The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract The concept of corridor-based geopolitical positioning plays a pivotal role in shaping national power and, by extension, national security. In geopolitical theory, such positioning refers to the strategic spatial configuration where power competition among geopolitical actors unfolds in relation to geographic space. When a state successfully leverages its corridor-based advantages in this competitive landscape, it gains geopolitical superiority over its rivals, thereby enhancing its national security. This study investigates the role of Iran’s corridor-type geopolitical position in the domain of air transportation, emphasizing its potential to serve as a global aerial corridor. Despite possessing a geographically advantageous location that could facilitate international air transit, Iran has yet to capitalize on this latent asset, while regional competitors have effectively harnessed similar advantages to their benefit.
Iran’s geographical location situates it at the crossroads of major continental axes—north-south and east-west—offering a unique opportunity to function as a strategic air transit hub. However, this potential remains underutilized due to a combination of infrastructural, political, and economic constraints. The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, relying on library-based documentary sources to assess Iran’s current air transport infrastructure and its active air corridors. The findings reveal that Iran’s geopolitical position has not yet translated into tangible power generation or enhanced national security. Nevertheless, if this position is strategically developed in alignment with Iran’s geographic capacities, it could significantly contribute to both power projection and national security.
Corridor-based positioning inherently generates power by linking demographic, economic, political, military, and cultural spheres of influence. When such positioning holds regional significance, it is classified as geopolitical; when it extends to global relevance, it becomes geostrategic. The aviation industry, by its very nature, is deeply embedded in geopolitical dynamics. Air corridors and transit routes not only facilitate economic exchange but also serve as instruments of strategic influence. The development of air hubs and the expansion of aerial connectivity can directly impact national security by fostering economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and regional integration.
Iran’s geopolitical location offers multiple opportunities to enhance its national power. The aviation sector, in particular, presents a compelling case for strategic investment. In 2019, global aviation statistics underscored the magnitude of this industry: 4.3 billion passengers were transported, accounting for 8.3 trillion revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs). Additionally, 58 million tons of air cargo were moved, equivalent to 231 billion freight ton kilometers (FTKs). On a daily basis, over 100,000 flights carried approximately 12 million passengers and $18 billion worth of goods. In total, 38 million commercial flights operated across 48,500 air routes, covering 54 million kilometers and accumulating 85 million flight hours. The aviation industry supported 65 million jobs and contributed 3.6% to global GDP, with an economic turnover of $2.7 trillion (Aviation Benefit, 2019:6).
These figures illustrate the strategic importance of air transit and its direct correlation with corridor-based geopolitical positioning. The volume and quality of transit flights are closely tied to a country’s ability to leverage its geographic location. Iran’s potential to serve as a transit hub—connecting northern, southern, eastern, and western air routes—remains largely untapped. By enhancing its air transport capabilities and offering competitive services to transit flights, Iran could generate substantial wealth and global prestige, both of which are critical to national security. According to projections, air travel is expected to double by 2034. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that passenger growth between the Middle East and Africa will continue to rise through 2022, presenting Iran with a strategic opportunity to capitalize on this trend for both economic and security gains.
Transit flights are not only indicators of security but also contributors to its formation. The fluid nature of national security—shaped by political, economic, and strategic variables—means that the quantity and quality of transit flights are influenced by broader geopolitical conditions. Air corridors and overflight routes can generate wealth, mitigate geopolitical isolation, and serve as strategic assets during periods of international sanctions. Activating Iran’s corridor-based position, a fixed geopolitical factor, through targeted policy measures and infrastructural development, can have a direct impact on national power and security.
The research findings underscore a critical gap between Iran’s potential and its current utilization of corridor-based geopolitical advantages. Despite possessing high transit appeal and significant geographic capacity, Iran has not effectively harnessed these assets to bolster its national security or economic development. Key indicators such as transit flight revenue, number of overflights, airport capacity, geopolitical crises, comparative overflight tariffs, exclusion from regional corridors, and the strategic behavior of rival states all point to a strong correlation between air transit and national security. Iran’s potential to increase its transit flight revenue far exceeds its current performance. This untapped wealth could serve as a continuous source of national resilience, directly influencing security, welfare, and national survival.
Several variables influence Iran’s ability to generate revenue from its air corridors. These include its corridor-based positioning, territorial expanse, airport capacities, overflight tariffs (which are currently high), route security, availability of parallel routes through neighboring countries, the prevalence of restricted airspaces, political factors such as sanctions and conflicts, and inadequate infrastructure, particularly in air navigation systems. Addressing these challenges through strategic planning and investment could unlock Iran’s latent potential as a regional and global air transit hub, thereby reinforcing its geopolitical standing and enhancing its national security.
In conclusion, the study highlights the strategic imperative of transforming Iran’s corridor-based geopolitical position into a source of national power. By aligning infrastructural development with geopolitical strategy, Iran can reposition itself within the global aviation network, mitigate regional isolation, and secure long-term economic and security benefits. The findings call for a comprehensive policy framework that integrates geopolitical foresight with aviation sector development, ensuring that Iran’s geographic advantages are no longer squandered but strategically leveraged for national gain. 

Abstract As one of the most important functional regions in the world, the Persian Gulf region holds a significant position in the power equations and regional arrangements, particularly in terms of politics, economy, and security. The importance of this region for governments throughout history has been a platform for political and military competitions and challenges, to the extent that most wars and security conflicts have taken place in this regional systemOman is one of the important and influential Arab countries - a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council - in the Persian Gulf regional system, which has traditionally been one of Iran’s most important allies over the centuries. Despite having many cultural and civilizational similarities with other Persian Gulf actors, this country has different and distinctive characteristics, especially in its foreign policy approaches. Since the mid-1980s, Omani policy has been to adopt a policy of neutrality and build multi-layered friendships with regional and international actors, and they have generally refrained from directly engaging in issues that have a thorny aspect. Political realism has led Omanis to a position where they have simultaneously been able to establish appropriate relations between opposing and rival actors, such as the United States and Iran, China and India, and Iran and Saudi Arabia. The policy of avoiding tension is so deeply rooted in the foundations of Omani foreign policy that the country made non-interference in alignments against Iran one of its main conditions for joining the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it has striven to maintain it to this day. Omanis do not have the same financial and oil resources as their neighbors and do not play a role in the energy market. Accordingly, they are trying to take full advantage of the confrontation between Iran and the West. In this regard, they are trying to be the axis of energy transfer from Central Asia to other regions and, given their strategic location in the Sea of ​​Oman and the Makran region, take on the role of a "strategic actor". To achieve this goal, they are trying to create multi-layered and diverse interactions and play the role of a "mediating actor", and in this regard, Omanis have been among the most active countries present at regional and international conferences and meetings. In this regard, this research aims to examine the behavioral patterns of this country and its consequences within the framework of the foundations of Oman's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf regional system, given the importance and influence of Oman. Considering this issue, it can be said that the foundations of Oman's foreign policy, even after Sultan Qaboos, have been relatively stable based on political realism, the use of strategic-geopolitical capacities, and complex interactions with other actors. On this basis, despite the dynamics, developments, and changes in power equations and the occurrence of crises at the regional level, Oman's foreign policy in the regional system has continued in an independent, impartial, and balanced manner within the framework of intelligent diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral dialogues and cooperation in various economic, political, and security fields actively and systematically. These behavioral patterns have ultimately introduced this country as an active actor in the Persian Gulf regional system and have paved the way for enhancing the country's position in the Persian Gulf-Middle East regional system and the international system. This article aims to explain the trends and foundations of Oman's foreign policy in achieving this positioning by raising the question of what conditions exist in Muscat's foreign policy for achieving this goal. It is of the opinion that the country's performance in the three areas of desire, capacity, and acceptance for regional positioning over the past decade has prepared the ground for this role. Focusing on this question, the results of this article show that in the area of ​​desire, Muscat's foreign policy, due to avoiding ideological attitudes and replacing realistic leaders, has sought growth and progress, expanding interaction, and ultimately gaining a position at the regional level. Today, Oman's declared programs at various levels and the volume of exchanges of this country in this region indicate its serious desire for regional positioning. In the area of ​​capacities, which can be seen in investments, exchanges, and political and economic relations in the region, Oman's economic power and the expansion of economic influence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region clearly demonstrate the conditions for playing a role. In the current period, few researchers doubt Oman's economic, cultural, and political developments. In the area of ​​acceptance, Oman has been able to gain the satisfaction of the countries of the region. In the theoretical field, factors such as realism, tolerance, political neutrality, etc., have made Oman attractive. In practical terms, the huge volume of exchanges between regional countries and political mediations between regional countries, especially in relation to Iran, and above all the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic, and European and Western countries, can be evaluated in this context. Therefore, the series of developments that have taken place indicate that Oman's regional positioning has been moving forward in the last decade and, despite the change in the country's internal leadership, it has still been a source of playing an effective role in filling the gaps within the region in the regional order of the Persian Gulf, and has also been able to be a reliable source for political and security exchanges between the region and the level of the international system and the role of great powers in this region. In this study, an attempt was made to address how this role is instilled using the theoretical foundations of regional positioning; although these relations and this path were not and are not without challenges. The fragility of the region's security structure, polar divisions over fundamental regional crises such as the Palestinian issue and border disputes, and excessive expectations from regional rivals for Oman to take a clear and unilateral direction in times of crisis are the most important obstacles, the management of which by Muscat in the future could be a reflection of the success or failure of this country's regional positioning 

Abstract Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey have fluctuated from cooperation to competition since their inception. The perception of Turkey as a relatively secular country, allied with the West and a member of NATO has made it a challenging player in the intellectual structure of Iranian decision-makers. The two countries have different ideas about regional role, regional order, and regional leadership. Tehran’s threatening perception of the Zangezur Corridor and Israel’s growing influence in Turkey and Azerbaijan have exacerbated pessimism in this regard. At the same time, the historical relations between the two neighboring countries and cooperation in economic fields are considered a pivotal factor in advancing Iran's neighborhood policy and regional economic diplomacy. The experience of cooperation in the Qatar crisis and the referendum in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in 2017 also showed that Tehran and Ankara have common interests, at least in some thematic areas. The main question of this article is what factor has led to the sinusoidal fluctuation in Iran-Turkey relations between 2011 and 2023. This article is descriptive-analytical, and the required information was collected through library methods and reference to reliable internet sources. Instead of relying on the pattern of formation of cooperation and competition in a priori and predetermined formats, the present study uses an a posteriori and structuralist approach, which believes that relationships are formed in a context of bilateral and multilateral interactions. Under the influence of intellectual and normative structures, relations between Iran and Turkey have tended towards strategic competition and confrontation rather than cooperation. Ankara's policy of active presence in the Levant and Persian Gulf subsystems has been accompanied by entry into Tehran's traditional sphere of influence, making conflict of interests between the two sides inevitable. In Syria, Ankara has refused to normalize relations with the central government and, by continuing its presence on Syrian soil and providing multi-layered support to the opposition, has created a serious challenge to the restoration of the Assad government's sovereignty as a strategic ally of Iran. In Iraq, Turkey has also assumed a historical responsibility to protect the country's Sunni and Turkmen minorities, having crossed Iran's red lines in Iraq on numerous occasions. What adds to the complexity of this situation is the continued direct Turkish military presence in northern Syria and Iraq and the lack of a clear perspective for changing this situation. The dominance of the confrontational approach in bilateral relations has also overshadowed the prospects for achieving cooperation. Rather than being in line with the long-term goals and interests of both sides, the cooperation that has been formed has its roots in environmental requirements, including the gaps in Turkey's relations with the United States and Europe, as well as the preference for profits from trade with Iran under sanctions, and has at times led Tehran and Ankara to adopt a tactical cooperation strategy. The crisis-ridden economy, the confrontation with the United States, and the Kurdish issue in general have affected Tehran and Ankara, albeit to different degrees. The second Karabakh war in 2020, as well as Azerbaijan's recent advances in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, have changed the dynamics in the region in Turkey's favor, adding to Tehran's threatening perception of the developments. From the perspective of Iranian officials, Israel's increased influence in the South Caucasus region, especially its strategic relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan, along with the normalization and improvement of Ankara's relations with Tel Aviv, have also contributed to the insecurity of Iran's northern borders. The power vacuum resulting from Russia's presence in the Ukrainian war also intensifies the scope of the conflicts between Tehran and Ankara in Syria and Karabakh. Therefore, Iran and Turkey's different perceptions and understandings of security and threats in the Levant and the Persian Gulf have been the factor behind the fluctuation in bilateral relations, which are mainly confrontational and competitive, and less cooperative. In such circumstances, the economic relations between the two sides, under conditions of sanctions and some environmental opportunities resulting from the activism of rival or challenging identities, including tactical cooperation in the Qatar crisis, the Kurdistan Regional Government referendum, and cooperation during the 2016 coup, act as a moderator of the aforementioned mainstream. The perceptions and understandings of security and threat have been the factor in establishing various forms of Hobbesian (confrontation), Lockean (competition), and Kantian (cooperation) culture in Iran-Turkey relations during the period under discussion. In the positive aspect of establishing a desirable regional order, numerous cases of conflict and divergence of interests between Iran and Turkey are visible, including in the Syrian and Karabakh crises. In cases of attempts to prevent the establishment of an undesirable regional order, the two sides have reached a kind of tactical cooperation in the form of negative and passive action. Some economic areas of bilateral interactions have also had an intermediate status as a gray area of ​​relations.    

Abstract The September 11, 2001 attacks, followed by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, marked the beginning of a series of transformative developments that fundamentally altered the geopolitical order of West Asia. Amid these shifts, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, more than any other regional power, sought over the past two decades to position itself as a central political, security, economic, and cultural actor in shaping, defining, and implementing various regional initiatives.
The abstract of the resistance, given the quantitative and qualitative expansion it has found in the last two decades, has been able to show itself as an effective element in the political and military processes of the West Asian region and have special capabilities. This has led to the creation of specific security arrangements around the Iranian Islamic Republic, in a better way, to establish a balance of threats in the West Asian region, to the extent that it can "automatically" repel regional and trans -regional threats against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This study was aimed at examining the strategic requirements of resistance for the national security of the Islamic Republic.) The questionnaire (and the library, in accordance with the descriptive research method used in this study, uses a library (documentary) questionnaire to test the hypothesis. The statistical population of the present study was provided by professors and students of postgraduate and doctoral political sciences and other related trends in Tehran. Research shows that multitasking and miracles of resistance axis emphasizes the activation of the capacity of the economy, the consolidation of military and defense power, and the constructive relationship of deepening cooperation with Russia and China (as well as interacting and interacting with the neighborhood policy for the Islamic policy and adopting the most important foreign policy doctrine and adopting a strategy in the West. Has: Resistance Axis, Islamic Republic of Iran, West Asia Region, National Security. Despite sustained efforts by the United States and its allies to impose sanctions, exert economic pressure, and politically isolate Iran, the country’s regional policy in West Asia has expanded significantly over the past decade. This policy is largely reflected in Iran’s cooperation with the so-called “Resistance Axis,” a concept in Iranian foreign policy that encompasses alliances with a network of formal and informal, state and non-state actors across the region.
Iran has framed its initiative within the Resistance Axis as a counterforce to the United States, the Zionist regime, and the growing trend of normalization among regional states. While Iran’s foreign policy toward Islamic resistance movements and liberation struggles is ideologically rooted in humanitarian ideals and religious obligations, this orientation does not contradict its pursuit of national security within regional and global equations. Beyond its spiritual, religious, and humanitarian dimensions, Iran’s engagement with the Resistance Axis is a strategic response to perceived threats in the West Asian regional environment. Initially defensive in nature, this support has evolved as a deterrent against hostile powers operating in the region.
However, alongside its strategic opportunities and capabilities, the Resistance Axis also presents vulnerabilities, challenges, and structural weaknesses that adversaries may exploit to undermine Iran’s national interests and security. These include economic fragility, persistent sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia communities—and even among Shia factions regarding their alignment with Iran’s ideological and political vision—financial burdens associated with sustaining the Axis, and human losses resulting from military advisory support.
Another critical challenge is the imbalance between Iran’s military-security engagement and its political-economic relations with Resistance Axis actors. The formal and informal nature of these alliances, coupled with governance and economic disparities among member entities, introduces further complications. Thus, while the Resistance Axis yields both strategic benefits and risks for Iran’s national security and foreign policy, the central question driving this research is: What are the strategic requirements of the Resistance Axis for safeguarding the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Over the past four decades, Iran has successfully deepened its strategic ties and strengthened its political, security, and military relations with groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia factions in Iraq, thereby extending its strategic depth beyond its borders. In the last two decades, Iran has actively challenged the United States and its regional allies across multiple domains. It could be argued that no existential threat to these actors is currently more explicit, direct, and formidable than that posed by Iran.
At the strategic level, the perception of Iran by the Arab-Hebrew axis has shifted from a “containment” paradigm to one of “aggression.” Tactically, this has translated into direct attacks on Iranian assets. On the soft power front, the U.S. and its regional allies have mobilized media, cultural platforms, lobbying networks, and diplomatic influence to advance their confrontational agenda against Iran. In the semi-hard domain, they have employed sanctions, economic pressure, and political maneuvers—such as the “Deal of the Century,” the Abraham Accords, and deepening ties with regional and extra-regional powers—to recalibrate alliances and enhance their relative power vis-à-vis Iran’s position within the Resistance Axis.
Nonetheless, the substantial political, economic, and human costs borne by Iran in pursuit of these strategic gains cannot be overlooked. The security landscape in which Iran operates has become increasingly complex. The country now faces a multitude of regional and global adversaries, ranging from traditional geopolitical rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to overtly hostile actors such as the United States and the Zionist regime.
These dynamics have further complicated Iran’s strategic posture. The most pressing ambiguity lies in the absence of a comprehensive, long-term plan to capitalize on the achievements of Resistance Axis forces across the region. As a result, the future trajectory of these forces remains uncertain. Although their presence in various regional states has created valuable opportunities for Iran, the reluctance or lack of conviction among certain diplomatic actors—and their hesitation to align with Resistance forces and senior military commanders operating in the region—has led to missed opportunities for enhancing Iran’s national security.
 

Abstract The rise and fall of great powers has always been a significant subject in the international system. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the perception among observers and analysts has strengthened that a period of transition in the international system has begun, and the US-led international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union is changing. Given neorealism's emphasis on how states are influenced by the international system, this transitional period could present opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power. Therefore, the main research question is: What opportunities does the transitioning international system offer the Islamic Republic of Iran? Using neorealist theory, the research hypothesis posits that the transitioning international system provides opportunities for Iran, such as strategic cooperation with emerging powers, utilizing the potential of regional and international alliances and treaties, enhancing the agency of discursive power, and reducing the impact of sanctions. This study employs a descriptive-analytical research method. Data collection was conducted through library research, scholarly articles, and internet searches, and the information was analyzed qualitatively and interpretively using rational reasoning and analysis. The international system is a concept that has been used since the 1960s to describe interactions among state actors. It encompasses the environment in which units of international politics operate, where their intentions, orientations, and demands are influenced by the international system itself. Throughout history, international systems have undergone transformations in two domains: evolutionary and paradigmatic. In the evolutionary domain, systems have progressed from limited, regional forms (such as those in Mesopotamia, Greece, China, India, Africa, etc.) to more comprehensive systems (like those in Asia and Europe), culminating in the 20th century with a global international system. In terms of paradigmatic change, the international system, with its specific logic, norms, and rules, has given way to new systems. Examples of such changes include the multipolar system pre-World War II, the bipolar system during the Cold War, and the unipolar system in the 1990s (Karami, 2004: 83). Consequently, the primary focus here is on the second type of transformation, which neorealism theory is particularly well-suited to explain. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the proposition that a transitional period has begun in the international system has gained traction among observers and analysts. They posit that the international order envisioned by the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union is undergoing significant change. Consequently, this transitional phase in the international system, which aligns with the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, can present certain opportunities for the country. The most significant of these opportunities will be outlined below. Srategic Cooperation with Emerging Powers: The transitional period in the international system provides a conducive environment for cooperation with emerging powers. The Islamic Republic of Iran should leverage the internal contradictions within the international community currently evident between the United States (which advocates for maintaining the status quo) and certain powers such as Russia and China (which advocate for changing the status quo and playing an active role in the international system)—while bearing in mind that all actors in the international system seek to secure their national interests. By forging strategic ties with these countries, Iran can enhance its agency. Utilizing the Potential of Regional and International Alliances and Treaties:Given that regional powers have gained greater opportunity and scope for active engagement in the transitioning international system, the formation of regional unions and alliances represents another opportunity presented by this transitional phase. With the aim of consolidating its political, security, and economic role in the region, ensuring national security against regional instabilities, and maximizing economic, social, political, security, and cultural cooperation with its neighbors, the Islamic Republic of Iran can foster regional convergence by reducing points of divergence with both neighboring and non-neighboring countries. This is because, with the decline of U.S. power during the transition of the international system and the emergence of new powers, countries' dependence on the United States has diminished, thereby creating grounds for convergence, union, and alliance among nations. Enhancing the Agency of Discursive Power: Accordingly, given that the transitioning international system provides a foundation for the emergence of cultural power, discursive power, soft power, and norm-setting power, this situation presents an opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this context, owing to its possession of discursive and normative power, Iran can attain a distinct position and role, enabling it to exert influence within the international system. Reducing the Impact of Economic Sanctions: In the context of the transitioning international system, the formation of regional organizations with an economic focus and effective participation in them can serve as a strategy to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s membership in BRICS and other regional organizations can create opportunities to alleviate economic sanctions. If the power of such organizations is strengthened, BRICS countries can support Iran in international forums and help reduce political pressure on the country. This support may include opposing unilateral sanctions. Conclusion Throughout history, no similar pattern has consistently dominated power relations in the international system, which has undergone transformations corresponding to historical conditions. Changes in the structure of the international system have not only influenced its constituent units but have also been influenced by political units themselves. Following World War II, a bipolar structure prevailed in the international system, which shifted to a unipolar structure with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of American power. Given recent changes in the international order and the gradual weakening of US hegemony, a transitional period has begun in the international system, which could present significant opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional power opposed to the US-centric order.Based on the theoretical framework of neorealism, which emphasizes the influence of the international system's structure on states, Iran can utilize these developments to strengthen its position. This transitional period offers opportunities such as strategic cooperation with emerging powers, leveraging regional and international alliances, enhancing agency based on discursive power, and mitigating the impact of sanctions.

Abstract This article examines how population policies shape the balance of national power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Drawing on a mixed-methods design and a multi-dimensional understanding of national power (political, economic, military, technological and sociocultural capacities), the study investigates which policy requirements and mechanisms enable demographic dynamics to convert into sustainable national strength. The structure and tone of this abstract follow the organizational pattern used in the reference sample to ensure maximum alignment with scholarly expectations.
Population composition and spatial distribution are core determinants of a state’s resource base, human-capital potential, and long-term security. For Iran — given its extensive land borders, strategic corridors and varied regional capacities — demographic trends influence military mobilization potential, labor force adequacy, technological absorption, and socio-political resilience. Recognizing population policy as strategic statecraft, not merely a social program, is central to sustaining Iran’s position in a competitive regional environment.
The research seeks to identify and hierarchize the managerial, political, economic, educational, health, environmental and geographic requisites that mediate the effect of population policies on the national-power balance. The study proceeds from qualitative thematic mapping of expert knowledge to quantitative model testing, enabling both rich contextual insight and empirical validation of hypothesized causal paths.
The study synthesizes pronatalist / population-policy theory with concepts of national power and demographic security. It emphasizes both the quantitative (size, age-structure, spatial distribution) and qualitative (education, health, skills) dimensions of population, arguing that policy effectiveness depends on institutional capacity to mobilize demographic advantages into productive and security-relevant outcomes.
A convergent mixed-methods design was adopted. The qualitative strand involved purposive sampling of domain experts (minimum ten years’ experience in political science or population policy) and semi-structured interviews. Thematic analysis produced 82 initial codes, which were organized into 9 axial themes and consolidated into 4 higher-order meta-themes. Based on qualitative outputs, a questionnaire was developed for the quantitative strand; data were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) given the non-normal distribution of survey variables. Measurement quality was assessed via Content Validity Ratios (CVR) and Cronbach’s alpha to ensure instrument validity and reliability.
Interview analysis identified nine organizing themes grouped into four principal dimensions: (1) managerial & political-economic requirements; (2) educational, cultural & social requirements; (3) health, welfare & environmental requirements; and (4) geographic & demographic requirements. These dimensions encompass actionable elements such as institutional coordination, incentive systems for family formation, skills and education policies, reproductive and public health services, environmental sustainability, and regional spatial planning.
Validity and reliability metrics supported the instrument (dimension CVR values ranged approximately 0.64–0.76; Cronbach’s alpha values ranged ~0.73–0.81; overall construct validity ≈0.68; overall reliability ≈0.74). PLS-SEM path estimates reveal two central effects: geographic & demographic requirements significantly shape political/economic/social policy imperatives (β = 0.615, i.e., ≈61% influence), and managerial/political/economic requirements exert the largest direct effect on the national-power balance under population policy interventions (β = 0.662, i.e., ≈66%). These coefficients indicate that while spatial and demographic contexts set structural constraints and opportunities, managerial and politico-economic capacities are decisive in converting demographic potential into national power gains.
 
Principal challenges include fragmented governance, insufficient alignment of economic incentives with cultural contexts, environmental/resource constraints, and implementation bottlenecks. Opportunities emerge from strengthening human capital (education and health), deploying voluntary and culturally-sensitive incentive packages (housing, parental supports, childcare), enhancing regional retention through spatial planning, and mobilizing diaspora resources. The study highlights that coercive approaches are both ethically problematic and practically ineffective; voluntary, integrated and participatory policy packages yield greater legitimacy and sustainability.
Population policy can materially affect Iran’s balance of national power, but its success depends primarily on managerial capability and coherent politico-economic implementation rather than demographic change alone. Recommended priorities include: (1) institutional reforms to strengthen cross-sectoral implementation capacity; (2) economically sustainable, voluntary incentive mechanisms linked to housing, health and income stability; (3) long-term investments in education and skill formation to raise qualitative population potential; (4) continuous demographic monitoring and regional spatial planning  to optimize distributional effects; (5) environmental safeguards to preserve demographic dividends; and (6) constructive engagement with civil society and diaspora stakeholders. Treating population policy as strategic statecraft — integrated across ministries and anchored in evidence — is essential for translating demographic realities into durable national power.

Abstract With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the perspective toward the Zionist regime underwent a fundamental transformation. This regime had regarded Pahlavi Iran with particular attention within the framework of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine. The Ben-Gurion doctrine was based on the assumption that, in order to contain and counter its neighboring countries, the Zionist regime was compelled to establish strategic relations with the peripheral states of those countries. Accordingly, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia held prominent positions in the foreign policy of the Zionist regime. Specifically, the relations of this regime with the Pahlavi system in Iran were developed and expanded in multiple areas, including the military and intelligence domains. While the relations between the Pahlavi regime and the Zionist regime were expanding and deepening, the Islamic Revolution triumphed on February 11, 1979. One of the earliest and most symbolic events connected with foreign policy in this revolution was the handover of the Zionist regime’s embassy in Tehran to the Fatah Movement. For those familiar with the values of the Islamic Revolution, however, this event was by no means surprising; throughout the years of struggle of Imam Khomeini (RA) and his companions against the Pahlavi regime, one of the central pillars of their protest was the occupation of Palestine by the Zionist regime and the ties of the Pahlavi monarchy with it. Imam Khomeini (RA) analyzed the very nature of Israel within the framework of a broader hegemonic design and did not recognize any form of relations with this occupying regime, striving fundamentally for its eradication. His well-known statement that “Israel must be erased from the page of time” clearly reflects the full spectrum of his ideological and strategic outlook on the Zionist regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with such a perception of the Zionist regime, formulated its foreign policy. This was not, however, a one-sided hostility; from the very beginning, the Zionist regime also sought to advance its enmity toward Iran through multiple instruments and in diverse fields. Indeed, this hostility traces back to the years prior to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, when the regime, through its interactions with the Pahlavi system, sought to facilitate Mohammad Reza Shah’s efforts in suppressing Iranian revolutionaries. Throughout these years, the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran—or, more broadly, the axis of resistance—and the Zionist regime has remained a central subject of analysis. The Islamic Republic, relying on the “ideal of liberating al-Quds al-Sharif,” has sought, alongside capacity-building within the Islamic world, to employ available means to weaken and ultimately dismantle the Zionist regime. Conversely, the regime, through extensive exploitation of international capacities and discourses aimed at overthrowing the Islamic Republic, has actively pursued the weakening of Iran and openly placed regime change on its agenda. Within Iranian political and strategic discourse, one of the recurring themes in the confrontation with the Zionist regime has been “deterrence.” This concept has frequently appeared not only in the rhetoric of political and military officials but also in scholarly discussions addressing strategies for countering Israel. In elite debates that emerged after October 7, 2023, with the initiation of Operation Al-Aqsa Storm by Hamas against the Zionist regime, deterrence became a highly salient theme. Some argued that the deterrent capacity of the Islamic Republic had been undermined, while others—particularly before October 27, 2024, when the Zionist regime attacked Iran—emphasized the preservation of Iran’s deterrent power. Hence, it may be concluded that deterrence is a central and recurrent option within the Iran–Israel confrontation. At present, however, deterrence may be approached from a different perspective: does deterrence, in its theoretical sense, truly possess the sufficiency and conceptual validity to explain the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist regime? This article raises this question as its primary research inquiry and seeks, through a theoretical approach enriched with empirical illustrations, to reconsider the centrality of deterrence in this confrontation. In response to the aforementioned question, the hypothesis is advanced that deterrence, in its theoretical and classical sense, lacks the necessary explanatory adequacy for analyzing the Iran–Israel conflict. To evaluate this hypothesis as a possible answer to the central question of the study, the article employs a descriptive–analytical approach. It first conceptualizes deterrence and then assesses its validity in light of the environmental exigencies of the Iran–Israel confrontation. Accordingly, while emphasizing theoretical foundations, the study is also practical in orientation, as it focuses on a current problem with the aim of organizing responses to future challenges arising from this conflict. Data collection relies on library-based and documentary methods. Ultimately, this article seeks, through the lens of deterrence, to offer a conceptual framework for understanding the Iran–Israel confrontation. The significance of this endeavor lies in the fact that clarifying deterrence and its place in the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist regime can conceptually organize Iran’s offensive and defensive actions within a framework that is more coherent and effective. Based on the analytical assessment conducted, deterrence in its maximalist form does not provide comprehensive explanatory power for the Iran–Israel confrontation. This is because both actors fundamentally seek the weakening, containment, and eventual elimination of each other, and they consider offensive policies as the most central and defining layer of their strategic outlook, with defensive strategies designed subordinate to that offensive orientation. In this framework, deterrence is not a purely defensive policy aimed at preventing war and preserving the status quo; rather, it serves as a means of ensuring survival as a prelude to offensive action against the adversary. Accordingly, and in line with the reciprocal field dynamics of recent years, a conceptual framework of “deterrence in motion” can be proposed. While the detailed parameters of this framework require further precision and elaboration, at a general level, its premise is that deterrence does not entail the absolute prevention of enemy attacks. Given the offensive postures of both sides, which are rooted in strategic and ideological imperatives, avoiding aggression against the adversary holds little practical meaning. Under “deterrence in motion,” offensive actions may influence and shape enemy attacks rather than halt them outright: they may reduce their frequency and intensity, redirect their focus, or shift their domains. Thus, responding to an attack in one domain does not end the confrontation but merely transfers it to another arena. This cycle will persist so long as offensive strategies remain central and both sides retain the capacity for aggression. Naturally, with the logic of “defense for survival as a platform for offense,” the development of defensive mechanisms remains crucial, as they may restrict or halt certain types of enemy attacks. However, as noted, this does not terminate the conflict; hostilities between the two sides will continue in other domains. The offensive orientation on both sides of this struggle—though at times influenced by variables such as Iran–U.S. negotiations—cannot, for strategic and ideological reasons discussed in the article, be eliminated. Understanding this reality underscores the growing necessity for Iran to respond to the Zionist regime’s diverse and pinpoint attacks on its interests and national security.  

Abstract This research was conducted with the aim of clarifying the position of information security within the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on jurisprudential-political foundations. In today’s world, which has become information-centered societies, data play an indispensable role in decision-making processes. Advances in information technologies have led to increased use of data in all fields to the extent that one can claim the cycle of development has become highly influenced by informational development and, conversely, has also affected the information society. The present study, using a qualitative method and analysis of library documents, examines the question: given the jurisprudential-political foundations in the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, what status does information security hold? In this regard, political and legal measures related to information security and the influence of Islamic and jurisprudential principles on it are examined. The role of individual rights and privacy as variables affecting current and future security policymaking has also received special attention.
In the literature review section, the article provides a comparative analysis with other related studies, highlighting its distinctions across several key areas. These distinctions include: a focus on information security at the national level of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a special emphasis on the position of individual rights and privacy, the adoption of a practical and policy-oriented approach, and an examination of the current situation and operational measures in the field of information security.
Research in its theoretical literature, while defining the key concepts of security and information, first defines security in terms of vocabulary as meaning safety, freedom from fear, and the absence of unpleasant expectations. Then, it considers individual, social, cultural, political, economic, environmental, cyber, and military aspects of security to be worthy of examination. Information is also considered a fundamental pillar comprising data that can be valuable and obtained from various sources.
Examining the Law on Publication and Free Access to Information as a political strategy within a legal framework is another issue addressed in the present study. Although this law, by virtue of being a law, has a legal nature, the fundamental root of its nature is based on political values. The enactment of this law in 2009, considering the history of Iranian political history and based on the jurisprudential and interpretational foundations of the constitution, was carried out.
In the section on Islamic government and information security policy-making, the article explains the concept that policy-making is a term intertwined with the government, the state, society, and its public affairs, and evokes government action in the proper management of public affairs. The quality of information security policy-making and the type of political system governing countries are effective variables in determining the scope of information domains at the national level.
The section on jurisprudence of information and security in Islamic political theory examines the role of jurisprudence as a discipline that systematizes relationships within Islamic society. Although no specific chapter is dedicated to security and information in jurisprudential works, a review of the sources of deduction, along with jurisprudential opinions, indicates the existence of extensive but scattered jurisprudential discussions in this regard. Rulings related to revealing secrets, the prohibition of espionage, the necessity of protecting individuals' privacy, rulings related to backbiting and disseminating individuals' private news, and transferring sensitive information to enemies during wartime are among the jurisprudential opinions related to the jurisprudence of information.
This research examines the political-legal measures of the Islamic Republic of Iran in information security in four main categories: principles of the Constitution (such as Principles 24, 25, 69, and 176), laws on information and communication technology (such as the Electronic Commerce Law and the Law on Publication and Free Access to Information), the establishment of supreme councils related to information and information security (such as the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and the Supreme National Security Council), and directives and announcements of organizations and councils responsible for ensuring information security. The jurisprudential-legal foundations of these measures are also examined in several main areas: ensuring the simultaneous freedom and security of information, the need to respect the privacy of personal information, the need to respect the psychological security of society in the dissemination of information, and liability arising from material and moral damages of information dissemination.
Finally, in the conclusion section, the article concludes that information security in the Islamic Republic of Iran has a multi-dimensional nature and is directly influenced by the jurisprudential-political foundations of the system. Respect for privacy, prohibition of espionage without religious and legal permission, and emphasis on the psychological security of society are among the key principles that shape security policies. Also, the balance between freedom of information and national security is emphasized as a fundamental challenge in this area

Abstract This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the transformative role of communication technologies, from traditional print media to modern digital platforms, in shaping political mobilization and collective action, with a particular focus on the Arab Spring. It argues that while literacy and print media were foundational to the democratic public sphere, digital technologies like mobile phones and social media have exponentially amplified the power to organize, coordinate, and disrupt political action. The article synthesizes key theories from scholars like Castells, Smelser, and Rheingold to build a framework for understanding how these technologies facilitate rapid mobilization, circumvent state control, and create new forms of "smart mobs" and digital public spheres. However, it also cautions against technological determinism, highlighting the dual-use nature of these tools for both democratic empowerment and the spread of misinformation, polarization, and violence. The analysis concludes that the Arab Spring epitomizes this new paradigm, where deep-seated political grievances, a youthful population, and ubiquitous digital tools converged to create a powerful, albeit complex, force for political change.
Traditional scholarship on the democratic public sphere emphasized the role of print media and literacy. This article shifts the focus to the disruptive political potential of modern digital technologies. Its central objective is to analyze how social media and mobile phones have redefined collective action, using the Arab Spring as a primary case study. It seeks to move beyond techno-optimism by exploring both the empowering and destructive capacities of these tools in contexts of political dissatisfaction.
Network Society Theory (Manuel Castells, 2007, 2023): Posits that digital networks have replaced traditional hierarchies as the core organizing structure of society, facilitating new forms of power, identity, and collective action.
Theory of Collective Behavior (Neil Smelser, 1962): Provides a classic model for understanding the determinants of collective action (e.g., structural conduciveness, generalized beliefs, mobilization). The article updates this model by inserting digital technology as a key factor in spreading beliefs and enabling mobilization.
Digital Public Sphere (Schafer, 2015): Builds on Habermas to examine the transformation of public discourse online, acknowledging its potential for democratization while highlighting challenges like algorithmic polarization and disinformation.
Smart Mobs (Howard Rheingold, 2002): Introduces the concept of impromptu, self-organizing groups capable of coordinated action through mobile and digital technologies.
Media Dependency Theory (DeFleur & Dennis, 2002): Suggests that people's reliance on media increases during times of social conflict and change, a dependency now shifted towards social media platforms.
This article employs a theoretical and descriptive analysis, synthesizing existing literature and case studies (e.g., the Arab Spring, the Philippine "Edsa Revolution"). It draws on a wide range of sociological and communication theories to build a multi-faceted framework for understanding digital mobilization.
Historical Precedents: The article notes early examples of mobile-led mobilization, such as the 2001 protests in the Philippines coordinated via SMS.
The Arab Spring Case Study: The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the viral spread of the event on social media is identified as a critical "accelerating factor" (per Smelser) that ignited widespread protests across the region. Studies by Howard et al. (2011) and Karasapan (2013) are cited to show the key role of Twitter and Facebook in real-time information dissemination, documentation of state violence, and regional coordination.
Dual-Use Technology: The core finding is the dual-use nature of these tools. They empower "self-mobilized citizens" (Doran, 2011) and create flexibility for movements (Ghaffari et al., 2013) but also facilitate the spread of misinformation, extremism (Huszár et al., 2021), and can be used for crime and terrorism.
Shifting Academic Perspectives: Research has evolved from early optimism (Rheingold, 2002) towards a more realistic understanding of the challenges, including the commercial, non-democratic structure of platforms (Fuchs, 2023) and their role in political polarization.
Demographic Factors: Research by Saad (2012) is cited, indicating that age, gender, and education level directly influence mobile phone use and, consequently, susceptibility to mobilization for protests.
The Arab Spring serves as a powerful illustration of how long-standing political grievances (structural conduciveness) can be ignited by a single event and rapidly amplified through digital networks, overwhelming authoritarian regimes unprepared for this new form of horizontal, leaderless mobilization.
The article concludes that digital technologies are not a primary cause of revolution but are powerful accelerants and facilitators. They have fundamentally altered the landscape of political action by:
Dramatically reducing the cost and increasing the speed of coordination and information sharing.
Circumventing state-controlled media and traditional hierarchical organizations like political parties.
Creating a new, digital layer of the public sphere that is global, instantaneous, and often chaotic.
However, this new power is ambiguous. The same infrastructure that supports pro-democracy movements also amplifies hate speech, misinformation, and extremism. The future of digital collective action will likely depend on combating these negative forces while harnessing the technology's potential for open and democratic engagement. The conclusion calls for a nuanced understanding that avoids both technological determinism and simplistic optimism, recognizing that technology amplifies existing human intentions—both for good and for ill.

Abstract The fall of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. military occupation of Iraq in March 2003 led to the emergence of regional competitions within the country's political and economic arena. As a result of the ensuing power vacuum in Iraq, regional rivalries between its two neighbors, Turkey and Iran, intensified. This study aims to explain the elements and variables influencing the escalation of Ankara's competition with Tehran in Iraq. Accordingly, the central question of this article is: What factors facilitated the expansion of competition between Turkey and Iran in Iraq from 2003 to 2020? The findings suggest that the power vacuum created after Saddam's fall, energy acquisition and its transit in the region, and the takeover of Iraqi markets due to reconstruction and economic needs resulting from war damages have been significant drivers of increased rivalry between Iran and Turkey. The strategic visions of both countries—Iran aiming to become the leading regional power by 2025 (1404 in the Iranian calendar) and Turkey by 2023—have placed them in a process of securing advantageous political and economic positions in the region, competing to become regional role models. This article employs an explanatory-analytical method and analyzes economic interaction statistics to explore the dimensions of Iran-Turkey competition in Iraq after 2003. The United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein were not simply regime‑changing events but a turning point that reshaped the geopolitical map of the Middle East in ways still unfolding. Iraq, geographically positioned between the Levant, Iran, the Pertion Gulf, and Anatolia, became a fragile state whose political order and economic resources turned into arenas for regional and international rivalry. Among the neighbors most directly involved, Iran and Turkey emerged as the primary competitors. Although both states share security concerns regarding terrorism, instability, and Kurdish separatism, their historical experience and national interests have largely driven them into forms of conflict rather than cooperation. The post‑2003 period created a particular context where overlapping political, economic, and energy considerations gave new intensity to long‑standing rivalries. 
This paper analyses the rivalry between Iran and Turkey in Iraq from 2003 to 2020 through the lens of international political economy, with particular emphasis on three interrelated factors: political influence over Iraq’s new state order, the struggle for energy resources and transit routes, and the attempt to dominate Iraq’s markets in the aftermath of war. The methodological approach is explanatory and analytical, relying on statistical data as well as secondary sources, while the theoretical perspective is inspired by Robert Gilpin’s neo‑realist interpretation of the global political economy. Gilpin’s framework is particularly relevant because it insists, against claims of globalization’s transcendence, that states remain the decisive agents in shaping both political and economic outcomes. 
Politically, the transformation inside Iraq after 2003 reversed the traditional Sunni dominance and elevated the Shiʿa population to the corridors of power. Before 1958, out of fifty‑nine cabinets, barely five Shiʿa ministers were ever appointed; after 2003, their dominance increased dramatically, producing not only a novel political landscape but also a fundamental shift in Iraq’s external alignments. For Iran this represented a major strategic opening, as it could rely on shared sectarian and religious ties as well as long‑standing networks built with clerics, parties, and militias. For Turkey, however, the change carried threatening implications. Ankara perceived the Shiʿa ascendancy as an extension of Iranian influence, thereby undermining the presence of actors closer to its own interests. The issue was compounded by the strengthening of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which, though initially favored by Washington, soon became an economic partner of Turkey itself, particularly through investment, trade, and energy deals. Yet this pragmatic partnership never eliminated the deeper strategic rivalry, as Ankara and Tehran positioned themselves as competitors in Baghdad’s fragile order. 
Energy constituted the second, and arguably the most strategic, ground of competition. Iraq holds around 141 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, equivalent to about 11 percent of world reserves, alongside 110 billion cubic feet of natural gas. For energy‑poor Turkey, the control and transit of these resources have long been a national priority. It is not coincidental that by the 1990s Turkish leaders floated claims over the oil fields of Kirkuk, expressing in thinly veiled terms how central northern Iraq’s hydrocarbons were too Turkish geostrategy. Iran, while possessing its own significant energy wealth, has consistently sought to integrate Iraq into a broader conception of energy corridors under its direction, including the so‑called Islamic pipeline project. However, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, especially after Washington’s exit from the nuclear agreement in 2018, rendered Iran unable to fully realize its ambitions. In contrast, Turkey through its refining corporation TÜPRAŞ and governmental agreements, embedded itself more deeply in Iraq’s oil economy.
The bargaining over oil pipelines, the struggle to capture contracts, and the political maneuvering within Baghdad’s evolving institutions are all part of one complex fabric of competitive state behavior. Iraq has therefore become not merely a post‑war fragile state but a laboratory of political economy rivalry in which neighboring states seek to maximize gains under the shadow of global sanctions, shifting alliances, and persistent insecurity. 
In conclusion, the Iraqi case between 2003 and 2020 underscores the resilience of state‑centric rivalry in the Middle East despite discourses of globalization and interdependence. Iran and Turkey have approached Iraq less as a partner and more as an arena where political influence, economic control, and energy access are contested in mutually exclusive terms. The evidence suggests that Iraq’s trajectory of development and stability will remain deeply conditioned by this rivalry, as neither state is likely to forgo opportunities to secure dominance. For international relations scholarship, the implication is that the interaction of politics and economics cannot be analyzed separately; what appears as trade or investment is simultaneously an expression of strategic rivalry. The post‑2003 history of Iraq therefore illustrates how the logic of the political economy of rivalry continues to define the regional order of West Asia. 
 
 
 

Abstract Group conflicts, particularly in societies with significant ethnic and cultural diversity like Afghanistan, often arise under adverse social and economic conditions such as unemployment and detrimental familial backgrounds. These conflicts not only diminish social cohesion but also escalate intergroup tensions and reduce positive interactions. Thus, strengthening social well-being as a key variable can be an effective strategy to mitigate conflicts and improve social bonds. Considering its importance, examining the impact of social well-being on reducing tendencies toward group conflicts, especially among young men, is crucial. Social well-being can help mitigate aggressive behaviors and enhance social cohesion by fostering social skills and encouraging positive interactions. Consequently, research focused on the role of social well-being in ethnic conflicts can guide the development of policies and programs aimed at reducing group disputes and promoting social order. This research is applied in purpose, temporary in time, extensive in scope, and employs a quantitative, survey-based approach. The study population consists of men aged 18–45 in Kabul. A multi-stage cluster sampling method was used to select 384 participants based on Morgan's table and Cochran's formula. Data were collected using Keyes' standardized questionnaire and a researcher-developed Likert-scale questionnaire. The collected data were then classified and analyzed using SPSS software. The findings revealed no significant relationship between marital status and tendencies toward ethnic conflicts. However, education showed a meaningful correlation with conflict levels. Occupation, as a social status indicator, aligned with Cohen’s status frustration theory, demonstrated that mismatches between individuals' expectations and their roles can heighten the likelihood of conflict. Age-related analysis indicated that younger individuals, due to unstable norms and generational gaps, are more prone to disruptive behaviors.  Social acceptance, encompassing self-worth, trust in others, and respect for differences, displayed a negative correlation with tendencies toward conflict. Durkheim’s anomie theory suggests that societal normlessness reduces social acceptance and fosters distrust. The theories of Robert Merton and Albert Cohen emphasize that a disconnect between institutional goals and means, coupled with status frustration, diminishes social acceptance, increasing deviant behaviors. Keyes’ (1998) research highlights that positive messages and social support enhance social acceptance, while its absence exacerbates ethnic conflict. Social adaptation, defined as the ability to align with one’s environment, also exhibited a negative correlation with conflict. Durkheim’s theory of anomie points to a lack of shared values as a barrier to adaptation. Merton noted that contradictions between institutional goals and means create pressures impeding adaptation. Cohen argued that marginalized groups, deprived of opportunities, face challenges in social adaptation. Studies by Keyes (1998) and Blanco & Díaz (2007) affirm that social order and participation provide the foundation for adaptation, while its weakness amplifies group conflicts.  Social participation, or active involvement in societal activities, negatively correlates with conflict. Durkheim linked weak social solidarity to decreased participation, while Merton and Mayer identified discrimination and inequality as obstacles to participation. Research by Keyes (1998) and Khushfar et al. (2015) suggests that active participation fosters a sense of security and reduces social tensions. Declines in participation are associated with increased ethnic disputes.  Social flourishing, involving a positive perception of societal progress, also negatively correlates with conflict. Putnam’s social capital theory and Inglehart’s social change theory emphasize the importance of trust and communication networks in enhancing flourishing. Lerner connects flourishing to belief in social justice. Studies by Keyes (2006) and Khushfar et al. (2015) reveal that economic growth and reduced discrimination boost flourishing, while its absence fosters passivity and conflict. Social cohesion, referring to emotional and ethical bonds within a community, is inversely related to conflict. Parsons' social cohesion theory and Habermas’ theory of communicative action highlight the role of institutional coordination and healthy communication in promoting cohesion. Bourdieu identified disparities in social and economic capital as factors undermining cohesion. Research by Iman et al. (2019) and Khushfar et al. (2015) demonstrates that reducing inequalities and strengthening participatory policies enhance cohesion, mitigating conflicts. Social well-being, as a multidimensional aspect of human welfare, is shaped by social acceptance, participation, adaptation, flourishing, and cohesion. These dimensions play a vital role in fostering belongingness, improving quality of life, and mitigating social conflicts. Social acceptance fosters mutual respect, participation empowers individuals, adaptation resolves conflicts, flourishing promotes justice, and cohesion strengthens emotional bonds. Factors like trust, justice, and robust communication enhance social well-being, while inequality and social exclusion weaken it. Strengthening social well-being requires programs to build public trust, expand social networks, and reduce disparities. Additionally, teaching communication skills, creating equal opportunities, and fostering a culture of constructive interaction—along with the regular monitoring of social well-being indicators—can aid policymakers in devising effective strategies. 

Abstract Donald Trump's presidency was marked by his distinctive and extensive use of the Twitter platform as a primary tool of communication, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. This approach challenged traditional diplomatic norms and created a novel space for analyzing the political discourse of world leaders. Simultaneously, U.S.-Iran relations during this period witnessed escalating tensions and profound complexities, a significant portion of which was reflected in Trump’s tweets. Understanding how power relations are constructed, negotiated, and represented in the digital political arena—especially by global leaders—has become increasingly important. The case study of Trump’s tweets regarding Iran offers a rich opportunity to analyze these dynamics of power. This study seeks to uncover the various layers through which power is exercised and represented in one of the most contentious international relationships of the contemporary era, by conducting a thematic analysis of these tweets. Main Research Question:
How are power relations represented and exercised in Donald Trump's social media messages about Iran? Sub-questions: How does Trump represent U.S. power, Iranian power (or its absence), and his own position as a global actor in contrast to Iran and international agreements (such as the JCPOA) in his tweets? What discursive strategies (e.g., threats, sanctions, negotiations) does Trump employ to establish, exercise, or alter power relations with Iran, and how do these strategies contribute to the portrayal of power dynamics? This study employs qualitative content analysis, specifically the thematic network analysis approach developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). This approach comprises six systematic phases that allow the researcher to identify, analyze, and report semantic patterns (themes) within qualitative data. These six phases—which will be elaborated in subsequent sections—include: familiarization with the data, initial coding, theme identification, theme network mapping, theme network analysis, and final report writing. In the following sections, the study will detail the steps taken to implement thematic analysis on the dataset of Donald Trump's tweets concerning Iran. First, the process of data familiarization and initial coding will be presented. Then, the procedures for identifying and refining themes and mapping the theme network will be explained. Next, the thematic network will be analyzed and interpreted in depth. Finally, the study concludes by presenting key findings, answering the research questions, and offering suggestions for future research. At this stage, a final review was conducted to ensure full coherence between the developed themes (listed in Table 3) and the set of initial codes (listed in Table 2). The objective was to ensure that all codes related to power relations were meaningfully incorporated into either basic or organizing themes, leaving no significant portion of the coded data unrepresented. This review confirmed that the developed themes effectively captured the coded data and conveyed their core meanings. Following this validation, the themes were organized based on logical and hierarchical relationships among them. This process involved identifying which themes were broader and more encompassing (organizing themes) and which ones reflected more specific aspects of those broader themes (basic themes). This initial arrangement set the stage for selecting the types of themes and mapping the final thematic network. Global Theme: In alignment with the main research question, the global theme of this analysis is defined as “The representation and exercise of power relations in Trump’s tweets about Iran.” This serves as the overarching conceptual framework that guides all subsequent analyses. Organizing Themes: The five main organizing themes presented in Table 3—”Displaying U.S. hegemony and directly threatening Iran”, “Undermining the past to construct present power: The JCPOA and the Obama administration”, “Applying maximum pressure: Sanctions and economic isolation”, “Delegitimizing the Iranian regime and supporting internal opposition”, and “Personalizing power and projecting Trump’s individual authority”—function as the structural pillars of the theme network. Each represents a major dimension of how Trump constructs and represents power in relation to Iran. Basic Themes: The basic themes listed under each organizing theme in Table 3 serve as more specific building blocks that elucidate the various dimensions and details of the organizing themes. These themes are more directly derived from the initial coding of the data. The thematic analysis of Donald Trump's tweets concerning Iran reveals that his discourse in this area is heavily centered on the projection and exercise of unilateral U.S. power and his own personal authority. Power relations are constructed and represented through a range of discursive strategies, the most prominent of which include military threats and intimidation, economic pressure via crippling sanctions, delegitimization of prior agreements and U.S. administrations, discrediting the Iranian regime, and the extreme personalization of foreign policy. This discourse constructs a binary, zero-sum worldview in which the power of one side necessarily entails the weakness of the other. Through Twitter, Trump sought to establish his narrative of U.S.-Iran relations as the dominant one—simultaneously functioning as a tool of public diplomacy and coercive pressure. This analysis demonstrates how social media can become an arena for the complex and at times contradictory performance of power at the level of global leadership.

Abstract The West Asia region in general, and the Palestinian issue in particular, have been among the focal points of attention for major powers and international institutions over the past 76 years. This issue has shaped the dynamics of events in the region, triggering a domino effect of regional crises — the “War of Independence” (1948), the “Suez Crisis” (1956), the “Six-Day War” (1967), the “Yom Kippur War” (1973), the “Israeli Army’s invasion of southern Lebanon” (1982), the successive wars between Israel and Palestine (especially in the Gaza Strip), the “Intifada in the West Bank,” and “Operation al-Aqsa Flood” (2023) — as well as international crises such as the 1973 oil shock. The instability created by the establishment of the Israeli regime led its leaders to adopt policies such as the “Periphery Doctrine” to break out of the Arab encirclement; to suppress and ethnically cleanse Palestinians; to attract large numbers of Jewish immigrants from across the globe to alter demographic indicators; and to pursue a gradual normalization process with surrounding Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria under the protective umbrella of successive U.S. administrations. In this context, the Oslo Accord was placed on the agenda more than forty years after the regime’s establishment, under the guidance of the Madrid Peace Conference, in which both global powers — the United States and the Soviet Union — were involved. However, the accord did not succeed. Despite Israel’s disregard for the “1947 UN Partition Plan” and the continuation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as one of the most persistent disputes of the past 76 years in the international system, various solutions have been proposed by national and transnational actors to resolve it. The “Two-State Solution,” the “Israeli–Palestinian Confederation,” the “One Democratic Binational State,” the “Non-Democratic Jewish State,” the “Jordanian Option,” and Donald Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan are among the international initiatives advanced to address the conflict. Among these, the Two-State Solution has enjoyed the broadest support internationally, to the extent that even some alternative proposals have built their conceptual foundations upon it. This plan emerged from the 1991 Madrid Conference and has since been the subject of negotiations between the two sides regarding its scope and content. Nevertheless, the historical trajectory of the past two decades has not been favorable to the Two-State Solution. Moreover, the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, along with the transfer of administrative and security control of Area C to Israel, has eroded the prospect of reviving this plan. It appears that the Israeli regime is increasingly moving toward a one-state solution. Existing literature and key studies on this subject indicate that the disagreements between Israel and Palestine—particularly regarding refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state—are so significant that they have led Israel to distance itself from the peace process. This study by collecting the necessary data from library and online sources is qualitative in nature and employs a descriptive–analytical approach within a comparative study framework to have a comparative examination of the consequences of the two-state and one-state solutions. this study seeks to answer the question of what the Israeli regime’s actual strategy toward the Palestinian issue is. Based on ten key indicators — the fate of Jewish identity, democracy, security, ease of implementation, level of domestic support within the regime, acceptability of the plan to the United States, acceptability of the plan within the European Union and international organizations, acceptability among Arab states, and both direct and indirect costs — the findings show that each of these two solutions carries its own security implications for the Israeli regime. These indicators were selected and categorized under three overarching dimensions: Regime-related issues: including democracy, the status of Jewish identity, security, and the level of domestic support within the Israeli regime. Technical-executive issues: including the feasibility of implementation and the direct and indirect costs associated with the plan. International stakeholder acceptance: including the plan’s acceptance among Arab states, the European Union, and the United States. This framework allows the study to examine how each of these dimensions influences the likelihood of a peace plan being accepted or rejected by the relevant actors.  Accordingly, the rise of the revisionist right under Menachem Begin and the growing political maneuvering power of radical Jewish currents have significantly eroded the feasibility of the Two-State Solution. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in response to the peace negotiations of the 1990s underscored this reality, confirming that the current ruling power in Israel did not genuinely believe in the establishment of a Palestinian state. With the growth of the religious Zionist movement within the governing framework of the Likud Party, the party’s radical and nationalist tendencies have intensified, leading to the expansion of settlement activity and the marginalization of Palestinians. Extremist groups such as Hilltop Youth and Lehava emerged out of this environment, openly calling for the expulsion or killing of Palestinians from the “Holy Land.” As this trend deepened and the Yesha Council gained influence, the prospect of a two-state solution effectively became a mirage. With the expiration of that option, demands for a one-state solution began to surface. Although the one-state solution reflects the ruling Jewish leadership’s long-standing aspiration, demographic realities and fears of legal repercussions have prevented its formal adoption. The Israeli regime faces two paths for implementing a one-state arrangement: If it wishes to avoid international legal pressure, it would need to grant citizenship to all Palestinians in the West Bank. Yet demographic trends preclude this option: granting citizenship to the Arab population would make the Jewish and Arab populations numerically comparable, thereby eroding the Jewish identity and its bureaucratic structure. If it officially declares a Jewish state but withholds citizenship and recognition from Arab Palestinians, it will be labeled an apartheid state in international forums. Under these circumstances, it appears that the Israeli regime is opting for gradual annexation and maintaining the status quo until an opportune moment arises for large-scale ethnic cleansing in the West Bank — continuing settlement construction and extending its influence there while simultaneously preserving the Palestinian Authority as a tool to control the Arab population. Indeed, following “Operation al-Aqsa Flood,” which many Jews have called it a “second Holocaust,” it seems that the long-awaited green light for the radical right to transform creeping annexation and the status quo into a de facto one-state reality without granting citizenship to West Bank Arabs may have arrived. Prior to the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, both radical right-wing and centrist political factions in Israel openly rejected any engagement with the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and consistently reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining the status quo, particularly in relation to their obligations toward the “Yesha Council.” Following European pressure after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the Knesset convened a session on this issue. In that session, with 68 votes in favor, the Knesset declared the creation of an independent Palestinian state within Israel’s borders to be impossible, framing it as an existential threat to Zionists. Consequently, the Israeli government officially announced that the two-state solution no longer had any place in its agenda following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. This position was further corroborated by analyses of the rapid settlement expansion in the West Bank.

Abstract With the increasing expansion of communication technologies and the increasing presence of users in cyberspace, social networks, especially Instagram, have created a fundamental transformation in human social, cultural, and political interactions. Instagram is considered one of the most widely used social networks in Iran and the world due to its diverse capabilities, visual appeal, and interactive features. However, along with communication and information opportunities, this network has also caused significant damage to human societies. The present study, using the pathology model and Levine force-field analysis, has identified and analyzed the positive and negative pressure forces of Instagram within the framework of a hybrid war against Iran. The results show that despite the filtering of this network in Iran after the events of 1401 AH, Instagram is still widely used by Iranian users and plays an effective role in shaping public opinion in creating social and political tension. In this regard, this network, as a tool at the disposal of the hegemonic system and political opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has helped to transform some social demands and protests into internal crises and psychological warfare by directing protests and conducting psychological operations on public minds. In addition, the lack of media literacy of users, the dissemination of biased news and information, and the inability to properly analyze content have exacerbated the damage and negative impact of this network on culture, social cohesion, and fundamental issues of Iranian society. According to the research findings, the negative pressure forces of Instagram in Iranian society operate beyond the positive pressure forces and have played a decisive role in creating social and political challenges, which reveals the need for intelligent management, promotion of media literacy, and the development of countermeasure strategies to reduce its negative effects. Today, social networks in cyberspace are one of the main platforms of human social life. As users of these networks, individuals are present in social networks using their smartphones and are in contact and interaction with human societies and play a role (Vorderer, Kohring, 2013; Matthes, 2022: 7). Cyberspace social networks have attractive and special features compared to other media, including the ability to interact and participate. This has led to their superiority and advantage, general popularity and great dependence of citizens of human societies on them. In the current situation, these networks have occupied a major and main part of gaining awareness, informing and entertaining people of human societies. As a result, these networks play a pivotal and effective role in human life and social developments (Mohammadi Khanghahi, Rezaei, 2019: 195). Since 2000, with the expansion of cyberspace, the global community has entered a new era of social life. The shock of the Covid-19 pandemic forced all people in human societies to enter the space of these social networks, and as a result, an important part of people's social life migrated to cyberspace (Haji Heydari, 2022: 26). One of the most popular social networks today is Instagram. Given the popularity of this network, this platform is used for various purposes, such as political purposes. Politicians and rival powers seek to create and launch Instagram accounts to attract people to their political campaigns (Liebhart, Bernhardt, 2017; Kwon, 2020: 2). Instagram, as a tool at the disposal of the hegemonic system, promotes the beliefs and thoughts accepted by this system and is used in hybrid wars as a tool in the service of media, information and psychological warfare against the target actor or country. Using this tool (Instagram) as a war tool is much less expensive than military tools and helps a lot in achieving the desired goal of the hegemonic regime and political opponents, in such a way that this regime uses this tool to bombard the target actor or country with information and imagery. In addition to publishing extremist literature, understatement and excerpts of information, this network uses prominent individuals, who are called celebrities, to give public opinion a direction in accordance with its goals. Therefore, the use of this tool by users of the target country also brings social, cultural, moral, ideological and political harm. By recognizing these harms and trying to increase user awareness, target countries can mitigate these harms. Therefore, these unresolved issues of Iranian society have become one of the main topics discussed in cyberspace social networks, especially Instagram, in such a way that this social network has become one of the main centers of command and direction for public opinion. Users and political opponents publish numerous posts and stories in this space daily and direct public opinion. The purpose of this research is to identify the damages of social networks, especially Instagram, in the hybrid war against Iran. As a result, in this research, the damages and weaknesses have been identified by identifying the positive and negative pressure forces of this platform regarding Iranian society. The scope of this pathology includes addressing the components of a phenomenon and examining its problems and dilemmas. Through this pathology, the problems and issues created by this platform (Instagram) are identified and then examined. As a result, the main and fundamental goal of this research is to take a step towards solving the problems and reducing the effectiveness of negative pressure forces by identifying the issues and problems of Instagram and preventing the problems from escalating. According to the quantitative findings and the approach (field-force analysis) of this research, the negative pressure forces from this network on Iranian society have caused the positive pressure forces of this network to weaken. Also, according to the approach of Levin's field-force analysis, the negative pressure force exerted on Iranian society by this platform is greater than the positive force, therefore it has led to an imbalance of pressure and a more pronounced negative characteristics of this platform in Iranian society. In this regard, in order to overcome the challenges and reduce the impact of negative forces and establish balance, appropriate approaches need to be adopted so that the negative forces reach their minimum level of impact. Considering that the most important negative pressure force of this network is cultural aggression, as a result, this tool in the hybrid war has initially targeted Iranian-Islamic culture and by influencing public opinion, especially the youth, has increased the influence of the ruling system and opposition groups in Iran, and has created a deep gap between the individuals of society and led to its division. Instagram, as a tool, has a butterfly effect on the minds of Iranian society and distances the society from its original values. It will also replace American culture with Iranian culture over time. In this regard, conscious measures need to be taken to neutralize these attacks. These measures must be of the same nature as these attacks themselves. In other words, for the measures taken to be effective, they must be soft measures. Such attacks cannot be resisted with hard and physical action. In any case, smart technologies require smart users. By being aware of how this space works, we can act more intelligently against future attacks.

Abstract The international image of West Asia, especially after the September 11, 2001 incident, has been strongly linked to terrorism. This has been exacerbated by the emergence of ISIS and its numerous attacks in various parts of the world and the use of extreme violence. Terrorist groups in West Asia generally attract a large population of radical Muslims. Therefore, due to the greater number of terrorist groups and their large number of followers in this region compared to other regions of the world, the intensity of violence and the number of attacks, the terrorist activity of most of these groups is linked to Islam as the dominant ideology in the societies of the region, and thus a certain type of Islamism has become associated with terrorism on a global level. A comprehensive explanation and prevention of terrorism is a very difficult and almost impossible task, however, an attempt is made to consider its various aspects by looking at terrorism from the perspective of social capital as an interdisciplinary concept (political science, sociology and economics). The reason for choosing 2007 as the starting point is, on the one hand, the lack of much of the data required for the previous article, and on the other hand, it is related to the developments of the Arab Spring.
The present study was quantitative in terms of approach; time-based, periodic, and based on secondary data (Legatum and the Global Terrorism Data Center or START, etc.) in terms of data collection. Social capital and terrorism are the independent and dependent variables of the study, respectively. The collected data were analyzed using SPSS version 22 software.
Our target statistical population is the countries of West Asia, but since their number is large for a single study, we focused on 6 specific samples. Purposive sampling of the type of “sampling to achieve representativeness” was considered appropriate for the research objectives. The purpose of choosing this type of purposive sampling was to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the entire Middle East.
Based on the values obtained between institutional social capital and the intensity of violence, i.e. the correlation coefficient (*-0.605) and the significance level (0.022), it can be argued that there is a significant relationship between these two variables. This indicates that as institutional social capital increases, the intensity of violence by terrorist groups decreases. Also, according to the correlation coefficient (**0.737) and the significance level (0.003) obtained between institutional social capital and the number of attacks, it can be said that as social capital increases at this level, the number of attacks by terrorist groups increases. There was also a significant relationship between international social capital and the number of terrorist groups with a correlation coefficient (**0.707) and a significance level (0.005). This indicates that with the increase in international social capital, the number of terrorist groups also increases. The number of their attacks also increases.
The relationship between social capital and the number of terrorist groups: Based on the best-fit model obtained from the stepwise regression analysis, the R2 value obtained (0.731) indicates that 73 percent of the variance in the number of terrorist groups is explained by international social capital and international trust. Also, for each unit change in international social capital and international trust, there is a change of about (3.076) and (-2.417) units in the number of terrorist groups, respectively.
The relationship between social capital and the number of terrorist attacks: Based on the best-fit model obtained from the stepwise regression analysis, the R2 value obtained (0.829) indicates that 83 percent of the variance of the number of attacks variable is explained by international trust.
The relationship between social capital and the intensity of violence of terrorist groups: Based on the best-fit model obtained from stepwise regression analysis, the R2 value obtained (0.367) indicates that 37 percent of the variance in the severity of violence variable is explained by institutional participation.
In this study, focusing on social capital and considering different levels of interpersonal, national or institutional and international, and the components of trust, participation and cohesion, it was concluded that different levels and components of social capital have different effects on the number of terrorist groups, the intensity of violence they commit and the number of their attacks. In such a way that with the increase in social capital and international trust, the number of terrorist groups and the number of their attacks increase; because citizens feel that their rulers act against their values and norms. The colonization of regional countries, the issue of Israel and other factors have caused a very negative attitude towards Western countries to form and persist among the people of the region, unlike the rulers of the region. It was also concluded that the upward trend of institutional participation in society reduces the intensity of violence of terrorist groups; because civil society acts as a social shield against them.