The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract This research critically examines the phenomenon of gender commodification and the expansion of the sex work economy within the context of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) rapid economic development. This specific model of development, contingent upon the swift influx of capital and expatriate labor, has engendered a complex societal structure. This paper posits that sex work in Dubai is a structural manifestation of prevailing macroeconomic priorities, globalizing forces, and the inherent contradictions embedded within the theoretical paradigms guiding economic policymaking. The commodification of gender in the UAE, set against the panorama of economic globalization—as is typical in other rapidly industrializing nations—is accompanied by intricate and often paradoxical economic, social, and cultural impacts. While the UAE is globally recognized as a premier nexus for commerce and tourism, its engagement with economic globalization has not only unlocked significant opportunities for investment and aggregate growth but has also precipitated profound transformations across its social and cultural spheres. The commodification of gender in the UAE presents distinct challenges owing to the nation's conservative Islamic culture. In contrast to other nations that have more overtly utilized sex work to attract tourism, the UAE has adopted a markedly more cautious strategy. Furthermore, economic globalization has facilitated the emergence and propagation of novel gender identities and representations within the Emirates. Although the UAE has consistently sought to capitalize on global economic opportunities for advancement, this trajectory has simultaneously introduced complexities such as gender commodification and its attendant cultural repercussions. This study concentrates on clarifying the multi-dimensional consequences of economic globalization on gender and sex work within the UAE, directly addressing the inquiry: How has economic globalization influenced the commodification of gender in the UAE? The central hypothesis of this case study is formulated as follows: Economic globalization, driven by the imperative for profit maximization and capital accumulation, has instigated the commodification of personsand the objectification of gender within the economic domain, thereby creating the structural conditions conducive to the prevalence of sex work as a means of establishing a capital-attracting and employment-generating industry. Economic globalization in the UAE, one of the most dynamic economies in the Gulf region, has exerted manifold influences across social, cultural, and gender stratifications. To dissect these shifts, this study adopts the theoretical lenses of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Structuralism from International Political Economy (IPE). These three perspectives are optimally suited to investigate the changes induced by globalization, particularly regarding gender dynamics and individual commodification in the UAE context. From a Realist standpoint, state behavior is fundamentally driven by the pursuit of national power preservation. Sex work may function, albeit perhaps unintentionally, by satisfying the demands of the international consumer base and maintaining an "attractive" milieu for foreign investment, thereby securing capital inflow and, consequently, national power. Liberalism prioritizes individual liberties and bodily autonomy. Under this framework, sex work, where it stems from voluntary choice, can be conceptualized as an individual economic decision aimed at income generation within a deregulated market. The primary friction emerges between the tenets of liberal market freedom and the constraints imposed by established traditional/Islamic legal norms. Adopting a Structuralist view, globalization is understood not as a process governed solely by state or corporate actors, but as unfolding within a complex structural matrix of power dynamics and socio-economic norms that actively shape those very actors. Structuralism illuminates the deepest strata of exploitation, directly linking sex work to the operational logic of Neoliberal Capitalism. This economic model engenders profound cleavages in class, gender, and ethnicity. The exploitation of migrant workers, especially those originating from the Global South, under precarious conditions is a direct outcome of these systemic global inequalities. A Structuralist solution mandates deep, transformative institutional reform.
 
The research findings underscore that due to the paramount importance states place on conforming to global economic integration—and their efforts to leverage globalization’s capacities, particularly through creating attractive incentives and bolstering infrastructure—capital has become the decisive variable. Maximizing capital attraction necessitates diversifying the means of production, including labor, which extends to women across various sectors. Integrating the theoretical synthesis of Realism, Liberalism, and Structuralism, this analysis demonstrates how the phenomenon of gender has been instrumentalized by the UAE within this globalizing process. The prevalence of sex work in the UAE, particularly Dubai, transcends being a mere social anomaly; it is a direct reflection of strategic economic policies and globalizing trajectories. The nation’s development-centric policies, focusing on foreign direct investment, tourism, and economic diversification, are engineered to secure maximal profitability with minimal governmental interference. Within this context, migrant labor, particularly female labor, is harnessed as a quantifiable economic input. Despite the UAE’s official repudiation of sex work, the underlying market-driven economic structure, exacerbated by lacunae in regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, provides an underlying substratum where this activity can indirectly thrive.
At the macro level, UAE policies exemplify a development paradigm where the imperatives of economic competition and increased global market share systematically outweigh considerations of social welfare and human dignity. This model, reliant on attracting international finance, facilitating tourism, and maximizing the deployment of migrant labor, not only perpetuates social divisions but actively intensifies gender and class disparities. Crucially, the UAE's status as a pivotal hub in the global economic system has diminished the efficacy of regulatory and oversight mechanisms against market pressures. Under these conditions, sex work, as an unavoidable byproduct of global economic integration, has proliferated in the absence of countervailing policy controls and protective frameworks.
From a policy analysis vantage point, the UAE's deepening dependency on market economics and international engagement, absent the cultivation of robust civil society institutions and protective safeguards, has precluded the establishment of a sustainable equilibrium between economic expansion and social equity. Dubai, acting as a global nexus for trade and tourism, has inadvertently fostered an environment where informal and illicit activities, including sex work, germinate within regulatory gaps, becoming embedded within the intricate economic fabric. This situation indicates that the governing structures, notwithstanding their success in capital aggregation, have yet to cultivate the institutional capacity required to manage the social externalities of globalization.
Consequently, ameliorating this situation mandates the enactment of comprehensive, multi-scalar policies designed to forge a congruence between economic advancement and the non-negotiable demands of social justice. Such reforms must encompass the reinforcement of legal strictures, the establishment of robust labor protection modalities, the pursuit of regional and international collaboration to combat human exploitation, and the drafting of enduring social policies. Absent these systemic adjustments, any strategy focused solely on economic growth will inevitably encounter intractable structural impediments over the long term. Ultimately, realizing a development blueprint that successfully integrates economic gains with fundamental social and humanistic principles will not only enhance the UAE's international standing but will also cultivate a more equitable and stable society for the future.
 
 

Abstract The natural gas industry, as one of the most significant strategic advantages of Iran’s economy, plays a pivotal role in advancing sustainable development—a form of development that extends beyond economic growth to encompass environmental protection, social justice, inclusive participation, and responsible governance. In the contemporary global discourse, sustainable development has emerged as a multidimensional paradigm that seeks to balance economic efficiency, environmental integrity, and social equity. Within this framework, energy resources—particularly natural gas as a relatively cleaner fossil fuel—are considered critical transitional assets for achieving long-term sustainability goals. From a Western theoretical perspective, sustainable development is closely associated with principles such as transparent and accountable governance, intergenerational equity, rational management of natural resources, environmental impact assessment, and meaningful stakeholder participation in policymaking processes. These principles emphasize the need to ensure that present development trajectories do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. At the same time, environmental stewardship, institutional coherence, and policy integration are regarded as essential components of sustainable energy governance. Parallel to these Western conceptualizations, Islamic teachings offer a complementary and normatively rich foundation for sustainable development. In Islamic thought, natural resources are viewed as divine trusts (amanah) bestowed upon humanity, obligating societies to exercise moderation (wasatiyyah) in resource exploitation and to avoid wastefulness (israf). Environmental protection, social justice, collective responsibility, and solidarity among the Muslim community (ummah) constitute core ethical principles that resonate strongly with contemporary sustainability discourses. Consequently, an Islamic approach to sustainable energy development underscores balance, ethical governance, cooperation, and the pursuit of collective welfare rather than narrow economic gains. The Islamic Republic of Iran, possessing the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, holds considerable potential to play a decisive role in regional and transregional energy architecture. Iran’s geostrategic location, combined with its vast gas resources, provides unique opportunities for enhancing energy cooperation, strengthening economic interdependence, and promoting energy diplomacy within the Islamic world and beyond. Natural gas, in this context, can function not only as an economic asset but also as a strategic instrument for fostering political dialogue, cultural exchange, and regional stability. Despite these significant advantages, Iran’s gas policymaking framework faces a range of structural and institutional challenges that have hindered the realization of sustainable development objectives. Among the most critical obstacles are fragmented governance structures, weak policy coordination, inconsistencies in decision-making processes, insufficient stakeholder engagement, and inadequate attention to strategic environmental assessments. These challenges have resulted in short-term, reactive policies that often prioritize immediate economic or political considerations over long-term sustainability goals. Furthermore, the absence of an integrated governance model has contributed to inefficiencies in energy planning and implementation. Overlapping institutional mandates, lack of transparency, and limited mechanisms for accountability have undermined policy coherence and reduced public trust. Environmental considerations, although formally acknowledged in policy documents, are frequently marginalized during implementation, leading to adverse ecological impacts and missed opportunities for aligning gas development with environmental justice principles. Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to address the central research question: What are the main obstacles and requirements for achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking, considering the country’s regional and transregional role? The core hypothesis of the research posits that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector requires more than merely removing institutional barriers. Rather, it necessitates the establishment of participatory governance structures, the formulation of long-term strategic visions, and the purposeful utilization of natural gas as a tool for strengthening economic, political, and cultural linkages with regional and transregional partners—particularly within the Islamic world. Methodologically, this research adopts a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in the theoretical framework of sustainable development. The study relies on library-based and documentary data, including academic literature, policy documents, official reports, and international frameworks related to energy governance and sustainability. To systematically examine the data, thematic analysis is employed as the primary analytical method. This approach enables the identification of recurring patterns, key themes, and underlying conceptual linkages relevant to sustainable gas policymaking and governance. The findings of the study reveal that structural reform in energy policymaking is a fundamental prerequisite for advancing sustainable development in Iran’s gas sector. Specifically, the results highlight the necessity of transitioning from fragmented and sectoral governance toward an integrated and unified governance model. Such a model would enhance policy coherence, reduce institutional conflicts, and facilitate long-term planning aligned with sustainability principles. Additionally, the research underscores the importance of strengthening transparency and accountability mechanisms within energy governance institutions. Transparent decision-making processes, access to information, and clear lines of responsibility are essential for improving policy effectiveness and ensuring that environmental and social considerations are adequately addressed. Enhanced accountability not only contributes to better governance outcomes but also fosters public trust and stakeholder confidence. Another key finding relates to stakeholder participation. The study demonstrates that inclusive and meaningful engagement of stakeholders—ranging from governmental bodies and private sector actors to local communities, environmental organizations, and academic institutions—plays a crucial role in promoting sustainable energy policies. Participatory governance enables the incorporation of diverse perspectives, reduces policy resistance, and enhances the legitimacy and social acceptance of energy projects. Moreover, the findings suggest that aligning Iran’s gas policy with broader objectives of the Islamic world can significantly contribute to achieving balanced and justice-oriented development. By framing natural gas cooperation within a shared ethical and cultural context, Iran can leverage its energy resources to promote solidarity, mutual benefit, and collective resilience among Muslim-majority countries. This approach not only reinforces Iran’s energy diplomacy but also integrates moral and normative dimensions into energy policymaking. Importantly, the study highlights the potential of integrating Western sustainable development frameworks with Islamic principles to create a hybrid and context-sensitive model of energy governance. Such a model recognizes the value of international best practices—such as environmental impact assessments, policy integration, and stakeholder engagement—while grounding them in indigenous cultural and religious values. This synthesis can enhance the legitimacy, adaptability, and effectiveness of sustainability-oriented policies in Iran and similar contexts. In conclusion, the research argues that achieving sustainable development in Iran’s gas policymaking requires a comprehensive and multidimensional strategy. This strategy should encompass institutional reform, participatory governance, long-term strategic planning, environmental justice, and proactive energy diplomacy. By adopting an integrated approach that draws upon both Western sustainability paradigms and Islamic ethical principles, Iran can transform its natural gas sector into a catalyst for balanced, indigenous, and justice-oriented development. The findings of this study offer both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, the research enriches the literature on sustainable energy governance by highlighting the compatibility and complementarity of Western and Islamic perspectives. Practically, it provides policymakers with actionable insights for revising and redesigning energy policies in a manner that aligns economic objectives with environmental protection, social equity, and regional cooperation. Ultimately, this study suggests that Iran’s natural gas resources, if governed sustainably and ethically, can serve as a powerful engine for national development and constructive engagement within the regional and global energy landscape. 

Abstract After achieving the status of a global superpower following the Second World War, and particularly subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America established the preservation and permanence of its hegemony as the most critical objective of its foreign policy. To this end, the country has leveraged a diverse array of strategies and tactics; ranging from sweeping economic sanctions, threatening or executing military strikes, media demonization, and the securitization of rivals and opponents, to more covert and drastic strategies such as coup-making. The present study addresses the central question: How and for what purpose was the coup-making strategy in Iran, targeting Mohammad Mosaddegh, placed on the agenda of United States foreign policy? The research attempts to elucidate the position of the coup as the ultimate, high-yield option within the hierarchy of tools used for maintaining American hegemony, by focusing on the Coup of 28 Mordad 1332 (August 19, 1953). The research method is descriptive-analytical, relying on documentary and library data. For the first time, the theoretical framework of the study employs the Conservation of Resources Theory (COR) from the field of managerial psychology, extending its application to International Relations and US foreign policy. According to this theory, actors (here, the US as the hegemon), when perceiving their valuable resources across three domains -personal (national self-esteem, American exceptionalism, ideological superiority), social (ally support, maintenance of unequal core-periphery relations), and structural (financial resources, military bases, access to oil and weaponry)- as being under threat or destruction, and when conventional tools (sanctions, military attack, demonization) lose their effectiveness, they resort to riskier and more aggressive behaviors. The key principle of this theory, loss aversion, precisely aligns with the behavior of US foreign policy when facing potential resource depletion: the loss of existing resources is far more painful than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently, the hegemon is willing to accept the risk of a coup to prevent a key country from exiting its sphere of influence.The research findings indicate that coup-making has been a structural and repetitive strategy in US foreign policy for the maintenance of hegemony, rather than an isolated or exceptional action. CIA documents, declassified in 2013, explicitly confirm that Operation Ajax was designed and executed "under CIA direction" and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy at the highest levels of government." The coup against Mosaddegh was placed on the table only after more overt tactics (negotiation, economic pressure, conditional aid, and securitizing Mosaddegh and his associates as communist-leaning) had reached a stalemate. The nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1330 (1951) and Mosaddegh’s Negative Equilibrium Policy simultaneously jeopardized the three categories of U.S. resources: 1.    Personal Resources: Challenging American exceptionalism and ideological superiority, rejecting Washington's mediation, and setting a precedent for independence that could be exported to other peripheral states. 2.    Social Resources: Threatening Iran's exit from the Western sphere of influence, thereby weakening the chain of US allies in the Middle East, and particularly undermining the position of the fledgling Israeli regime. 3.    Structural Resources: Jeopardizing the access of American and British oil companies to Iranian oil resources, the potential loss of Iran as a military-espionage base against the Soviet Union, and a decrease in American arms sales. When these threats could not be contained by conventional means, the U.S., adhering to the principle of loss aversion and accepting the high risk of a coup, executed Operation Ajax to reinstate the young Shah as a loyal ally. This move turned Iran into a primary platform for supplying the U.S. with economic, political, military, and geostrategic resources for three decades. Following the coup, 80% of Iran’s oil marketing remained in the hands of the Consortium of Western companies, Iran became one of the largest purchasers of American weaponry, and served as the frontline of containment against Communism in the region. The historical-comparative section of the study reveals that the 1953 coup was merely one instance of a recurring pattern. Since the nineteenth century, the United States has played a direct or supportive role in dozens of coups (some sources cite up to 81 successful and unsuccessful cases) across five continents: from Hawaii (1893), Cuba (1933), Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973), Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), Bolivia (2019), and many others. In all these instances, the common denominator has been the effort to prevent the exit of valuable resources from the hegemon's sphere of influence and to maintain the power imbalance in America's favor. The final conclusion of the research is that coup-making is not the "last resort" in US foreign policy doctrine, but rather a prudent, low-cost (relative to full-scale war), and quick-yielding option. It is activated precisely when the hegemon feels its key resources at the personal, social, and structural levels are under severe threat and overt tools have lost their efficacy. The 1953 coup served as a turning point for this strategy in the Middle East and sent a clear message to other peripheral governments: any attempt at genuine independence from the American hegemonic core-periphery system will be met with a decisive and severe response from the hegemon. Therefore, recognizing the pattern of U.S. coup-making is a strategic and scholarly imperative, not only for understanding contemporary Iranian history but also for any actor resisting U.S. hegemony.

Abstract  The impact of the Arab Spring on the dynamics of political society in the Arab world created a two-fold pattern of transformations: states undergoing structural transformations (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria) and societies witnessing limited transformations (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman). These events not only transformed the regional power architecture, but also had far-reaching geopolitical consequences, and the origins of these transformations, which were rooted in Arab structural crises, reflected the dialectical interaction of local grievances and transnational dynamics. This research seeks to answer the important question of why protest movements in Kuwait were ineffective in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Therefore, within the framework of the theoretical foundations of social constructionism, it must be acknowledged that although endogenous variables of sectarian conflicts, the bio-legal crisis of the Bedoons, the political hybrid structure, and exogenous factors of waves of regional unrest caused the emergence of synergistic mechanisms of protests in Kuwait, and although internal variables provided the basis for disharmony; transnational components played a decisive role in shaping the process of protest actions and the direction of revolutionary discourses and failed to bring about a revolution in Kuwait. This research, which was developed based on the descriptive-analytical method and the use of library and document collection tools, indicates that although Kuwait's foreign policy was somewhat neutral; It benefits from the importance of working with the United States to ensure the stability of the region and protect it from any potential security threats, whether from regional conflicts or foreign interventions, as the United States has focused on strengthening its relations with the Gulf states, including Kuwait, through security and diplomatic cooperation and supporting regional defense against any threat. The Arab Spring was a wave of protests and uprisings in late 2010 that spread across the Muslim world, challenging long-standing authoritarian regimes. The movement began with widespread dissatisfaction with political repression, corruption, and economic problems, particularly high unemployment and declining living standards. Kuwait, meanwhile, was affected by these developments and experienced significant political unrest during the Arab Spring, accompanied by widespread protests and demands for a process of government reform. These movements occurred mainly in 2011-2012 and were rooted in public dissatisfaction with corruption, lack of political accountability, and demands for constitutional reform. Among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait has a remarkable history of political liberalization and a gradual transition to democracy, which began in the 1990s and has had a relatively stable process, but it faces serious structural obstacles. Kuwait was the first country in the region to have an elected and appointed parliament and a constitution stipulating certain freedoms and civil rights after gaining independence in the early 1960s. Constructivism: emerged as an important theoretical approach in international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly after the Cold War. This theory argues that many aspects of international relations are constructed through shared ideas, norms, and identities rather than being determined solely by material forces. The identities and interests of states and other actors are not fixed, but are shaped through social interactions. This view challenges traditional theories such as realism and liberalism, which often view state behavior as driven by material interests or power dynamics. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, official documents, and field data.  Data collection tools include: - Content analysis of diplomatic documents - Interviews with experts in international relations - An examination of the political and social conditions in Kuwait during and after the Arab Spring. Political reforms in Kuwait over the past 14 years have played a dual role in stabilizing the state, amid a constant tension between parliamentary constitutionalism and traditional dynastic authority. On the one hand, measures such as increasing the share of women in parliament (to 6 seats in 2022) and strengthening oversight institutions have strengthened the legitimacy of the system. By attracting the support of the urban middle class and educated elite, these reforms contained the instability caused by the Arab Spring; Kuwait was the only Gulf state to continue holding regular elections during this period. However, the showy nature of some reforms, especially after 2014, has deepened structural crises. The repeated suspension of parliament (11 times from 2006 to 2023) on security or legal grounds has not only created legislative deadlock but also exacerbated the discursive gap between the government and civil society. Kuwait's most important challenges after the Arab Spring: The community of al-Badun, Communications and media - organizing protesters and conveying messages, Widespread structural corruption, The role of social movements in Kuwait since 2006, The anti-oppression Islamist discourse of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Socialization of Arab people from each other and regional influences, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as an opportunity for democracy, The impact of the Arab Spring revolutions on Kuwait's national security. The findings show that: 1.     Domestic factors §  Economic discontent: Economic problems and corruption fueled public protests, using economic demands as a pretext for demonstrations. §  Political movements: The unification of various parties against the government and calls for the prime minister's removal represented a broad political movement. §  Disputes in governance: Internal tensions among the political elite and family disputes within the ruling family led to political instability. §  Electoral changes: Reforms in electoral districts, which protesters believed were a threat to democracy, increased tensions. §  Support for democracy: Kuwaitis are proud of their democratic institutions and see corruption as a threat to these institutions, a sentiment that has united the opposition. 2.     External factors §  Presence of youth: Educated and active youth on social media played a key role in organizing protests in the region and in Kuwait. §  Role of global powers: Western countries, especially the United States, supported authoritarian regimes instead of effectively supporting democracy, which contributed to the failure of the movements. §  Political and economic impacts: Inefficient political management and economic inequalities in various countries exacerbated dissatisfaction and, as a result, the emergence of uprisings. §  Israel had a significant influence on the decisions of Western countries to support authoritarian regimes in the region and prevent democratic developments. §  In Kuwait, popular demonstrations due to dissatisfaction with the government were suppressed, and the United States, instead of directly intervening, supported the governments to prevent fundamental changes. These policies increased tensions and public dissatisfaction. US cooperation with Kuwait during the Arab Spring did not have much impact on political changes in the country. Kuwait, as one of the relatively free states in the Persian Gulf, attempted to avoid unrest by adopting a neutral approach and maintaining stability. The United States focused on protecting its own interests rather than directly intervening. As a result, political changes in Kuwait were largely driven by domestic pressures and social discontent rather than external influences.  

Abstract The rapid expansion of the digital economy has fundamentally transformed the nature of economic power and competition in the international system, particularly in regions seeking to reduce structural dependence on traditional resources. In the Persian Gulf, the digital economy has increasingly become a strategic domain through which states pursue economic diversification, enhance competitiveness, and project geo-economic influence. Among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as the two most prominent actors in shaping the regional digital landscape. Their ambitious national visions and large-scale investments in digital infrastructure, innovation ecosystems, and advanced technologies have turned the digital economy into a key arena of geo-economic competition between them.
This emerging competition is deeply embedded in each country’s broader development strategy. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 places the digital economy at the core of its efforts to transform the Kingdom into a diversified, knowledge-based economy. Massive investments in data centers, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, fintech, and e-government platforms are intended not only to modernize domestic economic structures, but also to position Saudi Arabia as a regional digital hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Projects such as NEOM and the rapid expansion of digital public services signal Riyadh’s ambition to leverage scale, state capacity, and regulatory power to attract global technology firms and foster indigenous digital capabilities.
By contrast, the United Arab Emirates has pursued a more market-driven and globally integrated digital strategy, building on its early-mover advantages in logistics, finance, and services. Through initiatives such as Smart Dubai, digital free zones, and progressive regulatory frameworks for fintech, blockchain, and artificial intelligence, the UAE has cultivated an innovation-friendly environment that appeals to international investors, startups, and multinational technology companies. Its emphasis on agility, openness, and public–private partnerships has enabled it to consolidate its position as a regional gateway for digital trade and services, reinforcing its geo-economic influence despite a smaller domestic market compared to Saudi Arabia.
Taken together, the digital economy has become a central arena of strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reflecting broader shifts in power, competitiveness, and economic governance within the Gulf. While their competition has accelerated regional digital transformation and reduced reliance on hydrocarbons, it also highlights diverging models of state-led versus market-oriented digital development. The outcome of this rivalry will not only shape the future economic trajectories of the two countries, but also influence the structure of the digital economy across the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East.
This study examines how the digital economy has evolved into a field of geo-economic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and analyzes the similarities and differences in their strategic approaches. The central argument of the research is that while both countries share the common objective of attaining regional leadership in the digital economy, their distinct political–economic structures, market capacities, and governance models have produced divergent strategic pathways and comparative advantages. The UAE has largely pursued an open and network-based strategy, emphasizing regulatory flexibility, international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and the development of digital service hubs. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has adopted a more state-centered and domestically oriented strategy, relying on large-scale public investment, national champions, and technology localization policies supported by its substantial domestic market.
Methodologically, the study employs a comparative analytical framework to assess the digital economy strategies of the two countries across key indicators, including digital competitiveness, investment in information and communication technologies, innovation capacity, and the contribution of the digital sector to gross domestic product. By drawing on official policy documents, international indices, and economic data, the research provides a systematic comparison of how each state operationalizes digital transformation as a tool of geo-economic power.
The findings suggest that this competition has reshaped economic roles and hierarchies within the Persian Gulf region. The UAE has consolidated its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, and platform-based economies, while Saudi Arabia has leveraged scale, state capacity, and long-term investment to build a more self-reliant digital ecosystem. Beyond bilateral rivalry, this dynamic illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies function as strategic instruments of influence, shaping patterns of regional integration, economic dependency, and power projection in the Gulf and beyond.
The findings of this study indicate that geo-economic competition in the digital economy has significantly reshaped economic roles and strategic priorities within the Persian Gulf. Rather than following a uniform model of digital transformation, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have institutionalized distinct development paths that reflect their broader political–economic structures. This divergence has intensified competition over regional leadership, digital standard-setting, and the attraction of capital, talent, and innovation, thereby redefining the contours of economic influence in the Gulf region.
At the national level, the UAE has strengthened its position as a regional hub for digital services, fintech, artificial intelligence, and platform-based economies by emphasizing openness, regulatory agility, and global connectivity. Its integration into international digital networks has enabled the country to act as an intermediary between global technology markets and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has leveraged its demographic scale, fiscal capacity, and centralized governance to construct a more state-driven and domestically anchored digital ecosystem, prioritizing national digital champions, data sovereignty, and long-term technological self-sufficiency.
At the regional and systemic levels, this evolving rivalry illustrates a broader transformation in geo-economic competition, in which digital technologies have become central instruments of power projection and economic statecraft. The competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only influences patterns of regional integration and economic dependency but also shapes the future governance of the digital economy in the Persian Gulf. As such, the digital domain has emerged as a critical arena in which economic diversification, strategic autonomy, and regional leadership are actively contested.
 

Abstract The government has a strategic and fundamental role in development. Successful agents of development are only development-oriented and efficient governments that try to bring the country to this goal by using various tools and policies. Qatar has also emerged as an important player in regional and international politics and has been able to achieve remarkable success in the field of economic, social and human development and become one of the richest countries in the world with a high global per capita income level. This research seeks to answer the question of "what role the government has played in the development of Qatar?"  The assumption of the research is that according to the development-oriented government model, the government has been able to play an effective role in Qatar's progress with various development strategies and programs. Using a descriptive-analytical research method and relying on Adrian Leftwich's theory of the developmental state, we conclude that the government in this country, led by Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani and then Sheikh Tamim, has had the characteristics of a developmental state model in both domestic and foreign policy, and with various economic, monetary, trade, educational, and investment strategies, it has been able to pave the way for economic and human development in this country and achieve significant progress. Reformist measures and the implementation of an ambitious economic development program, along with intelligent investments in international capital markets, have enabled the Qatari government to become one of the leading players in the world economy, while escaping the risk of collapse during the Arab revolutions. Also, the aforementioned government has obtained suitable opportunities for activities in the tourism, agriculture, and trade industries by using the huge revenues from the sale of natural resources and has become one of the developed countries in the world. Since the adoption of the Qatar National Vision 2030 in 2008, the country has experienced economic prosperity and development in various fields. According to this plan, by 2030, by diversifying the economy, the growth of the non-oil sector will increase, and the government will create a knowledge-based economy that is in harmony with the global economy and in line with strengthening the private sector. Qatar's economic development strategy is based on investing oil revenues and underground resources in development projects, so that the country can create a new structure and model for economic, social and cultural development in accordance with this vision document. The Qatar Investment Authority and the Qatar Foundation, led by Sheikha Muza, help the government increase its political influence in global investment trends and processes, while using the revenues from this trade in its economic, social and cultural development strategy at the level of the Arabian Peninsula, the region, the Arab world and, more importantly, at the international level. As a result, Qatar has achieved a remarkable position in terms of economic indicators and human development. Therefore, based on Leftwich’s developmental state model, the elites and the governance system of Qatar have been able to be effective in advancing the economic development of their country by intelligently and realistically understanding the dynamics of the global power system, by defining their global position in the national Vision 2030 program, and by appropriate economic, monetary, educational reforms, trade and investment policies. Also, The Qatari government is using the national strategy of artificial intelligence to benefit its economy, and according to the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country is set to become a "Smart Qatar" and develop a digital economy in the country. As a result, the application of artificial intelligence has not only increased the power of the bureaucracy and the Qatari government over citizens, but also increased the government's competitiveness in the international community.  This country has been able to stand on the world map with bureaucracy and institutional synergy in the Al Thani family and in a society where there is no union, syndicate or civil society organization to confront and oppose Sheikh Hamad's independence of action. In the international arena, Qatar has pursued national interests on a broader scale within the framework of a balanced, active and opportunity-creating foreign policy, and its efforts in the field of peace have been effective. Therefore, by proving the hypothesis of the present research, we conclude that the developmentalist government of Qatar has been able to become a visible regional and global actor with diverse strategies. As stated in the text of the research, the main task of developmentalist governments is to provide conditions for economic growth and development in the domestic and international arenas. The developmentalist government of Qatar, as part of the largest exporters of gas and oil in the world, has acquired enormous wealth, which has resulted in increased income and economic growth, as well as the opportunity to develop infrastructure and human capital. Of course, like most countries on the southern edge of the Persian Gulf, this country is also involved in a structural challenge between rapid economic growth and political underdevelopment.

Abstract The term narco-terrorism was first introduced in 1983 by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry to describe violent actions undertaken by drug traffickers against state institutions. Over time, the concept has evolved to capture the complex and increasingly intertwined relationship between terrorism and illicit drug economies. In contemporary security studies, terrorism is no longer understood solely as a state-centric or ideologically rigid phenomenon. Instead, it has assumed non-state, transnational, and hybrid forms shaped by globalization, political instability, economic inequality, and weak governance. The convergence of terrorism and narcotics trafficking has transformed many extremist organizations into financially self-sustaining entities capable of conducting prolonged campaigns of violence. Afghanistan, due to decades of conflict, institutional fragility, and its major role in global narcotics production, has become one of the most prominent arenas for narcoterrorism. Within this context, ISIS-K has emerged as a critical destabilizing actor, challenging the Taliban’s authority and complicating efforts toward state-building and governance consolidation. Narco-terrorism is composed of two interdependent features: organized political violence and systematic engagement in the production, trafficking, or taxation of narcotics. Terrorist groups involved in narco-terrorism utilize drug revenues to finance recruitment, acquire weapons, sustain territorial presence, and exert coercive control over populations. As a result, narco-terrorism directly undermines state sovereignty, rule of law, and institutional legitimacy.In Afghanistan, the narcotics economy has long flourished due to limited state capacity, widespread poverty, and persistent insecurity. Armed groups have repeatedly exploited this economy to secure financial resources. Although ISIS-K presents itself as ideologically distinct from other militant actors, it has demonstrated pragmatic engagement with narcotics-related activities, either through direct involvement or indirect cooperation with trafficking networks. This involvement has enabled ISIS-K to pose a challenge the Taliban not only through violence but also by weakening the important economic foundations for effective governance. Existing literature identifies narco-terrorism as a multidimensional threat with far-reaching consequences. Studies focusing on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) illustrate how narcotics revenues sustain long-term insurgent campaigns and facilitate transnational criminal activities. Research on Central Asia highlights the role of narco-terrorist networks in undermining regional multilateralism and security cooperation, particularly in politically fragile environments. Comparative analyses of the Middle East and Latin America identify groups such as ISIS, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as prominent examples of narco-terrorist organizations. These studies emphasize that narco-terrorism generates security, political, economic, and social challenges that extend beyond national borders. However, scholarly attention to ISIS-K’s specific role in obstructing the Taliban’s state-building process remains limited, underscoring the need for focused analysis. This study draws upon the Frustration–Aggression Theory to explain the mechanisms of recruitment and violence within extremist organizations. Originally formulated by John Dollard in the late 1930s, the theory posits that persistent frustration arising from unmet expectations or perceived injustice produces aggressive behavior. When institutional mechanisms fail to address grievances, individuals may turn to violence as an alternative means of expression and redress. In Afghanistan, prolonged conflict, economic deprivation, social marginalization, and political exclusion have created fertile ground for extremist recruitment. ISIS-K capitalizes on these conditions by offering financial incentives, ideological narratives, and a sense of purpose to disaffected individuals. This dynamic transforms individual frustration into organized violence and reinforces the group’s capacity to challenge state-building efforts. Narco-terrorism can be categorized into several forms. Genuine narco-terrorism involves direct participation by terrorist groups in drug trafficking to finance militant activities. Criminal narco-terrorism prioritizes profit, with drug syndicates employing terror tactics to intimidate governments and rivals. State-sponsored narco-terrorism emerges when governments support or tolerate terrorist groups engaged in narcotics trafficking to achieve strategic objectives.Additionally, fabricated narco-terrorism refers to the political manipulation of narco-terrorist narratives, while instrumental narcoterrorism conceptualizes drug trafficking as a tool to weaken governance and social order. ISIS-K’s activities in Afghanistan most closely resemble genuine and instrumental narco-terrorism, as the group exploits the narcotics economy to destabilize governance and undermine Taliban authority. The Taliban’s state-building project faces significant obstacles that are intensified by ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities. From a security perspective, persistent attacks undermine public safety, erode public confidence, and stretch the Taliban’s limited security capabilities. Economically, ISIS-K’s involvement in narcotics trafficking distorts local economies, fuels corruption, and deprives the Taliban of potential revenues needed for governance and service provision.Politically, ISIS-K challenges the Taliban’s legitimacy by presenting itself as a more ideologically uncompromising alternative. This strategy has enabled the group to attract dissatisfied Taliban members, particularly when financial incentives are offered. Socially, continued violence exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, undermining social cohesion and complicating nation-building efforts. These dynamics collectively weaken the Taliban’s capacity to consolidate authority and establish effective governance Although Afghanistan’s instability has deep historical roots, its current intensification is closely linked to the U.S. military withdrawal and the resulting political plan. Within this context, the rivalry between ISIS-K and the Taliban represents a crucial security challenge with significant regional implications, extending to I.R of Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite the Taliban’s claims for combating ISIS-K, persistent governance deficits and limited institutional capacity hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. ISIS-K’s narco-terrorist activities continue to pose serious threats to the Taliban’s state-building process and to regional stability more broadly. Prolonged delays in governance consolidation are likely to exacerbate security, political, economic, social, and environmental risks, increasing the likelihood of broader regional instability. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that extend beyond military responses to include economic development, political inclusion, and sustained regional cooperation.

Abstract  
The grounds for China's active presence in the Central Asian region were provided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of the regional governments. In addition to geopolitical proximity, Beijing has put the continuation and expansion of relations with Central Asian countries and an increasing presence, especially in the energy equations of the region, on the agenda, and has sought to develop influence in the layers of power in Central Asia, which, in addition to helping China become the future leading power in the region, can provide the necessary grounds for expanding Beijing's power on the international stage. The region's proximity to China's western borders, rich energy resources, the region's consumer market, the region's need to attract foreign investment, the activity of the Uyghurs in the region, and the geographical location of Central Asia, which provides China with the possibility of establishing connections with Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe, are among the attractions that have increased Beijing's attention to this region. China sees Central Asia as an important region that can develop its economic growth through trade routes and meet China’s need for hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the stability and economic development of neighboring states in Central Asia are considered an important prerequisite for ensuring stability and security in China’s western regions.
China’s doctrine towards Central Asia can be seen as having three main aspects: The first aspect is rooted in China’s history, which has always considered Central Asia as the first bulwark for its security on its western borders. The possibility of instability in Xinjiang has always been an intellectual concern for Chinese statesmen. The seven million Muslims in this region, who are mainly Turks and Uyghurs, feel closer to the Muslim ethnic groups of Central Asia than to the Han Chinese. The autonomous and Uyghur-populated Xinjiang region is highly vulnerable to separatist tendencies and anti-Chinese propaganda. The second aspect, or economic dimension, of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia involves efforts to create a free Central Asian zone in order to improve China’s economy and security. The economic development of Central Asia can be both attractive and dangerous for China’s backward and remote regions bordering the region. Chinese leaders, especially after the Tiananmen Square unrest in 1989, realized the importance of investment for the economic growth of these regions. The third pillar of China’s doctrine towards Central Asia stems from its increasing desire to play a role in the global security system. In order for China to have an effective and prominent presence on the world stage, it must first be able to assert its voice in the Central Asian region. In a short time, China has become the most important player in the Central Asian energy equation and has been able to direct a significant part of the region’s energy resources to its consumer market, which is the largest in the world, through extensive investments. China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia mainly has three dimensions. First, establishing long-term energy relations with the region through economic integration and developing trade relations; Second, the construction of direct pipelines carrying oil and gas from producing countries in the region to China, and third, the reduction of the role of greedy trans-regional countries in the governments of Central Asia. China has become the dominant economic power in the Central Asian region by implementing a comprehensive, long-term and targeted planning. Its extensive economic presence and influence in the Central Asian region in the three areas of energy exchanges, trade relations and investment in the economic infrastructure of Central Asia have played an important role in developing the country's economic influence in the region and have narrowed the space for the entry and role of actors such as Russia and Iran. The result of these developments, namely China's rise and dominance in the Central Asian economy, has led some analysts to speak of a "Chinese Marshall Plan" by Beijing for Central Asia, which is reminiscent of the Marshall Plan of the United States of America after the end of World War II. The interpretation of this symbolic interpretation and historical simulation is to pay attention to a long-term trend and planning by the Chinese to create a capable market for purchasing Chinese products, ensuring energy security and increasing China's economic influence in the Central Asian region, which has significantly changed and transformed the geoeconomic picture of this region.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of an American presence in Central Asia became very serious for China when the United States invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. In the wake of this event, Central Asian states sought to develop their strategic, military, and economic relations with Washington, but China’s response to this issue was proactive; meaning that Beijing sought to redouble its efforts in the region, and did so by developing bilateral security agreements with regional countries and strengthening the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China’s strategy in this regard has been to present Beijing as a real and reliable security partner for Central Asian states, thereby providing them with a reliable alternative to developing military and security cooperation with the United States. Since 2002, China has signed a series of military and security agreements with Central Asian countries, including providing $3 million in military aid to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, an extradition agreement with these two countries, an agreement on cooperation in combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the opening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s “Regional Counter-Terrorism Center” in Tashkent, and the holding of annual joint exercises with Central Asian countries under the title “Peace Mission.” The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the formation of new republics in Central Asia opened up new opportunities for Beijing’s leaders to develop political, economic, and military relations with the Central Asian republics and thereby regain their former interests in the region. Beijing’s top priority in Central Asia is economic and trade, and investment in oil and gas fields. As the largest investor in Central Asia, China has focused on infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative. Two international corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative pass through Central Asia, connecting China to the Middle East, South Asia and Europe. Apart from its economic importance, Central Asia plays an important role for Beijing from a security perspective. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, China became interested in the issue of border security. However, due to China’s increasing global influence, monitoring the region is very important given its proximity to China and Russia. The insecurity on the borders of Xinjiang and the fight against religious extremists have led Beijing to expand its relations with Central Asian countries, and in this regard, Chinese authorities are taking steps to ensure regional security and ensure internal stability, especially in the western regions of China.
 

Abstract In the contemporary international system, trade and transit corridors have become a critical arena for economic competition, enhancing political influence, and ensuring national security. Iran's unparalleled geographical position at the crossroads of three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—has historically established it as a "communication bridge" and the "corridor heartland" of the world, to the extent that some researchers refer to Iran as the "geopolitical center of the world." However, developments over the past decade reveal a concerning paradox: while geographically situated at the nexus of the most vital transit routes, Iran is, in practice, being excluded or bypassed from the main regional corridor channels such as China's "Belt and Road," the "Middle Corridor," and the "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)." This research seeks to answer the central question of what Iran's performance in regional corridor initiatives has been and what consequences it has entailed. To analyze this issue, the research employs the theoretical framework of "Geopolinomics." Developed by Demko, Wood, and Kazi, this theory posits that in the 21st century, the power game is not solely reliant on geography and politics (geopolitics) or geography and economy (geo-economics), but rather is shaped by the tripartite and dynamic interaction of geography, politics, and economy. From this perspective, factors such as transportation corridors, energy routes, and ports function as the "arteries" and "nodes" of power in the "New Great Game." Consequently, a country's success in the "war of corridors" depends not merely on its geographical location, but also on its capacity for economic diplomacy, creating efficient infrastructure, and attracting investment into these integrated projects. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library and documentary sources. The researchers collected, classified, and analyzed data from existing books, scientific articles, research projects, and reports from reputable domestic and foreign institutions (such as the Iran Chamber Research Center and the Rahnegare journal) to scrutinize Iran's performance in various corridors. The primary focus has been on examining seven major regional corridors, including: the Belt and Road Initiative (China), the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the North-South Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, the Development Road Corridor, and the Resistance Corridor. The findings of the research clearly indicate that Iran has failed to capitalize on its geographical advantage to play a pivotal role in the corridors. This failure can be traced back to two categories of factors: domestic and external. Domestic factors include weaknesses in both hard and soft infrastructure (such as delays in completing critical railways like Chabahar-Zahedan and Rasht-Astara), inefficient economic governance and cumbersome bureaucracy, the prioritization of security-political considerations over economic interests in foreign policy, and ambiguity regarding political and economic stability for foreign investors. External factors encompass international sanctions, which have both disrupted investment within Iran and increased the risk of cooperation with it for other countries; competition among major powers (such as U.S. efforts to replace Iran with alternative corridors like IMEC); and intense regional competition (particularly with Turkey and Azerbaijan within the framework of the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur project). As a result of these factors, Iran is losing its position in most corridors. For example, within China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus is being developed instead of passing through Iranian territory. The North-South Corridor project is also facing severe delays due to domestic infrastructure problems and sanctions. Simultaneously, regional competitors such as Turkey, through active diplomacy and investment in infrastructure, are increasingly becoming transit hubs. Ultimately, the research arrives at the key conclusion that the main hypothesis of the study is confirmed: the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite possessing unique geopolitical advantages, has failed to secure a deserving share of regional corridors due to a combination of domestic challenges and external pressures. The consequence of this situation will be nothing less than "geopolitical isolation." This isolation manifests itself in the weakening of the national economy (loss of transit revenues and job creation opportunities), a reduction in the security coefficient (strengthening of competitors' positions and regional encirclement), and the gradual erosion of Iran's soft power and regional influence. The research warns that geographical advantages are not permanent and can be eroded if neglected. The authors emphasize that escaping this impasse requires a paradigm shift in national strategy: transitioning from a foreign policy based solely on security-political priorities to an active and pragmatic economic diplomacy, increasing transparency in the business environment, accelerating the completion of critical infrastructure projects, and striving for de-escalation in international relations. Otherwise, if the current trend continues, the risk of Iran's complete removal from the future communicative and economic map of Eurasia and its transformation into a "geopolitical island" will not be far-fetched.  

Abstract Globalization and glocalization have significantly reshaped the landscape of international relations, introducing innovative diplomatic tools such as paradiplomacy and the strategic utilization of diaspora communities. Paradiplomacy, as a form of sub-state diplomacy, empowers non-central governments and diaspora groups to engage in cross-border interactions, complementing formal state diplomacy. The Iranian diaspora in Turkey serves as a compelling case study due to its ability to influence bilateral relations through cultural, economic, and political channels. This study explores the paradiplomatic capacities of the Iranian diaspora in Turkey and evaluates how these capacities can enhance Iran-Turkey relations.
The research addresses the central question: What paradiplomatic potential does the Iranian diaspora in Turkey possess, and how can it impact bilateral relations? The study posits that the Iranian diaspora holds considerable paradiplomatic capabilities that can foster stronger ties between the two nations. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can expand its influence in the region while simultaneously strengthening its bilateral ties with Turkey. This research aims to shed light on the role of Diasporas as informal yet significant contributors to international relations, particularly in the context of neighboring countries with shared historical and cultural ties.
The research employs a causal (cause-and-effect) approach to analyze the relationship between diaspora activities and their diplomatic impacts. Data collection was conducted through a combination of library research (academic articles, policy reports, and historical records) and semi-structured interviews with Iranian diaspora members in Turkey, as well as experts in international relations and diaspora studies. The qualitative analysis focuses on identifying key areas cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and political engagement where diaspora involvement can contribute to paradiplomatic efforts. This methodology ensures a comprehensive understanding of the Iranian diaspora’s potential and the challenges it faces in Turkey.
The findings highlight three primary dimensions in which the Iranian diaspora in Turkey can exercise paradiplomatic influence:
1-     Cultural Diplomacy:
The Iranian diaspora acts as a cultural bridge, promoting mutual understanding through language, art, literature, and academic exchanges. Iranian cultural associations in Turkey organize events such as Persian language workshops, art exhibitions, and cultural festivals that introduce Turkish society to Iranian heritage. These activities foster people-to-people connections and strengthen cultural ties between the two nations. Additionally, Iranian cuisine and cultural traditions have gained popularity in Turkey, further enhancing cultural diplomacy.
2-     Economic Diplomacy:
Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and business professionals in Turkey contribute significantly to trade and investment flows between the two countries. The diaspora facilitates business partnerships, joint ventures, and knowledge transfer, particularly in sectors such as tourism, technology, and manufacturing. For instance, Iranian-owned businesses in Turkey often serve as intermediaries for circumventing international sanctions, facilitating trade in goods such as petrochemicals, agricultural products, and handicrafts. This economic engagement not only bolsters bilateral trade but also creates opportunities for collaborative ventures.
3-     Political Engagement:
Certain members of the Iranian diaspora engage in lobbying efforts, think tank collaborations, and policy dialogues that indirectly shape diplomatic relations. Their dual familiarity with Iranian and Turkish political landscapes positions them as informal mediators capable of addressing shared challenges. For example, diaspora members have participated in initiatives to promote regional stability and counter negative narratives about Iran in Turkish media and political circles.
The study underscores the Iranian diaspora’s networking capabilities, transnational ties, and socio-economic influence, which position it as a valuable actor in paradiplomacy. However, the research also identifies challenges, such as political sensitivities, differing foreign policy priorities, and the lack of a cohesive strategy for diaspora engagement, which may limit the full realization of these potentials.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey represents a unique asset for both countries, offering opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations across cultural, economic, and political dimensions. The study identifies several key factors that contribute to the diaspora’s paradiplomatic effectiveness:
1-     Transnational Networks:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey maintains strong transnational networks that facilitate cultural exchange, economic collaboration, and political dialogue. These networks enable the diaspora to act as a bridge between Iranian and Turkish societies, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation.
2-     Shared Historical and Cultural Ties:
Iran and Turkey share a rich history of cultural and civilizational interactions, which the diaspora can leverage to foster closer relations. The diaspora’s efforts to highlight these shared legacies through events, publications, and media can counter divisive narratives and strengthen cultural bonds.
3-     Economic Contributions:
The diaspora’s economic activities, particularly in trade and investment, serve as a critical component of Iran-Turkey relations. By facilitating cross-border commerce and promoting Iranian products in Turkish markets, the diaspora contributes to the economic interdependence of the two nations.
4-     Cultural Representation:
The Iranian diaspora’s cultural initiatives, such as organizing Persian New Year (Nowruz) celebrations and establishing Persian language schools, enhance Iran’s soft power in Turkey. These activities not only promote Iranian culture but also improve Iran’s image among Turkish citizens.
Despite these strengths, the research highlights several challenges that need to be addressed to maximize the diaspora’s paradiplomatic potential. These include:
ü  Political Sensitivities:
The complex political dynamics between Iran and Turkey, including regional rivalries and differing foreign policy objectives, can create obstacles for diaspora engagement.
ü  Fragmentation within the Diaspora:
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey is diverse in terms of socio-economic status, political affiliations, and motivations for migration. This diversity can hinder the formation of a cohesive and unified diaspora strategy.
ü  Resource Constraints:
Limited financial and institutional support from Iranian authorities restricts the diaspora’s ability to implement large-scale paradiplomatic initiatives.
The Iranian diaspora in Turkey possesses significant paradiplomatic capacities that can enhance Iran-Turkey relations in cultural, economic, and political spheres. By leveraging these capacities, Iran can strengthen its regional influence and foster closer ties with Turkey. However, realizing the full potential of the diaspora requires addressing the identified challenges through targeted policies and initiatives.
Policy Recommendations:
1-     Develop a Comprehensive Diaspora Strategy:
The Iranian government should establish a clear and cohesive strategy for engaging the diaspora in Turkey. This strategy should include mechanisms for supporting cultural, economic, and political initiatives led by diaspora members.
2-     Enhance Institutional Support:
Strengthening the role of cultural attachés and other institutional representatives in Turkey can provide the diaspora with the resources and guidance needed to implement paradiplomatic projects effectively.
3-     Promote Cultural and Educational Exchanges:
Expanding cultural and educational programs, such as scholarships for Turkish students to study in Iran and vice versa, can deepen people-to-people connections and foster mutual understanding.
4-     Facilitate Economic Collaboration:
Encouraging joint ventures and trade partnerships between Iranian and Turkish businesses can leverage the diaspora’s economic influence to strengthen bilateral trade and investment.
5-     Address Political Challenges:
Diplomatic efforts should focus on reducing political tensions and building trust between Iranian and Turkish authorities, creating a more favorable environment for diaspora engagement.
By addressing these challenges and implementing the proposed recommendations, Iran can harness the paradiplomatic potential of its diaspora in Turkey to achieve strategic objectives and strengthen its regional position.
 
 
 

Abstract The ever-increasing expansion of the soft and cultural power of Islam and the growing trend towards Islam, especially in European and American societies, against the material logic of Western civilization, has caused a kind of desperation, passivity and helplessness among far-right politicians and Western racists and has forced them to All historical and civilizational capacities have been used in various layers of social causes (political, social, cultural, historical, security, etc.), the causes of discourse - worldview and the causes of conflicting metaphors - myths between the two civilizations of the West and Islam, making Islam the first class enemy of identity, western civilization and values and create a wave of Islamophobia and anti-Islamism in western societies. Especially after the September 11 incident, due to bad media propaganda, public opinion has been affected and insulting Muslims and Islamic holy things has been placed at the top of racist movements and has created a new type of racism under the concept of Islamophobia. "Islamophobia" is a combination of Islam and phobia, and phobia means an irrational and unreasonable aversion or fear of something. The question that arises from the combination of these two words is that what is the reason for this unreasonable fear or dislike of Islam in the western society and in the minds of western people? Can superficial social, political, cultural and economic reasons alone have a convincing answer for the cause of this problem? Or what is happening in the upper layers of Western societies, both European and American, is rooted in the lower layers of the mind and history of man and Western society? Finding the causes of Islamophobia and anti-Islamism is so important and necessary that day by day we witness the intensification of such thoughts and behaviors not only in the minds of experts but also in the social context and among ordinary people of Western societies in the face of Islam and millions of Muslims.According to this, the main goal of the research is the causal layered analysis of Islamophobia in the West, and in this regard, its secondary goals are to explain the objective/litany layers and to identify and analyze the layers of causal systems, discourse-worldview and myth-metaphor of the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the West. For this purpose, the main research question isThe roots and causes of the spread of Islamophobia in the West based on the method of causal layered Analysis include what causes and factors?
And the sub-questions are
1- How can the objective signs of the spread of Islamophobia in the West be analyzed in recent decades?
2- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of causal systems (economic, social, political, cultural, security, etc.)?
3- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of the worldview-discourse system?
4- What are the roots of the spread of Islamophobia in the West at the level of the myth-metaphor system?
This research seeks to collect and analyze data by using the method of causal layered analysis as a suitable method to analyze cultural-social events in future studies, and also by two methods of environmental survey of texts and interviews with experts, and to the research questions to answer.
Based on the investigations carried out during the current research, among the causes of Islamophobia in different layers and levels, we can include such things as the increase in the Muslim population in the West and the depiction of this issue as a cultural-security threat, the false belief and understanding of Islam by Westerners and the confrontation with it, the growth of takfiri movements in the Islamic world and the occurrence of terrorist incidents in the West Media deception in order to justify the interventionism of the West in the Islamic world, the rise of extreme right-wing parties in the West, the growth of political Islam in the Islamic world and the international system, the fundamental fear of the possibility of Islamists gaining power in the political arena, the financial crisis of the West due to the presence of Muslim immigrants, the growth of political Islam and the endangerment of the economic interests of the West in the energy center of the world (Persian Gulf), made of Islam and the East as the West (otherization), cultural and historical conflict between Islam and the West, defensive reaction of Muslims against Western modernity, culture of xenophobia in the West, cultural decline and crisis of spirituality in Western civilization, discourse weakness of The West against Islamic logic, belief in the apocalyptic battle (war of civilizations), belief in the centrality and superiority of the West and the Western race, belief in the system of liberal democracy as an unrivaled intellectual system in the world, etc.
The findings of the research show that the roots and causes of Islamophobia in the West include a range of issues from objective layers and political, social causal systems, etc. to discourse-worldview and myth-metaphor layers. The theorization and social expansion of Islamophobia in the West is not an action but a passive and desperate reaction against the growing wave of Islamism that has challenged the foundations of the West (in its historical, cultural and discursive sense) and The future of this process will expand more and more and will turn from Islamophobia to anti-Islamism.
 
 
 

Abstract The contemporary Islamic world is currently navigating a profound ideological and structural competition between divergent models of governance, each attempting to redefine the intricate relationship between religion, the state, and the multifaceted demands of modernity. This research focuses on the emergence and consolidation of the "Neo-Traditional National State" model, particularly as manifested in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has positioned itself as a sophisticated alternative to the "Islamic Caliphate Revival" model advocated by various Salafist and political Islam movements. Historically, the failure of secular Arab nationalism and the subsequent vacuum left by the decline of Pan-Arabism led to the rise of utopian movements that envisioned a return to the early Caliphate as a solution to social and political crises. Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and more recently ISIS, capitalized on this vacuum, proposing a model where Sharia precedes the state and an exclusionary "Ummatic" identity replaces national sovereignty. In direct contrast, the UAE has sought to transcend this dichotomy by synthesizing tradition with functional modernization. The core objective of this study is to analyze how the UAE has successfully navigated the constraints of radical Salafist ideology to establish a governance structure that achieves high levels of economic development and functional legitimacy while remaining anchored in indigenous traditions. To facilitate this analysis, the research employs the theoretical framework of Imre Lakatos’ "Research Programs," which allows for a structural deconstruction of these governance models into a "Hard Core" of non-negotiable principles and a "Protective Belt" of flexible auxiliary hypotheses. In the case of the UAE’s neo-traditionalist model, the hard core is defined by national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the preservation of a patriarchal, sheikhly governing structure, while the protective belt is composed of a pragmatic and tolerant interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence known as Fiqh al-Maqasid (the Jurisprudence of Higher Objectives).
This Lakatosian framework reveals that while the caliphate model possesses a rigid hard core predicated on the absolute primacy of نص (text) over the state, the UAE model utilizes Fiqh al-Maqasid to ensure the state’s survival and prosperity. This jurisprudential paradigm, heavily influenced by the Maliki school and the writings of Imam Al-Shatibi, focuses on the "Higher Objectives" of religion—namely the preservation of life, intellect, religion, property, and lineage—rather than a literalist adherence to historical legal forms. A pivotal figure in this intellectual project is Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, whose "Neo-Traditionalist" discourse provides the theological justification for the state''s policies. Bin Bayyah’s philosophy advocates for a "Theology of Obedience" and Fiqh al-Waqi (the jurisprudence of reality), which emphasizes that scholars should renounce direct political interference to maintain social order and prevent فتنه (fitna or chaos). By establishing institutions like the "Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies" and the "Emirates Fatwa Council," the UAE has effectively centralized religious authority, creating a defensive layer that protects the state from the encroachment of radical political Islam while simultaneously legitimizing its modernization agenda. This approach has facilitated the transition of the state''s legitimacy from a purely ideological or charismatic basis to a "functional" or "performance-based" legitimacy. In this model, the government''s authority is sustained by its tangible success in delivering economic growth, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and transforming the nation into a global hub for logistics, aviation, and technology.
Furthermore, the research highlights that the UAE''s "strait diplomacy" and strategic foreign policy, exemplified by the Abraham Accords in 2020, are not merely political calculations but are presented through a neo-traditionalist lens as religious imperatives for peace and the preservation of human life. The state utilizes concepts like the "New Alliance of Virtue" (Hilf al-Fudul al-Jadid) to frame international cooperation and interfaith dialogue as traditional Islamic values, thereby mitigating the internal friction often caused by rapid globalization. However, the study identifies several critical structural risks that could challenge the long-term viability of this model. The reliance on a top-down, authoritarian-consultative (Shura-based) structure may eventually face pressure from the rising civil demands of an increasingly educated and globally-connected domestic population. There is also the persistent risk of a "neo-fundamentalist" backlash; if the state is perceived as disregarding traditional "red lines" of Islamic identity in its quest for secular efficiency or regional normalization, it could trigger a reactive radicalization within certain social segments. Additionally, the unique demographic composition of the UAE, where a vast expatriate majority resides alongside a native minority, presents ongoing challenges for the preservation of a cohesive national identity amidst the forces of radical secularism or religious conservatism.
In summary, the UAE’s evolution into a neo-traditional national state demonstrates a successful integration of religious tradition and modern governance, offering a functional alternative to the institutional failures of radical political Islam. The model proves that religion, when interpreted through the lens of Maslahah (public interest) and Fiqh al-Maqasid, can serve as a catalyst for national development rather than an obstacle. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this program depends on the state''s ability to manage the delicate equilibrium between its "Hard Core" of patriarchal sovereignty and its "Protective Belt" of religious flexibility. The findings suggest that for the neo-traditional model to remain progressive, it must continue to evolve its consultative mechanisms to accommodate emerging civil expectations while maintaining the theological rigor required to sustain its legitimacy within the broader Islamic world. This research provides a theoretical framework for understanding the interaction between religion and the state in newly developing Islamic nations, concluding that the survival of such models hinges on their capacity to balance national interests with religious heritage in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

Abstract Linguistic discussions and their applications in the study of texts and speeches facilitate a systematic reading of the materials. By applying rigorous linguistic tools, researchers can move beyond surface-level readings to uncover the pragmatic intentions, illocutionary forces, and perlocutionary effects that shape audience perceptions and societal responses. Within this broad domain, John Searle's speech act theory emerges as a particularly influential paradigm, originally building upon J.L. Austin's foundational work in How to Do Things with Words (1962). Searle, in his seminal text Speech Acts (1969) and subsequent elaborations like Expression and Meaning (1979), refines the taxonomy into five core categories of illocutionary acts: assertives (which commit the speaker to the truth of a represented proposition, such as stating facts or describing events), expressives (which articulate the speaker's psychological state or attitude toward a propositional content, like praising or lamenting), directives (which attempt to compel the hearer to perform an action, through commands, requests, or suggestions), commissives (which obligate the speaker to a future course of action, such as promises or vows), and declaratives (which effect a change in institutional reality simply by virtue of their utterance, like declaring war or baptizing). This research aims to apply John Searle's speech act theory in analyzing Ayatollah Khamenei's Friday prayer sermons delivered after the martyrdom of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, addressing the following questions: According to John Searle's speech act theory, what speech acts did Ayatollah Khamenei employ in his Friday sermon? What does the frequency of these acts signify?  The methodology used in this article is a mixed-methods approach, encompassing both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The data collection method was purposive sampling and content validity was conducted based on a single focus group. The findings were presented in both descriptive and explanatory formats. The descriptive findings of the article show that among the speech acts of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the most speech acts were declarative speech acts. In other words, out of the total of 87 speech acts, 43 cases, which include 49.42 percent, were Assertive. In second place, the Expressive speech acts with 23 cases, i.e. 26.43 percent, expresses the speaker's feeling about the world. In this sermon, the directive speech act is in the next place. This speech act with 14 speech fragments, 16.10 percent, indicates that the speaker puts the listener in the performance of a task and forces him to do something. The Commissive speech act, with a frequency of 5 cases and 5.75 percent, indicates that the speaker intends to commit himself to perform an action in the future. Finally, the declarative act includes speech acts that, by expressing them, create real changes in the world, which has the lowest frequency in this sermon with only 2 cases and 2.30 percent. Therefore, the findings of the study indicate that in leadership speech, Assertive act had the highest frequency and declarative act had the lowest frequency. The frequency of Assertive act was 49.42 percent, Expressive speech act was 26.43 percent, Directive act was 16.10 percent, Commissive act was 5.75 percent, and declarative act was 2.30 percent. Also, in the explanatory findings of the research, the rereading of this sermon according to John Searle's speech act theory showed that in this sermon, all five types of speech acts emphasized by Searle, including declarative, affective, persuasive, commitment, and declaration, can be found among the speech fragments. The reason why declarative acts are used most frequently in this sermon is that Ayatollah Khamenei, as the leader of the world's Shiites, in the religious-political sphere, considers the interests of the country and the resistance front, and his speeches reflect a deep look at political and cultural issues. Considering the context and circumstances that have arisen, the existence of crises, seditions, and specific political conditions prevailing in the region, and the impact of this on Iran as well as the resistance front in Islamic countries, the delivery of these sermons by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution can pave the way for the right choice in the path and movement of the people and officials, as well as the resistance movements in Islamic countries, including Lebanon, Palestine, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and help them make appropriate decisions in their policies. The findings of this study, as a feedback on the Friday prayer sermon of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, within the framework of Searle's speech act theory, indicate that the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei, as the religious-political leader of Iran and the Resistance Front, have provided his audience with the opportunity to strengthen their spirit of defiance and all-round resistance by choosing the right path and making effective decisions. The honesty in his speech and his frank and uncompromising expression, in explaining current events correctly and without exaggeration, has played an important role in enlightening society and has created the basis for a good and sincere relationship between the Leader of the Revolution and the people under his command in Iran and the Resistance Front. The high frequency of assertive acts among Ayatollah Khamenei's speech acts suggests that when delivering this sermon, he sought to fulfill the duty of enlightening and raising societal awareness regarding recent events, including the recent assassinations that led to the martyrdom of Ismail Haniyeh (2024-5-31) and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah(2024-10-4), as well as Iran's missile strikes  against Israel (Promise of Truth 1 & 2)(2024-4-13, 2024-10-01), in his capacity as the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Resistance Front.

Abstract This article examines the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. The country has been the scene of confrontation between various and conflicting ideologies over the past two centuries. Supporters of these ideologies have undertaken political struggles at various levels, from discursive confrontation to armed struggle, to achieve political power and implement their ideological goals. Meanwhile, political Islam, as an ideology, has faced the stability and sustainability of Afghanistan's political systems with many problems since the beginning.
Developments in Afghanistan over the past two centuries have paved the way for the emergence of political and intellectual ideologies, including political Islam. The country has been the focus of major, extra-regional, regional, and neighboring powers due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position, but the entry of the British, followed by the Russians and the West led by the United States over the past 200 years, has further highlighted the discussion of political Islam in Afghanistan. Political ideologies have taken shape in the context of political, social, economic, and cultural developments, influenced by the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of the nation-state process, class contradictions, and religious and ethnic differences. Political Islam emerged as a political ideology in competition with ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and democracy. Political Islam was a response to the intellectual and political conditions of the 19th century and the expansion of Western ideas and political systems.
Afghanistan, like other Islamic and non-Islamic countries, has witnessed the emergence and growth of various movements and ideologies. Regarding the grounds for the emergence of political Islam, thinkers have mentioned various reasons: Fouad Ajami cites the failure of secular elites, Theda Skocpol cites the lack of political participation, Nikki Keddie and Gilles Kepel cite the crisis of the petite bourgeoisie, and Michael Fischer cites oil dollars and unequal development and the effects of cultural decline. Political Islam, with its approach to the Islamic state, is attributed to the first government of early Islam, but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 is considered a turning point for the resurgence of Islamism after a period of decline. In essence, political Islam is considered the reconstruction of society based on Islamic rules, and this discourse, in opposition and contradiction to all traditional and modern discourses that prohibit the combination of religion and politics, has been considered. Political Islam is not only a struggle against modernism, but also a reaction against injustices, bullying, and inequalities in Islamic societies. Political Islam is understood as Islam that is justice-seeking, development-oriented, worldly, authoritarian, civilization-building, realistic, revolutionary and reformist, science and reason-based, progressive, fighting against domination, system-building, and pragmatic.
The main question of this research is to investigate the political and social contexts of the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan. According to the data, it is hypothesized that the emergence of political Islam in Afghanistan is rooted in the ideas and thoughts of Sayyid Jamal al-Din. Furthermore, political Islam with different tendencies has been influenced by the views of Turkish political Islam by Mahmud Tarzi, Sufi political Islam by the Mujaddidi and Gailani families, and Deobandi political Islam by Indian teachers. However, in its modern sense, it entered Afghanistan with the return of Al-Azhar University of Egypt graduates with the intellectual line of the Muslim Brotherhood and the return of Qom seminary students from Iran with Shia views. The current research is exploratory and uses the historical sociology method with a descriptive and analytical approach. The present article, with a descriptive and analytical approach, falls into the category of theoretical and applied research. The documentary technique has been used for data collection. For data analysis, text analysis patterns in historical sociology have been used, drawing on the views of Charles Wright Mills. These topics are discussed in detail in the theoretical framework section. Historical sociology is a method that, by examining the past, seeks to understand how the formation and emergence of phenomena and transformations of societies occur over time. By analyzing macro political and social patterns, this method understands the complex processes that shape social structures.
The discussion of Islamic political movements began with Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi, born in 1838, coinciding with the first British invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequently, through the efforts of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in Egypt, it gradually grew and expanded in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Later, figures such as Hassan al-Banna and Muhammad Rashid Rida founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Simultaneously, Maulana Maududi initiated his Islamic thought in British India, emphasizing the realization of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic Sharia, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan party in 1941.
 

Abstract Over the past two decades, the international system has undergone profound structural transformations, marked notably by the relative decline of United States hegemony and the rise of emerging economic and geopolitical actors. These shifts have necessitated a critical reassessment of power balance theories and regional analytical frameworks, emphasizing the increasing complexity of global governance and the emergence of a multipolar international order. Eurasia, due to its central geographical location, vast energy resources, and extensive transit networks, has emerged as a strategic hub that plays a decisive role in redefining global influence and facilitating the redistribution of power among regional and extraregional actors. This region, therefore, is no longer merely a passive conduit for international trade and energy flows but has become a key arena for strategic maneuvering and geopolitical competition. Historically, international transport infrastructure in the Global South was predominantly designed to serve Western powers, prioritizing resource extraction and the export of raw materials to industrial centers in Europe and North America over the economic and social needs of local populations. Railways and maritime routes in regions such as India, Africa, and the Middle East were constructed to integrate local economies into global value chains controlled by Western actors, often reinforcing dependency and limiting the strategic autonomy of the host states. However, in recent decades, a new wave of infrastructure projects in Eurasia has challenged this paradigm, demonstrating that large-scale transport networks can simultaneously serve economic, political, and strategic purposes, enhancing the capabilities of regional powers while constraining traditional U.S. influence. Among the most significant initiatives are the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The INSTC, developed since 2000 with the participation of Iran, Russia, and India, integrates multimodal transport routes—combining maritime and overland pathways—to reduce the transit time for goods between Europe and India by approximately 15 to 20 days, while lowering transportation costs by roughly 30 percent. Beyond its economic benefits, the corridor functions as a strategic instrument, allowing Russia and Iran to enhance their autonomy from Western-controlled routes and exert greater influence in regional logistics and energy flows. This initiative exemplifies how infrastructure development can be leveraged as a tool of regional power, altering the balance of influence in Eurasia. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, similarly represents a transformative approach to regional connectivity. Encompassing over 130 countries, the BRI has facilitated massive investments in transport, logistics, and energy infrastructure, establishing a dense network of strategic corridors that strengthen China’s influence in a multipolar international system. These projects not only increase China’s direct foreign investment in participating countries but also encourage engagement by major global investors, including Western actors, reshaping the patterns of global capital flow and economic interdependence. Rail and road connections between China and Iran, for example, have reduced maritime transit times from 20 days to approximately 15 days over land, creating new economic arteries that can significantly affect regional power dynamics and the strategic autonomy of participating states. This study’s theoretical framework is anchored in three complementary perspectives: hard and soft power, balance of power, and the theory of emerging multipolar order. From a power perspective, large-scale infrastructure projects such as the INSTC and BRI are considered instruments of structural power. By lowering transportation costs and reducing transit times, these corridors enhance the economic and logistical capacities of Eurasian actors, while associated institutional and financial mechanisms reinforce their political and economic autonomy. The integration of hard and soft power elements in these projects increases the strategic leverage of China, Russia, Iran, and India, establishing a direct link between infrastructural capabilities and geopolitical influence. Within the balance of power framework, structural realism underscores that security and survival in an anarchic international system depend on the creation of equilibrium among major actors. New Eurasian transit corridors, by providing independent alternatives to Western-dominated routes, strengthen regional capabilities and facilitate the redistribution of power at both regional and global levels. These developments, therefore, not only generate tangible economic benefits but also reshape the strategic environment, limiting the influence of the United States and enabling a more diversified and resilient global order. The study finds that both the INSTC and the BRI operate simultaneously as economic drivers and strategic tools. The INSTC has created significant economic and geopolitical opportunities for India, Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan, allowing these states to play a more proactive role in regional power redistribution and reinforcing their strategic positions. The BRI, through extensive investment in transit and logistical infrastructure, not only enhances economic capacities but also strengthens political leverage, fosters institutional independence, and creates parallel financial mechanisms. Together, these initiatives facilitate the emergence of a more balanced multipolar architecture in Eurasia and accelerate the transition away from unipolar dominance. Overall, the research demonstrates that contemporary Eurasian infrastructure projects, by establishing transport networks independent of Western control, have the potential to shift the global economic and political center of gravity toward this continent. Eurasia is no longer solely a transit region; it functions as a strategic and geopolitical lever capable of redefining global governance and power relations. These initiatives exemplify how infrastructure can transcend conventional economic roles to become instruments of smart power, increasing the strategic autonomy of regional actors and shaping the architecture of a multipolar world order. The ongoing expansion of these corridors suggests that Eurasia will increasingly serve as a decisive center of gravity in global politics, with implications for trade, energy, and security across multiple regions. In conclusion, the study highlights the transformative impact of large-scale transport infrastructure on the global balance of power. By enabling regional actors to circumvent traditional Western-controlled routes, the INSTC and BRI enhance regional autonomy, facilitate economic growth, and provide the strategic means to influence global governance. These projects underscore the interplay between economic infrastructure and geopolitical power, demonstrating how Eurasia’s emerging network of corridors is reshaping the international system. The findings suggest that the strategic centrality of Eurasia is set to increase, with infrastructure serving as both an enabler of economic development and a decisive instrument of geopolitical strategy, ultimately contributing to the emergence of a multipolar global order.