The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract This research examines the influence of the foreign policy of the twelfth government of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Afghanistan, the special focus of the research will be on changing the approach of the twelfth government towards the Taliban and the role of Iran in the Afghan peace process. Also, Iran has tried to play a constructive role in the peace process of Afghanistan, which has also influenced the position of the Taliban. This research helps to better understand the dynamics of Iran's foreign policy in the region and the challenges facing it. The main question of the research is, what effect has the foreign policy of the 12th government of Iran had on the process of developments in Afghanistan, especially in relation to the Taliban? It seems that Iran's foreign policy in this period, while supporting the process of peace and stability in Afghanistan, has tried to maintain its national interests by adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to the developments in this country and the re-emergence of the Taliban. The research method of this research is library, analytical and descriptive, which was done by using reliable domestic and foreign sources. To compile the research, the set of regional security theories and crisis management theories have been used in a consolidated manner. The research findings show that Iran's foreign policy in this period was formed based on the principles of constructive interaction, economic diplomacy and multilateralism.

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its location in the West Asia region and proximity to Central Asia and the Caucasus, requires an optimal regionalization strategy. Consequently, this research has been conducted with the aim of providing a scientific and analytical explanation of the dimensions and key components of the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy within the context of the ongoing transition in the international system. The main research question is as follows: within the theoretical framework of Neorealism and under the specific conditions of the transition of the international system, how can Iran's regionalization strategy and its components be delineated? In response to this question, the hypothesis is formulated that the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy can be operationalized across five dimensions—political, security, economic, and socio-cultural—with specific components in each dimension. Employing an explanatory-analytical approach and utilizing library resources, policy documents, and up-to-date regional evidence, this study has identified and evaluated these dimensions and components. The results indicate that the combination and synergy of these five dimensions, while enhancing Iran's resilience and balancing power, will provide new opportunities for elevating the country's status as a pivotal actor in the emerging regional order.

Abstract This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategies and deterrent measures employed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran to preserve public order and security. The study is situated within the evolving paradigm of security studies, which has expanded from traditional state-centric military defense to encompass broader concepts of "human security" and hybrid warfare. The article posits that the IRGC has developed a unique, multi-layered model of deterrence to address Iran's complex security challenges. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic position in West Asia, faces a multifaceted array of threats, ranging from conventional military risks and cross-border terrorist groups to more nuanced challenges such as cultural infiltration, cognitive warfare, media propaganda, cyber-attacks, and economic sanctions. Theoretical Framework and Methodology The study employs a mixed-methods research approach, combining qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative phase utilized a two-round Delphi method, involving semi-structured interviews and theoretical content analysis with 14 security and defense experts from relevant state institutions. This phase identified key dimensions, components, and themes related to the IRGC's management of terrorist crimes. The quantitative phase involved a closed questionnaire, derived from the Delphi findings, which was distributed to security experts and mid-level IRGC managers. Respondents rated the importance of various factors using a four-point Likert scale. Data analysis was performed using Friedman's test and Kendall's coefficient of concordance to rank the factors and measure the level of expert consensus.

Abstract Power is a fundamental concept in International Relations, particularly in Realist theory. While Realism defines power mainly in terms of survival, security, the balance of power, and national interest, Islamic thought incorporates material, ethical, normative, and divine dimensions into its understanding of power. This study examines the extent to which the Islamic conception of power overlaps with the realist perspective and identifies the areas in which it requires refinement. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a refinement (tanqīḥ) and purification (tahdhīb) approach, the article comparatively analyzes the concept of power in Realism and Islamic thought. The analysis is based on an interpretation of Islam that views power within the framework of justice, deterrence, legitimate defense, legitimacy, and moral responsibility. The findings show that Islam recognizes the necessity of power for maintaining security, deterrence, and the survival of the political community, thus sharing common ground with some realist assumptions. However, it rejects the realist view of power as an autonomous end based on the continuous accumulation of domination. Instead, it defines power through the principles of justice, human dignity, legitimacy, moral responsibility, divine purpose, and restrictions on the use of force. Given the diversity of Islamic interpretations concerning jihad, relations with non-Muslims, and the exercise of power, the study adopts a defensive–deterrent perspective as its analytical framework. It concludes that Islamic power emerges from the interaction of material capabilities, moral legitimacy, and divine purpose, providing a refined and context-based framework for understanding power in International Relations.

Abstract This article provides a comparative study of the challenges of annulment and enforcement of arbitral awards issued by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Given the increasing importance of international arbitration in investment disputes and the pivotal role of ICID in this field, it is essential to have a proper understanding of the legal mechanisms governing the annulment and enforcement of ICID awards. This study first examines the mechanisms and legal foundations of annulment of awards in the ICID system itself, and then, with a comparative approach, examines the domestic laws of different countries, especially Iran, and the approach of arbitral tribunals in other legal systems regarding the recognition and enforcement of these awards. In this regard, key concepts such as the rules governing jurisdiction, manifest violation of procedure, and grounds for annulment of awards in ICID, as well as the conditions and obstacles to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in national systems, will be analyzed. The main goal of this research is to provide a comprehensive picture of the current situation and the challenges ahead in the annulment and implementation of the ICSID votes, and to provide solutions to facilitate the fair and effective implementation processes of these votes at the international level.

Abstract In the contemporary era of the digital economy, where emerging technologies underpin the architecture of modern financial markets, the transition from traditional trading structures to digital systems is no longer a strategic choice but an existential imperative for capital markets in developing nations. The Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX), as a transitional financial market facing a proliferation of data-driven analytical tools and electronic trading platforms, confronts a fundamental challenge: the cultivation of investor trust in digital mediums. A critical scholarly gap exists, as policymakers and market directors have historically lacked an evidence-based, explanatory framework to understand the catalysts and mechanisms of investor technology adoption. Consequently, digital development initiatives in this context have often been predicated on ad-hoc, reactive decisions rather than empirically grounded strategies. Technology adoption in such environments is not merely a technical phenomenon; it is inextricably linked to complex behavioral, organizational, and institutional dimensions. Without a systematic understanding of these intersecting factors, investments in trading hardware and software risk becoming siloed, fragmented, and ultimately ineffective. This study, therefore, aims to identify the essential components of technology adoption among investors in the ISX and to construct a comprehensive conceptual model, thereby elucidating the systemic interplay between technical, behavioral, and institutional factors in an emerging market context. From a methodological standpoint, this study is anchored in the qualitative, exploratory paradigm, employing the systematic Grounded Theory approach according to the Strauss and Corbin model. This selection is strategically justified by the framework’s robust capacity to derive theory from empirical data, free from pre-existing theoretical biases, which is particularly vital for research within transitional markets. Participants were selected via purposive sampling, evolving into theoretical sampling until the point of theoretical saturation was achieved. Data collection comprised 25 semi-structured interviews, ranging from 45 to 60 minutes in duration; after stringent quality screening to remove redundancies, 20 interviews were utilized for the final analysis. The participant profile reflects deliberate diversity: eight individual investors, four institutional investors, four ISX executives and specialists, and four fintech experts of modern financial markets, the transition from traditional trading structures to digital systems is no longer a strategic choice but an existential imperative for capital markets in developing nations. The Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX), as a transitional financial market facing a proliferation of data-driven analytical tools and electronic trading platforms, confronts a fundamental challenge: the cultivation of investor trust in digital mediums. A critical scholarly gap exists, as policymakers and market directors have historically lacked an evidence-based, explanatory framework to understand the catalysts and mechanisms of investor technology adoption. Consequently, digital development initiatives in this context have often been predicated on ad-hoc, reactive decisions rather than empirically grounded strategies. Technology adoption in such environments is not merely a technical phenomenon; it is inextricably linked to complex behavioral, organizational, and institutional dimensions. Without a systematic understanding of these intersecting factors, investments in trading hardware and software risk becoming siloed, fragmented, and ultimately ineffective. This study, therefore, aims to identify the essential components of technology adoption among investors in the ISX and to construct a comprehensive conceptual model, thereby elucidating the systemic interplay between technical, behavioral, and institutional factors in an emerging market context. From a methodological standpoint, this study is anchored in the qualitative, exploratory paradigm, employing the systematic Grounded Theory approach according to the Strauss and Corbin model. This selection is strategically justified by the framework’s robust capacity to derive theory from empirical data, free from pre-existing theoretical biases, which is particularly vital for research within transitional markets. Participants were selected via purposive sampling, evolving into theoretical sampling until the point of theoretical saturation was achieved. Data collection comprised 25 semi-structured interviews, ranging from 45 to 60 minutes in duration; after stringent quality screening to remove redundancies, 20 interviews were utilized for the final analysis. The participant profile reflects deliberate diversity: eight individual investors, four institutional investors, four ISX executives and specialists, and four fintech experts. The demographic distribution included fifteen males and five females, with academic qualifications spanning undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral degrees. Professional experience was categorized into three strata: six participants with five to ten years of experience, eight with eleven to fifteen years, and six influence; information security, the preservation of financial privacy, social and cultural norms, and the influence of seasoned market veterans can either pave or obstruct the path to adoption. Analysis clearly demonstrates that in the absence of stable IT infrastructure and a well-defined legal framework, even advanced technologies fail to realize their adoption potential. This is because, in traditional markets, investor trust is primarily constructed upon face-to-face relationships, and migrating this trust to electronic systems requires a foundation of informational transparency and regulatory accountability. Based on the derived model, guiding this phenomenon toward desirable outcomes necessitates a strategic, four-pronged intervention approach. The first axis is the enhancement of digital and financial literacy among investors through continuous, capacity-building educational initiatives. Participants underscored that unfamiliarity with fundamental financial concepts was a primary deterrent; the investor’s apprehension regarding technology stems less from the tool itself than from a lack of understanding regarding the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, education must transcend mere “how-to” usage and focus on fostering trust in technology. The second axis is market information transparency, which facilitates informed judgment through timely disclosure and clear reporting. The third axis entails the development of mobile electronic services integrated with robust technical support, ensuring that user experience evolves from a technological promise to a functional daily reality. The fourth axis involves strengthening trust in technology across the entire trading ecosystem—trust that must transcend a specific brokerage and extend to the broader digital architecture and market governance. The realization of these strategies within the paradigmatic model leads to tangible results: the expansion of online trading, increased investor participation, mitigation of trading errors, a transition from intuitive decision-making to data-driven insights, enhanced operational efficiency, market liquidity, and ultimately, the sustainable, long-term development of the Iraqi capital market. In conclusion, this research demonstrates that technology adoption in the ISX is not a monolithic, purely technical event but the resultant of a dynamic interplay between technical, human, institutional, behavioral, and structural factors. A salient theoretical contribution of these findings is that institutional trust and legal support exert a more profound influence in this market than the variables traditionally cited in standard technology acceptance models, highlighting the necessity of re-evaluating imported models within transitional market contexts. Consequently, ISX policymakers must transcend the mere procurement of technical equipment and prioritize cybersecurity, data privacy, the codification of transparent fintech regulations, the provision of continuous financial and digital literacy training, the reinforcement of server and internet infrastructure, and the promotion of a digital culture. Absent this holistic approach, substantial technical investments will remain siloed and uncoordinated, failing to generate sustained impact on investor behavior. The paradigmatic model presented in this study offers a scientifically rigorous roadmap for policymakers, stock exchange executives, brokers, and scholars in designing digital transformation strategies. Future research is encouraged to validate this model quantitatively through structural equation modeling, thereby bridging the findings of this qualitative inquiry with broader generalizability and providing precise measurement tools for target-oriented development programs in regional financial markets.

Abstract The foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey towards the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) between 2015 and 2025 has exhibited one of the most complex and dynamic behavioral patterns in the Middle East. This study aims to examine the factors influencing this foreign policy in a turbulent decade, examining the security, economic, geopolitical and domestic variables. The findings of this study, which were based on a descriptive and analytical approach and using library data and official statistics, showed that Ankara shifted from an interactive and energy-based diplomacy to an aggressive and militarized strategy during this period. The sense of danger from the expansion of the influence of Kurdish non-state actors, coupled with the power vacuum in Baghdad and structural changes in the international system, prompted Turkish leaders to create a security buffer zone by establishing an extensive network of military bases in northern Iraq and using new technologies such as drones. At the same time, the volume of bilateral trade, which reached more than $12 billion in 2024, was used as a powerful lever to exert pressure and create asymmetric interdependence. The study concluded that Turkey’s foreign policy during this decade was a pragmatic combination of hard power and economic pressure that, while meeting Ankara’s short-term security objectives, had profound consequences for the long-term stability and balance of power in the Middle East region.

Abstract The US-Israeli strategic alliance is one of the most prominent security alliances in the Middle East and has had a wide-ranging impact on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This alliance creates a multilayered threat system against Iran using military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic tools. This research, with an analytical approach and case study, based on the theory of "balance of threat", aims to analyze the dimensions of the impact of this alliance on Iran's national security. Because countries are constantly trying to identify sources of threats and opportunities to ensure their survival and continuity in the international system. In this framework, the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its geopolitical position and regional capabilities, has a central position in the regional security equations of the Middle East. And the nature of the structural differences that link it to the United States and Israel. The US-Israeli strategic alliance, especially in the post-Cold War era, has become a major variable affecting the security environment surrounding Iran. The US-Israeli alliance, one of the most prominent strategic alliances in the region, is a key factor in creating strategic balances in the Middle East that have affected the Islamic Republic of Iran and presented it with political, security, military, economic, and social challenges. This study concludes that the US-Israeli alliance not only activates hard threats, but also includes soft and hybrid threats that have forced Iran to adopt asymmetric deterrence strategies to maintain the threat balance in its regional environment

Abstract Water is an important element in the dynamics of culture and society, and its shortage poses challenges and threats to the security of individuals, society, and the political system. The dominant aspect of water geopolitics in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is the existence of an upstream-downstream situation between Turkey and downstream countries. The aim of the research is to explain Turkey's water policies in the direction of social security in Iran and Iraq. In this research, we have tried to answer the question of what effects Turkey's water policies have had on the social security of Iran and Iraq? The research hypothesis is that Turkey's water policies have posed significant challenges and threats to social security in Iran and Iraq. The findings of the research show that, in addition to the spread of socio-political conflicts between Iran and Iraq and Turkey, Turkey's water policies have led to the destruction of wetlands, fertile agricultural lands, vegetation and forest cover, desertification, air pollution, the creation and transfer of fine dust, and disruption of agricultural, industrial, and social activities, and have caused a significant number of people to migrate from Iraq to Iran and a significant number of residents of the western and southwestern regions of Iran to settle in large cities, especially Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad, Qom, Rey, Karaj, and the north of the country. These issues have led to the spread of environmental and social problems such as marginalization, theft, conflict, and changes in the demographic structure.

Abstract One of the important achievements of Afghanistan after the 1980s is the separation of powers and responsibilities of the three branches of government. The division is carried out in order to prevent the monopoly of power. According to the Afghan Constitution, the legislative body of Afghanistan was recognized as an independent body with specific powers. The Afghan parliament is basically two-chamber and bicameral; one is called the Wolesi Jirga, which has 250 representatives and is directly elected by the people, and the other is the Meshrano Jirga, which consists of 102 representatives, 34 of whom are appointed from among the representatives of the provincial councils (one representative from each province for a period of four years), another 34 from among the district councils (one representative from each province) for a period of three years, and another 34 of whom are appointed by the president for a period of five years.

Abstract The Red Sea, in contemporary geopolitical developments, is no longer merely a vital corridor for global trade or a maritime space confined to security considerations. Rather, it has evolved into a dynamic and enduring arena of competition among extra-regional powers, where maritime security, access to energy resources, and geopolitical influence are closely intertwined. This study seeks to explain the mechanisms through which the intervention of extra-regional powers contributes to the reproduction of geopolitical insecurity in the Red Sea by addressing the following central research question: How does the intervention of extra-regional powers contribute to the intensification and persistence of geopolitical insecurity in the Red Sea? The research adopts an explanatory–analytical approach and employs a qualitative research design. Data were collected through documentary and, official reports, and analytical documents. The findings indicate that the active and, at times, competing presence of extra-regional powers through military installations, economic partnerships, and maritime diplomacy has altered the region's fragile balance, affecting not only global trade routes but also local security networks and institutional structures. The study further demonstrates that the complex interactions among extra-regional actors, together with the adaptive responses of the littoral states, play a decisive role in shaping the regional security environment. . Overall, the study concludes that the reproduction of geopolitical insecurity in the Red Sea is driven less by the mere presence of extra-regional powers than by the prevailing pattern of strategic competition, the militarization of the region, and the weakness of coordination mechanisms between regional and extra-regional actors.

Abstract Tariff wars in the last decade have shown that customs tariffs are no longer just traditional instruments of trade policy, but have gradually become a tool for exerting political, economic and security pressure in international relations. This development has raised fundamental questions about the relationship between the economic sovereignty of states, obligations arising from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the effectiveness of the legal system of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The present study, with a descriptive-analytical approach and using library resources, WTO documents, dispute settlement procedures and judicial decisions, examines the legal status of tariffs, the effects of tariff wars on the rules-based order of world trade and the limits of states' reliance on the national security exception of Article XXI of GATT. The findings of the study show that the expansion of unilateral tariff measures and the broad interpretation of the national security exception have undermined fundamental principles such as non-discrimination, predictability, and legal certainty in international trade and have challenged the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. an analysis of recent US court rulings on the limits of the President’s authority to impose tariffs shows even in domestic legal systems, the tendency to limit the unilateral application of tariffs within the framework of the rule of law has been strengthened. with an emphasis on the situation in Iran, suggestions are presented for aligning tariff policy with accepted principles of international trade law and reducing vulnerability to changes in the global trading system.

Abstract Cultural diplomacy, as one of the important tools of foreign policy, plays a significant role in strengthening relations between countries and creating regional understanding and cooperation. This article aims to present a model for cultural diplomacy based on regional intercultural communication, and examines various aspects of this field. In this regard, first, key concepts related to cultural diplomacy and intercultural communication are examined, and then, using an analytical-comparative approach, the factors affecting the success of regional cultural diplomacy are identified. Next, a proposed model for cultural diplomacy based on regional intercultural communication is presented, and its main components, including cultural exchange, intercultural dialogue, educational and research cooperation, and the use of media capacities, are discussed and examined. Finally, by presenting examples of successful experiences of regional cultural diplomacy, it presents solutions for strengthening this type of diplomacy in different regions of the world and emphasizes the importance of multilateral cooperation and the use of local capacities. This model can be used as a model for developing countries to strengthen their cultural identity and increase their soft influence in the international arena.

Abstract Hamas’s military operation of 7 October 2023 against Israel fundamentally challenged Tel Aviv’s prior assumptions regarding the sufficiency of its early-warning systems, border defenses, deterrent posture, and capacity to contain the Hamas threat. This study addresses the core question of how this event has transformed Israel’s threat perception and security identity vis-à-vis Hamas, and analyzes the resulting discursive shift. Methodologically, the article employs a qualitative approach based on thematic analysis. Data were collected through purposive sampling of official and publicly available documents issued by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, the Knesset, the Israel Defense Forces, and the government between 7 October 2023 and 21 August 2026. The findings indicate that, within Israel’s official discourse, the 7 October incident was represented as a strategic rupture and a “fivefold crisis” encompassing early warning, threat assessment, defense, deterrence, and citizen protection. This perceptual crisis precipitated a redefinition of Hamas—from a “containable, fragmentary threat” to an “existential, militarized, governing actor with self-regenerative capabilities.” Consequently, Israel’s declared security objectives evolved from the “periodic management of threat” toward the “complete destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities and governmental structures,” “unyielding opposition to its organizational reconstruction,” and a “fundamental reconfiguration of the threat environment.” The article concludes that this transformation does not signify a wholesale replacement of Israel’s security doctrine, but rather its recalibration and reordering to realize “active security,” a “prevention-oriented doctrine,” and the “maximal guarantee of strategic freedom of action.”

Abstract Relations between Iran and Egypt since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 represent a key variable in the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East and can be understood through a multi-level analytical framework. This study seeks to explain the persistence of structural divergence between the two countries despite significant potential for convergence, and to assess the possibility of a gradual shift toward limited engagement in light of geopolitical developments, particularly after 2018. Using a descriptive–analytical approach, the research examines Iran–Egypt relations across three levels: domestic, regional, and extra-regional. It addresses two main questions: the factors behind continued structural divergence after 2018, and the conditions that could enable a transition toward managed interaction and limited convergence. Findings indicate that bilateral relations are characterized by “structural divergence with limited convergence capacity.” At the domestic level, ideological tensions between Iran’s revolutionary Islamism and Egypt’s security-oriented secularism sustain mutual distrust. At the regional level, competing alliance structures and geopolitical rivalries reinforce functional separation. At the extra-regional level, the strategic influence of external actors, particularly the United States, remains the most significant constraint on rapprochement. Nevertheless, evolving international conditions, reduced great-power intervention, and overlapping security and economic interests suggest the possibility of limited, managed cooperation in the long term. Overall, the future of Iran–Egypt relations depends on reducing external pressures, strengthening gradual diplomacy, and redefining shared strategic interests.

Abstract Intense international sanctions have heavily compromised Iran’s economy and national security. In response, the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally elevated the "Look East" policy as a cornerstone of its economic and political diplomacy. Employing an analytical-descriptive framework, this study evaluates this approach as a strategic adaptation to sanctions, examining its outcomes in trade and economic security alongside its structural and political challenges over the past two decades. Key strategies analyzed include deepening strategic partnerships with China and Russia (specifically the 25-year agreement), active engagement in Eastern-led regional frameworks like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and diversifying transit corridors toward Asia. Findings indicate that while this strategy has partially mitigated sanctions shocks, cultivated alternative markets, and reduced international isolation, it remains constrained. Major challenges include an asymmetrical power balance favoring Eastern partners, a potentially detrimental dependency on China's economy, reduced diplomatic flexibility from overconcentration on a single front, and limited capital and technology absorption capacity. Consequently, this study contends that while the "Look East" strategy has been a necessary response shifting Iran’s economic geopolitics, its reactive and lopsided nature prevents it from independently ensuring sustainable economic security. Long-term success demands intelligent hedging, enhanced domestic bargaining power, and structural economic reforms to prevent Iran from being relegated to the periphery of an East-centered economic order.

Abstract Economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Indonesia, despite significant potential in energy, trade, investment, the halal economy, technology, and transportation, remain well below their expected level. This study aims to identify and prioritize strategies for enhancing bilateral economic relations using a strategic management approach. The research is applied in purpose and descriptive–analytical in method. Data were collected through document analysis, library research, official statistics, expert interviews, and questionnaires. The study population consisted of 51 experts in international relations, economics, and Southeast Asian studies. Data were analyzed using SWOT analysis, the Internal Factors Analysis Summary (IFAS), the External Factors Analysis Summary (EFAS), and the Quantitative Strategic Planning Matrix (QSPM). The findings indicate that Iran’s major strengths include its strategic geopolitical position, abundant energy resources, productive capacity, and skilled human capital, while the main weaknesses are an inefficient financial and banking system, bureaucratic barriers, inflation, and dependence on oil revenues. The analysis also identifies substantial opportunities for expanding cooperation in energy and petrochemicals, bilateral trade, joint financial institutions, the halal economy, and investment in joint projects. The QSPM results demonstrate that aggressive (SO) growth strategies represent the most appropriate approach for strengthening Iran–Indonesia economic relations. The highest-priority strategies include expanding energy cooperation, establishing joint financial mechanisms, promoting non-oil exports, strengthening economic diplomacy, developing the halal economy, and increasing bilateral investment. The findings provide a practical framework for economic policymaking and commercial diplomacy and may contribute to enhancing Iran’s economic engagement with Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries.

Abstract Ethnic conflicts have been among the significant factors undermining political cohesion and impeding state-building in Afghanistan. The central question of this study is how ethnic conflicts have contributed to the weakening and eventual breakdown of Afghanistan’s political structure. The study aims to explain the relationship between ethnic structures, declining state legitimacy, and the reproduction of political instability by drawing on Joel Migdal’s theoretical framework of “Strong Societies and Weak States.” Methodologically, the research adopts a historical-analytical approach based on the examination of documentary sources, historical records, and studies addressing Afghanistan’s political and ethnic transformations. The findings indicate that the concentration of political power within a dominant ethnic group, the limited political participation of other ethnic communities, and the state’s inability to establish inclusive institutions have undermined state legitimacy and weakened its capacity to regulate social relations and distribute resources effectively. Across different historical periods, from earlier governments to the post-Taliban republic and subsequent periods of Taliban rule, the state’s limited engagement with ethnic and local social networks has contributed to intensified identity-based competition, violence, rebellion, and recurring political crises. Moreover, the instrumentalization of social and political cleavages by ethnic elites has reinforced this cycle. The study concludes that inclusive institutions, equitable ethnic participation, and effective mechanisms for power-sharing are essential for mitigating ethnic conflicts and strengthening political stability in Afghanistan.

Abstract In September 2025, during the visit of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed to Azerbaijan, the level of relations between the two countries was elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership. This event clearly demonstrates a growing trend and deepening of cooperation between the two nations, following the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in July 2025 during Ilham Aliyev's visit to the UAE. These developments have opened up new horizons for strategic partnership and interaction for both parties, reflecting an increasing convergence and continuous development of relations across various fields, including green energy, tourism, joint investments, and more. The UAE serves as a significant commercial and financial center in the Middle East, while Azerbaijan is recognized as a crucial connecting link and transportation hub between Asia and Europe. These characteristics have enhanced the appeal of relations between the two countries, providing a solid foundation for expanding cooperation. The question arises: why have these two nations chosen to pursue a path of strategic cooperation and partnership? It appears that the shared vulnerabilities of the UAE and Azerbaijan, along with their joint efforts to address and mitigate these vulnerabilities through mutual cooperation, have paved the way for the enhancement of their relations. This study adopts a qualitative approach to explore the reasons behind the close relations between the UAE and Azerbaijan, utilizing a descriptive-analytical framework within the context of Tom Lang's theory on collective power.

Abstract In recent decades Sino-Afghan relations have been based on Beijing's approach to regional and international developments. The elimination of American troops from Afghanistan and the seizure of Kabul by the Taliban changed China's approach to Afghanistan from different perspectives. The US withdrawal will change the balance of power in Afghanistan and its environs. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been based on security considerations, and now economic considerations have been added to it. China's economic project in Pakistan and Central Asia, along with fears of links between extremist groups in Afghanistan and neighboring Uighurs, is one of China's top security concerns. The Taliban's presence in power and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan have changed the pattern of relations from expected indifference to strategic partnership. Components such as environmental uncertainty and strategic compliance paved the way for China to adopt this model. In this context, the present study will examine why China's approach to Afghanistan changes from expected indifference to strategic partnership and will try to provide a clear picture of developments by mentioning China's role in Afghanistan.
Examining China-Afghanistan relations in the past decades proves that China's distance and proximity to Afghanistan depended on China's internal restrictions, regional and international developments, China's competition with other actors and dealing with extremist threats. In this regard, we can mention China's secret assistance to arm the Mujahedeen in 1980 during the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces . Therefore, the statement of relations based on the assessment of the needs of two actors has no place for Arabs here. The official relations between China and Afghanistan began in the 1950s with the recognition of China by Afghanistan. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been economic with an emphasis on security considerations. In the past decades, security considerations have always been the first priority in the eyes of the Chinese authorities towards Afghanistan, which include the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the civil war in Afghanistan, the dominance of the Taliban and finally the presence of American forces. As a great power that is consolidating its hegemony in its surrounding environment, China definitely evaluates every impulse and the presence of competing actors in the region from the perspective of its competition with that actor. The presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan in the past decades can be examined from this point of view.
In this regard, we can mention China's cooperation and lack of cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan. In the 1980s and with the attack of the Soviet forces on Afghanistan, China stood by the United States and against the Soviet Union, and after the attack of the Western coalition led by the United States on Afghanistan in September 2001, it refused military and security cooperation with these forces and distanced itself from the efforts of foreign actors presented in Afghanistan. For political reconciliation and reconstruction, Afghanistan kept as far away as possible and avoided accepting the title of the West's partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Huasheng, 2012), while the coalition forces were fighting the Taliban threatening China's strategic interests, Beijing exploration projects  began monitoring Afghanistan's underground resources, and this action faced serious criticism from the United States and even Russia .
The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has serious consequences on regional equations in South and Central Asia; Therefore, all regional actors are trying to closely monitor the developments and present multiple scenarios to minimize possible security and political costs. Any change in the arrangement of forces in Afghanistan definitely affects the current and future interests and goals of regional actors. China, as a neighboring country of Afghanistan and one of the most important players in the economic war with America, is definitely closely monitoring the developments in Afghanistan. From China's point of view, everything that provides the ground for terrorism and international extremism on the edge of its territorial borders and around its economic super project will be specially monitored. From this point of view, the developments in Afghanistan have both components.
Despite Beijing's previous approaches to the developments in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of American forces from this country has caused China to worry due to the change in the nature of threats. Since 2016, with increasing speculations about the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the creation of a security evacuation in this country, Beijing, like other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, initiated the project of securing its border lines with Afghanistan . China has detailed plans for Afghanistan without foreign military forces for several reasons: 1. Afghanistan is one of the focal points in the One Belt One Road project; 2. There are religious extremists on both sides of the border lines between Afghanistan and China, and China is worried about the connection between the Uyghurs with ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan; 3. To expand its political influence in the region, China should expand its influence to the remaining regions such as Afghanistan and advance its security and political goals through an economic lens; 4. Beijing expects American material and moral support for Chinese Muslim protesters in the west of this country, and from this point of view, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan despite the ongoing crisis in this country has aroused China's suspicion.
As mentioned, China, as one of Afghanistan's neighboring countries, has chosen a "wait and wait" approach to Afghanistan's developments in the last twenty years; But since 2016, with the withdrawal of American forces, China has changed its policy of conscious and considered indifference towards Afghanistan and put a cooperative and step-by-step approach on the agenda. Strategic partnership is a new model of relations between governments that has entered international relations literature from the beginning of the 21st century. Based on the changing pattern of China's cooperation with Afghanistan, the current research tries to present a picture of the actions of foreign actors in the neighboring environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to provide the basis for other researches in this field. Therefore, in this research, by introducing the model of strategic partnership and explaining it, it will deal with the application of two economic and political components separately on the two variables of China's attitude and actions towards Afghanistan, and finally, the conclusion section and providing strategic recommendations for Iranian policy makers.

Abstract Of the most unexpected events in the year, 2021 was the collapse of the Afghanistan government, on August 15th, 2021, and the re-emergence of the Taliban’s Islamic state (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) without facing up serious resistance from the state and society. How can one analyze the Taliban`s takeover of the country? This is the central question that guides the analytical narration in the text. The present research attempts to come up with a multi-faceted scheme to respond to the question. In this regard, the paper hypothesizes that the Taliban movement managed to retrieve its sovereignty owing to symmetry of some factors: its internal social solidarity/ coherence in the context of Afghanistan’s segmented society and failed state, and connivance in the international environment as well. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of some theoretical approaches under a combinative theoretical framework. The constituents are as follows: the concept of ‘Asabiyyah’ (social solidarity in Ibn Khalodn's sense of the word), ‘resource mobilization theory, the quadruple crisis of the regime, and the role of the international environment in revolutionary transformation.
 
According to the framework, the Taliban`s mobility to conquer the country was proceeding continually because of internal social solidarity driven by its ethnic (Pashtunism) and religious (Deobandi Salafi) foundations. It is whilst, on the contrary, there had been a segmented society and failed state due to a crisis in the process of nation-state building. Consequently, not only was there were lack of national solidarity and united orientation against the coherent ethnoreligious movement of the Taliban, but also the Taliban utilized the government’s inefficacies and miss-functions (such as juncture and corruption in the political system) to mobilize the followers and attract the potential ones among the disappointed people.
 
In terms of the process of capturing the country, the Taliban’s mobility pattern showed some formal similarities to ‘Eastern Revolutions’ (in Huntington's sense of the word); that is, launching from the periphery to the capital. Having learned from the past, the Taliban came up with a more pragmatic orientation in its second round. While showing a tendency to negotiate with internal and foreign effective agents in the political environment of Afghanistan, the Taliban aimed to represent a modified picture of the movement compared to the long-standing violent image. To sum up, the causes of the Taliban`s success in re-taking political power can be narrated as the symmetry of the strong movement and the weak nation-state; the ethnoreligious social solidarity of the Taliban, and the lack of national solidarity and efficient government.
 
Afghanistan went through difficult times in 2021. It was not yet summer when those provinces came under the pressure of the Taliban fighting forces and then dominoes fell one after another until the Taliban forces reached the gates of Kabul. Finally, in the middle of August, to the surprise of the world, the capital fell and the Taliban managed to seize power in Afghanistan for the second time and start a rapid transformation in the Afghan political system in order to revive the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. There are factors involved in the occurrence of this transformation, some of which are the responsibility of the Afghan government and the others part of the United States: 1. The announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan; 2. Weakness and a deep gap in the leadership of the Afghan government; 3. The deep gap between army and country policies; 4. Perpetuation of the corrupting incomes caused by drugs, as well as increasing the Taliban's income generation from local sources; 5. Denial of many problems in the organization, training, equipment, and leadership of Afghan forces at least from 2007 onwards by the US, NATO, and the Afghan government; 6. The low level of readiness of the Afghan army due to dependence on American forces; 7. Dependence of Afghan forces on contractors for equipment; 8. The wrong focus of America and NATO on only the terrorist and military threat of the Taliban instead of evaluating the reasons for their increasing progress, 9. Focusing only on the cities and densely populated centers and leaving the villages and suburbs; 10. Not paying attention to the strategy of the Taliban, which was preparing for a massive advance toward the north and other regions at the same time as the peace talks.
This development has been analyzed from different perspectives, such as examining the causes of the weakness of the Afghan government, the role of foreign powers, its impact on the future of Afghanistan, regional relations, and its threats and opportunities for Iran. What distinguishes the current research is the focus on analyzing why and how this political transformation occurred from the perspective of "revolutionary transformation theories". In this context, the question is raised, how to analyze the Taliban's re-gaining power? The nature and context of the recent political transformation in Afghanistan have been such that the fixation on one of the common divisions of revolutionary transformations (revolution, coup, civil war, etc.) hinders the understanding of the various dimensions and complexities of this transformation. Based on this, the current research is based on the hypothesis that the theoretical analysis of this event requires a combination of old and new theories about the logic of political transformation. In this sense, the Taliban's ethnoreligious movement, relies on the element of nervousness, in the conditions of the crisis of the nation-state in Afghanistan, i.e. a mixture of a fragmented society and a bankrupt government and symmetry with suitable international conditions, without facing serious resistance from the society, the government and successful foreign actors to restore its sovereignty in Afghanistan. The way this transformation took place was similar to the style of eastern revolutions, advancing from the periphery to conquering the capital.
The present research consists of several parts. First, in the form of a combined theoretical framework, the theoretical possibilities of old and new theories are highlighted in the direction of designing the elements of a conceptual model. In the next steps, we show the implications and examples of each of the elements of this combined theoretical framework for the analysis of the Taliban's resumption of power. In order, to the importance of nervousness in the group cohesion of the Taliban, the effect of social disintegration and the absence of the national government on the non-formation of anti-mobilization against the Taliban, and symmetry with the appropriate international conditions in the transfer of power. In the end, by freely using the style of eastern revolutions, we explain the formation of this transformation (how the Taliban advance).

Abstract The wave of Arab uprisings in 2010 reshaped the Middle East’s regional order, prompting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an emerging regional power, to adopt an active role in the Syrian crisis. Prior to 2011, the UAE maintained close ties with the Assad government, investing heavily in Syria. However, in 2012, as the crisis escalated, the UAE severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and supported opposition groups. Between 2012 and 2014, the UAE pursued an aggressive policy aimed at toppling Assad, but from 2018 onward, it shifted toward de-escalation and normalization of relations. This shift, marked by the reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus and reciprocal high-level visits, is analyzed through the lens of pragmatism. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on library and electronic sources, this article examines the reasons behind this policy shift, positing that regional and international political, economic, and security considerations were the primary drivers of this pragmatic turn. Pragmatism in international relations prioritizes policies that maximize national interests without being constrained by abstract principles. In recent years, the UAE has sought to project itself as a pragmatic, interest-driven actor, engaging with diverse regional and international players. The UAE’s foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2024 can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first period, the UAE adopted an aggressive stance aimed at overthrowing Assad, aligning with U.S. policies. Politically, it closed its embassy in Damascus and supported the “Friends of Syria” group and the Syrian National Coalition. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed called for Assad’s ouster in 2013, while Mohammed bin Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, predicted Assad’s downfall in 2014. Militarily, the UAE provided over $1 billion in funding through operations like “Timber Sycamore” and participated in the MOC operations room, supporting armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Economically, Abu Dhabi hosted conferences like the 2012 “Partnership for Investment in Syria’s Future,” backing anti-Assad businessmen. This aggressive policy was rooted in pragmatism, as the UAE sought to enhance its regional influence and emerge as a key power. Cooperation with allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. aimed to counter Iran’s influence and the Axis of Resistance. The UAE perceived Iran as a geopolitical, nationalist (Arab-Persian), and sectarian (Sunni-Shia) threat. Politically and militarily, Abu Dhabi supported Assad’s opponents to advance these objectives. The entry of Russia into the Syrian crisis in 2015 and the reduced likelihood of Assad’s ouster prompted the UAE to retreat from its confrontational stance. Abu Dhabi withdrew from the anti-ISIS coalition and refrained from condemning Russia’s actions. Anwar Gargash, noted that Moscow was targeting a common enemy (ISIS). The prolonged crisis and the failure of opposition groups increased the UAE’s costs, leading it to redirect resources to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the UAE softened its critical rhetoric and began to view Assad as part of a potential resolution to the crisis. From 2018, the UAE adopted a pragmatic approach, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Improved relations were evident through official visits, the resumption of flights, and enhanced intelligence and economic cooperation. In 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed announced UAE support for Syria’s COVID-19 response, including aid shipments. In 2021, Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus, signing agreements for solar power investments. Assad’s visits to the UAE in 2022 and 2023 marked a turning point. The UAE also played a pivotal role in Syria’s reinstatement in the Arab League, advocating for regional stability. In 2024, Hassan Ahmed Al-Shehi was appointed UAE Ambassador to Damascus. The UAE’s shift toward normalization from 2015 was driven by multiple factors. Politically, the UAE sought to shape Syria’s future and curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it viewed as a regional security threat, considering Assad a preferable alternative to jihadist groups. Security-wise, the UAE aimed to reduce Iran and Turkey’s influence in Syria through diplomacy rather than confrontation, believing closer ties with Damascus would limit rivals’ leverage. Additionally, the UAE pursued an independent stance from Saudi Arabia to assert geopolitical primacy. Economically, the UAE sought opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, capturing 14% of Syria’s foreign trade by 2021. Overall, the UAE’s relations with Syria from 2011 to 2024 underwent significant shifts. Initially, the UAE cut ties and backed Assad’s opponents aggressively. However, from 2015, due to the opposition’s failures, Russia’s intervention, and high conflict costs, the UAE pivoted toward de-escalation. The reopening of its embassy in 2018, reciprocal visits, and support for Syria’s Arab League reinstatement reflected a pragmatic approach. Following Assad’s ouster in 2024, the UAE maintained ties with the new government but remained wary of Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence. These shifts, aligned with pragmatism, underscore the UAE’s flexibility in pursuing national interests, countering rivals, and asserting a pivotal regional role. Assad’s fall, however, presented both opportunities and challenges for the UAE. While it achieved its goal of distancing Syria from Iran, the rise of Turkey and Qatar as key backers of Syria’s new leadership—aligned with the UAE’s regional rivals—poses challenges. Abu Dhabi views the dominance of ideologically driven Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant threat, potentially sparking new competition with Turkey.    

Abstract Understanding Israel's security policies from a realist point of view has almost become a fundamental principle. It seems that this regional actor has adjusted all its relations with regional countries based on the policy of zero sum, and therefore security concerns have overshadowed other aspects of the actor's policies. Accordingly, Israel's foreign policy is almost equivalent to its national security policy, and without understanding the nature of security threats and challenges, understanding Israel's foreign policy process cannot be understood and evaluated. In the long run, it seems that Israel's security problems have not changed much, and this small actor still faces the same challenges both at the peripheral and regional levels. Given that Israel views regional security relations vertically, that is exclusively state-to-state and confined to superior military power, not horizontally and strategically or multilaterally and under comprehensive security, effective deterrence remains at the core of Israel's strategic thinking.
Existing trends are likely to turn into turmoil sooner or later, forcing Israel to play a role in mitigating the challenges. From Israel's point of view, the emergence of this emerging Middle East has created a new multi-faceted and uncertain scenario in which a strategic doctrine adapted to these changing and unexpected conditions is essential for survival. Today's complex and challenging operating conditions, which have led to geostrategic changes in borders and the environment, are the result of regional developments and related events that have led to fundamental changes in the level of Israel's strategic decisions. At the core of Israel's strategic assessment is the challenge between its apparent power and success in various fields and the likelihood that this situation will continue, albeit temporarily and fragilely. This challenge stems from a number of factors that could in the future lead to the expansion of threats and conflicts with the escalation of the security dilemma, and includes Israel's approach to a series of key national security challenges.
Overall, in the view of Israeli security analysts, the window of strategic opportunity does not appear to have been sufficiently exploited, and growing threats require a rethinking of Israel's security strategy, defense policy, resource allocation, and more up-to-date strategies. These analysts suggest two possible approaches to Israel's strategy: one is a cautious and stabilizing solution, emphasizing diplomacy and controlling existing threats so that they do not become malignant. Second, it is a preventive and possibly aggressive solution to eliminate emerging threats, but it can lead to full-scale war in various fields. According to these analysts, the main prerequisite for choosing the right approach is to strengthen the foundation of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, and by emphasizing social solidarity, they seek to first heal social gaps and then restore confidence in governing institutions. In addition, the issue of Palestine continues to mean that the real problem that some actors are trying to ignore, or at least pretend to not exist, has significant implications for regional actors' relations. The issue of Palestine remains a regional issue with historical, religious and cultural dimensions, and Israel and its allies cannot ignore it. It is true that Israel's relations with some Arab countries have taken on a new form, but strong alliances with Israel are not expected to be formed before the Palestinian issue is resolved.
Analysis and strategic assessment of regional trends show that Israel does not face immediate and immediate threats at this time and in the short term. However, there are signs of internal, peripheral, and regional trends that could lead to malignancies in the future and increase the likelihood that these existential threats will become a reality. The timing of these threats, which are largely foreign sources, varies: while rocket and missile strikes can occur in the short term, other external threats, such as the formation of a regional coalition of hostile actors, the nuclearization of the Middle East, and international isolation, can occur in the interim. Long-term occur. At the same time, the internal threat of social incoherence to Israeli Jewish identity under certain conditions could also develop in the medium term. Regardless of the ideological point of view, in the end it should be emphasized that Israel is not a passive actor according to the existing assessments, but an actor that tries to change the existing threatening realities and keep the threats it faces away.

Abstract  The Middle East is one of the most important, sensitive and complex regions in the world. What makes this region stand out in all its dimensions and areas is its unique political, economic, cultural-social, geographical and geopolitical features. These conditions have somehow overshadowed the structural equations of the region under the dialectical influence of the interaction of political, economic, cultural-social and security components and power in relation to other actors in the region, so that the increase of cooperation of these governments in this interaction space, eventually led to the formation of an organization called the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 in the Persian Gulf regional system. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is one of the most important regional organizations in the regional environment of Iran, and Iran's policies have always played an important role in the orientations and goals of the council. In this regard, the members of the Council considered the developments in the Middle East, especially the establishment of a democratic and Shiite government in Iraq and the developments of the Islamic Awakening as a shift in the balance of power in favor of Iran and increasing power and influence in the regions of Iran. Movements in the regions of Iran see their lives and survival in danger.  This has caused them to use all their facilities and tools to counter the growing power of the regions of Iran. Understanding the real tensions between Iran and the Saudi-led PGCC countries along the Shiite-Sunni lines in the PGCC has been shaped most regionally and internationally. These differences also undermine Iran's efforts to improve relations with council governments in recent years. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, he has repeatedly proposed peace initiatives for Saudi-led PGCC member states. Not only has this pragmatic policy not been very successful, but Iran-Saudi Arabia relations have become much colder than before. Relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have worsened since the Barjam nuclear deal. Iran's regional expansion and the siege of Qatar, while changing the power structure in the Persian Gulf region, created more tension and insecurity in the region and increased the scope of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the UN Security Council and the announcement of "maximum pressure policy." He turned against Iran. Although several smaller Gulf states have taken a more balanced approach to their relations with Iran, the main policy of the council is by Saudi Arabia with a new configuration of Middle East policy that sees a rare tripartite convergence of interests was regulated against Iran between Saudi Arabia and Israel. and the United States under Trump. According to the actions of the Cooperation Council and foreign interventionist powers, Iran's policy towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly based on three considerations: First, it hopes to turn enemies into friends, improves Iran's isolated position, and resolves the security-geopolitical dilemma in the Persian Gulf region. Second, Tehran's goal is to develop trade relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors and promote Iran's economic development, and third, to cooperate with Iran to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf and weaken its hostility to Iran. Therefore, this article uses a method of analytical research to review the regional and international policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a historical perspective to explain the relations with the neighbors of the Cooperation Council in the post-Iran-Iraq period. The question that arises is what has been the main component and axis of Iran's policy after the Holy Defense, especially during the presidency of Mr. Rouhani towards the PGCC? . This study shows that during Mr. Rouhani's administration, improving relations with the PGCC has been the main focus of Iran's efforts to improve security in the Persian Gulf region. However, a number of structural obstacles, historical distrust, and Iran's movements in the region have severely hostile Tehran's relations with the Cooperation Council and have further increased insecurity in the region as Iran's growing influence in the Arab region coincides with its anti-hegemonic policy. This means that Iran's peace initiatives with the Cooperation Council have faced major obstacles, and Iran's success in reducing tensions and promoting peace plans with the PGCC has not been useful.

Abstract Abstract
along the years of relationships , these two countries have witnessed various kinds of engagement within political, economic and security areas. Among the most important issues between our two countries are, Hirmand River,the problem of narcotic,Taleban Terrorism and the problem of Afghan refugees as well as economic cooperation.
Utilizing the descriptive-analytic method, this article provides true answers to the question of how the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan can be proceed within the De-security framework during 2000 to 2019.
In order to test and evaluate the hypothesis of utilizing the theoretical concepts and parameters of securitization -desecuritization within the framework of Copenhagen Security School, endeavors have been taken place to understand better the relationship between two countries within the axis of dsescuritizstion.
From this perspective, in answer to the main question, it should be said that with the gradual removal of security issues from the narrow military and political sphere and the transfer of foreign policy from the political-security layers to the economic-trade layers, Iran-Afghanistan relations is at the desired levels of their agents. The country will move towards insecurity.
A look at the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan shows that these two countries are affected by each other due to their neighborhood. For example, the civil war in Afghanistan led to instability on Iran's borders and the influx of Afghan refugees into Iran.
However, there are several factors in the formulation of security policies that have hindered the development of other relations and the emergence of challenges in Iran-Afghanistan relations. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US and NATO military movements in Afghanistan, political-consensus instability, and economic instability resulting from the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, along with drug trafficking, especially in the post-Taliban period from 2000 to 2019. It has been a collection of sources threatening the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue has emerged in the formulation of Iran's political-security relations with Afghanistan. This approach has hindered the development of economic-trade relations as a first step of cooperation and coordination.
From this perspective, getting out of the narrow military circle is criticized from the point of view of those who considered security one-dimensional and in military dimensions, and comprehensive security is discussed. For this purpose, the above research seeks to study the theory of the Copenhagen school and explain relations Economic and trade and its impact on foreign policy orientation in order to destabilize relations; To answer the question of how the relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the period 2000 to 2019 are in the process of becoming insecure?
Theoretical Framework
According to Buzan, security is a sense of security (mental security), protection against danger (objective security) and freedom from doubt (trust in the personal perceptions of others) .The process of securing issues goes through four main stages: first, the security discourse, which refers to the identification and urgency of existential threats against the government; second, the legitimacy and public acceptance; third, emergency security operations to deal with threats; These actions affect the internal and external relations of governments .
According to the practical solutions of the Copenhagen School to make many phenomena and threats insecure, an efficient political system is necessary to discuss the process of generating security threats before considering the appearance of the threat.
the concept of building security is one of the most important topics in the Copenhagen School. A phenomenon becomes a security phenomenon when the actor secures the phenomenon during the process and his audience accepts it. Belief in "manifestation of threat" and "public acceptance" are the two main pillars of "security logic".
 
History of Iran-Afghanistan relations
The Islamic Republic of Iran is neighboring 15 countries, but due to historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries are different. The two countries have a common history, culture, religion and language, and in many other cases there are many commonalities and even a common enemy. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to pursue good neighborliness properly. During the years of holy defense, when Iran was facing many problems, it did not hesitate to cooperate with Afghan refugees, which shows the depth of relations between the two countries. After the victory of Jihad, Iran was aligned with the Mojahedin government and did not leave the Afghan people alone during the Taliban rule. After the fall of the Taliban, he also helped build and institutionalize the government.
Iran and Afghanistan, despite having a common political border and common cultural and religious interests, are believed to have the greatest potential for expanding political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.
Conclusion
The economic diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Afghanistan has been a common element of profit and profit and an effective and relatively sustainable lever in managing water disputes, if the two countries can define a package of mutual interests in the form of economic diplomacy, this dependence Bilateral economic, the two sides will share in the fair use of water resources. In these circumstances, when the outcome of the combination of economic diplomacy and the water issue forms a kind of win-win diplomacy and paves the way for a major deal, it is highly likely that the parties can reach a common solution to the management of the existing water dispute.

Abstract Saudi Arabia has been known as one of the most important and influential countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East for its conservative approach to foreign policy, and has often been recognized as an actor who supports the status quo and opposes change. However, its behavior over the past decade in the regional arena indicates its transition from a conservative approach to a strong tendency towards an aggressive approach. Neoclassical realism analysis is a multilevel analysis that examines unit-level factors, government and macro-factors and offers a complete and appropriate theory of foreign policy by combining internal and external factors. For this reason, the authors claim that neoclassical realism provides a more coherent and appropriate theoretical framework for understanding Saudi foreign policy. In this regard, this article seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy in the last decade can be explained from the perspective of neoclassical realism, using the analytical-explanatory method and using library sources. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the article is that due to the changing domestic, regional and international conditions of Saudi Arabia; The foreign policy behaviors of this country have shifted from a conservative state to an aggressive and security-oriented behavior, and the domestic level has played an effective role in this transformation as well as the systemic and macro level. The results of the research confirm that the presence of multiple levels of change in the behavior of Saudi foreign policy has led to the continuation of approaches resulting from change. At the micro and national levels, the role of the third generation of Saudi leaders, especially the current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has now become a major player in Saudi foreign policy has been so important in transforming Saudi foreign policy by adopting traditional domestic and foreign policies. The importance of leadership characteristics and the impact of new domestic political priorities on foreign policy behavior. In addition to the role of emerging Saudi leaders, the traditional role of ideology and neo-Wahhabism and the position of Saudi geoculture and the position of the two holy shrines in an effort to restore the leadership of the Islamic world and the role of financial revenues from increased oil sales in recent years and Saudi Arabia. As the largest producer and supplier of oil, he noted that it is very important in adopting an active Saudi foreign policy in the last decade.
At the macro level, neoclassicists emphasize the rise of relative power, the influence and maximization of security as neorealists, and the balance of interests alongside the balance of power. According to this theory, countries are always seeking to increase and expand their relative power in order to influence the peripheral environment and beyond. The purpose of influence is to change the decisions of other countries in the direction of its own interests, and this influence usually results in shaping the regional security environment in a way that is in harmony with the interests of the influential country. Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen under its Arab League, intervened effectively in the Syrian crisis to secure its interests, formed an Arab coalition to change political relations with Qatar, both at the time of severing diplomatic relations and seeking to soften relations, and finally, in an effort to permanently balance relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as its main rival and reduce its deeper influence in the region, it has always sought to maximize its power, security and interests, even at the cost of opposing or disregarding the wishes of its traditional strategically( America) to act. It seems that Saudi Arabia is trying to use the card of necessity of putting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region in its relations with other supra-regional powers, including China, which is in line with China's Middle East policy of non-interference in its geopolitical rivalries. Iran, as a strategic partner and China's commitment to balancing relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be successful. However, these efforts represent a fundamental shift in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy approach. On the other hand, it can be a proof that Saudi Arabia and Muhammad bin Salman intend to pursue their active and aggressive approach in order to ensure the maximum interests of Al-Saud and to promote Saudi leadership in the Islamic world in the future.
Overall, Saudi Arabia's evolving and active approach to foreign policy over the past decade has several key components, resulting in a combination of levels of analysis influencing foreign policy behavior: first, pursuing the maximum interests of the Saudis and promoting Saudi Arabia's undisputed leadership in the Islamic world; Second, legitimizing Saudi policies and delegitimizing the behavior and approaches of rivals and enemies; Third, the lack of adherence to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy on the priorities of the United States' own traditional allied regions and the search for other powerful global allies looking east; Fourth, weakening the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and trying to influence regional and supra-regional alliances and coalitions; And finally, maintaining and strengthening the position of the regions of Saudi Arabia and promoting it in the changing world order.