The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Background and purpose: The concept of inclusive growth has become one of the new concepts in the economic literature of countries and has attracted much attention in recent decades. Many economists in different countries around the world have focused on it. In the definition provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, urban growth refers to the creation of new economic opportunities for all segments of society, including marginalized and poor communities. In other words, in inclusive economic growth, the poor segment of society benefits more from economic growth compared to other income groups in society (Sadeqi, 2013: 206). Therefore, it can be claimed that in the present era, in all economic societies, any progress and development are influenced by the advancement of science and knowledge. The evolution of all economic variables, inclusive growth, national welfare, infrastructure development, and the evolution of economic cycles is dependent on knowledge. Any economic variable and activity that is accompanied by knowledge leads to significant development and progress in economic systems. Therefore, it can be said that a knowledge-based economy affects all economic dimensions and is one of the fundamental factors in development, growth, productivity, efficiency, and welfare.
The main issue in this research is that one of the fundamental goals of countries and governments has always been achieving high welfare and economic growth, as well as reducing poverty and inequality. However, despite high economic growth in some countries, poverty and inequality have not decreased. Many studies, including Kuznets (1995), have shown that economic growth is accompanied by inequality and income distribution and does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction and inequality. For this reason, the concept of inclusive growth has been raised in the economic literature of development, which aims to benefit all members of society, including the poor, from the benefits of growth. In other words, inclusive growth focuses on simultaneous growth and equality (Mozaffari Pour, 2020:2). One of the influential factors in inclusive growth is a knowledge-based economy, which means a knowledge-based economy can promote innovation, socialization, self-entrepreneurship, technological advancement, and structural evolution in important economic sectors, improve the efficiency of production factors, and achieve sustainable development. A knowledge-based economy is mainly based on the use of ideas rather than relying on physical capabilities. According to the World Bank's definition, a knowledge-based economy is based on four components: knowledge, education, innovation, and incentive system, each of which plays a significant role in inclusive growth, national welfare, and economic progress.
In this research, titled "The Impact of Components of Knowledge-Based Economy on Inclusive Growth in Selected Islamic Countries," the researcher aims to identify the components of a knowledge-based economy and provide answers to the following questions: Is there a relationship between a knowledge-based economy and inclusive growth in selected Islamic countries?
Can a knowledge-based economy increase inclusive growth and bring about changes in it?
Due to the importance and necessity of the mentioned subject to achieve the goal based on the data panel method, this issue has been addressed. In this research, after presenting the introduction and theoretical foundations, the background of the research will be examined, and then the research method will be explained. Finally, after performing calculations and data analysis based on the data panel method, the subject will be summarized and concluded
Method : This research is based on an analytical-descriptive method. Initially, based on library documents and resources, including books and scientific articles, a literature review was conducted to extract the research framework and analytical model. In the next stage, for the inference and testing of hypotheses and answering research questions, the desired statistical information from published documents by statistical agencies and organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for the period 2006 to 2020, were collected and processed. Following the examination of the impact of knowledge economy factors on inclusive growth in selected Islamic countries, a panel data approach was used, combining different periods and using the FMOLS method and Eviews11 software
Findings : This research aimed to determine the impact of the components of the knowledge-based economy on overall growth in selected Islamic countries using panel data from 2006 to 2020. The components of the knowledge-based economy (education and human resource development, innovation system, information infrastructure, and economic incentives and institutional frameworks) were considered as explanatory variables, while overall growth (employment and productivity, economic growth, education, health, environmental sustainability, poverty and inequality, and gender equality) was considered as the dependent variable. Additionally, variables such as inflation, foreign investment, and goods exports were considered as control variables. The FMOLS (Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares) method was used to analyze the data using the EVIEWS software. Necessary tests, such as unit root tests to determine the stationarity of the data, and the Kaio co-integration test and panel data models with fixed effects and random effects were conducted. Based on the results obtained from Model A, it is evident that there is a significant and long-term relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, as indicated by the coefficient of determination (R2) of 94%. This shows that the independent variables explain 94% of the variations in the dependent variable. Furthermore, the component of education and human resource development has a positive and significant relationship with overall growth in selected Islamic countries. With a 1% increase in education and human resource development, overall growth will increase by 0.412%. Similarly, the composite index of 16 other variables also has a significant impact on overall growth.
Innovation and inventions also have a positive and meaningful impact on overall growth, with a 1% increase in the innovation system resulting in a 0.159% increase in overall growth. The index of information and technological infrastructures also has a positive impact on overall growth, with a 1% increase in these infrastructures leading to a 0.035% increase in overall growth. However, economic incentives have a significant negative relationship with overall growth, with a 1% increase in economic incentives and institutional frameworks resulting in a 0.117% decrease in overall growth in selected Islamic countries. Therefore, the three components of a knowledge-based economy, namely education and human resource development, innovation system, and information infrastructures, all have a positive impact on overall growth in selected Islamic countries, with education and human resources having the greatest influence. Based on the results obtained from the above model, where overall growth is the dependent variable and the composite index of knowledge-based economy is the independent variable, as well as inflation, logarithm of foreign investment, and logarithm of exports as control variables, it can be concluded that there is a significant long-term relationship between these variables, with the determination coefficient (R2 = 0.92) indicating that 92% of the variations in the dependent variable (overall growth) can be explained by the independent and control variables. Among the explanatory variables, the composite index of the knowledge-based economy has a significant positive effect on long-term growth, with a 1% increase in this variable leading to a 0.281% increase in overall growth. This means that as long as the economy in selected Islamic countries is based on knowledge, information, and technology, there will be an increase in overall growth. Similarly, variables such as gross domestic product and foreign investment have a positive impact on overall growth, but with a 1% increase in gross domestic product and foreign investment, there is a 0.084% and 0.002% increase in overall growth, respectively. On the other hand, the inflation variable has a significant negative effect on overall growth in selected Islamic countries, with a 1% increase in inflation resulting in a 0.003% decrease in overall growth.

Abstract The relationship between tradition and modernity has long constituted one of the central debates in political and social thought, particularly within developing societies. In many such contexts, modernity has been introduced as an external and, at times, disruptive phenomenon, generating tensions within pre-existing cultural and institutional frameworks. In Iran, this tension has acquired distinctive characteristics following the Islamic Revolution, which established a political order grounded in religious values while simultaneously confronting the structural imperatives of a modern state and an increasingly globalized world. Despite the transformative aspirations of the Revolution, the dichotomy between tradition and modernity has persisted across multiple spheres of Iranian society, including politics, culture, and governance. The expansion of globalization in the past half-century has intensified this interaction, creating new arenas of contestation and dialogue between competing discourses. The present study seeks to examine how this dynamic interplay has influenced political development in post-revolutionary Iran.The central research question guiding this study is: How has the confrontation between tradition and modernity affected political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution?The study advances the hypothesis that, notwithstanding the enduring tension between traditional and modern paradigms, the emergence of a new discourse—rooted in national, indigenous, and religious values while remaining compatible with certain universal modern principles—has been both necessary and influential in fostering political development in Iran. Rather than viewing tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive, this research explores the possibility of their synthesis as a driver of institutional evolution and political participation.This study is situated within broader debates on political development, discourse theory, and modernization in non-Western societies. Traditional modernization theories often conceptualize development as a linear transition from traditional to modern forms. However, such binary frameworks have been increasingly criticized for neglecting local agency, cultural specificity, and the potential for hybrid models of governance. In the Iranian context, post-revolutionary political discourse has attempted to redefine modern political concepts—such as participation, legitimacy, civil society, and sovereignty—through a religious and indigenous lens. The interaction between revolutionary ideals and global political norms has produced a distinctive discursive field in which confrontation and adaptation coexist. The research employs a qualitative analytical approach based on primary documentary sources, including official documents, scholarly works, and credible online materials. Through interpretive analysis, the study examines the evolution of political discourses after the Revolution and assesses their role in shaping institutional arrangements, public participation, and state–society relations. The qualitative method allows for an in-depth exploration of meanings, narratives, and ideological transformations rather than relying solely on quantitative indicators of political development. The findings indicate that the post-revolutionary political order in Iran has succeeded in articulating a distinctive ideological and political identity that resonates beyond its national boundaries, particularly among certain revolutionary and liberation-oriented movements. This development cannot be understood solely through the lens of conflict between tradition and modernity. Instead, it reflects a dynamic process of contestation, negotiation, and selective integration. The study reveals that the tension between traditional religious values and modern political institutions has not merely generated stagnation or regression. On the contrary, the interaction of competing discourses has contributed to the gradual transformation of political structures and practices. Electoral processes, constitutional mechanisms, public debate, and policy discourse have evolved within a framework that seeks to reconcile religious legitimacy with elements of modern governance.Globalization has further complicated this relationship by introducing new normative standards and communication networks. In response, Iranian political discourse has undergone adaptations aimed at preserving cultural authenticity while engaging with global modernity. This adaptive process has played a meaningful role in shaping the trajectory of political development, even as debates over identity, authority, and reform continue.The confrontation between tradition and modernity in post-revolutionary Iran should not be interpreted solely as a source of contradiction or paralysis. Rather, it has functioned as a catalyst for discursive innovation and institutional evolution. The emergence of a hybrid discourse—grounded in indigenous, national, and religious values while selectively incorporating modern political concepts—has been instrumental in advancing political development. Ultimately, the study concludes that political development in Iran after the Islamic Revolution has been shaped not by the dominance of one paradigm over the other, but by the ongoing interaction between them. The future trajectory of Iran’s political development will likely depend on the continued capacity of its political discourse to mediate, reinterpret, and harmonize these two foundational forces.

Abstract The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been among the most complex bilateral relationships in the Persian Gulf region over the past five decades. These relations have continuously been influenced by a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors and have fluctuated between economic cooperation, geopolitical competition, and security tensions. Although relations between the two countries reached one of their most confrontational periods between 2016 and 2020, signs of de-escalation and a return to diplomacy have emerged since 2021, coinciding with political changes in both the United States and Iran. Utilizing a descriptive-explanatory method, drawing upon library and electronic sources, and employing the Constructivist framework, this study examines three possible patterns for the future of Iran-UAE relations: the Hobbesian model (confrontation and hostility), the Lockean model (managed competition), and the Kantian model (cooperation and friendship). The findings indicate that the most probable scenario for the future of bilateral relations is the model of managed competition. In the first model, namely the dominance of Hobbesian culture, relations between Iran and the UAE move toward increased tension, mistrust, and the possibility of military confrontation. The most significant domestic factor underlying this situation is the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran considers these islands an inseparable part of its territory, whereas the UAE claims sovereignty over them and has consistently sought to raise the issue in international forums. This historical dispute has persisted since the establishment of the UAE in 1971 and has become a significant symbol of political and identity-based competition between the two countries. From Tehran’s perspective, sovereignty over these islands is non-negotiable, whereas Abu Dhabi insists on resolving the issue through negotiations or international arbitration. At the regional level, geopolitical competition has also played a major role in the formation of Hobbesian culture. Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the UAE’s concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence increased substantially. Developments in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen war, and the expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and across the region were viewed by the UAE as threats to the regional balance of power. The Yemen war became the most important arena of indirect competition between the two countries. The UAE supported forces opposed to Ansar Allah, while Iran provided political and strategic support to the movement. Drone attacks on Abu Dhabi and reciprocal confrontations in Yemen further intensified mistrust between the two states. The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020 constituted another factor contributing to heightened tensions. Iran viewed this development as a threat to its national security and warned against the security and intelligence presence of Israel near its borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the expansion of military and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel could alter the regional security balance to Iran’s detriment. Consequently, the growing ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv are regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to improving Iran-UAE relations. At the international level, the UAE’s security dependence on the United States has also been a major factor in generating tensions. The UAE views the American military presence as a guarantee of its security, while Iran considers the presence of U.S. forces in the region a direct threat to its national security. American military bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Iran significantly exacerbated bilateral tensions in recent years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by the UAE as a threat to regional stability, leading Abu Dhabi to consistently support international pressure against Tehran. In contrast, the second model, namely Lockean culture or managed competition, emphasizes the control of tensions and the preservation of limited interactions. This model is based on the assumption that both countries recognize the extremely high costs of direct confrontation and therefore seek to manage their differences. At the domestic level, the federal structure of the UAE plays an important role in this process. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which adopts a security-oriented and hardline approach toward Iran, Dubai and Sharjah favor maintaining economic relations with Tehran due to their strong dependence on trade and a non-oil economy. This divergence in perspectives has ensured that even during periods of political tension, bilateral trade relations have never been completely severed. At the regional level, several developments have contributed to reducing tensions. The reduction of the UAE’s military presence in Yemen, the initiation of security dialogues between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, and efforts to manage disputes through diplomatic channels are among the notable examples. The exchange of security and political delegations between the two capitals in recent years and the signing of border cooperation agreements demonstrated the determination of both sides to prevent further escalation. In addition, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 fostered a regional atmosphere conducive to de-escalation, encouraging the UAE to adopt a more balanced foreign policy. At the international level, the shift in U.S. policy following the inauguration of President Joe Biden also influenced this trend. Washington’s reduced support for the maximum pressure policy against Iran and efforts to revive nuclear negotiations prompted the UAE to reconsider its regional policies. Within this framework, Abu Dhabi also improved its relations with Qatar, Türkiye, and Syria and sought to establish itself as a more balanced regional actor. The third model, namely Kantian culture, represents the most optimistic scenario for the future of Iran-UAE relations. Under this model, the two countries move toward stable and friendly relations through economic cooperation, interdependence, and the reduction of security tensions. The most important driving force behind this process is the extensive economic interdependence between the two states. Over the past decades, the UAE, particularly Dubai, has played a crucial role in Iran’s foreign trade and has become one of Tehran’s most important economic partners. Thousands of Iranian companies operate in the UAE, and bilateral trade has experienced substantial growth in recent years. Economic interdependence has ensured that economic relations have never been completely interrupted, even during periods of peak political tension. As a regional commercial hub, Dubai possesses significant economic interests in maintaining relations with Iran. Furthermore, extensive Iranian investments in the UAE and the country’s role in Iran’s financial and commercial exchanges have created strong incentives for continued cooperation. At the regional level, a reduction in geopolitical tensions could facilitate the realization of this model. The end or de-escalation of the Yemen conflict, the improvement of Iran-Saudi relations, the growing role of regional mediators, and the expansion of regional economic cooperation are among the factors that could strengthen ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, if the UAE limits its security cooperation with Israel and focuses more on economic cooperation, some of Iran’s security concerns may be alleviated. At the international level, the success of nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran could provide a foundation for expanding economic and political cooperation between the two countries. The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated that whenever tensions between Iran and the United States decreased, trade and investment between Iran and the UAE increased correspondingly. Under such circumstances, joint economic projects, the development of regional transportation corridors, and cooperation in the fields of energy and infrastructure could elevate bilateral relations to a new level. In conclusion, the study emphasizes that Iran-UAE relations possess a dual and multilayered nature in which economic cooperation and political competition coexist simultaneously. Although territorial disputes, security rivalries, and the UAE’s relations with the United States and Israel hinder the development of full strategic trust between the two countries, economic interdependence and the high costs of direct confrontation also prevent relations from evolving into comprehensive hostility. Therefore, the most probable scenario for the future of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi is the continuation of a pattern of “managed competition accompanied by limited cooperation.” Within this framework, while maintaining their political and security differences, both countries are likely to utilize economic and diplomatic interactions to prevent the escalation of tensions and avoid direct confrontation. Such a situation could preserve relative stability in the Persian Gulf and provide the basis for limited yet sustained cooperation between two important regional actors.

Abstract The growing global power of the People's Republic of China and its efforts for superiority in power-generating resources in the international arena have made it particularly important to explain the role of other countries in its global approach. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its regional position and influence, geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages, and its role in the power structure in the international system, is of great importance to the great powers in different eras and to China in the current state of the world system. Also, the development of growing relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China as a result of the commonalities and structural requirements of the international system, the capabilities of various areas of cooperation, and emerging common areas has led to increased attention to the relations between these two countries in the international arena. The purpose of this article is to explain the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and examines the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in China's global approach and the strategies branching from it.
This study employs an experiential epistemology and an analytical-explanatory method, gathering credible evidence through empirical methods to elucidate the reality and relationships between variables. The research design began with an initial idea and evolved as the researcher's understanding of the subject deepened. Data were collected through library research. In this method, sources related to the research are studied and the necessary evidence is prepared in the form of the index card and analyzed using a Qualitative method.
Analysis of China's choices, political actions, and economic actions in the global arena indicate that the country has adopted a partnership-oriented approach to developing its global relations. Within the framework of the partnership-oriented approach, after the end of the Cold War, China has established a network of global and multidimensional partnerships that serves as a guiding framework for foreign policy and the center of its strategy for developing economic and political cooperation with other countries in the world. In the first step, it signed strategic partnership documents with various countries. In the second step, it sought to deepen partnerships with various countries in the world by creating foreign policy initiatives .In the third step, along with other dimensions of partnership-oriented cooperation, it promoted institutional cooperation to strengthen partnerships in the world.
China's global approach is indeed partnership, which is in contrast to the US's alliance approach. China's partnership approach includes; bilateral strategic partnership, partnership in the form of Chinese initiatives and institutions, and partnership in economic, political-security and specific Practical areas including energy, technology, digital and investment. China’s political-security partnership approach in the region is in its early stages compared to economic partnership, and the status of its long-term security commitments to the countries in the region is unclear. In fact, Beijing, in continuation of its energy security and investment policy in the region, seeks to play a diplomatic and security role in West Asian affairs. In the cultural sphere, it is also trying to expand its influence in the region with political and financial support and the establishment of cultural institutions.
China's partnership-oriented approach with West Asian governments is being pursued in the economic, political-security and cultural fields. The signing of strategic partnership documents with regional governments and the effective role in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative demonstrate the prominence of the West Asian region in China's partnership-oriented approach.
In this framework, Iran plays an important role. Strategies such as the “South-South Strategy”, “Hedging Strategy” and Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Health Silk Road, the Digital Silk Road, the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative are in line with China’s partnership-oriented approach, in which Iran’s role is prominent due to its geopolitical location, energy security and Iran and China similar views on international political and security issues. China promotes a multipolar world order through institutions and rules in which other civilizations and worldviews, such as Iran, have a special position. The Islamic Republic of Iran and China have similar views on global political and economic blocs to move from the rules of the liberal order to a new order.
For example, Iran has a special place alongside other major countries in the region in Beijing’s balanced approach. In addition to developing China’s relations with the Persian Gulf countries, cooperation with Iran is also on the agenda of the Chinese government, and Beijing has a balanced view of cooperation with Iran compared to other countries in the West Asian region.
Iran’s geopolitical and strategic location in Central Asia, Europe, and Africa and direct access to international waterways have given it a special place in Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the “Digital Silk Road,” the “Health Silk Road,” the “Global Development Initiative,” the “Global Security Initiative,” and the “Global Civilization Initiative”.
The structural requirements of the international system have forced China to adopt new partnership-based strategies such as; searching for a like-minded partner outside the liberal order, diversifying markets, industrial strategy and creating new investment axes in the world and creating a supply chain independent of the West to neutralize the US sanctions policy. In each of these strategies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has an important position for China. In order to escape the US containment policy, China has developed relations with like-minded governments, developed relations with governments outside the US alliance network, activated and expanded the development of regional organizations and groups.
Iran is one of the countries that can help China to implement the above strategy. China has tried to expand trade relations with other regions of the world and diversify global supply chains, in which countries of the global south, including Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and West Asia, including Iran, play a decisive role. China is seeking to create a supply chain independent of the sphere of influence of the United States and its allies in the world. The investment policy on clean and renewable energy and electric vehicles is at the center of Beijing's policy. China needs a strategic partner in the sanctions sectors to escape US pressure. Given the similar conditions of Iran and China in this sector, the country needs a long-term strategic partner like Iran.
The US containment policy through new plans and alliances at the global level (QUAD and AQUOS) and the region (Abraham Pact aimed at normalizing relations between the regime-Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia) as well as the multidimensional interaction of the regional rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran with China are among the obstacles to the development of cooperation between Tehran and Beijing.
Within the framework of China's partnership-oriented approach, the initiatives and strategies that China has developed in various fields to guide foreign policy in the world prescribe principles, foundations, and actions in China's foreign policy that both have potential capacities for cooperation with Iran. At the same time, China needs Iran's current role and position in the international system to better implement them. Iran has a special position in the aforementioned initiative and China's partnership-oriented policies in the economic and political sectors of China towards West Asia. By developing specific programs in various fields, Iran's role in China's grand strategies in the West Asia region can be improved.

Abstract A review of events in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century brings attention to a racial group known as the Taliban. This entity emerged in the early 1990s, drawing largely from former members of the Afghan mujahideen, a coalition of Islamic guerrilla fighters who had resisted the Soviet occupation. The Taliban rapidly gained popular support by promising to establish stability and restore the rule of law following four years of internal conflict among rival factions from 1992 to 1996.
However, the Taliban’s policies and actions—including the brutal persecution of Shiites and the violent treatment of the Hazara community—led to rising tensions with neighboring Iran. These tensions escalated in the late 1990s, culminating in the 1998 attack in which the Taliban killed Iranian diplomatic personnel and an Iranian journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. This incident positioned the Taliban as a direct adversary of Iran and raised serious concerns among Iranian officials about the possibility of military confrontation.
The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to launch military action against the Taliban, which in turn brought Iran closer to the U.S. position. The two countries cooperated in efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime. Following the conflict, Iran played an active role in supporting the establishment of a U.S.-backed government and transitional administration in Afghanistan, reflecting a temporary convergence of interests with the United States.
Despite this cooperation, the relationship between Iran and the Taliban shifted significantly in the years that followed. Signs of a potential rapprochement began to emerge. U.S. officials alleged that Iran continued to support certain Taliban members even while cooperating with the United States to dismantle the group—an allegation that Iranian officials strongly denied. Western media had reported on the evolving relationship between Iran and the Taliban for several years, but the issue gained broader international attention in 2015.
Since then, Iran has increasingly made its contacts with the Taliban public, framing its outreach as an effort to manage regional security concerns and reconcile competing interests. In December 2016, Afghan security officials reported strengthening ties between Iran and the Taliban. The Iranian embassy in Afghanistan later confirmed these contacts, stating that their purpose was to enhance information exchange and intelligence coordination.
When the Taliban regained power in September 2021, Iran adjusted its policies to accommodate the new political reality. It expanded its engagement with the Taliban and initiated diplomatic discussions with officials of the interim government. This shift marked a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s evolving approach toward the Taliban.
This article explores the transformation of Iran’s foreign policy narrative from confrontation and hostility to cautious engagement and pragmatic cooperation over the two decades from 2001 to 2021. It begins by introducing narrative research as a theoretical and methodological framework, outlines the key elements of narrative analysis, and then examines the case of Iran and the Taliban within this framework.
A narrative methodology has been employed to analyze the evolution of Iran’s narrative regarding the Taliban. This method makes it possible to examine how Iranian officials construct, frame, and adapt their storytelling strategies over time in response to shifting regional and international dynamics. By focusing on official statements, speeches, and policy documents, the study identifies patterns in meaning-making and representation. These narratives are analyzed as reflections of broader themes within Iran’s foreign policy orientation and strategic priorities. Specifically, the research considers three essential elements: environment, characterization, and emplotment, to understand how threats, allies, and actions are discursively constructed.
The findings indicate a significant shift in the narratives expressed by Iranian officials toward the Taliban over the past 25 years. During the first period of Taliban rule (the First Islamic Emirate, 1996–2001), Iran’s foreign policy toward the Taliban was framed within a confrontational narrative due to deep ideological differences. In this context, Iran even provided crucial assistance to the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. However, following the fall of the Taliban, a gradual transformation in Iran’s narrative toward the group began. By the time of the Taliban’s re-emergence in 2021, Iran’s narrative had evolved to emphasize interaction and cautious engagement, reflecting a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
The changing narratives reveal how Iran has adapted its foreign policy to shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan and the broader geopolitical context. Regarding the environment element, the narrative of Iran’s foreign policy after the fall of the Taliban reflected an effort to distance itself from its earlier confrontational stance. Despite the elimination of its proximate enemy (the Taliban), a more distant adversary—the United States—had established a significant presence in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
By shifting from a confrontational posture to a more interactive approach, Iranian leaders and political elites—including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and prominent military commanders—demonstrated an ability to recalibrate their narratives in pursuit of strategic objectives, while simultaneously taking into account domestic constraints within Afghanistan and mounting international pressures, particularly from the United States.
With regard to emplotment, it is worth noting the official assessment of the Iranian government at the time, which maintained that engagement with the Taliban had achieved its intended objectives. According to this view, Iran’s national interests were better served by the ongoing tensions between the Afghan government and the United States. In contrast, a competing perspective—here referred to as the “narrative of failure”—argues that the Taliban continues to be regarded as an adversary of Iran, as it has never abandoned its confrontational ideological and strategic posture toward the country.
This article has examined the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy narrative toward the Taliban from the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) to the second (since 2021), highlighting the interplay between ideology, security concerns, and geopolitical pragmatism. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s regional outlook was deeply influenced by Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary principles, including support for oppressed Muslims, an emphasis on Shiite solidarity, and a populist framing of resistance movements. During the 1990s, Tehran initially viewed developments in Afghanistan through this ideological lens, particularly in relation to the Hazara community and broader Shiite networks.
However, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 during the first Taliban regime dramatically altered this perception. The incident intensified mistrust and generated a dual discourse within Iran’s political elite: reformists tended to advocate cautious engagement and regional diplomacy, while conservative and fundamentalist factions emphasized deterrence and confrontation.
After the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001, and especially in response to the expanding U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran’s narrative gradually shifted once again to friendship with the Taliban. Viewing the United States as the primary strategic threat, Tehran recalibrated its narrative and adopted a more pragmatic posture toward the Taliban. This recalibration was shaped significantly by the strategic outlook of the Quds Force and the regional diplomacy associated with Qasem Soleimani.

Abstract During the last two decades, social networks have become one of the most influential arenas for the redefinition of relations between authoritarian governments and opposition forces. In Saudi Arabia, where formal political participation is limited, media institutions are centrally controlled, and religious legitimacy remains a decisive element of state authority, digital platforms have created a new environment for political, religious, and ideological activism. The expansion of Twitter/X, Telegram, YouTube, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram has enabled oppositional actors to bypass the constraints of conventional political organization and to communicate with domestic, regional, and transnational audiences. This transformation is especially significant in the case of Salafi opposition currents, because these groups are rooted in religious discourse while at the same time they increasingly depend on modern communication technologies to reproduce their identity, mobilize followers, and challenge official narratives. The present study examines the why and functions of social networks in the activism of Saudi Arabia's political opposition, focusing specifically on two currents: Salafi-Takfiri groups and Neo-Salafi groups. Although both currents emerge from the broader Salafi intellectual environment, they differ fundamentally in their political language, degree of radicalism, relationship to violence, and methods of digital mobilization. Salafi-Takfiri groups generally adopt a confrontational and exclusionary discourse based on strict religious dualisms, delegitimization of the Saudi political order, and militant interpretations of religious duty. By contrast, Neo-Salafi groups tend to employ a softer reformist language, a more moderate critique of political and religious authority, and a strategy of gradual discursive influence rather than open violent confrontation. The study therefore seeks to explain not only why these groups have moved toward social networks, but also how the same digital environment produces different forms of political and ideological practice. The central research problem is based on the tension between the Saudi state's restrictive political structure and the relative communicative openness offered by social media platforms. The main question is: what roles and functions do social networks perform for Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi opposition currents in the field of political activism? The secondary questions examine how these platforms assist in the reproduction of oppositional meanings, the mobilization of supporters, the production of religious-political legitimacy, the management of psychological operations, and the creation of hidden or semi-open networks. The main assumption of the research is that social networks, due to their interactive, transnational, low-cost, and rapidly distributive nature, have transformed the weight and effectiveness of Salafi opposition currents in Saudi Arabia. They have allowed these currents to construct alternative identities, organize dispersed audiences, and exert discursive pressure on the Saudi political and religious establishment. The theoretical framework of the study combines several perspectives in order to explain the phenomenon at structural, communicative, and ideological levels. The theory of the public sphere helps conceptualize social networks as an alternative arena in which actors excluded from official political institutions can express dissatisfaction and produce counter-discourses. Habermas's theory of communicative action is used to examine how arguments, religious references, and claims to truth and legitimacy are formulated in digital interaction. Castells's theory of the network society explains how power in the information age is organized through flows of communication and how oppositional actors function as nodes in transnational networks. Framing theory is used to analyze how political events, state repression, foreign policy, religious authority, and social grievances are interpreted differently by Takfiri and Neo-Salafi currents. Finally, online radicalization theory helps clarify the ways in which closed digital communities, emotional content, ideological repetition, and algorithmic visibility may intensify radical tendencies among some users while also opening possibilities for counter-radical and reformist discourse. Methodologically, this research follows a descriptive-analytical and comparative design. It is based on documentary analysis, qualitative content analysis, and digital discourse analysis. The data consist of publicly available online content, media samples, posts, messages, and behavioral patterns produced by Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi groups across social networks and related digital spaces. The study uses a non-interventionist approach: the researcher did not interact with the actors or influence the production of content, but analyzed existing outputs available in open sources, websites, channels, and social media accounts. The sampling strategy is purposeful and theoretical rather than statistical. Accounts and channels were selected because they had explicit or implicit links with one of the two currents under study, showed identifiable political and ideological positions toward the Saudi state and official religious institutions, and maintained a sufficient level of activity during the period considered. The analysis was carried out in three complementary stages. First, documentary and library analysis was used to clarify the conceptual framework and the existing literature on social networks, digital opposition, Salafism, radicalism, and Saudi politics. Second, digital discourse analysis was applied to identify the linguistic structures, ideological metaphors, binary oppositions, religious justifications, and framing patterns used in online content. Third, qualitative content analysis was conducted through open, axial, and selective coding. The unit of analysis was the content segment, meaning each tweet, post, channel message, text, or media item that carried a recognizable message about the political, ideological, or organizational role of social networks. Through this process, major categories such as delegitimization of the government, radical religious mobilization, soft reformism, digital recruitment, transnational networking, and symbolic identity construction were extracted and interpreted in relation to the theoretical framework. The findings show that social networks now operate as the most important field of digital activism for Saudi Salafi opposition currents. These networks are not merely technical tools for communication; rather, they function as the central infrastructure for producing political meaning, reconstructing religious identity, mobilizing audiences, and challenging official legitimacy. In the closed and authoritarian structure of Saudi Arabia, social networks serve as an alternative public sphere where dissatisfaction can be expressed, oppositional narratives can be reproduced, and ideological conflicts can become visible beyond the limits of state-controlled media. This function is particularly important because Saudi opposition groups have limited access to formal institutions, legal party activity, independent mass media, and public protest. Digital platforms therefore compensate for institutional closure by offering speed, anonymity, reach, and symbolic visibility. The research identifies three main functions of social networks for these opposition currents. The first is political. Social networks are used to challenge the legitimacy of the Saudi government, criticize official institutions, highlight perceived failures in domestic and foreign policy, and produce rival narratives regarding issues such as Yemen, Syria, relations with Western powers, and the role of official religious bodies. The second is ideological. Both currents use social networks to reproduce Salafi identity, but they do so in sharply different ways. Takfiri groups emphasize radical religious interpretations, sharp distinctions between belief and unbelief, emotional religious symbols, and narratives of betrayal and confrontation. Neo-Salafi groups emphasize reformist interpretations, legal-religious argumentation, moderate criticism, and the need to correct political and religious performance without necessarily rejecting the entire political order. The third function is organizational and communicative. Digital platforms reduce the cost of mobilization, enable dispersed networking, facilitate hidden or semi-hidden coordination, and allow actors to maintain activity even under security pressure through encrypted channels, shifting accounts, and flexible patterns of communication. The comparison between Salafi-Takfiri and Neo-Salafi currents demonstrates two opposing patterns of digital activism. Salafi-Takfiri groups use a closed, polarized, and confrontational communicative style. Their discourse is often based on binary classifications such as faith/unbelief, truth/falsehood, loyalty/betrayal, and Islam/enemy of Islam. They frame the Saudi government and its religious institutions as illegitimate, corrupt, or hostile to authentic religion, and they address audiences who are more likely to be frustrated, marginalized, or already receptive to radical frames. Their digital activity is therefore associated with delegitimization, emotional mobilization, clandestine networking, and, in some cases, the normalization of extremist interpretations. However, from 2018 to 2024 their level of activity shows an initial increase followed by gradual decline. This decline is related to intensified security pressure, platform restrictions, account removals, disruption of communication channels, and the increasing difficulty of maintaining open radical content on major platforms. Neo-Salafi currents follow a different trajectory. Their discourse is more open, argumentative, and reformist. Rather than relying on broad takfir or direct calls for violent confrontation, they use religious-political reasoning, moderate criticism, and social concerns to build credibility among broader audiences. Their messages often address governance, rights, religious authority, social restrictions, arrests, reform, and the moral responsibilities of rulers and scholars. Because this discourse is less openly violent and more compatible with the language of reform, Neo-Salafi groups have been able to maintain a more stable and growing digital presence between 2018 and 2024. They appeal not only to radicalized young users, but also to religiously oriented middle-class audiences, educated users, and individuals seeking a critical yet non-militant alternative to official discourse. In this sense, Neo-Salafism increasingly appears as a soft digital opposition that competes with both the state narrative and the radical Takfiri narrative. The study also shows that digital platforms shape the form of the message itself. Twitter/X is used for rapid political reaction, hashtag activism, framing of current events, and public confrontation. Telegram is more suitable for semi-closed circulation, hidden networking, and the preservation of content under pressure. YouTube enables longer ideological explanation, sermons, lectures, and narrative construction. WhatsApp and similar messaging applications are useful for interpersonal circulation, emotional mobilization, and the spread of short persuasive messages. Instagram and Facebook, although less central in some Salafi circles, contribute to visual framing, symbolic presentation, and the dissemination of simplified messages to wider audiences. Thus, each platform has a specific communicative logic, and opposition actors adapt their content according to the affordances, risks, and audiences of each digital space. Overall, the findings indicate that social networks have become the main arena of discursive competition among the Saudi Salafi opposition. The field is characterized by the relative retreat of radical Takfiri currents and the gradual strengthening of Neo-Salafi currents as a more sustainable form of soft digital opposition. This does not mean that radical discourse has disappeared; rather, it has become more fragmented, cautious, encrypted, and difficult to observe openly. At the same time, reformist Neo-Salafi discourse has benefited from its ability to remain visible, interact with wider audiences, and present itself as a religiously grounded but politically moderate critique. The future of Saudi opposition activism will therefore depend not only on state control and platform governance, but also on the ability of each current to adapt its language, organization, and identity to the changing architecture of cyberspace. The conclusion of the research is that social networks play a decisive role in the political, religious, and social activism of Saudi opposition forces. They create an alternative public sphere, provide tools for identity reconstruction, enable the circulation of counter-narratives, and transform the relationship between ideology and political action. For Salafi-Takfiri currents, digital platforms provide opportunities for radical framing, hidden networking, and ideological mobilization, although these opportunities are increasingly restricted by surveillance and platform regulation. For Neo-Salafi currents, they provide a more durable space for reformist criticism, audience expansion, and the formation of a soft opposition discourse. Consequently, understanding Saudi political opposition today requires close attention to the digital environment where legitimacy, authority, religion, and resistance are continuously contested.

Abstract The recent advancement of artificial intelligence must be understood as part of a broader transformation wherein digital infrastructures have moved from merely transmitting information to organizing meaning and adjudicating truth. In daily experience, search engines and social media once served as primary gateways to the world of information; now, large language models and generative systems have become interlocutors, interpreters, summarizers, and recommender, fundamentally reshaping the public sphere. For Iran, the stakes are high because the issue is not only what content AI produces but also which data it deems credible, which linguistic styles and historical narratives it reproduces, and which worldview it effectively imposes on users. Domestic policymaking in this domain often falls into a simplistic “opportunity/threat” binary or remains confined to general digital economy plans. Internationally, national strategies typically combine ethical principles, institutional flexibility, and a degree of functional ambiguity to balance innovation and regulatory intervention. For Iran, reliance on vague ethical declarations without enforceable mechanisms risks widening the gap between discourse and technical reality; conversely, rigid regulation without social participation, data infrastructure, and indigenous evaluation can stifle innovation and encourage circumvention. A framework that treats identity as a public policy issue and is technically and institutionally implementable is therefore an urgent necessity.

How can Iran, in the age of artificial intelligence, align technological development with the active preservation and creative renewal of its national identity (in its Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary configuration), without falling into cultural closure or harmful self-contained insularity?
This study advances a central policy proposition: by operationalizing a “cultural justice in AI” framework, supported by six interconnected policy pillars (spanning data sovereignty, indigenous evaluation benchmarks, participatory governance, and conditional international engagement) Iran can simultaneously foster responsible AI development and actively safeguard its national identity, thereby transforming potential algorithmic risks into opportunities for cultural resilience and creative renewal.
This study adopts an analytical and policy‑oriented methodology. It does not test a narrow empirical hypothesis but designs a decision‑ready framework suitable for translation into programs, standards, and institutional mechanisms within regulatory bodies. The analysis proceeds along three synergistic paths: a critical review of AI governance literature, with emphasis on the state’s dual role as facilitator of development and guarantor of risk mitigation; a focus on the specific characteristics of generative AI, which amplify risks such as hallucination, opacity, and unintended cultural homogenization; and the grounding of these discussions in Iran’s indigenous configuration of national identity, translating abstract governance concepts (data, benchmarks, auditing, accountability) into the language of identity‑laden domains (Persian language, historical memory, religious authority, revolutionary narrative, social cohesion).
The theoretical framework conceptualizes AI not as a neutral tool but as an “infrastructure of meaning” and a site of potential “data colonialism,” where cultural resources are extracted as raw material and returned as dominant stereotypes. Drawing on this critical lens, the study introduces the concept of “cultural justice in AI,” defined as the guarantee that Persian language, diverse dialects and expressive styles, and central narratives of history, religion, and revolution are not mere consumers of technological products but are actively present in the data layer, evaluation metrics, and decision‑making institutions. This perspective bridges infrastructure studies, critical data studies, and identity politics, emphasizing that cultural injustices often occur not in visible outputs but in the “invisibilities” of data collection, labeling, and weighting.
The analysis yields a multidimensional policy framework that moves beyond symbolic protection toward operational transparency and accountability. First, the study maps identity‑sensitive domains (such as religious authority and automated fatwa systems, Persian language and literature education, historical narrative generation, and content recommendation in mass media) and classifies them according to risk levels (very high, high, medium/low). This risk‑based approach guides the intensity of regulatory intervention: very high‑risk applications require licensing, mandatory human‑in‑the‑loop, pre‑ and post‑audit, and grievance mechanisms, while lower‑risk domains can operate under lighter, supervised self‑regulation.
Second, the article identifies three layers for translating the abstract notion of “identity risk” into actionable requirements: the data layer, where the creation and maintenance of high‑quality, diverse, and transparently documented Persian corpora are treated as public goods; the evaluation layer, where indigenous benchmarks are designed to assess not only technical fluency but also cultural‑identity dimensions such as distortion of religious concepts, ethnic stereotyping, and one‑sided historical narratives; and the institutional layer, where a participatory governance architecture is proposed. This includes a “Cultural Representation Council for AI,” a multi‑stakeholder body composed of linguists, historians, theologians, sociologists, and industry representatives, tasked with producing concrete audit protocols and data guidelines rather than general recommendations.
Third, six complementary policy pillars are detailed: (1) defining and institutionalizing sensitive identity domains and risk tiers; (2) building and reinforcing reliable Persian corpora and data assets as commons; (3) designing indigenous cultural‑identity evaluation benchmarks and regular auditing mechanisms; (4) embedding participatory governance and cultural representation within the regulatory structure; (5) enhancing interdisciplinary AI literacy across educational, media, and religious institutions; and (6) pursuing targeted, conditional international data diplomacy to influence global standards and avoid passive marginalization.
The discussion emphasizes that effective governance cannot rely solely on top‑down prohibition; it must be adaptive, learning‑oriented, and rooted in a political‑economic understanding of platform power. The framework advocates starting with policy pilots in selected domains, systematically gathering evidence, and iteratively revising rules, thereby maintaining innovation while ensuring accountability. It also warns that without deliberate investment in Persian data infrastructure and local evaluation tools, Iran risks becoming dependent on opaque foreign models that structurally embed alien cultural norms.
The intersection of artificial intelligence and national identity in Iran is a governance‑level challenge. As generative models become the primary mediators of meaning (affecting education, collective memory, religious practice, and entertainment) policy inaction effectively cedes authority to external standards and datasets. The study concludes that aligning AI development with the Iranian‑Islamic‑revolutionary identity requires simultaneous intervention in three layers: semantic infrastructure (data, models), assessment (evaluation, auditing), and institutions (participation, accountability). The proposed package (centered on cultural justice, data sovereignty, indigenous benchmarks, participatory governance, literacy, and data diplomacy) offers a path to transform AI from a threat of cultural homogenization into an instrument of dynamic identity preservation. Responsiveness, in the sense of clear data provenance, documented model assumptions, transparent evaluation procedures, and defined liability for high‑risk errors, serves as the unifying thread of this architecture. Ultimately, a learning‑based governance model that balances innovation with rigorous accountability can enable Iran to strengthen its digital sovereignty while actively and creatively renewing its national identity.

Abstract In the complex and pluralistic landscape of 21st-century international relations, media diplomacy has emerged as a foundational pillar and strategic instrument of foreign policy. This phenomenon, which in essence signifies the intelligent and targeted use of communication tools to manage a nation’s image and advance its national objectives on the global stage, is recognized as the primary arm for exercising soft power. In a world where public opinion plays a decisive role in legitimizing government policies, a country’s ability to narrate its own story, articulate its positions, and influence global perceptions has become a vital component of national power. Global media giants such as the BBC, Voice of America, Reuters, and the Associated Press are not merely news organizations; they function as diplomatic instruments that can shape the global agenda and serve the interests of their home countries by framing events and highlighting specific issues. This reciprocal and synergistic relationship between politicians and the media is an undeniable reality; politicians need the media to convey their messages and mobilize public support, while the media depends on political elites for access to primary news sources and firsthand analysis.
Following the fundamental transformations of 2003 and the collapse of the Ba’athist regime, Iraq faced an existential challenge in the international arena: the challenge of rebuilding its national image. To establish its position as an independent and effective actor in the region and the world, the new Iraq requires an active and dynamic presence in the global communication sphere. However, the central problem this research addresses is the country’s structural inability to effectively leverage media diplomacy. The roots of this failure are deep and multifaceted. On one hand, the legacy of decades of despotic Ba’ath party rule, which suppressed any growth of independent and professional media, has resulted in a historical vacuum and backwardness in Iraq’s media infrastructure. On the other hand, post-2003, the country has faced not only internal reconstruction challenges but also a continuous and negative media onslaught from some regional and Western networks, particularly American-Saudi media, which have further weakened its standing in global public opinion by presenting a stereotypical, distorted, and one-sided image of Iraq as an insecure, unstable, and sectarian-ridden nation. This situation has turned the necessity of formulating scientific and practical strategies for enhancing Iraq’s media diplomacy into an undeniable strategic priority.
Despite the critical importance of the subject, a review of the existing literature reveals a significant gap in academic work related to Iraq’s media diplomacy, which itself confirms the underdevelopment of this field in both practice and theory. Nevertheless, the few studies that have been conducted illuminate various dimensions of this challenge. For instance, previous research has emphasized the key role of media in the post-ISIS peace-building process while also analyzing its function in Iraq’s internal conflicts and crises. Other researchers have identified the structural and political obstacles hindering the emergence of independent media and have scrutinized the initial media dynamics following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The consensus from all this research points to one key commonality: the absence of a professional, independent, and capable media infrastructure is the primary and fundamental obstacle to Iraq playing a significant role in global diplomacy, and resolving this dilemma requires specific and operational solutions.
To achieve this goal, a deep exploration of the perspectives and experiences of elites was undertaken using a qualitative approach and the research method of thematic analysis. Accordingly, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty prominent experts, including veteran Iraqi diplomats, professors and specialists in communication sciences, and leading media activists. The selection of this purposive sample was aimed at gathering the collective wisdom of an elite group directly involved with Iraq’s foreign policy and media challenges. To ensure the scientific validity and reliability of the findings, the technique of researcher triangulation was employed, where the initial coding and analysis process was reviewed by a team of distinguished communication professors, ensuring the final analytical framework was agreed upon with high precision.
The rich findings from these interviews revealed three primary and interconnected strategies for advancing Iraq’s media diplomacy: producing desirable media content, adopting a desirable media strategy, and maintaining a media focus on major foreign policy issues. Among these, the production of professional and engaging content was identified as the cornerstone of any successful endeavor. According to the experts, desirable content must prioritize the maximum use of digital technologies and modern communication platforms to bypass traditional media filters and establish direct and effective communication with global audiences. Furthermore, the produced messages must adhere to global journalistic standards; that is, they must be clear, concise, accurate, reliable, and as impartial as possible to break down barriers of distrust and be heard in the competitive global information environment. Objectivity in covering events, precise and non-exaggerated descriptions, and presenting balanced views on controversial topics are necessary conditions for gaining and maintaining international credibility.
Beyond mere news reporting, the power of effective storytelling is a fundamental axis. This approach means shifting from a defensive and reactive stance to an active and innovative one in narrative construction. Instead of simply responding to the negative narratives of others, Iraq must create its own alternative and compelling narrative, built upon the vast cultural, civilizational, and historical capacities of its land. Highlighting the heritage of Mesopotamia, showcasing contemporary artistic and cultural achievements, focusing on success stories of reconstruction and peaceful coexistence, and utilizing the powerful tools of art can be the building blocks of this new narrative. Presenting a realistic image that acknowledges challenges while focusing on opportunities and positive prospects, alongside efforts to create a unified and coherent narrative from all government institutions, will prevent sending contradictory messages and project an image of a stable state. Increasing diversity in the form and content of messages to engage various audience segments and focusing on the positive aspects of Iraq’s historical relations with other nations will significantly strengthen the country’s content strategy.
In today’s world, media diplomacy for a country in Iraq’s position is not an option or a ceremonial tool, but a vital necessity and a guarantor of survival and progress in the international arena. Foreign policy without the backing of a powerful media that can explain its positions, defend its interests, and manage its image is highly inefficient and lacks influence. For Iraq to make its independent voice heard by the world, neutralize the biased and toxic narratives of its rivals, and reclaim its true position as a key player in the region and the world, it has no choice but to make a serious and long-term investment in rebuilding and developing its media system. This requires allocating resources, training specialized human capital, creating coordination between diplomatic and media institutions, and learning from successful global experiences. An intelligent and effective media presence can dramatically increase a country’s diplomatic weight and influence in global affairs. Therefore, enhancing media diplomacy must be placed on the agenda of Iraqi policymakers as a grand national project, so that the country can not only correct its distorted past image but also play an active, constructive, and leading role in resolving future crises and shaping a more stable future for its people and the region.

Abstract The Gaza crisis, particularly following the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation in October 2023, has become a turning point in regional developments, having wide-reaching effects on the security and geopolitical dynamics of the region. Evidence suggests that, prior to the Gaza crisis, Iran, as a key player in West Asia, had played a significant role in maintaining and reproducing the regional security order through supporting resistance groups, adopting deterrence policies, multilateral diplomacy, and balancing power. However, the Gaza crisis, with its expansion into Syria and Lebanon and the widespread use of hybrid warfare strategies, has reshaped the structure and nature of the regional order. This war not only escalated the historic conflicts between Palestinian resistance and the Israeli regime but also, by enhancing the role of new technologies (such as drones and information warfare), has introduced a new phase of complexity and power shift in the regional order. The Gaza crisis, while disrupting the regional power balance, has posed a serious challenge to Iran's geopolitical strategies for preserving its position. The crisis, by altering the regional power balance and increasing political and security pressures, has placed the Islamic Republic of Iran at risk of a new encirclement in a coalition of rival forces, in what can be described as "strategic isolation." The continued Gaza crisis, accompanied by new complexities and developments, particularly the use of advanced technologies and hybrid warfare strategies, seems to require Iran to shift from traditional methods to new strategic approaches. This research is significant in its ability to offer a deeper understanding of the power shifts in the region that have emerged after the Gaza crisis, which are markedly different from the past. It provides new insights into Iran's security and diplomatic strategies and explores the country's approaches to maintaining national security and determining the security order in the region. Furthermore, identifying effective tools and mechanisms for addressing new threats contributes to the study's importance, as it helps Iran's foreign policy escape the security trap of crisis cycles (the siege crisis). The novelty of this research lies in addressing the gap in prior studies by analyzing the impact of the Gaza crisis on the regional order in West Asia and Iran's role in reproducing this order. It also examines the long-term consequences of the Gaza crisis on regional power dynamics and Iran's future foreign policy strategies. Research Questions 1. How has the Gaza crisis impacted the power dynamics, roles of regional actors, and the structure of the security order in West Asia? 2. What security, diplomatic, and economic strategies can Iran adopt to preserve and enhance its regional position in the new regional order? Theoretical and Conceptual Framework To explain and analyze the situation of the regional order during the Gaza crisis and Iran's new strategies in addressing regional crises, the strategic rationality theory of John Mearsheimer, which falls under the theory of offensive realism, can be used. This multi-layered theoretical framework is designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the structural changes in Iran’s foreign and security policies in the region and how they adapt to new crisis conditions. Mearsheimer's strategic rationality is based on explanatory frameworks, including: 1. The need to redefine rationality in complex crisis situations. 2. Focusing on active deterrence through "smart power." 3. The distinction between risk and uncertainty in conflict situations. 4. Avoiding the maximization of benefits in crisis and conflict situations. Research Methodology This research is based on the paradigm of offensive realism and is applied in nature. It uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library-based and documentary techniques. Research Findings - The Gaza crisis and Iran's multi-layered security strategy - The power shift during the Gaza crisis - Iran's overall capabilities and new threats - The hidden cycle of regional actors’ actions - The expansion of hybrid warfare and its impact on changing the nature of conflicts against Iran Reproduction of Regional Order and Possible Strategies for the Islamic Republic of Iran Considering the regional changes, the Islamic Republic of Iran must move beyond traditional strategic frameworks and adopt new multi-layered strategies. These strategies should focus on combining hard, soft, and smart power and using hybrid warfare tools and flexible diplomacy to manage regional crises. In other words, to control the regional order based on a precise understanding of power relations and to change the cycle of power and the regional order, Iran’s new role and the design of a new deterrence system are essential. Given the regional transformations, it is clear that Iran must move from linear deterrence systems to non-linear deterrence, allowing all countries to apply this control system in complex and asymmetric environments. Conclusion This research, with its comprehensive approach and effort to accurately understand the current status of the region and security relations, clarifies how the Gaza crisis has impacted the regional order and what the best crisis management decisions for Iran are. Findings highlight that, for the first time, threats have reached Iran’s internal security layers and its core. In such a situation, achieving maximized benefit through strategic rationality is undesirable, and Iran must focus on creating absolute benefits and optimal conditions. Moreover, prioritizing economic issues for regional countries and focusing on development under political stability leads to a transformative power dynamic, whereas Iran, due to its different understanding of threats and severe economic sanctions, continues to view power dynamics through military security relations. Despite Israel’s attempts to bring competition and conflict into non-military, informational, and technological fields, the Islamic Republic responded with military operations that provided deterrence and confrontational capacity. This decision, based on strategic rationality, aimed to adopt strategies that allowed Iran to maintain its ability and capacity in the military arena. However, the general capabilities shift, the expansion of hybrid warfare, and its impact on the nature of conflicts against Iran is a significant event that could limit Iran’s role, especially as the Gaza crisis revealed that Israel has been able to create a long-term implicit security regime through a common threat of Iran in the region. This becomes critical when regional powers are silent and passive in the face of Tel Aviv's actions, placing them in a hidden balance with Israel. In such a scenario, Iran must adopt smart policies to strengthen the resistance axis and prevent new security alliances against itself.

Abstract
Science diplomacy has emerged in recent years as one of the important instruments in international relations, and many countries have sought to use their scientific and academic capacities to strengthen their international standing, expand international cooperation, and achieve development goals. In this context, science and technology are no longer limited to educational and research domains; rather, they have become an important component of countries’ soft power and a significant tool of foreign policy. Countries that are able to expand their interactions through scientific networks, academic collaborations, knowledge exchange, and participation in international research projects are more likely to enhance their position in the international system. Nevertheless, the realization and effective use of science diplomacy in some countries face numerous challenges and limitations that hinder the optimal use of this capacity. Within this framework, the main problem of this study is to examine the status of science diplomacy in Iraq and to identify the most significant limitations and obstacles that hinder its realization. Due to its geopolitical position, historical and cultural background, and its considerable need for scientific development and the reconstruction of educational infrastructures, Iraq possesses significant potential for benefiting from science diplomacy. However, the political, economic, and institutional conditions of the country have made the utilization of these capacities considerably difficult. Therefore, the central question of this research is: why has the realization and effective use of science diplomacy in Iraq been confronted with fundamental challenges and limitations?
Method: This study adopts a qualitative approach and is conducted through the analysis of secondary data. The required data were collected from various reliable sources, including reports of international organizations such as UNESCO and the World Bank, scientific articles published in reputable journals, and official documents related to Iraq’s scientific and educational policies. After the data were collected, qualitative content analysis was employed to examine and analyze the information. In this process, the data were coded and the main themes and patterns related to the status of science diplomacy in Iraq were extracted. The use of credible sources and systematic analysis made it possible to provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the current situation and the main challenges in this field.
Theory: This study examines the transformation of emerging forms of international diplomacy that are developing in response to complex contemporary global challenges—ranging from infectious diseases and environmental degradation to cybercrime and the impacts of new technologies—where science and technology play a central role. The growing dependence of international decision‑making on specialized knowledge has highlighted the need for systematic use of scientific advice. However, within the structure of the United Nations there has not been a coherent and centralized mechanism for receiving scientific recommendations, which has led to proposals for creating platforms capable of building global consensus on scientific issues. At the same time, the expansion of the internet, big data, and communication technologies has transformed the environment in which diplomacy operates by reducing costs and increasing the capacity and speed of information exchange. These developments have gradually shifted diplomacy from a purely state‑centered model toward a more networked and people‑oriented form, in which non‑state actors, companies, online platforms, and global public opinion play an increasingly important role. The study then relies on the theoretical framework of public diplomacy and the concept of soft power to explain the technologies and mechanisms of modern diplomacy. Public diplomacy, as an instrument of soft power, is based on mobilizing and guiding foreign public opinion in line with national interests, and its main mechanism is attraction and persuasion. According to Joseph Nye, attractive culture, political values, and legitimate policies constitute the most important sources of this power. Within this framework, the technologies of public diplomacy function as tools for shaping and managing public attitudes and preferences, enabling states to pursue their national interests through the support of foreign publics. In this sense, public diplomacy in the digital age not only continues the traditions of foreign policy but also represents a more complex and effective form of international influence through the use of modern communication technologies.
Findings: The findings indicate that the development and realization of science diplomacy in Iraq face a number of structural and institutional obstacles. One of the most significant barriers is the weakness of scientific and research infrastructures. Over the past decades, Iraq’s scientific system has been heavily affected by wars, political crises, and economic difficulties. As a result, many universities and research centers lack adequate facilities, equipment, and scientific capacity. This infrastructural weakness has reduced the ability of Iraqi scientific institutions to actively participate in international scientific collaborations and has created a major barrier to the development of science diplomacy. Another important factor is political instability and fluctuating security conditions in Iraq. Political stability is considered one of the essential prerequisites for scientific development and the expansion of international cooperation. In a context where the political system is affected by instability, internal tensions, or security crises, long‑term planning in the fields of science and technology becomes difficult, and many scientific collaborations may face disruption. Political instability can also negatively influence decision‑making processes related to scientific policy and hinder the implementation of development programs in this sector. Financial constraints and limited funding also represent another major obstacle to the development of science diplomacy in Iraq. Scientific and technological development, as well as the expansion of international scientific cooperation, require significant investment in higher education, research activities, laboratory infrastructure, and academic exchange programs. When sufficient financial resources are not allocated to these sectors, the capacity for strengthening scientific institutions and participating effectively in international scientific networks is reduced. Consequently, financial limitations can directly affect the level of international scientific engagement and the country’s ability to benefit from science diplomacy. Moreover, the absence of coherent policy‑making and a clear strategic framework in the field of science diplomacy is another major challenge. The development of science diplomacy requires long‑term planning, coordination among various scientific and governmental institutions, and the definition of clear objectives within the framework of scientific foreign policy. Without such an approach, scientific and international activities may occur in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner and may fail to produce sustainable and effective outcomes. Therefore, the lack of a coherent policy framework can prevent the formation of an efficient system for utilizing scientific capacities in international relations.
In conclusion, the development of science diplomacy in Iraq requires serious attention to institutional reforms and the strengthening of the country’s scientific capacities. In this context, improving research infrastructures, increasing financial support for universities and research institutions, establishing political and security stability, and formulating coherent policies in the fields of science and technology are among the key measures that can facilitate the expansion of international scientific cooperation. In this regard, strengthening science diplomacy also requires Iraq to increase research funding and invest more in strategic sectors. In addition, creating appropriate incentives and supportive policies to attract and encourage the return of scientific elites living abroad is essential. Expanding scientific and research cooperation at the regional level is also an important step toward enhancing Iraq’s scientific engagement. The implementation of these measures can strengthen the country’s scientific capacities and provide a suitable foundation for the effective use of science diplomacy. If these conditions are achieved, science diplomacy can become an effective instrument for enhancing Iraq’s scientific and international standing and for accelerating the country’s development process.

Abstract Terrorism in today’s world has become a multidimensional phenomenon, and terrorism financing, as one of the fundamental challenges to the international security system, has targeted not only the domestic stability of countries but also collective security. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran, considering its geopolitical conditions and surrounding threats, has formulated criminal and preventive policies to combat this phenomenon. The present research has been conducted with the aim of analyzing Iran’s preventive approaches in combating terrorism financing and their alignment with the standards of international documents. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used, relying on the analysis of legal documents, domestic laws, and international conventions. Legislative challenges arising from the lack of a single and universal definition of the concept of terrorism have faced difficulties in the full implementation of international standards. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a country that has itself been a victim of terrorism, has designed a unique legislative model within this ambiguous context, which not only has not fallen behind global standards but has also introduced effective legislative innovations into its legal literature across many supervisory layers. With the understanding that definitional ambiguity can be used as a political lever against states, it has sought to localize norms. This national approach is, in fact, a reaction to attempts that intend to isolate legitimate regional resistances under the guise of terrorism. In international documents, including the 1999 New York Convention, special emphasis has been placed on the importance of tracking financial flows and identifying the identities of actors involved in transactions. The legal system of Iran, by accepting part of these norms and integrating them into domestic laws, has traversed a path in which financial institutions are defined as the front line of the combat. The country’s legislative transformation in the years 2007 and 2015 is considered a turning point in this path, which was carried out with the aim of directly criminalizing terrorism financing and creating legal frameworks for institutional supervision. In these laws, the traditional concepts of combating money laundering have expanded and extended to the sensitive field of terrorism financing. The main basis of the argument of this research is built on the assumption that prevention in the field of terrorism financing, before being a judicial matter, is a "supervisory and financial" process. In the past, the focus of the legislator was mainly on punishing the perpetrators after the commission of a crime, but with the legislative developments of recent decades, particularly by relying on the experiences gained from anti-money laundering laws and their elevation to the level of combating terrorism financing, this approach has undergone a fundamental change, and the legal system of Iran has not merely relied on passive modeling in designing preventive mechanisms. Prevention in Iran’s system is a combination of adhering to technical banking standards and maintaining ideological and political boundaries, which is reflected in the country’s criminal legislation; the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a combined approach (criminal and non-criminal) in which criminal prevention is highlighted through laws such as the "Counter-Terrorism Financing Law" passed in 2015 and its subsequent amendments in 2018. Studies show that despite the lack of formal accession to the 1999 New York Convention, Iran has integrated its key provisions into its domestic law. In this regard, a significant portion of the Iranian legislator’s efforts in drafting preventive rules has been focused on controlling suspicious financial flows. These preventive measures in Iran’s legal system, beyond mere criminalization, have proceeded to create supervisory structures to identify the roots of terrorism financing for terrorist groups. One of the key points that must be mentioned is the role of financial institutions and the responsibilities assigned to them in domestic laws. The Counter-Terrorism Financing Law, by utilizing previous legal experiences in the field of combating money laundering, has designed mechanisms that attempt to ensure alignment with global standards alongside the preservation of national authority. In fact, an analysis of the governing regulations shows that Iran’s approach, in the link between criminal measures and administrative supervisions, seeks to block existing gaps in the path of financing terrorist activities. However, the analyses of this research indicate that the existing challenges are not merely limited to legal texts and also have their own specific complexities in implementation. The article emphasizes that the Iranian policymaker, despite these challenges, has sought to design a framework compatible with national security by relying on domestic legal and jurisprudential (Fiqh) sources. In completion of the previous discussions, this research insists precisely on the point that the preventive system in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of an evolutionary legislative process, shaped in response to national security needs and international structural pressures. A comparison between the provisions of the 1999 Convention and domestic law indicates that the Iranian legislator has taken effective steps in the field of “criminal liability of legal persons,” which is aligned with global standards for combating terrorism financing. However, the article emphasizes that one of the main obstacles in the path of full implementation of these standards is the flexible yet ambiguous nature of the concepts mentioned in international documents. Furthermore, it should be noted that the position of the 1999 New York Convention within Iran’s legal system is one of the contentious focal points of this research. Although Iran has, in practice, reproduced many of the norms arising from this Convention in its national laws, its lack of formal accession stems from precise legal and political considerations regarding the definitions and instances of terrorism. This research clearly argues that the Iranian legal system, by adopting a "maximalist prevention" approach, has sought to combat terrorism financing networks without harming national sovereignty. From the perspective of this article, preventive measures are not limited solely to the criminal sphere; rather, they encompass a broader range of banking and financial supervisions in which the "Financial Intelligence Unit" (FIU) plays a pivotal role. The comparative study conducted in this research indicates that the Iranian model shares significant commonalities with the models prevalent in international conventions regarding the "supervision of natural and legal persons." Nevertheless, in the section of the definition of terrorism, conceptual gaps exist between what is recognized as a unified standard in international documents and what is accepted in domestic law. This research states that the Iranian legislator has preferred, instead of accepting external definitions, to interpret concepts based on its own legal principles in a manner that prevents political or legal abuses. Additionally, this article emphasizes that the fight against terrorism financing must be based on balanced international cooperation, such that the unilateralism of certain international financial institutions does not violate the rights of developing countries or countries under sanctions. In the final part of the analyses, we conclude that despite all legislative and executive challenges, the Iranian legal system has experienced a forward movement in aligning its structures with preventive requirements over the last decade. The creation of databases of persons at risk and the obligation of financial institutions to provide rapid reporting are among the achievements of this legislative process. The final emphasis is on the fact that terrorism grows in a context of financial concealment. Therefore, any step taken toward the transparency of financial flows is a step toward undermining the foundations of terrorism. The Iranian policymaker must guide this process with a proactive outlook so that the country, in its challenging regional environment, ensures its security as a law-abiding yet intelligent actor. Under the shadow of this integrated approach, a vision can be achieved in which the country’s financial system is not only secured against terrorism financing threats but also becomes a model for other developing countries. This research suggests that to exit interpretive deadlocks, there is a need for an international legal discourse based on a common and non-political definition of the concept of terrorism. Furthermore, expanding the scope of "preventive measures" without considering the legal differences between systems will lead to inefficiency at the implementation level. Therefore, the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran must continue to be based on strengthening the rule of law domestically, alongside active legal diplomacy in the international arena, to combat terrorism financing threats while utilizing legal capacities to preserve national interests.

Abstract Over the past two decades, China has undergone a profound transformation from a regionally focused actor into a globally influential power whose economic dynamism, technological advancement, and diplomatic activism have reshaped the international system. As Beijing’s material capabilities have expanded, so too has its ambition to redefine the norms, principles, and institutional arrangements governing global order. Central to this ambition is China’s effort to articulate and promote a distinct interpretation of "great power responsibility" a concept that diverges significantly from Western understandings of global leadership, intervention, and normative authority. Rather than framing responsibility in terms of military engagement, democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention, China emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, development-oriented cooperation, and multilateralism. This alternative framing has become a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy identity and a key instrument in its strategy to expand influence in critical regions, including the Middle East. The Middle East occupies a pivotal position in China’s strategic calculus. It is a region where Beijing’s core interests—energy security, connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis the United States—intersect. China’s growing presence in the Middle East is not merely a byproduct of economic expansion; it is a deliberate and carefully calibrated policy aimed at embedding China within the political, economic, and security architecture of the region. The question guiding this study is therefore: How has China employed the concept of great power responsibility to expand its influence in the Middle East in competition with the United States? Addressing this question requires a conceptual examination of China’s interpretation of great power responsibility, as well as an empirical analysis of its policies, initiatives, and diplomatic behavior in the region. China’s official discourse presents great power responsibility as a commitment to promoting stability, development, and mutually beneficial cooperation. This discourse gained renewed prominence following President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Governance Initiative in September 2025, which builds upon earlier frameworks such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Collectively, these initiatives articulate China’s vision for a more equitable and multipolar world order grounded in respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and inclusive multilateralism. In the Middle East, this vision translates into a foreign policy approach that seeks to avoid entanglement in regional conflicts while simultaneously expanding China’s economic footprint, diplomatic presence, and normative influence. China’s strategy in the Middle East rests on three foundational pillars. The first is energy security, as the region supplies more than 40 percent of Chinas crude oil imports. Ensuring stable access to energy resources is therefore a core national interest, and China has cultivated long-term partnerships with major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. These partnerships are framed not as extractive relationships but as mutually beneficial arrangements that contribute to regional stability and economic development an interpretation consistent with China’s development-oriented notion of responsibility. The second pillar is the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, which positions the Middle East as a critical hub for global connectivity. Through infrastructure investments, port development, digital cooperation, and financial integration, China seeks to embed regional economies within a broader Eurasian network centered on Beijing. The BRI is presented as a vehicle for shared prosperity, reflecting China’s claim that great power responsibility entails enabling development rather than imposing political conditions. In practice, BRI projects have deepened China’s economic interdependence with Middle Eastern states, thereby increasing Beijing’s leverage and influence. The third pillar is multilateralism and geopolitical balancing, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. China’s growing diplomatic engagement including its role in mediating the 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement illustrates Beijing’s attempt to position itself as a neutral, stabilizing actor capable of facilitating dialogue without imposing ideological agendas. This stands in contrast to Western approaches that often involve political conditionality or military intervention. By emphasizing neutrality, sovereignty, and non-interference, China seeks to differentiate its model of great power responsibility from that of the United States and present itself as a more acceptable partner to regional governments. China’s behavior in the Middle East demonstrates how the concept of great power responsibility functions as both a normative framework and a strategic tool. Beijing consistently portrays its actions as contributing to regional stability, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. For example, China’s diplomatic rhetoric surrounding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine emphasizes political solutions, humanitarian assistance, and respect for national sovereignty. Although China avoids direct military involvement, it leverages its economic influence and diplomatic channels to shape regional dynamics in ways that align with its long-term interests. The findings of this study, based on conceptual analysis and descriptive–analytical methodology, indicate that China’s approach to great power responsibility in the Middle East is characterized by pragmatism, restraint, and strategic opportunism. China seeks stability not out of altruism but because instability threatens its energy supply, investment environment, and regional partnerships. By respecting sovereignty and avoiding intervention, China appeals to regional governments wary of Western interference. Through development-oriented cooperation, China strengthens economic ties that gradually translate into political influence. And by promoting multilateralism, China challenges U.S. dominance while presenting itself as a constructive global actor. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has intensified efforts to expand both hard and soft power in the Middle East. Unlike Western powers that often invoke great power responsibility to justify military intervention or political pressure, China frames responsibility in terms of economic development, stability, and partnership. This alternative framing has resonated with many Middle Eastern states seeking diversification of external partnerships and greater autonomy from Western influence. China’s mediation efforts, economic diplomacy, and participation in regional forums further reinforce its image as a responsible major power committed to peaceful development. Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative represents the culmination of China’s evolving vision for global order. It emphasizes multilateralism, justice, and respect for civilizational diversity principles that challenge Western-centric models of governance. In the Middle East, these principles translate into policies aimed at reducing regional dependence on Western powers, strengthening China’s role as a key economic and diplomatic actor, and embedding the region within a multipolar global system. China’s growing influence is therefore not merely a consequence of economic expansion but a deliberate effort to reshape regional and global governance norms. In conclusion, China’s use of the concept of great power responsibility in the Middle East reflects a broader strategy to expand influence while avoiding the costs and risks associated with military intervention. By emphasizing sovereignty, development, and multilateralism, China presents itself as a benign and constructive actor, even as it pursues strategic objectives such as energy security, geopolitical balancing, and regional integration under the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach enables China to compete with the United States for influence in the Middle East while maintaining a narrative of peaceful rise and responsible leadership. Ultimately, China’s development-oriented interpretation of great power responsibility serves as both a normative justification and a practical mechanism for expanding its presence in one of the world’s most strategically significant regions.