The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract In recent decades Sino-Afghan relations have been based on Beijing's approach to regional and international developments. The elimination of American troops from Afghanistan and the seizure of Kabul by the Taliban changed China's approach to Afghanistan from different perspectives. The US withdrawal will change the balance of power in Afghanistan and its environs. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been based on security considerations, and now economic considerations have been added to it. China's economic project in Pakistan and Central Asia, along with fears of links between extremist groups in Afghanistan and neighboring Uighurs, is one of China's top security concerns. The Taliban's presence in power and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan have changed the pattern of relations from expected indifference to strategic partnership. Components such as environmental uncertainty and strategic compliance paved the way for China to adopt this model. In this context, the present study will examine why China's approach to Afghanistan changes from expected indifference to strategic partnership and will try to provide a clear picture of developments by mentioning China's role in Afghanistan.
Examining China-Afghanistan relations in the past decades proves that China's distance and proximity to Afghanistan depended on China's internal restrictions, regional and international developments, China's competition with other actors and dealing with extremist threats. In this regard, we can mention China's secret assistance to arm the Mujahedeen in 1980 during the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces . Therefore, the statement of relations based on the assessment of the needs of two actors has no place for Arabs here. The official relations between China and Afghanistan began in the 1950s with the recognition of China by Afghanistan. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been economic with an emphasis on security considerations. In the past decades, security considerations have always been the first priority in the eyes of the Chinese authorities towards Afghanistan, which include the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the civil war in Afghanistan, the dominance of the Taliban and finally the presence of American forces. As a great power that is consolidating its hegemony in its surrounding environment, China definitely evaluates every impulse and the presence of competing actors in the region from the perspective of its competition with that actor. The presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan in the past decades can be examined from this point of view.
In this regard, we can mention China's cooperation and lack of cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan. In the 1980s and with the attack of the Soviet forces on Afghanistan, China stood by the United States and against the Soviet Union, and after the attack of the Western coalition led by the United States on Afghanistan in September 2001, it refused military and security cooperation with these forces and distanced itself from the efforts of foreign actors presented in Afghanistan. For political reconciliation and reconstruction, Afghanistan kept as far away as possible and avoided accepting the title of the West's partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Huasheng, 2012), while the coalition forces were fighting the Taliban threatening China's strategic interests, Beijing exploration projects  began monitoring Afghanistan's underground resources, and this action faced serious criticism from the United States and even Russia .
The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has serious consequences on regional equations in South and Central Asia; Therefore, all regional actors are trying to closely monitor the developments and present multiple scenarios to minimize possible security and political costs. Any change in the arrangement of forces in Afghanistan definitely affects the current and future interests and goals of regional actors. China, as a neighboring country of Afghanistan and one of the most important players in the economic war with America, is definitely closely monitoring the developments in Afghanistan. From China's point of view, everything that provides the ground for terrorism and international extremism on the edge of its territorial borders and around its economic super project will be specially monitored. From this point of view, the developments in Afghanistan have both components.
Despite Beijing's previous approaches to the developments in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of American forces from this country has caused China to worry due to the change in the nature of threats. Since 2016, with increasing speculations about the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the creation of a security evacuation in this country, Beijing, like other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, initiated the project of securing its border lines with Afghanistan . China has detailed plans for Afghanistan without foreign military forces for several reasons: 1. Afghanistan is one of the focal points in the One Belt One Road project; 2. There are religious extremists on both sides of the border lines between Afghanistan and China, and China is worried about the connection between the Uyghurs with ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan; 3. To expand its political influence in the region, China should expand its influence to the remaining regions such as Afghanistan and advance its security and political goals through an economic lens; 4. Beijing expects American material and moral support for Chinese Muslim protesters in the west of this country, and from this point of view, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan despite the ongoing crisis in this country has aroused China's suspicion.
As mentioned, China, as one of Afghanistan's neighboring countries, has chosen a "wait and wait" approach to Afghanistan's developments in the last twenty years; But since 2016, with the withdrawal of American forces, China has changed its policy of conscious and considered indifference towards Afghanistan and put a cooperative and step-by-step approach on the agenda. Strategic partnership is a new model of relations between governments that has entered international relations literature from the beginning of the 21st century. Based on the changing pattern of China's cooperation with Afghanistan, the current research tries to present a picture of the actions of foreign actors in the neighboring environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to provide the basis for other researches in this field. Therefore, in this research, by introducing the model of strategic partnership and explaining it, it will deal with the application of two economic and political components separately on the two variables of China's attitude and actions towards Afghanistan, and finally, the conclusion section and providing strategic recommendations for Iranian policy makers.

Abstract Of the most unexpected events in the year, 2021 was the collapse of the Afghanistan government, on August 15th, 2021, and the re-emergence of the Taliban’s Islamic state (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) without facing up serious resistance from the state and society. How can one analyze the Taliban`s takeover of the country? This is the central question that guides the analytical narration in the text. The present research attempts to come up with a multi-faceted scheme to respond to the question. In this regard, the paper hypothesizes that the Taliban movement managed to retrieve its sovereignty owing to symmetry of some factors: its internal social solidarity/ coherence in the context of Afghanistan’s segmented society and failed state, and connivance in the international environment as well. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of some theoretical approaches under a combinative theoretical framework. The constituents are as follows: the concept of ‘Asabiyyah’ (social solidarity in Ibn Khalodn's sense of the word), ‘resource mobilization theory, the quadruple crisis of the regime, and the role of the international environment in revolutionary transformation.
 
According to the framework, the Taliban`s mobility to conquer the country was proceeding continually because of internal social solidarity driven by its ethnic (Pashtunism) and religious (Deobandi Salafi) foundations. It is whilst, on the contrary, there had been a segmented society and failed state due to a crisis in the process of nation-state building. Consequently, not only was there were lack of national solidarity and united orientation against the coherent ethnoreligious movement of the Taliban, but also the Taliban utilized the government’s inefficacies and miss-functions (such as juncture and corruption in the political system) to mobilize the followers and attract the potential ones among the disappointed people.
 
In terms of the process of capturing the country, the Taliban’s mobility pattern showed some formal similarities to ‘Eastern Revolutions’ (in Huntington's sense of the word); that is, launching from the periphery to the capital. Having learned from the past, the Taliban came up with a more pragmatic orientation in its second round. While showing a tendency to negotiate with internal and foreign effective agents in the political environment of Afghanistan, the Taliban aimed to represent a modified picture of the movement compared to the long-standing violent image. To sum up, the causes of the Taliban`s success in re-taking political power can be narrated as the symmetry of the strong movement and the weak nation-state; the ethnoreligious social solidarity of the Taliban, and the lack of national solidarity and efficient government.
 
Afghanistan went through difficult times in 2021. It was not yet summer when those provinces came under the pressure of the Taliban fighting forces and then dominoes fell one after another until the Taliban forces reached the gates of Kabul. Finally, in the middle of August, to the surprise of the world, the capital fell and the Taliban managed to seize power in Afghanistan for the second time and start a rapid transformation in the Afghan political system in order to revive the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. There are factors involved in the occurrence of this transformation, some of which are the responsibility of the Afghan government and the others part of the United States: 1. The announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan; 2. Weakness and a deep gap in the leadership of the Afghan government; 3. The deep gap between army and country policies; 4. Perpetuation of the corrupting incomes caused by drugs, as well as increasing the Taliban's income generation from local sources; 5. Denial of many problems in the organization, training, equipment, and leadership of Afghan forces at least from 2007 onwards by the US, NATO, and the Afghan government; 6. The low level of readiness of the Afghan army due to dependence on American forces; 7. Dependence of Afghan forces on contractors for equipment; 8. The wrong focus of America and NATO on only the terrorist and military threat of the Taliban instead of evaluating the reasons for their increasing progress, 9. Focusing only on the cities and densely populated centers and leaving the villages and suburbs; 10. Not paying attention to the strategy of the Taliban, which was preparing for a massive advance toward the north and other regions at the same time as the peace talks.
This development has been analyzed from different perspectives, such as examining the causes of the weakness of the Afghan government, the role of foreign powers, its impact on the future of Afghanistan, regional relations, and its threats and opportunities for Iran. What distinguishes the current research is the focus on analyzing why and how this political transformation occurred from the perspective of "revolutionary transformation theories". In this context, the question is raised, how to analyze the Taliban's re-gaining power? The nature and context of the recent political transformation in Afghanistan have been such that the fixation on one of the common divisions of revolutionary transformations (revolution, coup, civil war, etc.) hinders the understanding of the various dimensions and complexities of this transformation. Based on this, the current research is based on the hypothesis that the theoretical analysis of this event requires a combination of old and new theories about the logic of political transformation. In this sense, the Taliban's ethnoreligious movement, relies on the element of nervousness, in the conditions of the crisis of the nation-state in Afghanistan, i.e. a mixture of a fragmented society and a bankrupt government and symmetry with suitable international conditions, without facing serious resistance from the society, the government and successful foreign actors to restore its sovereignty in Afghanistan. The way this transformation took place was similar to the style of eastern revolutions, advancing from the periphery to conquering the capital.
The present research consists of several parts. First, in the form of a combined theoretical framework, the theoretical possibilities of old and new theories are highlighted in the direction of designing the elements of a conceptual model. In the next steps, we show the implications and examples of each of the elements of this combined theoretical framework for the analysis of the Taliban's resumption of power. In order, to the importance of nervousness in the group cohesion of the Taliban, the effect of social disintegration and the absence of the national government on the non-formation of anti-mobilization against the Taliban, and symmetry with the appropriate international conditions in the transfer of power. In the end, by freely using the style of eastern revolutions, we explain the formation of this transformation (how the Taliban advance).

Abstract Understanding Israel's security policies from a realist point of view has almost become a fundamental principle. It seems that this regional actor has adjusted all its relations with regional countries based on the policy of zero sum, and therefore security concerns have overshadowed other aspects of the actor's policies. Accordingly, Israel's foreign policy is almost equivalent to its national security policy, and without understanding the nature of security threats and challenges, understanding Israel's foreign policy process cannot be understood and evaluated. In the long run, it seems that Israel's security problems have not changed much, and this small actor still faces the same challenges both at the peripheral and regional levels. Given that Israel views regional security relations vertically, that is exclusively state-to-state and confined to superior military power, not horizontally and strategically or multilaterally and under comprehensive security, effective deterrence remains at the core of Israel's strategic thinking.
Existing trends are likely to turn into turmoil sooner or later, forcing Israel to play a role in mitigating the challenges. From Israel's point of view, the emergence of this emerging Middle East has created a new multi-faceted and uncertain scenario in which a strategic doctrine adapted to these changing and unexpected conditions is essential for survival. Today's complex and challenging operating conditions, which have led to geostrategic changes in borders and the environment, are the result of regional developments and related events that have led to fundamental changes in the level of Israel's strategic decisions. At the core of Israel's strategic assessment is the challenge between its apparent power and success in various fields and the likelihood that this situation will continue, albeit temporarily and fragilely. This challenge stems from a number of factors that could in the future lead to the expansion of threats and conflicts with the escalation of the security dilemma, and includes Israel's approach to a series of key national security challenges.
Overall, in the view of Israeli security analysts, the window of strategic opportunity does not appear to have been sufficiently exploited, and growing threats require a rethinking of Israel's security strategy, defense policy, resource allocation, and more up-to-date strategies. These analysts suggest two possible approaches to Israel's strategy: one is a cautious and stabilizing solution, emphasizing diplomacy and controlling existing threats so that they do not become malignant. Second, it is a preventive and possibly aggressive solution to eliminate emerging threats, but it can lead to full-scale war in various fields. According to these analysts, the main prerequisite for choosing the right approach is to strengthen the foundation of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, and by emphasizing social solidarity, they seek to first heal social gaps and then restore confidence in governing institutions. In addition, the issue of Palestine continues to mean that the real problem that some actors are trying to ignore, or at least pretend to not exist, has significant implications for regional actors' relations. The issue of Palestine remains a regional issue with historical, religious and cultural dimensions, and Israel and its allies cannot ignore it. It is true that Israel's relations with some Arab countries have taken on a new form, but strong alliances with Israel are not expected to be formed before the Palestinian issue is resolved.
Analysis and strategic assessment of regional trends show that Israel does not face immediate and immediate threats at this time and in the short term. However, there are signs of internal, peripheral, and regional trends that could lead to malignancies in the future and increase the likelihood that these existential threats will become a reality. The timing of these threats, which are largely foreign sources, varies: while rocket and missile strikes can occur in the short term, other external threats, such as the formation of a regional coalition of hostile actors, the nuclearization of the Middle East, and international isolation, can occur in the interim. Long-term occur. At the same time, the internal threat of social incoherence to Israeli Jewish identity under certain conditions could also develop in the medium term. Regardless of the ideological point of view, in the end it should be emphasized that Israel is not a passive actor according to the existing assessments, but an actor that tries to change the existing threatening realities and keep the threats it faces away.

Abstract The wave of Arab uprisings in 2010 reshaped the Middle East’s regional order, prompting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an emerging regional power, to adopt an active role in the Syrian crisis. Prior to 2011, the UAE maintained close ties with the Assad government, investing heavily in Syria. However, in 2012, as the crisis escalated, the UAE severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and supported opposition groups. Between 2012 and 2014, the UAE pursued an aggressive policy aimed at toppling Assad, but from 2018 onward, it shifted toward de-escalation and normalization of relations. This shift, marked by the reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus and reciprocal high-level visits, is analyzed through the lens of pragmatism. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on library and electronic sources, this article examines the reasons behind this policy shift, positing that regional and international political, economic, and security considerations were the primary drivers of this pragmatic turn. Pragmatism in international relations prioritizes policies that maximize national interests without being constrained by abstract principles. In recent years, the UAE has sought to project itself as a pragmatic, interest-driven actor, engaging with diverse regional and international players. The UAE’s foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2024 can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first period, the UAE adopted an aggressive stance aimed at overthrowing Assad, aligning with U.S. policies. Politically, it closed its embassy in Damascus and supported the “Friends of Syria” group and the Syrian National Coalition. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed called for Assad’s ouster in 2013, while Mohammed bin Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, predicted Assad’s downfall in 2014. Militarily, the UAE provided over $1 billion in funding through operations like “Timber Sycamore” and participated in the MOC operations room, supporting armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Economically, Abu Dhabi hosted conferences like the 2012 “Partnership for Investment in Syria’s Future,” backing anti-Assad businessmen. This aggressive policy was rooted in pragmatism, as the UAE sought to enhance its regional influence and emerge as a key power. Cooperation with allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. aimed to counter Iran’s influence and the Axis of Resistance. The UAE perceived Iran as a geopolitical, nationalist (Arab-Persian), and sectarian (Sunni-Shia) threat. Politically and militarily, Abu Dhabi supported Assad’s opponents to advance these objectives. The entry of Russia into the Syrian crisis in 2015 and the reduced likelihood of Assad’s ouster prompted the UAE to retreat from its confrontational stance. Abu Dhabi withdrew from the anti-ISIS coalition and refrained from condemning Russia’s actions. Anwar Gargash, noted that Moscow was targeting a common enemy (ISIS). The prolonged crisis and the failure of opposition groups increased the UAE’s costs, leading it to redirect resources to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the UAE softened its critical rhetoric and began to view Assad as part of a potential resolution to the crisis. From 2018, the UAE adopted a pragmatic approach, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Improved relations were evident through official visits, the resumption of flights, and enhanced intelligence and economic cooperation. In 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed announced UAE support for Syria’s COVID-19 response, including aid shipments. In 2021, Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus, signing agreements for solar power investments. Assad’s visits to the UAE in 2022 and 2023 marked a turning point. The UAE also played a pivotal role in Syria’s reinstatement in the Arab League, advocating for regional stability. In 2024, Hassan Ahmed Al-Shehi was appointed UAE Ambassador to Damascus. The UAE’s shift toward normalization from 2015 was driven by multiple factors. Politically, the UAE sought to shape Syria’s future and curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it viewed as a regional security threat, considering Assad a preferable alternative to jihadist groups. Security-wise, the UAE aimed to reduce Iran and Turkey’s influence in Syria through diplomacy rather than confrontation, believing closer ties with Damascus would limit rivals’ leverage. Additionally, the UAE pursued an independent stance from Saudi Arabia to assert geopolitical primacy. Economically, the UAE sought opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, capturing 14% of Syria’s foreign trade by 2021. Overall, the UAE’s relations with Syria from 2011 to 2024 underwent significant shifts. Initially, the UAE cut ties and backed Assad’s opponents aggressively. However, from 2015, due to the opposition’s failures, Russia’s intervention, and high conflict costs, the UAE pivoted toward de-escalation. The reopening of its embassy in 2018, reciprocal visits, and support for Syria’s Arab League reinstatement reflected a pragmatic approach. Following Assad’s ouster in 2024, the UAE maintained ties with the new government but remained wary of Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence. These shifts, aligned with pragmatism, underscore the UAE’s flexibility in pursuing national interests, countering rivals, and asserting a pivotal regional role. Assad’s fall, however, presented both opportunities and challenges for the UAE. While it achieved its goal of distancing Syria from Iran, the rise of Turkey and Qatar as key backers of Syria’s new leadership—aligned with the UAE’s regional rivals—poses challenges. Abu Dhabi views the dominance of ideologically driven Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant threat, potentially sparking new competition with Turkey.    

Abstract  The Middle East is one of the most important, sensitive and complex regions in the world. What makes this region stand out in all its dimensions and areas is its unique political, economic, cultural-social, geographical and geopolitical features. These conditions have somehow overshadowed the structural equations of the region under the dialectical influence of the interaction of political, economic, cultural-social and security components and power in relation to other actors in the region, so that the increase of cooperation of these governments in this interaction space, eventually led to the formation of an organization called the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 in the Persian Gulf regional system. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is one of the most important regional organizations in the regional environment of Iran, and Iran's policies have always played an important role in the orientations and goals of the council. In this regard, the members of the Council considered the developments in the Middle East, especially the establishment of a democratic and Shiite government in Iraq and the developments of the Islamic Awakening as a shift in the balance of power in favor of Iran and increasing power and influence in the regions of Iran. Movements in the regions of Iran see their lives and survival in danger.  This has caused them to use all their facilities and tools to counter the growing power of the regions of Iran. Understanding the real tensions between Iran and the Saudi-led PGCC countries along the Shiite-Sunni lines in the PGCC has been shaped most regionally and internationally. These differences also undermine Iran's efforts to improve relations with council governments in recent years. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, he has repeatedly proposed peace initiatives for Saudi-led PGCC member states. Not only has this pragmatic policy not been very successful, but Iran-Saudi Arabia relations have become much colder than before. Relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have worsened since the Barjam nuclear deal. Iran's regional expansion and the siege of Qatar, while changing the power structure in the Persian Gulf region, created more tension and insecurity in the region and increased the scope of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the UN Security Council and the announcement of "maximum pressure policy." He turned against Iran. Although several smaller Gulf states have taken a more balanced approach to their relations with Iran, the main policy of the council is by Saudi Arabia with a new configuration of Middle East policy that sees a rare tripartite convergence of interests was regulated against Iran between Saudi Arabia and Israel. and the United States under Trump. According to the actions of the Cooperation Council and foreign interventionist powers, Iran's policy towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly based on three considerations: First, it hopes to turn enemies into friends, improves Iran's isolated position, and resolves the security-geopolitical dilemma in the Persian Gulf region. Second, Tehran's goal is to develop trade relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors and promote Iran's economic development, and third, to cooperate with Iran to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf and weaken its hostility to Iran. Therefore, this article uses a method of analytical research to review the regional and international policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a historical perspective to explain the relations with the neighbors of the Cooperation Council in the post-Iran-Iraq period. The question that arises is what has been the main component and axis of Iran's policy after the Holy Defense, especially during the presidency of Mr. Rouhani towards the PGCC? . This study shows that during Mr. Rouhani's administration, improving relations with the PGCC has been the main focus of Iran's efforts to improve security in the Persian Gulf region. However, a number of structural obstacles, historical distrust, and Iran's movements in the region have severely hostile Tehran's relations with the Cooperation Council and have further increased insecurity in the region as Iran's growing influence in the Arab region coincides with its anti-hegemonic policy. This means that Iran's peace initiatives with the Cooperation Council have faced major obstacles, and Iran's success in reducing tensions and promoting peace plans with the PGCC has not been useful.

Abstract Abstract
along the years of relationships , these two countries have witnessed various kinds of engagement within political, economic and security areas. Among the most important issues between our two countries are, Hirmand River,the problem of narcotic,Taleban Terrorism and the problem of Afghan refugees as well as economic cooperation.
Utilizing the descriptive-analytic method, this article provides true answers to the question of how the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan can be proceed within the De-security framework during 2000 to 2019.
In order to test and evaluate the hypothesis of utilizing the theoretical concepts and parameters of securitization -desecuritization within the framework of Copenhagen Security School, endeavors have been taken place to understand better the relationship between two countries within the axis of dsescuritizstion.
From this perspective, in answer to the main question, it should be said that with the gradual removal of security issues from the narrow military and political sphere and the transfer of foreign policy from the political-security layers to the economic-trade layers, Iran-Afghanistan relations is at the desired levels of their agents. The country will move towards insecurity.
A look at the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan shows that these two countries are affected by each other due to their neighborhood. For example, the civil war in Afghanistan led to instability on Iran's borders and the influx of Afghan refugees into Iran.
However, there are several factors in the formulation of security policies that have hindered the development of other relations and the emergence of challenges in Iran-Afghanistan relations. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US and NATO military movements in Afghanistan, political-consensus instability, and economic instability resulting from the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, along with drug trafficking, especially in the post-Taliban period from 2000 to 2019. It has been a collection of sources threatening the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue has emerged in the formulation of Iran's political-security relations with Afghanistan. This approach has hindered the development of economic-trade relations as a first step of cooperation and coordination.
From this perspective, getting out of the narrow military circle is criticized from the point of view of those who considered security one-dimensional and in military dimensions, and comprehensive security is discussed. For this purpose, the above research seeks to study the theory of the Copenhagen school and explain relations Economic and trade and its impact on foreign policy orientation in order to destabilize relations; To answer the question of how the relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the period 2000 to 2019 are in the process of becoming insecure?
Theoretical Framework
According to Buzan, security is a sense of security (mental security), protection against danger (objective security) and freedom from doubt (trust in the personal perceptions of others) .The process of securing issues goes through four main stages: first, the security discourse, which refers to the identification and urgency of existential threats against the government; second, the legitimacy and public acceptance; third, emergency security operations to deal with threats; These actions affect the internal and external relations of governments .
According to the practical solutions of the Copenhagen School to make many phenomena and threats insecure, an efficient political system is necessary to discuss the process of generating security threats before considering the appearance of the threat.
the concept of building security is one of the most important topics in the Copenhagen School. A phenomenon becomes a security phenomenon when the actor secures the phenomenon during the process and his audience accepts it. Belief in "manifestation of threat" and "public acceptance" are the two main pillars of "security logic".
 
History of Iran-Afghanistan relations
The Islamic Republic of Iran is neighboring 15 countries, but due to historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries are different. The two countries have a common history, culture, religion and language, and in many other cases there are many commonalities and even a common enemy. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to pursue good neighborliness properly. During the years of holy defense, when Iran was facing many problems, it did not hesitate to cooperate with Afghan refugees, which shows the depth of relations between the two countries. After the victory of Jihad, Iran was aligned with the Mojahedin government and did not leave the Afghan people alone during the Taliban rule. After the fall of the Taliban, he also helped build and institutionalize the government.
Iran and Afghanistan, despite having a common political border and common cultural and religious interests, are believed to have the greatest potential for expanding political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.
Conclusion
The economic diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Afghanistan has been a common element of profit and profit and an effective and relatively sustainable lever in managing water disputes, if the two countries can define a package of mutual interests in the form of economic diplomacy, this dependence Bilateral economic, the two sides will share in the fair use of water resources. In these circumstances, when the outcome of the combination of economic diplomacy and the water issue forms a kind of win-win diplomacy and paves the way for a major deal, it is highly likely that the parties can reach a common solution to the management of the existing water dispute.

Abstract Saudi Arabia has been known as one of the most important and influential countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East for its conservative approach to foreign policy, and has often been recognized as an actor who supports the status quo and opposes change. However, its behavior over the past decade in the regional arena indicates its transition from a conservative approach to a strong tendency towards an aggressive approach. Neoclassical realism analysis is a multilevel analysis that examines unit-level factors, government and macro-factors and offers a complete and appropriate theory of foreign policy by combining internal and external factors. For this reason, the authors claim that neoclassical realism provides a more coherent and appropriate theoretical framework for understanding Saudi foreign policy. In this regard, this article seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy in the last decade can be explained from the perspective of neoclassical realism, using the analytical-explanatory method and using library sources. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the article is that due to the changing domestic, regional and international conditions of Saudi Arabia; The foreign policy behaviors of this country have shifted from a conservative state to an aggressive and security-oriented behavior, and the domestic level has played an effective role in this transformation as well as the systemic and macro level. The results of the research confirm that the presence of multiple levels of change in the behavior of Saudi foreign policy has led to the continuation of approaches resulting from change. At the micro and national levels, the role of the third generation of Saudi leaders, especially the current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has now become a major player in Saudi foreign policy has been so important in transforming Saudi foreign policy by adopting traditional domestic and foreign policies. The importance of leadership characteristics and the impact of new domestic political priorities on foreign policy behavior. In addition to the role of emerging Saudi leaders, the traditional role of ideology and neo-Wahhabism and the position of Saudi geoculture and the position of the two holy shrines in an effort to restore the leadership of the Islamic world and the role of financial revenues from increased oil sales in recent years and Saudi Arabia. As the largest producer and supplier of oil, he noted that it is very important in adopting an active Saudi foreign policy in the last decade.
At the macro level, neoclassicists emphasize the rise of relative power, the influence and maximization of security as neorealists, and the balance of interests alongside the balance of power. According to this theory, countries are always seeking to increase and expand their relative power in order to influence the peripheral environment and beyond. The purpose of influence is to change the decisions of other countries in the direction of its own interests, and this influence usually results in shaping the regional security environment in a way that is in harmony with the interests of the influential country. Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen under its Arab League, intervened effectively in the Syrian crisis to secure its interests, formed an Arab coalition to change political relations with Qatar, both at the time of severing diplomatic relations and seeking to soften relations, and finally, in an effort to permanently balance relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as its main rival and reduce its deeper influence in the region, it has always sought to maximize its power, security and interests, even at the cost of opposing or disregarding the wishes of its traditional strategically( America) to act. It seems that Saudi Arabia is trying to use the card of necessity of putting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region in its relations with other supra-regional powers, including China, which is in line with China's Middle East policy of non-interference in its geopolitical rivalries. Iran, as a strategic partner and China's commitment to balancing relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be successful. However, these efforts represent a fundamental shift in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy approach. On the other hand, it can be a proof that Saudi Arabia and Muhammad bin Salman intend to pursue their active and aggressive approach in order to ensure the maximum interests of Al-Saud and to promote Saudi leadership in the Islamic world in the future.
Overall, Saudi Arabia's evolving and active approach to foreign policy over the past decade has several key components, resulting in a combination of levels of analysis influencing foreign policy behavior: first, pursuing the maximum interests of the Saudis and promoting Saudi Arabia's undisputed leadership in the Islamic world; Second, legitimizing Saudi policies and delegitimizing the behavior and approaches of rivals and enemies; Third, the lack of adherence to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy on the priorities of the United States' own traditional allied regions and the search for other powerful global allies looking east; Fourth, weakening the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and trying to influence regional and supra-regional alliances and coalitions; And finally, maintaining and strengthening the position of the regions of Saudi Arabia and promoting it in the changing world order.