Examining the Egyptian Army's Approaches and Policies to Counter the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2013 Coup

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 . PhD student in Political Science, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

3 Visiting Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The 2013 coup in Egypt was the result of an alliance of political forces with the military. Although secular parties in Egypt and moderate Islamists also disagreed with the military on democracy and holding free elections, dissatisfaction with the performance of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi and concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance of the political structure led the disaffected middle class, secular parties, and the military to form an informal and cohesive coalition against the Brotherhood, which supported the military in carrying out the coup and overthrowing the Morsi government. The military in Egypt once again established an authoritarian "militaristic" system and widely suppressed Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood..
The consequences of the Sisi coup and its impact on the actions and position of the Brotherhood after this event are examined in this article. The main question of this article is formed by the theme of what internal factors (in the company of a part of the people and also secular parties) accelerated the process of the military coup in Egypt to overthrow Mohamed Morsi, the Islamist president? And the hypothesis is also based on the fact that the Egyptian army succeeded in carrying out the coup by relying on its extensive influence in political structures and the people's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Morsi government with the company of secular parties. In this hypothesis, the Egyptian army is the independent variable and the Morsi government and secular parties are the dependent variables.
The Arab Spring and the spread of popular protests did not cause the Egyptian army to reduce its interference in political affairs. The formation of the Transitional Council gave the Egyptian army and military the opportunity to maintain their power and influence while continuing to control the governance structure. The main goal of the military was to influence and influence the organs of power until the next elections were held. The Transitional Council (military) temporarily took power. This council was in charge of the administration of the country's affairs until the elections were held.
The military commanders in Egypt were not willing to place their most important base, the courts and the judicial system, at the disposal of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This process could further destabilize the position of the Egyptian army and the affiliates of the previous government (Mubarak) and advance the conditions for changing the conditions of the judicial process and the selection of judges in favor of the Islamists. Morsi's efforts led to dissatisfaction among the military and the army, and in the end, the Islamist president's actions to limit the power of judges and change the judicial process did not work.
The formation of a government and parliament with an Islamist majority led the Egyptian military leaders to conclude that they must confront the actions of the Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, which had been established after the Arab Spring. Constitutional drafting committees were formed, but with the intervention of the army, the majority in this group went to the supporters of the military.
The military commanders in Egypt abandoned their silence and passivity towards the Morsi government and organized their actions with the aim of expanding restrictions against the government. The Morsi government also failed completely to win the army's attention. The dismissal of many officials of the Hosni Mubarak regime and the attempt to interfere in changing the constitution were important factors in the army's confrontation with the Brotherhood.
The Egyptian army and military commanders carried out practical measures to overthrow the Morsi government and the coup with two approaches. The first approach was to organize political parties and figures opposed to the Brotherhood in a common political front, and the second approach was to use the vast capacity of the dissatisfied people's protests, which paved the way for people to take to the streets by organizing the "Tamarod Front".
with the organized presence of supporters of the Egyptian army on the streets, the discontented people also joined them, and this time street rallies were formed against Mohammed Morsi. This protest movement, supported by the Egyptian military, was called the "Tamord Movement" and played a key role in the overthrow of the Islamist president in the days leading up to the coup.
The process of dissatisfaction spread from the level of political parties and supporters of the military to the level of society, and the alignment of political and religious groups became an effective factor in the Tamord Movement playing a major role in the street protests and providing the popular force needed by the military to oust the Morsi government.
The Egyptian army gradually prepared the conditions for the coup and the overthrow of Morsi, and with cohesion and preparation, accused the Morsi government of being incapable of managing affairs and of creating tension and instability. As the protests of the Tamord Movement spread, the army took action and warned the Islamist president that if the current situation continued, they would take action with force.
After the coup, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was able to reorganize the army to form an authoritarian government, and he achieved his goal by carrying out the coup. Al-Sisi once again restored the constitution by holding a show referendum and achieved his goal by establishing large-scale courts and putting the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood on trial. In the authoritarian political structure, political institutions and courts were completely under the control of the army, and al-Sisi completely moved the power structure to his own desires to advance his goals. Another approach of al-Sisi was to influence the pillars of power and use legal capacities to consolidate the position of the authoritarian government. Al-Sisi expanded the influence and power of the military in the political structure and took advantage of the new situation to advance his goals. After the beginning of al-Sisi’s presidency, the army restored its affiliated courts again at a faster pace, and the dominance of the military and al-Sisi’s government over the legislative body enabled greater and faster suppression of opponents, including the Brotherhood. Al-Sisi entered the political arena and power structure directly, in a process that the Egyptian military has always used.
Al-Sisi and the Egyptian military took full advantage of the social forces supporting them and the political parties that were aligned with them to pave the way for the coup and its rapid conclusion. The strong dissatisfaction of the middle class with the performance of Mohamed Morsi and the Islamists provided sufficient ground for the military and their affiliates in the circle of power to form a broad political front against the Brotherhood. At the time the Islamists came to power, the Morsi government had to reach a political agreement with its main rivals (the army, moderate Islamists, and secular parties) to consolidate its position, but it failed to do so.
The policies of the Morsi government also had an impact on exacerbating the social divisions among the Brotherhood supporters, and with the beginning of the “Rebellion Movement” protests, the Islamist government was unable to attract and support different segments of the people. The Morsi government sought to implement programs and goals that were in conflict with the wishes of a significant part of Egyptian society. The formation of a political-military coalition between the army and the opposition parties played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Morsi government. The coup took place in a situation where the social and political conditions were prepared due to the type of Islamist activity, and the Muslim Brotherhood, allied parties, and Islamist political activists were unable to confront the army's actions.
Al-Sisi and the Egyptian military also mobilized their forces and resources in a timed process with specific goals and were easily able to avoid the process of consolidating the Islamist government. The military coup was the result of the alignment and cooperation of political forces with the military, which also played a role in the formation of the Arab Spring, but this political faction, which was concerned about unilateral actions and the possibility of the Brotherhood's influence and dominance over the pillars of power, openly stood up to the Islamists and completely leaned towards the military and the military in the power equation. The Egyptian military, relying on disaffected parties and protesting middle-class people, carried out the coup plan and plan, and after the establishment of the position of the Al-Sisi government and his presidency, the military returned to its original position in the political system. The most important political consequence of the coup and the return of the Egyptian military to power was the formation of an authoritarian system that dominated all political and economic sectors.

Keywords


Al-Shafiq Al-Amarini, N. (2019). The political autumn of the Arab revolutions (Explaining the foundations of the formation of the Arab Spring and its causes) (A. Madani & S. Homayouni, Trans.). Tehran: Nashre Negahe Moaser
Al-Zain, H. M. (2018). Documents of the Arab Spring and Islamic Awakening (J. Shojaei, Trans.). Tehran: Imam Sadiq University.
Alishahi,a,  Masoudnia,h, Forouzan,y ( 2020) The Transition to the Second Wave of the Revolution; An Analysis of the Performance of the Authoritarian Government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Post-Morsi Egypt  The Quarterly Journal of Political Studies of Islamic World Vol.9 ,NO.35, Fall 73-96
Bagheri Dolatabadi, A., & Awadpour, M. (2013). Egyptian revolution, its origins, actors and consequences, focusing on the period 2011–2013. Tehran: Publications of the African Studies Group.
Bashirieh, H. (2015). From Crisis to Collapse (Exploring the Persistence or Vulnerability of Political Systems). Tehran: Negha Maazareh Publishing House.
Bushrieh, H. (1376/1997). Political Sociology (The role of political forces in political life) (3rd ed.). Tehran: Nei Publishing House.
dinparasty, S., & Faez-Ramazani, Z. (2017). Investigation of political instability and government coalitions in post-revolutionary Egypt based on game theory. State Research Quarterly, Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Science, 4(51), Fall. [In Persian]
Haji Yousefi, A. M., & Zakari, M. A.-S. (2019). Popular uprisings in Arab countries: Bases and consequences (2011–2019). Tehran: Shahid Beheshti University Publications.
Hamidi, S., Mosdkhahe, E., & Aghajani, S. (2023). Deleuze's reading of the system of paranoid tyranny in North Africa and the emergence of desire in the Arab Spring developments: Case study Egypt, Tunisia, Libya. Quarterly Journal of Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World, 5(15), Spring.
Harati, M. J., & Zafari, M. (2012). The difference between the role and position of the army in the process of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the developments of 2011 in Egypt. Scientific Research Quarterly of the Islamic Revolution Research Journal, 2(8), Autumn.
Hoshi Sadat, S. M. (2019). Political and social history of the Middle East (from the ancient era to the post-modern era). Tehran: Tehran University Publications. [In Persian]
Husseini, I. M. (2006). The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest contemporary Islamic movement (S. H. Khosrowshahi, Trans.; 4th ed.). Tehran: Information Publishing Institute.
Khodori, M. (1995). Political tendencies in the Arab world (A. Alam, Trans.). Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mazaheri, M. M., Molai, A.-K., & Majid, K. (2014). The role of the military in the process of Islamic awakening in Egypt. Defense Policy Magazine, 23(35), Autumn. [In Persian]
Michelle, R. (2016). Muslim Brotherhood Community (S. H. Khosrowshahi, Trans.; Vol. 1). Tehran: Publications of University of Religions.
Motalebe, M. (2016). Recognizing the role and place of the army in the socio-political developments of Egypt before and after the fall of Morsi's government. Scientific-Research Quarterly Journal of Political Sociology of the Islamic World, 5(1), Spring–Summer.
Mousavi Khalkhali, A. (2021). The uprising of the disillusioned people (Compiled and Trans.). Tehran: New Edition.
Nabave, S. A., & Ebrahim Nia, H. (2014). The Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda: Similar beliefs on a different path. Specialized Political Science Quarterly, 10(29), Winter.
Victoria, Carty. (2014). Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The impact of new media on contemporary social movements and challenges to social movement theory. International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, 51(1), 51–80.
Zulfagari, V. (2023). Pathology of the transition to democracy in Egypt, 1950–2020. Islamic World Fundamental and Applied Studies Quarterly, 5(16), Summer.