and Development Failure in Afghanistan: The Role of Ethnic Divides, External Dependence, and the Legitimacy Crisis

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 29 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246464

seyyed hossein athari, Basir Ahmad Firouzi, vahid sinaee, morteza manshadi

Abstract Focusing on the cycle of political instability and development failure in Afghanistan, this research examines three main variables including ethnic divisions, external dependence, and legitimacy crisis as factors in this cycle. faults that are intertwined with internal political and security competitions and have prevented the creation of an inclusive and stable state. Also, historical and structural dependence on foreign support, whether in the form of direct interventions by world powers or in the form of dependence on financial and military aid, has weakened the country's independence of political decision-making and has led to the fragility of the state structure. The legitimacy crisis, as a complementary link in this cycle, is caused by the lack of transparent elections and the weakness of democratic institutions, which ultimately has led to citizens' distrust of the political system. The research method was conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner and data were collected from historical, political sources, and contemporary reports. The findings show that the combination of these three factors has trapped Afghanistan in a vicious cycle that is difficult to escape from, such that whenever there is room for development, ethnic divisions or foreign interventions have disrupted stability and exacerbated the legitimacy crisis. The results suggest that resolving the Afghan crisis depends only on redefining political legitimacy based on genuine citizen participation, reducing dependence on foreign support, and constructively managing ethnic diversity. Otherwise, the cycle of political instability will continue and the failure to progress on the path to development will continue.

Preventive Approaches of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Combating the Financing of Terrorism with an Emphasis on International Documents

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 30 June 2026

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2026.246551

Mahdi Razzaghinezhad, Kioumars Kalantari

Abstract The issue of terrorism is one of the most important issues discussed among countries in the world, because its consequences in security, political, legal, economic, military and even cultural issues have always been tangible and effective. In this regard, different countries in the world have adopted and implemented different approaches and policies in combating the financing of terrorism based on the necessity of combating and confronting terrorism. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to examine preventive approaches in combating the financing of terrorism; a comparative study of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and international documents. The main question is: "What are the preventive approaches of the Islamic Republic of Iran in combating the financing of terrorism based on international documents?" The findings of the research, using a descriptive-analytical method, library resources, and terrorism theory, showed that the preventive approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in combating the financing of terrorism is based on two types of criminal and non-criminal prevention, while in international documents on this issue, it is of the type of non-criminal prevention. Accordingly, the laws existing in Iranian law regarding the fight against the crime of financing terrorism are of the type of criminal prevention, and environmental, social, and managerial factors are also of the type of non-criminal prevention, although the lack of a comprehensive and complete concept and elements of terrorism has created legislative challenges in this regard.

Islamic World

Changing to Partnership

Volume 4, Issue 2, Summer 2022, Pages 1-29

https://doi.org/10.22034/FASIW.2022.344912.1165

Somaye , Marvoti, Hamid Ahmadi, Mahdi Zakarian,

Abstract In recent decades Sino-Afghan relations have been based on Beijing's approach to regional and international developments. The elimination of American troops from Afghanistan and the seizure of Kabul by the Taliban changed China's approach to Afghanistan from different perspectives. The US withdrawal will change the balance of power in Afghanistan and its environs. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been based on security considerations, and now economic considerations have been added to it. China's economic project in Pakistan and Central Asia, along with fears of links between extremist groups in Afghanistan and neighboring Uighurs, is one of China's top security concerns. The Taliban's presence in power and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan have changed the pattern of relations from expected indifference to strategic partnership. Components such as environmental uncertainty and strategic compliance paved the way for China to adopt this model. In this context, the present study will examine why China's approach to Afghanistan changes from expected indifference to strategic partnership and will try to provide a clear picture of developments by mentioning China's role in Afghanistan.
Examining China-Afghanistan relations in the past decades proves that China's distance and proximity to Afghanistan depended on China's internal restrictions, regional and international developments, China's competition with other actors and dealing with extremist threats. In this regard, we can mention China's secret assistance to arm the Mujahedeen in 1980 during the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces . Therefore, the statement of relations based on the assessment of the needs of two actors has no place for Arabs here. The official relations between China and Afghanistan began in the 1950s with the recognition of China by Afghanistan. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been economic with an emphasis on security considerations. In the past decades, security considerations have always been the first priority in the eyes of the Chinese authorities towards Afghanistan, which include the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the civil war in Afghanistan, the dominance of the Taliban and finally the presence of American forces. As a great power that is consolidating its hegemony in its surrounding environment, China definitely evaluates every impulse and the presence of competing actors in the region from the perspective of its competition with that actor. The presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan in the past decades can be examined from this point of view.
In this regard, we can mention China's cooperation and lack of cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan. In the 1980s and with the attack of the Soviet forces on Afghanistan, China stood by the United States and against the Soviet Union, and after the attack of the Western coalition led by the United States on Afghanistan in September 2001, it refused military and security cooperation with these forces and distanced itself from the efforts of foreign actors presented in Afghanistan. For political reconciliation and reconstruction, Afghanistan kept as far away as possible and avoided accepting the title of the West's partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Huasheng, 2012), while the coalition forces were fighting the Taliban threatening China's strategic interests, Beijing exploration projects  began monitoring Afghanistan's underground resources, and this action faced serious criticism from the United States and even Russia .
The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has serious consequences on regional equations in South and Central Asia; Therefore, all regional actors are trying to closely monitor the developments and present multiple scenarios to minimize possible security and political costs. Any change in the arrangement of forces in Afghanistan definitely affects the current and future interests and goals of regional actors. China, as a neighboring country of Afghanistan and one of the most important players in the economic war with America, is definitely closely monitoring the developments in Afghanistan. From China's point of view, everything that provides the ground for terrorism and international extremism on the edge of its territorial borders and around its economic super project will be specially monitored. From this point of view, the developments in Afghanistan have both components.
Despite Beijing's previous approaches to the developments in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of American forces from this country has caused China to worry due to the change in the nature of threats. Since 2016, with increasing speculations about the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the creation of a security evacuation in this country, Beijing, like other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, initiated the project of securing its border lines with Afghanistan . China has detailed plans for Afghanistan without foreign military forces for several reasons: 1. Afghanistan is one of the focal points in the One Belt One Road project; 2. There are religious extremists on both sides of the border lines between Afghanistan and China, and China is worried about the connection between the Uyghurs with ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan; 3. To expand its political influence in the region, China should expand its influence to the remaining regions such as Afghanistan and advance its security and political goals through an economic lens; 4. Beijing expects American material and moral support for Chinese Muslim protesters in the west of this country, and from this point of view, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan despite the ongoing crisis in this country has aroused China's suspicion.
As mentioned, China, as one of Afghanistan's neighboring countries, has chosen a "wait and wait" approach to Afghanistan's developments in the last twenty years; But since 2016, with the withdrawal of American forces, China has changed its policy of conscious and considered indifference towards Afghanistan and put a cooperative and step-by-step approach on the agenda. Strategic partnership is a new model of relations between governments that has entered international relations literature from the beginning of the 21st century. Based on the changing pattern of China's cooperation with Afghanistan, the current research tries to present a picture of the actions of foreign actors in the neighboring environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to provide the basis for other researches in this field. Therefore, in this research, by introducing the model of strategic partnership and explaining it, it will deal with the application of two economic and political components separately on the two variables of China's attitude and actions towards Afghanistan, and finally, the conclusion section and providing strategic recommendations for Iranian policy makers.

Islamic World

Taliban and Retrieving the Sovereignty: Strong Movement, Weak Nation-State

Volume 4, Issue 3, Autumn 2022, Pages 105-130

https://doi.org/10.22034/FASIW.2022.350464.1179

Mohsen Abbaszadeh Marzbali,, Kausar Taleshi Kelti,

Abstract Of the most unexpected events in the year, 2021 was the collapse of the Afghanistan government, on August 15th, 2021, and the re-emergence of the Taliban’s Islamic state (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) without facing up serious resistance from the state and society. How can one analyze the Taliban`s takeover of the country? This is the central question that guides the analytical narration in the text. The present research attempts to come up with a multi-faceted scheme to respond to the question. In this regard, the paper hypothesizes that the Taliban movement managed to retrieve its sovereignty owing to symmetry of some factors: its internal social solidarity/ coherence in the context of Afghanistan’s segmented society and failed state, and connivance in the international environment as well. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of some theoretical approaches under a combinative theoretical framework. The constituents are as follows: the concept of ‘Asabiyyah’ (social solidarity in Ibn Khalodn's sense of the word), ‘resource mobilization theory, the quadruple crisis of the regime, and the role of the international environment in revolutionary transformation.
 
According to the framework, the Taliban`s mobility to conquer the country was proceeding continually because of internal social solidarity driven by its ethnic (Pashtunism) and religious (Deobandi Salafi) foundations. It is whilst, on the contrary, there had been a segmented society and failed state due to a crisis in the process of nation-state building. Consequently, not only was there were lack of national solidarity and united orientation against the coherent ethnoreligious movement of the Taliban, but also the Taliban utilized the government’s inefficacies and miss-functions (such as juncture and corruption in the political system) to mobilize the followers and attract the potential ones among the disappointed people.
 
In terms of the process of capturing the country, the Taliban’s mobility pattern showed some formal similarities to ‘Eastern Revolutions’ (in Huntington's sense of the word); that is, launching from the periphery to the capital. Having learned from the past, the Taliban came up with a more pragmatic orientation in its second round. While showing a tendency to negotiate with internal and foreign effective agents in the political environment of Afghanistan, the Taliban aimed to represent a modified picture of the movement compared to the long-standing violent image. To sum up, the causes of the Taliban`s success in re-taking political power can be narrated as the symmetry of the strong movement and the weak nation-state; the ethnoreligious social solidarity of the Taliban, and the lack of national solidarity and efficient government.
 
Afghanistan went through difficult times in 2021. It was not yet summer when those provinces came under the pressure of the Taliban fighting forces and then dominoes fell one after another until the Taliban forces reached the gates of Kabul. Finally, in the middle of August, to the surprise of the world, the capital fell and the Taliban managed to seize power in Afghanistan for the second time and start a rapid transformation in the Afghan political system in order to revive the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. There are factors involved in the occurrence of this transformation, some of which are the responsibility of the Afghan government and the others part of the United States: 1. The announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan; 2. Weakness and a deep gap in the leadership of the Afghan government; 3. The deep gap between army and country policies; 4. Perpetuation of the corrupting incomes caused by drugs, as well as increasing the Taliban's income generation from local sources; 5. Denial of many problems in the organization, training, equipment, and leadership of Afghan forces at least from 2007 onwards by the US, NATO, and the Afghan government; 6. The low level of readiness of the Afghan army due to dependence on American forces; 7. Dependence of Afghan forces on contractors for equipment; 8. The wrong focus of America and NATO on only the terrorist and military threat of the Taliban instead of evaluating the reasons for their increasing progress, 9. Focusing only on the cities and densely populated centers and leaving the villages and suburbs; 10. Not paying attention to the strategy of the Taliban, which was preparing for a massive advance toward the north and other regions at the same time as the peace talks.
This development has been analyzed from different perspectives, such as examining the causes of the weakness of the Afghan government, the role of foreign powers, its impact on the future of Afghanistan, regional relations, and its threats and opportunities for Iran. What distinguishes the current research is the focus on analyzing why and how this political transformation occurred from the perspective of "revolutionary transformation theories". In this context, the question is raised, how to analyze the Taliban's re-gaining power? The nature and context of the recent political transformation in Afghanistan have been such that the fixation on one of the common divisions of revolutionary transformations (revolution, coup, civil war, etc.) hinders the understanding of the various dimensions and complexities of this transformation. Based on this, the current research is based on the hypothesis that the theoretical analysis of this event requires a combination of old and new theories about the logic of political transformation. In this sense, the Taliban's ethnoreligious movement, relies on the element of nervousness, in the conditions of the crisis of the nation-state in Afghanistan, i.e. a mixture of a fragmented society and a bankrupt government and symmetry with suitable international conditions, without facing serious resistance from the society, the government and successful foreign actors to restore its sovereignty in Afghanistan. The way this transformation took place was similar to the style of eastern revolutions, advancing from the periphery to conquering the capital.
The present research consists of several parts. First, in the form of a combined theoretical framework, the theoretical possibilities of old and new theories are highlighted in the direction of designing the elements of a conceptual model. In the next steps, we show the implications and examples of each of the elements of this combined theoretical framework for the analysis of the Taliban's resumption of power. In order, to the importance of nervousness in the group cohesion of the Taliban, the effect of social disintegration and the absence of the national government on the non-formation of anti-mobilization against the Taliban, and symmetry with the appropriate international conditions in the transfer of power. In the end, by freely using the style of eastern revolutions, we explain the formation of this transformation (how the Taliban advance).

Islamic World

Israel's national security strategy in the face of environmental threats

Volume 3, Issue 7, Summer 2021, Pages 40-64

Seyed Hadi Borhani, Seyed Hamed Hosseini

Abstract Understanding Israel's security policies from a realist point of view has almost become a fundamental principle. It seems that this regional actor has adjusted all its relations with regional countries based on the policy of zero sum, and therefore security concerns have overshadowed other aspects of the actor's policies. Accordingly, Israel's foreign policy is almost equivalent to its national security policy, and without understanding the nature of security threats and challenges, understanding Israel's foreign policy process cannot be understood and evaluated. In the long run, it seems that Israel's security problems have not changed much, and this small actor still faces the same challenges both at the peripheral and regional levels. Given that Israel views regional security relations vertically, that is exclusively state-to-state and confined to superior military power, not horizontally and strategically or multilaterally and under comprehensive security, effective deterrence remains at the core of Israel's strategic thinking.
Existing trends are likely to turn into turmoil sooner or later, forcing Israel to play a role in mitigating the challenges. From Israel's point of view, the emergence of this emerging Middle East has created a new multi-faceted and uncertain scenario in which a strategic doctrine adapted to these changing and unexpected conditions is essential for survival. Today's complex and challenging operating conditions, which have led to geostrategic changes in borders and the environment, are the result of regional developments and related events that have led to fundamental changes in the level of Israel's strategic decisions. At the core of Israel's strategic assessment is the challenge between its apparent power and success in various fields and the likelihood that this situation will continue, albeit temporarily and fragilely. This challenge stems from a number of factors that could in the future lead to the expansion of threats and conflicts with the escalation of the security dilemma, and includes Israel's approach to a series of key national security challenges.
Overall, in the view of Israeli security analysts, the window of strategic opportunity does not appear to have been sufficiently exploited, and growing threats require a rethinking of Israel's security strategy, defense policy, resource allocation, and more up-to-date strategies. These analysts suggest two possible approaches to Israel's strategy: one is a cautious and stabilizing solution, emphasizing diplomacy and controlling existing threats so that they do not become malignant. Second, it is a preventive and possibly aggressive solution to eliminate emerging threats, but it can lead to full-scale war in various fields. According to these analysts, the main prerequisite for choosing the right approach is to strengthen the foundation of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, and by emphasizing social solidarity, they seek to first heal social gaps and then restore confidence in governing institutions. In addition, the issue of Palestine continues to mean that the real problem that some actors are trying to ignore, or at least pretend to not exist, has significant implications for regional actors' relations. The issue of Palestine remains a regional issue with historical, religious and cultural dimensions, and Israel and its allies cannot ignore it. It is true that Israel's relations with some Arab countries have taken on a new form, but strong alliances with Israel are not expected to be formed before the Palestinian issue is resolved.
Analysis and strategic assessment of regional trends show that Israel does not face immediate and immediate threats at this time and in the short term. However, there are signs of internal, peripheral, and regional trends that could lead to malignancies in the future and increase the likelihood that these existential threats will become a reality. The timing of these threats, which are largely foreign sources, varies: while rocket and missile strikes can occur in the short term, other external threats, such as the formation of a regional coalition of hostile actors, the nuclearization of the Middle East, and international isolation, can occur in the interim. Long-term occur. At the same time, the internal threat of social incoherence to Israeli Jewish identity under certain conditions could also develop in the medium term. Regardless of the ideological point of view, in the end it should be emphasized that Israel is not a passive actor according to the existing assessments, but an actor that tries to change the existing threatening realities and keep the threats it faces away.

Islamic World

UAE foreign policy strategy in Syria crisis 2011-2024

Volume 7, Issue 1, Spring 2025, Pages 255-278

https://doi.org/10.22034/fasiw.2025.494048.1412

Seyed Ali Nejat,

Abstract The wave of Arab uprisings in 2010 reshaped the Middle East’s regional order, prompting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an emerging regional power, to adopt an active role in the Syrian crisis. Prior to 2011, the UAE maintained close ties with the Assad government, investing heavily in Syria. However, in 2012, as the crisis escalated, the UAE severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and supported opposition groups. Between 2012 and 2014, the UAE pursued an aggressive policy aimed at toppling Assad, but from 2018 onward, it shifted toward de-escalation and normalization of relations. This shift, marked by the reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus and reciprocal high-level visits, is analyzed through the lens of pragmatism. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on library and electronic sources, this article examines the reasons behind this policy shift, positing that regional and international political, economic, and security considerations were the primary drivers of this pragmatic turn. Pragmatism in international relations prioritizes policies that maximize national interests without being constrained by abstract principles. In recent years, the UAE has sought to project itself as a pragmatic, interest-driven actor, engaging with diverse regional and international players. The UAE’s foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2024 can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first period, the UAE adopted an aggressive stance aimed at overthrowing Assad, aligning with U.S. policies. Politically, it closed its embassy in Damascus and supported the “Friends of Syria” group and the Syrian National Coalition. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed called for Assad’s ouster in 2013, while Mohammed bin Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, predicted Assad’s downfall in 2014. Militarily, the UAE provided over $1 billion in funding through operations like “Timber Sycamore” and participated in the MOC operations room, supporting armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Economically, Abu Dhabi hosted conferences like the 2012 “Partnership for Investment in Syria’s Future,” backing anti-Assad businessmen. This aggressive policy was rooted in pragmatism, as the UAE sought to enhance its regional influence and emerge as a key power. Cooperation with allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. aimed to counter Iran’s influence and the Axis of Resistance. The UAE perceived Iran as a geopolitical, nationalist (Arab-Persian), and sectarian (Sunni-Shia) threat. Politically and militarily, Abu Dhabi supported Assad’s opponents to advance these objectives. The entry of Russia into the Syrian crisis in 2015 and the reduced likelihood of Assad’s ouster prompted the UAE to retreat from its confrontational stance. Abu Dhabi withdrew from the anti-ISIS coalition and refrained from condemning Russia’s actions. Anwar Gargash, noted that Moscow was targeting a common enemy (ISIS). The prolonged crisis and the failure of opposition groups increased the UAE’s costs, leading it to redirect resources to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the UAE softened its critical rhetoric and began to view Assad as part of a potential resolution to the crisis. From 2018, the UAE adopted a pragmatic approach, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Improved relations were evident through official visits, the resumption of flights, and enhanced intelligence and economic cooperation. In 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed announced UAE support for Syria’s COVID-19 response, including aid shipments. In 2021, Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus, signing agreements for solar power investments. Assad’s visits to the UAE in 2022 and 2023 marked a turning point. The UAE also played a pivotal role in Syria’s reinstatement in the Arab League, advocating for regional stability. In 2024, Hassan Ahmed Al-Shehi was appointed UAE Ambassador to Damascus. The UAE’s shift toward normalization from 2015 was driven by multiple factors. Politically, the UAE sought to shape Syria’s future and curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it viewed as a regional security threat, considering Assad a preferable alternative to jihadist groups. Security-wise, the UAE aimed to reduce Iran and Turkey’s influence in Syria through diplomacy rather than confrontation, believing closer ties with Damascus would limit rivals’ leverage. Additionally, the UAE pursued an independent stance from Saudi Arabia to assert geopolitical primacy. Economically, the UAE sought opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, capturing 14% of Syria’s foreign trade by 2021. Overall, the UAE’s relations with Syria from 2011 to 2024 underwent significant shifts. Initially, the UAE cut ties and backed Assad’s opponents aggressively. However, from 2015, due to the opposition’s failures, Russia’s intervention, and high conflict costs, the UAE pivoted toward de-escalation. The reopening of its embassy in 2018, reciprocal visits, and support for Syria’s Arab League reinstatement reflected a pragmatic approach. Following Assad’s ouster in 2024, the UAE maintained ties with the new government but remained wary of Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence. These shifts, aligned with pragmatism, underscore the UAE’s flexibility in pursuing national interests, countering rivals, and asserting a pivotal regional role. Assad’s fall, however, presented both opportunities and challenges for the UAE. While it achieved its goal of distancing Syria from Iran, the rise of Turkey and Qatar as key backers of Syria’s new leadership—aligned with the UAE’s regional rivals—poses challenges. Abu Dhabi views the dominance of ideologically driven Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant threat, potentially sparking new competition with Turkey.    

Islamic World

Islamic Republic of Iran s The policy towards the GCC countries

Volume 2, Issue 6, Winter 2021, Pages 49-72

Reza Simbar, Danial Rezapour, Sadigheh Azin

Abstract  The Middle East is one of the most important, sensitive and complex regions in the world. What makes this region stand out in all its dimensions and areas is its unique political, economic, cultural-social, geographical and geopolitical features. These conditions have somehow overshadowed the structural equations of the region under the dialectical influence of the interaction of political, economic, cultural-social and security components and power in relation to other actors in the region, so that the increase of cooperation of these governments in this interaction space, eventually led to the formation of an organization called the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 in the Persian Gulf regional system. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is one of the most important regional organizations in the regional environment of Iran, and Iran's policies have always played an important role in the orientations and goals of the council. In this regard, the members of the Council considered the developments in the Middle East, especially the establishment of a democratic and Shiite government in Iraq and the developments of the Islamic Awakening as a shift in the balance of power in favor of Iran and increasing power and influence in the regions of Iran. Movements in the regions of Iran see their lives and survival in danger.  This has caused them to use all their facilities and tools to counter the growing power of the regions of Iran. Understanding the real tensions between Iran and the Saudi-led PGCC countries along the Shiite-Sunni lines in the PGCC has been shaped most regionally and internationally. These differences also undermine Iran's efforts to improve relations with council governments in recent years. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, he has repeatedly proposed peace initiatives for Saudi-led PGCC member states. Not only has this pragmatic policy not been very successful, but Iran-Saudi Arabia relations have become much colder than before. Relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have worsened since the Barjam nuclear deal. Iran's regional expansion and the siege of Qatar, while changing the power structure in the Persian Gulf region, created more tension and insecurity in the region and increased the scope of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the UN Security Council and the announcement of "maximum pressure policy." He turned against Iran. Although several smaller Gulf states have taken a more balanced approach to their relations with Iran, the main policy of the council is by Saudi Arabia with a new configuration of Middle East policy that sees a rare tripartite convergence of interests was regulated against Iran between Saudi Arabia and Israel. and the United States under Trump. According to the actions of the Cooperation Council and foreign interventionist powers, Iran's policy towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly based on three considerations: First, it hopes to turn enemies into friends, improves Iran's isolated position, and resolves the security-geopolitical dilemma in the Persian Gulf region. Second, Tehran's goal is to develop trade relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors and promote Iran's economic development, and third, to cooperate with Iran to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf and weaken its hostility to Iran. Therefore, this article uses a method of analytical research to review the regional and international policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a historical perspective to explain the relations with the neighbors of the Cooperation Council in the post-Iran-Iraq period. The question that arises is what has been the main component and axis of Iran's policy after the Holy Defense, especially during the presidency of Mr. Rouhani towards the PGCC? . This study shows that during Mr. Rouhani's administration, improving relations with the PGCC has been the main focus of Iran's efforts to improve security in the Persian Gulf region. However, a number of structural obstacles, historical distrust, and Iran's movements in the region have severely hostile Tehran's relations with the Cooperation Council and have further increased insecurity in the region as Iran's growing influence in the Arab region coincides with its anti-hegemonic policy. This means that Iran's peace initiatives with the Cooperation Council have faced major obstacles, and Iran's success in reducing tensions and promoting peace plans with the PGCC has not been useful.

Islamic World

Explain how to de-secure Iran-Afghanistan relations from 2000 to 2019

Volume 2, Issue 6, Winter 2021, Pages 25-48

Hadi Shekh Ghafoori, Sakineh Babri Gonbad, Hosein Deheshyar

Abstract Abstract
along the years of relationships , these two countries have witnessed various kinds of engagement within political, economic and security areas. Among the most important issues between our two countries are, Hirmand River,the problem of narcotic,Taleban Terrorism and the problem of Afghan refugees as well as economic cooperation.
Utilizing the descriptive-analytic method, this article provides true answers to the question of how the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan can be proceed within the De-security framework during 2000 to 2019.
In order to test and evaluate the hypothesis of utilizing the theoretical concepts and parameters of securitization -desecuritization within the framework of Copenhagen Security School, endeavors have been taken place to understand better the relationship between two countries within the axis of dsescuritizstion.
From this perspective, in answer to the main question, it should be said that with the gradual removal of security issues from the narrow military and political sphere and the transfer of foreign policy from the political-security layers to the economic-trade layers, Iran-Afghanistan relations is at the desired levels of their agents. The country will move towards insecurity.
A look at the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan shows that these two countries are affected by each other due to their neighborhood. For example, the civil war in Afghanistan led to instability on Iran's borders and the influx of Afghan refugees into Iran.
However, there are several factors in the formulation of security policies that have hindered the development of other relations and the emergence of challenges in Iran-Afghanistan relations. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US and NATO military movements in Afghanistan, political-consensus instability, and economic instability resulting from the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, along with drug trafficking, especially in the post-Taliban period from 2000 to 2019. It has been a collection of sources threatening the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue has emerged in the formulation of Iran's political-security relations with Afghanistan. This approach has hindered the development of economic-trade relations as a first step of cooperation and coordination.
From this perspective, getting out of the narrow military circle is criticized from the point of view of those who considered security one-dimensional and in military dimensions, and comprehensive security is discussed. For this purpose, the above research seeks to study the theory of the Copenhagen school and explain relations Economic and trade and its impact on foreign policy orientation in order to destabilize relations; To answer the question of how the relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the period 2000 to 2019 are in the process of becoming insecure?
Theoretical Framework
According to Buzan, security is a sense of security (mental security), protection against danger (objective security) and freedom from doubt (trust in the personal perceptions of others) .The process of securing issues goes through four main stages: first, the security discourse, which refers to the identification and urgency of existential threats against the government; second, the legitimacy and public acceptance; third, emergency security operations to deal with threats; These actions affect the internal and external relations of governments .
According to the practical solutions of the Copenhagen School to make many phenomena and threats insecure, an efficient political system is necessary to discuss the process of generating security threats before considering the appearance of the threat.
the concept of building security is one of the most important topics in the Copenhagen School. A phenomenon becomes a security phenomenon when the actor secures the phenomenon during the process and his audience accepts it. Belief in "manifestation of threat" and "public acceptance" are the two main pillars of "security logic".
 
History of Iran-Afghanistan relations
The Islamic Republic of Iran is neighboring 15 countries, but due to historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries are different. The two countries have a common history, culture, religion and language, and in many other cases there are many commonalities and even a common enemy. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to pursue good neighborliness properly. During the years of holy defense, when Iran was facing many problems, it did not hesitate to cooperate with Afghan refugees, which shows the depth of relations between the two countries. After the victory of Jihad, Iran was aligned with the Mojahedin government and did not leave the Afghan people alone during the Taliban rule. After the fall of the Taliban, he also helped build and institutionalize the government.
Iran and Afghanistan, despite having a common political border and common cultural and religious interests, are believed to have the greatest potential for expanding political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.
Conclusion
The economic diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Afghanistan has been a common element of profit and profit and an effective and relatively sustainable lever in managing water disputes, if the two countries can define a package of mutual interests in the form of economic diplomacy, this dependence Bilateral economic, the two sides will share in the fair use of water resources. In these circumstances, when the outcome of the combination of economic diplomacy and the water issue forms a kind of win-win diplomacy and paves the way for a major deal, it is highly likely that the parties can reach a common solution to the management of the existing water dispute.

Islamic World

Analysis of Saudi aggressive / active foreign policy on neoclassical realism perspective 2010-2020

Volume 2, Issue 6, Winter 2021, Pages 1-24

Maeziyeh Sadat Alvand, Maryam Sadat Hosaini

Abstract Saudi Arabia has been known as one of the most important and influential countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East for its conservative approach to foreign policy, and has often been recognized as an actor who supports the status quo and opposes change. However, its behavior over the past decade in the regional arena indicates its transition from a conservative approach to a strong tendency towards an aggressive approach. Neoclassical realism analysis is a multilevel analysis that examines unit-level factors, government and macro-factors and offers a complete and appropriate theory of foreign policy by combining internal and external factors. For this reason, the authors claim that neoclassical realism provides a more coherent and appropriate theoretical framework for understanding Saudi foreign policy. In this regard, this article seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy in the last decade can be explained from the perspective of neoclassical realism, using the analytical-explanatory method and using library sources. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the article is that due to the changing domestic, regional and international conditions of Saudi Arabia; The foreign policy behaviors of this country have shifted from a conservative state to an aggressive and security-oriented behavior, and the domestic level has played an effective role in this transformation as well as the systemic and macro level. The results of the research confirm that the presence of multiple levels of change in the behavior of Saudi foreign policy has led to the continuation of approaches resulting from change. At the micro and national levels, the role of the third generation of Saudi leaders, especially the current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has now become a major player in Saudi foreign policy has been so important in transforming Saudi foreign policy by adopting traditional domestic and foreign policies. The importance of leadership characteristics and the impact of new domestic political priorities on foreign policy behavior. In addition to the role of emerging Saudi leaders, the traditional role of ideology and neo-Wahhabism and the position of Saudi geoculture and the position of the two holy shrines in an effort to restore the leadership of the Islamic world and the role of financial revenues from increased oil sales in recent years and Saudi Arabia. As the largest producer and supplier of oil, he noted that it is very important in adopting an active Saudi foreign policy in the last decade.
At the macro level, neoclassicists emphasize the rise of relative power, the influence and maximization of security as neorealists, and the balance of interests alongside the balance of power. According to this theory, countries are always seeking to increase and expand their relative power in order to influence the peripheral environment and beyond. The purpose of influence is to change the decisions of other countries in the direction of its own interests, and this influence usually results in shaping the regional security environment in a way that is in harmony with the interests of the influential country. Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen under its Arab League, intervened effectively in the Syrian crisis to secure its interests, formed an Arab coalition to change political relations with Qatar, both at the time of severing diplomatic relations and seeking to soften relations, and finally, in an effort to permanently balance relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as its main rival and reduce its deeper influence in the region, it has always sought to maximize its power, security and interests, even at the cost of opposing or disregarding the wishes of its traditional strategically( America) to act. It seems that Saudi Arabia is trying to use the card of necessity of putting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region in its relations with other supra-regional powers, including China, which is in line with China's Middle East policy of non-interference in its geopolitical rivalries. Iran, as a strategic partner and China's commitment to balancing relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be successful. However, these efforts represent a fundamental shift in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy approach. On the other hand, it can be a proof that Saudi Arabia and Muhammad bin Salman intend to pursue their active and aggressive approach in order to ensure the maximum interests of Al-Saud and to promote Saudi leadership in the Islamic world in the future.
Overall, Saudi Arabia's evolving and active approach to foreign policy over the past decade has several key components, resulting in a combination of levels of analysis influencing foreign policy behavior: first, pursuing the maximum interests of the Saudis and promoting Saudi Arabia's undisputed leadership in the Islamic world; Second, legitimizing Saudi policies and delegitimizing the behavior and approaches of rivals and enemies; Third, the lack of adherence to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy on the priorities of the United States' own traditional allied regions and the search for other powerful global allies looking east; Fourth, weakening the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and trying to influence regional and supra-regional alliances and coalitions; And finally, maintaining and strengthening the position of the regions of Saudi Arabia and promoting it in the changing world order.

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