The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Iran, relying on its geopolitical necessities and foundations—including its strategic and transit position, human and natural characteristics, and its historical centrality in the Islamic world—is considered a regional power in Southwest Asia. Given this description, global and extra-regional powers such as the United States and the Israeli regime—which are present in this region based on their self-interest—are striving either to bring Iran under their hegemony and domination, or to diminish and prevent Iran's independent behavior in Southwest Asia. Prioritizing the elimination of Iran as the leading pole of the Islamic world—which is attempting to counter their sphere of influence in regional countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—they seek to achieve their interests. A true understanding of the components, capabilities, and facilities of each country—in a word, its geopolitical foundations—on the one hand, and on the other hand, the formulation of goals, policies, and programs aimed at ensuring national security and national power, which is the same as geopolitical dignity and status, in fact serves as a guiding light for any international actor. Iran, with its geopolitical foundations influenced by its geography, has always been the focus of world countries, especially global powers, throughout history.
The political and strategic environment of the Islamic Republic is located within overlapping circles of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Southwest Asia. The unique nature of Iran after the Islamic Revolution throughout its historical periods is such that it can emerge and function as a regional power. It is obvious that for many reasons, including proximity to the Persian Gulf and centrality in the Islamic world, especially Shiism, these are among the most fundamental attachments of Iran. Iran's powerful presence on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean is the result of all the mentioned characteristics and is influenced by energy, the first revolution, and is the best evidence that Iran is at the expected level of this writing. However, the extensive presence of international powers and the clash of their interests with Iran's presence have created serious obstacles for what Iran deserves.
The United States has also been the main extra-regional actor and power influencing the security processes of West Asia, especially the Persian Gulf region, over the past four decades, and has planned and implemented various security schemes for this region. The expansion of military bases in the countries of this area and the frequent movement of American ships and submarines in the waters of the Persian Gulf are evidence of this importance. Moreover, specifically after September 11, in the US strategy, while energy issues and the Arab-Israeli conflict remained, communism gave way to terrorism. On the other hand, the Israeli regime, as a strategic partner of the United States, has shown great concern and sensitivity towards regional developments, and its political and intelligence apparatuses have precisely monitored and continue to monitor these developments. This is because the Israeli regime has faced significant and serious security constraints and challenges since its formation.
In Southwest Asia, Iran—due to its various geographical advantages, its adjacency to the world's geopolitical and geostrategic regions throughout different historical periods, its special transit position, its location within the strategic energy ellipse and other economic advantages, and especially its cultural centrality, its position as the center of Shiism, and its pivotal role in the Islamic world—can play a greater role than its national and geographical power. This role will be influential in regional politics and order, and if this role materializes and comes to fruition, it will be an important factor for enhancing Iran's position, organizing relations and the perspective of other regional countries toward Iran, and most importantly, for establishing order and progressing toward regional security in the future.
In this article, utilizing library documents and a descriptive-analytical method, we seek to answer the question of to what extent Iran's presence in Southwest Asia possesses the necessary geopolitical logic and necessity, and what are the geopolitical results and dimensions of Iran's independent behavior and presence in this region? Undoubtedly, Iran, by emphasizing its geopolitical characteristics, can play its special role in Southwest Asia.

Abstract The research article meticulously examines the function, objectives, and institutional mechanisms of systematic sexual violence and enslavement perpetrated by the terrorist organization ISIS (Islamic State) across territories under its control in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. This period, encompassing the rise, consolidation, and eventual territorial collapse of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, was marked by widespread crimes against humanity. Among these atrocities, systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, and the enslavement of women and girls—particularly from the Yazidi, Shia, and Christian communities—constituted a central pillar of ISIS's governance and military strategy. Rather than being incidental consequences of armed conflict, these practices were deliberately organized, bureaucratically regulated, and ideologically justified, making them an integral component of ISIS's state-building project and its broader strategy of domination over conquered populations.
The central problem motivating this study is the proposition that these grave sexual crimes were not opportunistic acts committed by undisciplined fighters or spontaneous manifestations of wartime violence. Instead, they represented a calculated, institutionalized, and multifunctional policy designed to advance ISIS's political, ideological, military, demographic, and economic objectives. Consequently, the primary research question asks: What strategic objectives did ISIS seek to achieve through the systematic perpetration of rape and sexual enslavement in territories under its control, and how did these practices contribute to the establishment, consolidation, and maintenance of the Caliphate's system of governance and domination?
The article advances the hypothesis that sexual violence functioned as a multidimensional strategic instrument simultaneously employed to: (1) propagate terror and intimidation among local populations; (2) engineer demographic transformation through the control of women's reproductive capacity, thereby facilitating ethnic and religious cleansing; (3) strengthen internal cohesion by providing sexual access as a material and symbolic reward for fighters; and (4) humiliate, fragment, and ultimately destroy the collective social, cultural, and religious identity of targeted minority communities, especially the Yazidis, through the systematic degradation of women. Beyond these functions, sexual slavery also generated financial resources through the commodification and trafficking of enslaved women, further embedding sexual violence within the political economy of the ISIS Caliphate. The systematic character of these crimes is demonstrated by concrete historical evidence, including the assault on Sinjar on 3 August 2014, during which approximately 6,800 Yazidi women and girls were abducted, catalogued, transported, distributed, and traded in organized slave markets operating under standardized pricing mechanisms, illustrating both the bureaucratic sophistication and economic rationality underlying ISIS's system of sexual exploitation.
The research employs an explanatory qualitative methodology based on documentary analysis and qualitative content analysis of authoritative secondary sources. The principal empirical materials consist of reports produced by the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, investigations conducted by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and a broad body of peer-reviewed academic scholarship addressing conflict-related sexual violence, genocide, terrorism, and gendered violence. To demonstrate the institutionalized nature of these crimes, the analysis examines recurring behavioral patterns, including official religious fatwas legitimizing sexual slavery, formal administrative directives issued by senior ISIS authorities, organizational regulations governing the ownership and transfer of captives, and the establishment of regulated slave markets in urban centers such as Mosul and Raqqa. Collectively, these sources reveal a high degree of organizational planning rather than isolated criminal conduct.
The theoretical framework integrates the concepts of Sexual Property, Hegemonic Masculinity, and Sexual Objectification with broader perspectives drawn from structural inequality theory, feminist security studies, genocide studies, and the political economy of armed conflict. This interdisciplinary framework enables the study to situate ISIS's sexual violence within wider historical patterns of patriarchal domination while simultaneously explaining how extremist ideology transformed pre-existing gender hierarchies into an institutionalized system of governance. The article further develops previous scholarship by demonstrating that sexual violence operated not merely as an expression of misogyny but as a strategic mechanism linking ideological control, military coercion, demographic engineering, economic extraction, and symbolic domination.
The findings demonstrate unequivocally that sexual violence occupied a central position within ISIS's overall strategy rather than representing conventional criminality or undisciplined battlefield behavior. First, it functioned as a weapon of terror and social destruction. Sexual assault deliberately targeted women as symbolic bearers of communal honor, enabling ISIS to terrorize entire populations, accelerate forced displacement, and dismantle the social cohesion of conquered communities. The destruction of family structures and communal trust significantly facilitated territorial conquest and long-term political control.
Second, sexual violence served as an instrument of genocide and demographic engineering. By exercising control over women's reproductive capacity and imposing the ideological identity of ISIS upon future generations through patrilineal descent, the organization sought to eradicate minority identities while permanently transforming the demographic composition of occupied territories. The deliberate targeting of Yazidi women, recognized internationally as constituting genocidal conduct, exemplifies the strategic relationship between sexual violence and ethnic cleansing.
Third, sexual violence reinforced hegemonic masculinity and organizational cohesion. Participation in sexual enslavement symbolized military success, masculine dominance, and ideological commitment. Access to enslaved women functioned as a powerful incentive for recruitment, rewarded battlefield participation, strengthened loyalty to commanders, and fostered solidarity among fighters. Sexual domination therefore became an important mechanism through which ISIS reproduced internal discipline and reinforced collective identity.
Finally, sexual violence became deeply embedded within the political economy of the Caliphate through the commodification of women as transferable property. Female captives were systematically registered, classified, priced, exchanged, inherited, and sold, transforming human bodies into economic assets capable of generating financial revenue while simultaneously reinforcing ideological claims regarding ownership, hierarchy, and domination. This institutionalization of sexual exploitation reflected the practical implementation of the concepts of Sexual Property and Sexual Objectification, whereby women were reduced to movable capital subject to bureaucratic administration and market exchange.
Analytically, these findings indicate that ISIS successfully integrated long-standing gender inequalities, sectarian discrimination, and extremist religious interpretations into a coherent institutional framework capable of simultaneously producing political authority, economic resources, military cohesion, demographic transformation, and ideological legitimacy. Sexual violence thus became a foundational instrument of governance rather than a peripheral consequence of armed conflict.
The research concludes that systematic sexual violence within the ISIS Caliphate constituted a deliberate and highly organized weapon of war employed to consolidate territorial control, ensure ideological reproduction, generate economic resources, reshape demographic realities, and eliminate the collective identities of targeted minority populations. These crimes were legitimized through extremist jurisprudence, administered through bureaucratic institutions, and implemented according to formal organizational procedures, demonstrating that sexual violence represented an essential component of ISIS's governance model rather than an exceptional or incidental phenomenon. The findings therefore contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between terrorism, gender-based violence, genocide, and institutionalized systems of domination, while emphasizing the necessity of recognizing systematic sexual violence as a core mechanism of political power in extremist organizations.

Abstract Introduction
By removing geographical barriers, accelerating transactions, reducing operational costs, and diversifying business models, cross-border e-commerce has become an important component of the global economy. Nevertheless, its virtual and transnational nature gives rise to complex legal and technical disputes concerning applicable law, jurisdiction, electronic contracts and signatures, digital evidence, data protection, cybersecurity, intellectual property, online payments, smart contracts, and the enforcement of obligations across different legal systems.
Traditional litigation is often unsuitable for resolving such disputes because it may involve lengthy proceedings, high costs, jurisdictional conflicts, limited technical expertise, and difficulties in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. International arbitration provides an effective alternative due to party autonomy, procedural flexibility, confidentiality, the ability to appoint arbitrators with legal and technological expertise, and the broad enforceability of arbitral awards under the 1958 New York Convention. Moreover, electronic arbitration and Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) facilitate online case registration, digital submission of documents, remote hearings, electronic communication, and the issuance of electronic awards. This study examines the role of international arbitration in resolving disputes arising from Iran’s cross-border electronic commerce and identifies the legal, institutional, and technological requirements for its effective implementation.
Methodology
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method combined with a comparative legal approach. Relevant Iranian legislation, international legal instruments, institutional arbitration rules, academic literature, and selected international experiences concerning electronic arbitration and ODR are reviewed and analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the 1958 New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the UNCITRAL instruments on electronic commerce and electronic signatures, and the practices of major international arbitration institutions. The study also evaluates international ODR experiences and digital arbitration procedures to determine their applicability to Iran’s legal and commercial environment. The analysis focuses on the compatibility of electronic arbitration with fundamental procedural principles, including party autonomy, due process, equality of the parties, confidentiality, data integrity, and the enforceability of arbitral awards.
Results
The findings demonstrate that international arbitration is generally more appropriate than national court litigation for resolving disputes arising from cross-border electronic commerce. Its flexibility allows parties to determine the applicable law, seat and language of arbitration, procedural rules, and qualifications of arbitrators. This reduces jurisdictional uncertainty and improves the predictability of digital commercial relationships. The possibility of selecting arbitrators with expertise in information technology, data protection, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and electronic contracts is particularly valuable in technologically complex disputes.
Electronic arbitration and ODR can further reduce the time and cost of proceedings by eliminating unnecessary travel, enabling remote participation, and facilitating the secure and efficient exchange of digital documents. Artificial intelligence may support document review, legal research, case management, pattern recognition, and risk assessment. Blockchain technology can also help verify the authenticity, integrity, and chronological registration of electronic evidence. However, these technologies should assist rather than replace human decision-making unless adequate legal and ethical safeguards are established.
Several obstacles may limit the effectiveness of electronic arbitration in Iran. These include uncertainty regarding the legal status and enforcement of electronically issued awards, differences among national systems concerning digital evidence and electronic signatures, ambiguity over the seat of arbitration, cybersecurity threats, inadequate data-protection standards, possible breaches of confidentiality, unequal access to digital infrastructure, and a shortage of arbitrators with combined legal and technical expertise. Algorithmic bias, lack of transparency in artificial-intelligence systems, and uncertainty regarding responsibility for technology-related errors may also undermine procedural fairness and public trust.
International experience indicates that technology alone cannot ensure successful ODR. Effective implementation requires coherent legislation, institutional support, secure technical infrastructure, reliable digital identification, robust cybersecurity protocols, transparent procedural rules, trained arbitrators and mediators, and effective mechanisms for recognizing and enforcing awards.
Conclusion
International arbitration can play a strategic role in strengthening legal certainty and commercial confidence in Iran’s cross-border electronic commerce. Its flexibility, confidentiality, specialist decision-making, and international enforceability make it well suited to disputes generated by digital transactions. Electronic arbitration and ODR can further improve access to justice, reduce costs, and accelerate dispute resolution, provided that procedural fairness and information security are adequately protected.
Iran should therefore develop specific regulations governing electronic arbitration and ODR, clarify the validity of electronic arbitration agreements and awards, strengthen the legal framework for digital evidence and data protection, and harmonize domestic rules with internationally accepted standards. Establishing modern arbitration institutions and secure ODR platforms, training technologically competent arbitrators, adopting cybersecurity and digital-identity standards, and promoting cooperation among the judiciary, universities, professional associations, and technology authorities are also necessary. These reforms could enhance Iran’s participation in global digital trade and create a more reliable environment for domestic and foreign businesses.

Abstract The phenomenon of commodity smuggling, as one of the most persistent and, at the same time, most understudied issues in the economic and social history of Iran during the Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, has consistently played a decisive role in the transformations of the southern ports of the Persian Gulf. Adopting a historical-sociological approach and drawing upon Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, the present study examines the process of formation, institutionalization, and consequences of commodity smuggling networks in the northern ports of the Persian Gulf during the first half of the twentieth century. The central problématique of this research is that smuggling in this region, contrary to prevailing perceptions that regard it merely as an economic and marginal phenomenon, is in fact the result of a triple convergence: the inefficient fiscal and customs policies of the central government, the distinctive socio-livelihood structures of the coastal communities of southern Iran, and the targeted interventions of colonial powers, particularly Britain. This triple interaction laid the groundwork for the emergence of an organized, multi-layered network of smuggling of strategic commodities—including arms, silver coinage, tea, sugar, grains, and livestock—which not only disrupted the legal flow of trade but also gradually became an inseparable component of the livelihood patterns, power structures, and socio-political relations of Iran's southern coasts.
The research methodology adopted in this study is historical-analytical, grounded in the examination of archival documents, annual reports of British political representatives in the Persian Gulf, contemporary press sources including the newspaper Habl al-Matin, and field observations of British officials such as Lorimer. These rich sources have made it possible to reconstruct in detail the operational mechanisms of smuggling, to identify the principal actors—including local merchants, tribal sheikhs, customs officials, British agents, and transregional family-commercial networks—and to delineate the multifaceted consequences of this phenomenon for the economy, security, demography, and social structure of the region. Documented evidence from major ports such as Bushehr, Bandar Lengeh, Mohammara (Khorramshahr), Bandar Abbas, Kish, and other smaller coastal settlements attests to the pervasiveness and depth of smuggling networks at all economic and administrative levels of the region.
The theoretical framework of this research is grounded in Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, which analyzes societies within the framework of the global capitalist system, characterized by an unequal division of labor among core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral regions. According to this theory, core countries, by virtue of their economic, political, and technological preponderance, determine the rules governing trade and financial exchanges, while peripheral regions are predominantly positioned as suppliers of raw materials and as consumer markets for goods manufactured in the core. Within this structure, during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, Iran—particularly in the context of its southern ports—occupied a semi-peripheral or even peripheral position, with its economic relations being largely shaped by the interests and policies of colonial powers, especially Britain. From this perspective, the smuggling networks in the southern ports of Iran cannot be interpreted merely as a local reaction to customs policies or legal restrictions; rather, these networks constituted integral components of the informal mechanisms of exchange within the global economy, which emerged against the backdrop of structural cleavages between the core and the periphery, and ultimately served to reproduce dependency and inequality.
The research findings indicate that smuggling in the Persian Gulf ports during the first half of the twentieth century exhibited considerable diversity and complexity, with each commodity domain leaving its own specific consequences. In the monetary and financial sphere, the global decline in silver prices, coupled with the large-scale smuggling of Iranian silver coinage to India, led to a significant depletion of the country's silver reserves and the devaluation of the national currency. As Lorimer's observations reveal, the prevailing currency in the southern ports of Iran was not the Iranian qiran, but rather the Indian rupee and the pound sterling—a situation that exacerbated the monetary crisis and rendered the Iranian government increasingly dependent on foreign financial markets. The newspaper Habl al-Matin also issued warnings in this regard, urging that changes be made to the state's coinage system to stem the outflow of silver. In the security domain, arms smuggling assumed far more serious dimensions. From the 1880s onward, the systematic inflow of weapons from Muscat, Kuwait, and Bahrain—often conducted with the overt or tacit support of British political agents—enabled the tribes and confederacies of the south to acquire considerable military power, effectively marginalizing the central government's supervisory authority. Reports indicate that in the year 1318 AH (1900 CE), alone in the port of Bushehr, approximately fifty thousand firearms were in the hands of the populace—a figure that attests to a profound decline in state authority and the emergence of a kind of local security order closely intertwined with the interests of foreign powers.
This phenomenon transcended a mere economic infraction, leading to a fundamental reorganization of the region's socio-economic geography. The smuggling of consumer goods such as sugar, tea, and grains—exacerbated by the incomplete implementation of trade monopoly laws, widespread administrative corruption, and collusion among customs officials—disrupted legitimate commerce and inflicted substantial losses upon local merchants. Free ports under the control of Arab sheikhs (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Trucial States) became primary entry points for smuggled commodities, while Iranian agricultural products were illicitly exported to these destinations. This bidirectional flow upset the regional trade balance, heightened the livelihood dependency of the population on informal activities, and set the stage for the large-scale migration of merchants, seafarers, and skilled laborers from Iranian ports to the southern shores of the Persian Gulf.
Consequently, historic Iranian ports such as Bandar Lengeh, Bushehr, Kish, and Bandar Abbas experienced economic recession, population decline, and infrastructural deterioration, whereas the ports and sheikhdoms of the southern littoral emerged as new hubs of commerce and transit. Institutional and political factors further intensified this trajectory: the corruption of customs agents and local governors, the regulatory weakness of the central government, and the direct intervention of Britain—which, through its support for allied sheikhs and facilitation of smuggling, circumvented Iran's formal economic mechanisms and reinforced the region's dependence on the colonial economy.
Within the framework of Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory, smuggling reflected Iran's semi-peripheral and peripheral position within the structure of the global economy. Smuggling networks were not opportunistic reactions but rather adaptive mechanisms employed by local communities in response to structural pressures—mechanisms that, while sustaining livelihoods in the short term, ultimately consolidated dependency, weakened governance institutions, and transferred economic advantages in favor of core economies in the long run. The study concludes that smuggling in the southern ports of Iran constituted a multifaceted and structural phenomenon, deeply embedded in asymmetrical power relations at the local, national, and global levels. Re-examining this historical process is of critical importance for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the state, society, and the global economy in the borderlands and coastal regions of the Islamic world. It further underscores the necessity of historical-sociological studies grounded in the world-systems approach and the utilization of local archives and multilingual sources for a more precise reconstruction of socio-economic networks in peripheral regions.

Abstract The foreign policy of every state is shaped by a complex interplay of geopolitical determinants, strategic interests, and relative advantages within both regional and international systems. The Islamic Republic of Iran, owing to its unique geopolitical position, has experienced a new phase of regional interaction since the 1979 revolution. A pivotal yet often strained aspect of this engagement has been its relationship with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despite deep-seated historical, cultural, and geographical commonalities, relations between Iran and these Arab states over the past four decades have been characterized by a notable lack of strategic depth and stability. This instability is largely attributed to divergent security perceptions, interventions by extra-regional actors, and a chronic deficiency in technical and non-political cooperation frameworks.
Concurrently, the GCC countries, despite significant investment in healthcare infrastructure, grapple with pressing health challenges, particularly a rising burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These challenges are compounded by a scarcity of specialized medical personnel and a heavy reliance on expensive and often inaccessible treatment services from outside the region. In this context, leveraging Iran's proven comparative advantages in modern technologies, specifically within the field of nuclear medicine, presents a novel opportunity for functional cooperation and the strengthening of regional ties. Nuclear medicine, which relies on the production and clinical application of radiopharmaceuticals, is a critical tool for the early diagnosis and effective treatment of debilitating diseases, most notably various forms of cancer. According to the World Health Organization, the most prevalent cancers in the Gulf region—including breast, lung, colorectal, and liver cancer—require sophisticated diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Iran, building on its substantial research and technological infrastructure, holds a prominent position in the Middle East and North Africa region and ranks 17th globally in the fields of medicine and pharmaceuticals. This standing, combined with its indigenous production capabilities and expertise in radiopharmaceuticals, creates an unparalleled opportunity for technological collaboration with its neighbors. Given the global supply constraints for certain radiopharmaceuticals, their short half-lives necessitating immediate use, and significant cost implications, the development of nuclear medicine tourism emerges as a practical solution for patients with specific ailments.
The central research question of this study is: How can nuclear medicine, as a technological and therapeutic capability, serve as a catalyst for convergence between Iran and the GCC member states? To address this question, the present study utilizes David Mitrany's theory of functionalism as its analytical framework. It examines three key variables: the shared need for advanced healthcare (the independent variable), Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities (the intervening variable), and the consequent strengthening of regional cooperation and convergence (the dependent variable). The primary objective of this research is to elucidate the role of Iran's nuclear medicine capacities in promoting regional collaboration, focusing on technical, therapeutic, and infrastructural indicators. This core objective is supported by secondary goals: identifying healthcare needs of GCC states regarding NCDs; investigating Iran's prowess in producing and transferring nuclear medicine technologies; analyzing the feasibility of scientific cooperation and medical tourism based on the functionalist model; and evaluating the long-term impact of such collaborations on deepening political and economic relations.
Methodologically, the research employs a qualitative content analysis approach. Data were sourced from a rigorous examination of scientific documents, international reports, specialized nuclear medicine data, and semi-structured interviews with Iranian officials and experts in this domain. The collected data were meticulously analyzed through the lens of Mitrany's functionalist theory to explicate the relationship between shared needs, technological performance, and the potential for cooperation to expand to broader regional levels.
A systematic review of existing literature reveals a significant gap. Prior research on Iran-GCC relations has predominantly concentrated on security dimensions, geopolitical rivalries, and energy matters, largely neglecting the potential of non-political technical-functional partnerships. The review identifies two distinct and disconnected bodies of work: one focused on the technical and medical aspects of nuclear medicine, examining Iran's capabilities and the region's needs in isolation; and another centered on political-security analyses, often making cooperation contingent on resolving security dilemmas and overlooking the central role of non-political technologies. No comprehensive study has employed Mitrany's functionalist framework to specifically analyze how peaceful nuclear cooperation, particularly in medicine, could bridge the gap between these technical and political spheres.
The theoretical underpinning is Mitrany's classic functionalist theory (1943). In A Working Peace System, Mitrany posits that technical cooperation in apolitical fields—such as health—can, by fostering a "habit of cooperation," build trust and gradually create a "spill-over" effect, paving the way for collaboration in more sensitive political matters. Iran's advancements in nuclear medicine are substantial and internationally recognized. With 155 nuclear medicine centers and 200 gamma cameras, it ranks second in the region after Turkey in infrastructure. Iran is also one of the region's leading producers of radiopharmaceuticals, manufacturing 60 radiopharmaceuticals with 20 more in clinical trials. This progress, achieved despite significant international sanctions, underscores the nation's technological resilience. Advantages include specialized personnel trained over six decades, advanced imaging technologies like PET and SPECT, and cost-effective production of diagnostic and therapeutic radioisotopes, directly improving patient outcomes through early detection, diagnostic precision, and effective treatment.
Conversely, despite ambitious national programs for nuclear power, GCC states face significant lag in human resources and infrastructure necessary for advanced nuclear medicine. Data from the International Agency for Research on Cancer reveals a growing cancer burden, with Saudi Arabia accounting for nearly 75% of approximately 254,000 cases recorded in the Arab Gulf states over the past two decades. This escalating health crisis, characterized by high costs and reliance on foreign healthcare, creates a pressing common need—a cornerstone of Mitrany's theory.
Applying the functionalist framework, this study identifies several convergent components. First is the common need: the universal imperative to ensure public health and combat the shared threat of NCDs. Second is functional performance: the practical, problem-solving approach of addressing health needs through specific, non-political mechanisms like medical treatment and technology transfer. Third is the spill-over effect: the probability that successful technical cooperation will create precedents and institutional linkages, which can extend to other areas of economic and scientific interaction. Fourth is technical self-determination: the principle that functional organizations can be structured flexibly to meet immediate needs without imposing overarching political systems. Finally, voluntary cooperation is central: all states can participate based on self-perceived benefit, as all stand to gain from improved public health without compromising sovereignty.
In conclusion, this research demonstrates that Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities represent not merely a technical asset but a potent and untapped strategic instrument for fostering regional convergence. By framing this collaboration through a functionalist lens, the study provides a novel model for scientific diplomacy. It argues that by focusing on shared health imperatives, Iran and its Arab neighbors can bypass deep-seated political rivalries to build trust and interdependence. The findings strongly suggest that medical nuclear cooperation is a feasible, cost-effective, and politically viable mechanism to improve health indicators and lay the groundwork for deeper and more stable political and economic relationships in the Persian Gulf region. This approach fills a critical void between technical and security-focused studies and offers a pragmatic pathway to transform a point of contention into a platform for shared prosperity and peace.

Abstract Introduction :The West Asia region, referred to in geopolitical literature as both the cradle of ancient civilizations and the epicenter of contemporary crises, has consistently played a pivotal role in global security and economic equations. Owing to its possession of the world's largest proven oil and gas reserves, its location at the crossroads of three continents, and its numerous flashpoints of tension, West Asia has historically been the primary arena for great-power rivalries. For the past seven decades, the United States — relying on an extensive network of military bases, a formidable naval fleet, and a web of security treaties with key regional states — had managed to establish an unparalleled hegemony over this region. However, the rise of the People's Republic of China as an emerging economic and political power on the international stage has fundamentally challenged this long-standing structure.
The central research question this study seeks to answer is: "How has China's multidimensional influence in the West Asia region during the 2021–2025 period affected the strategies, priorities, and practical actions of the United States in this region?" In response, the core hypothesis posits that, unlike the traditional U.S. approach based on military interventions, direct force presence, and unilateral security ordering, China — by leveraging economic soft power, multilateral diplomacy, and massive infrastructure investments — has succeeded in constraining Washington's strategic space in the region, compelling it to undertake a profound reassessment of its policies. The significance and necessity of this research lie in its precise depiction of emerging trends in West Asia's regional order, its provision of an analytical framework for better understanding international system dynamics in the era of power transition, and its assistance to policymakers and regional studies scholars in more accurately assessing plausible future scenarios.

Theoretical Framework :To analyze the escalating rivalry between these two major powers in West Asia, this study employs Offensive Realism as its primary theoretical framework. This theory, systematically articulated by John Mearsheimer in his seminal work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, rests on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic, lacking any overarching sovereign authority to resolve disputes; (2) great powers inherently possess offensive military capabilities that can be used to threaten others; (3) states can never be certain of others' intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of states; and (5) states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative power. Within this framework, China's emergence and its steadily growing economic, technological, and military capabilities are interpreted as a serious threat to U.S. regional and global hegemony. Moreover, China's pragmatic and non-confrontational approach — built on the principle of "win-win cooperation" and avoidance of direct military engagement — has created favorable conditions for its penetration into domains previously regarded as America's exclusive sphere of influence.Conceptually, key notions such as "Balance of Power," "Hegemony," "Economic Diplomacy," "Complex Interdependence," and "Great Strategic Rivalry" are employed in this research. Furthermore, to more accurately explain China's behavior, the concept of "Smart Power" — combining hard and soft power — has been utilized. By successfully integrating economic investments (economic hard power), provision of regional public goods (soft power), and maintaining neutrality in regional states' internal conflicts (diplomatic smart power), China has demonstrated a novel model of influence that has been insufficiently addressed in earlier theoretical literature.

Research Methodology: This study is designed and conducted using a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method. Data collection is based on content analysis of authoritative scientific documents, strategic reports from reputable international institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Crisis Group (ICG), annual U.S. Department of Defense reports on China's military power, and official statements by senior officials from both countries and regional states. The study's timeframe is deliberately limited to the years 2021–2025 to enable precise examination of current developments and the short-to-medium-term effects of China's active presence in the region. To ensure validity and reliability, the triangulation method has been employed, whereby data are collected and cross-referenced from multiple sources and through various approaches. The coding and content analysis process has been conducted systematically using thematic categorization. In this context, five dimensions of China's influence in West Asia have been identified and subjected to in-depth analysis: (1) economic dimension (trade, investment, and energy); (2) political-diplomatic dimension (bilateral and multilateral relations and mediation); (3) technological-infrastructural dimension (construction projects, communication networks, and technology transfer); (4) security-military dimension (training cooperation, arms sales, and joint exercises); and (5) cultural-public dimension (public diplomacy and academic exchanges). Correspondingly, U.S. responses in each of these domains have been categorized and explained separately.

Research Findings:The research findings indicate that during 2021–2025, China, through the adoption of a smart, multi-layered, and forward-looking strategy, has established a steadily growing and sustainable presence in West Asia that extends far beyond mere economic relations. In the economic dimension: In addition to securing a stable flow of oil and gas from major producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, China has undertaken large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure projects, including the construction and management of modern ports (such as Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar and Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi), development of high-speed rail networks, establishment of special economic zones and industrial parks, and expansion of advanced communication networks and the Internet of Things. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — as the largest infrastructure investment project in human history — has played a central role in linking the economic interests of regional countries with China's economy and creating transregional value chains. By 2023, China's trade volume with Gulf Cooperation Council countries exceeded $300 billion, more than double the trade volume of these countries with the United States in the same year. In the political and diplomatic dimension: By adopting a policy of "active neutrality" in regional conflicts and strengthening strategic bilateral relations with key regional actors — including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt — China has succeeded in presenting itself as a cross-factional, trustworthy, and independent player free from the region's identity-based and religious disputes. The most significant event in this domain was Beijing's historic mediation in the normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, which, through the signing of a tripartite statement in Beijing, created a dramatic shift in the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf and West Asia. This move demonstrated China's emerging capacity for engagement in complex security conflicts and signified the decline of the traditional U.S. role as the region's sole hegemonic mediator.


Discussion and Analysis of Results: The results derived from the findings clearly demonstrate that China's growing multidimensional influence in West Asia has unprecedentedly challenged the United States' long-standing hegemony. This challenge is not only manifest in the economic sphere — reducing America's share of regional energy markets and infrastructure projects — but is equally pronounced in strategic and diplomatic domains. On the one hand, Washington — which in recent decades, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, had adopted the "Pivot to Asia" or "Rebalancing toward East Asia" strategy centered on containing China — now confronts a new and paradoxical reality: China has not only emerged as a dominant power in its traditional sphere of influence in East Asia, but has also established new and extensive bases of influence in the heart of America's vital sphere, i.e., West Asia. This situation places the White House in a strategic dilemma: any withdrawal or reduction of presence from the region will be interpreted as ceding strategic space to the rival, while any direct military confrontation or engagement could incur enormous financial, human, and diplomatic costs. In response to this existential challenge, the United States has undertaken a series of diverse measures, including: (1) significantly increasing military and economic aid to its long-standing regional allies, particularly Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain; (2) attempting to revive regional security pacts, such as the creation of a joint naval fleet under the "Combined Forces" banner in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; (3) intensive diplomacy to normalize Israel's relations with Arab states through the Abraham Accords; (4) intensifying economic and technological sanctions against Chinese companies and institutions active in the region; and (5) striving to design and present alternative projects to the Belt and Road Initiative, such as the "Build Back Better World" (B3W) scheme and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). However, evidence suggests that purely confrontational and security-oriented strategies no longer possess their former efficacy, and the U.S. is gradually compelled to accept the reality of the multipolarization of the regional order and China's effective role alongside other powers.

Conclusion:Based on the comprehensive analyses conducted in this study, the escalating rivalry between China and the United States in West Asia is not a temporary or fleeting phenomenon but rather a tangible reflection of profound and fundamental changes in the global balance of power and the transition from a unipolar order to a multipolar-multi-actor one. China, skillfully utilizing economic tools, long-term infrastructure investments, non-confrontational diplomacy, and a win-win cooperation approach, is redefining its role from a marginal actor and mere energy supplier to an effective, influential, and even decisive player in West Asia's security and political equations. In contrast, the United States — accustomed for decades to exclusive, unilateral, and coercive role-playing in this region — now faces an unprecedented historical scenario that demands fundamental adjustments to its traditional strategies, reduced reliance on military interventions, and adaptation to the new regional and global order.

Abstract The Palestinian Question has remained one of the most protracted and contentious international conflicts since the early twentieth century. Beyond its territorial dimension, it encompasses issues of international law, human rights, statehood, diplomacy, regional security, and great-power competition. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a country with deep historical, political, and strategic ties to the Middle East, France has consistently sought to position itself as an influential diplomatic actor in the management of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. French governments have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to international law, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel within the framework of the two-state solution. Nevertheless, despite this normative discourse, numerous observers have argued that French foreign policy demonstrates a persistent inconsistency between official declarations and practical implementation. France simultaneously condemns Israeli settlement expansion, supports Palestinian self-determination, and advocates international humanitarian law while maintaining extensive diplomatic, military, technological, and economic cooperation with Israel. These contradictions have generated significant academic debate regarding the real motivations underlying French policy toward Palestine. Objective This study aims to examine France's approach to the Palestinian Question by analyzing the consistency between its diplomatic discourse and foreign policy practices. Specifically, the research evaluates French policy through three principal dimensions: human rights, the two-state solution, and Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories. The study seeks to answer the following research question: What approach has France adopted toward the Palestinian Question, and to what extent are its declared principles reflected in its practical foreign policy? The principal hypothesis argues that although French diplomacy officially promotes a balanced position between supporting Palestinian statehood and guaranteeing Israel's security, its practical policies reveal a considerable divergence between rhetoric and action. This divergence largely reflects France's strategic interests rather than its declared normative commitments. Theoretical Framework The study employs Classical Realism as its analytical framework. Classical Realism views states as rational actors operating within an anarchic international system where national interests, security, power, and survival constitute the primary objectives of foreign policy. Ethical principles and international norms are regarded as secondary considerations whenever they conflict with strategic interests. Within this framework, France's behavior toward Palestine is interpreted as a rational balancing strategy designed to maximize national interests while preserving diplomatic flexibility. French policy seeks simultaneously to maintain strategic relations with Israel, preserve historical influence in the Arab world, strengthen France's international diplomatic status, and reinforce its role as an independent European power. Consequently, the apparent contradiction between official discourse and practical policy is understood not as policy inconsistency but as the predictable outcome of realist calculations. Methodology The research adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology based on documentary and library research. Primary and secondary sources include scholarly books, peer-reviewed journal articles, official publications of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, reports issued by the French Senate and National Assembly, European Union documents, international legal instruments, and recent academic literature in both English and French. Data were analyzed through qualitative content analysis, enabling the identification of recurring patterns in French diplomatic discourse and comparison with practical policy implementation across different historical periods and policy domains. Findings The findings indicate that French policy toward Palestine has evolved significantly over the past seven decades while preserving an underlying strategic continuity. During the 1950s and early 1960s, France maintained exceptionally close military and strategic cooperation with Israel, largely driven by regional security concerns, the Suez Crisis, and the Algerian War. Following the rise of Arab nationalism and the increasing geopolitical importance of Arab energy resources, French foreign policy gradually shifted toward a more balanced diplomatic position under President Charles de Gaulle. Since then, France has consistently advocated a negotiated political settlement based upon the establishment of two independent states. However, closer examination demonstrates that French diplomacy frequently prioritizes strategic considerations over normative commitments. Regarding human rights, France regularly condemns civilian casualties, humanitarian crises, violations of international humanitarian law, and deteriorating living conditions within the occupied Palestinian territories. French diplomatic institutions actively support humanitarian assistance and repeatedly emphasize the protection of civilians and respect for international law. Nevertheless, these declarations have rarely been accompanied by concrete political or economic measures capable of influencing Israeli policy. Military cooperation, technological partnerships, intelligence exchanges, and commercial relations with Israel have continued despite repeated criticism of Israeli actions. The study further demonstrates that France's support for the two-state solution represents one of the clearest examples of the gap between rhetoric and practice. While successive French governments have repeatedly described the two-state framework as the only viable solution to the conflict, France historically refrained from formally recognizing the State of Palestine despite acknowledging the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. According to the analysis presented in this article, recent French announcements concerning possible recognition of Palestine should be interpreted primarily as diplomatic instruments intended to preserve French influence within a changing regional geopolitical environment rather than as evidence of a fundamental transformation in French foreign policy. The analysis of Israeli settlement activities reveals a similar pattern. France consistently considers settlements established in territories occupied since 1967 to be illegal under international law and has supported several European Union initiatives designed to distinguish Israel proper from settlements in the occupied territories. However, implementation has remained limited, and bilateral agreements between France and Israel generally lack sufficiently explicit territorial restrictions. Consequently, practical cooperation frequently continues without fully enforcing the legal distinction officially advocated by French diplomacy. Discussion The evidence presented throughout this study demonstrates that French foreign policy cannot be adequately understood solely through normative approaches emphasizing human rights or international law. Instead, Classical Realism provides a more convincing explanation by highlighting the central role of national interests and strategic calculations. France continuously attempts to reconcile several competing objectives: maintaining close relations with Israel, preserving political influence throughout the Arab world, protecting economic and security interests, reinforcing European diplomatic leadership, and projecting itself as an independent international mediator distinct from United States policy. This multidimensional balancing strategy inevitably generates contradictions between discourse and practice. Rather than representing isolated inconsistencies, these contradictions constitute structural features of French foreign policy. Human rights advocacy, support for Palestinian statehood, criticism of settlement expansion, and commitment to international law coexist with pragmatic diplomatic restraint whenever stronger measures might jeopardize broader strategic interests. The article further argues that recent regional transformations—including shifting Arab alliances, increasing American influence, evolving security dynamics, and changing geopolitical competition—have reinforced France's pragmatic approach. Conclusion This study concludes that France's approach to the Palestinian Question is best characterized as pragmatic classical realism rather than principled normative diplomacy The persistent discrepancy between official rhetoric and practical behavior is particularly visible in France's responses to human rights violations, recognition of Palestinian statehood, and Israeli settlement expansion. French diplomacy therefore illustrates how middle powers frequently employ normative discourse to reinforce international legitimacy while simultaneously pursuing strategic objectives through cautious and interest-based foreign policy. Ultimately, France's policy toward Palestine reflects an enduring effort to preserve diplomatic influence, maintain regional balance, and maximize national interests within an increasingly complex international system. As long as these strategic considerations remain unchanged, the gap between French discourse and practice is likely to continue shaping its approach to one of the world's longest-standing international conflicts.

Abstract Diplomatic missions in contemporary international relations serve functions far beyond formal ceremonial duties, consular assistance, and official state-to-state communication. Historically, embassies have frequently operated as pivotal nodes for clandestine intelligence gathering, covert political operations, network building among political and societal elites, and structural influence operations designed to advance the strategic national interests of the sending state. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the bilateral relationship between Tehran and Washington underwent an unprecedented paradigm shift. Iran transitioned almost overnight from a principal strategic partner and sub-regional pillar of American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf under the Pahlavi monarchy into an ideological, discursive, and geopolitical challenger opposing U.S. hegemony.
Losing a crucial geopolitical asset prompted Washington to deploy a multifaceted array of diplomatic, economic, military, and covert instruments to manage, destabilize, or re-orient the trajectory of the nascent Islamic Republic. Central to these clandestine efforts was the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Following the November 4, 1979, takeover of the embassy by Iranian university students ("Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line")—an event later termed the "Second Revolution"—thousands of classified, secret, and top-secret intelligence cables, diplomatic correspondence, personality profiles, and operational memoranda were uncovered and meticulously reconstructed. Despite the historical, empirical, and theoretical significance of these primary source documents (commonly referred to as the "Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den"), existing academic literature has predominantly treated them in fragmented ways, focusing selectively on isolated dimensions such as cultural diplomacy, educational initiatives, or specific political events. Consequently, there remains a prominent theoretical and empirical gap regarding a comprehensive, systematic model that synthesizes the overarching structural pattern of post-revolutionary American infiltration in Iran. To address this gap, this study formulates and addresses the core research question: What was the structural pattern of U.S. infiltration in post-revolutionary Iran based on the primary documents retrieved from the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran?
Methodology:This research adopts a qualitative methodological framework utilizing inductive qualitative content analysis. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, which focuses primarily on word frequencies and statistical metrics, qualitative content analysis emphasizes extracting overt and latent thematic structures, contextual meanings, and operational patterns embedded within textual data. The inductive approach was deliberately selected because it allows conceptual categories and analytical models to emerge directly from the raw primary data without imposing a pre-determined, rigid theoretical matrix that might constrain or distort empirical findings.
The empirical data source comprises the complete corpus of diplomatic cables, intelligence reports, inter-agency communications, and operational records published across multiple volumes by the Center for Publication of the Islamic Revolution Documents, the Institute for Political Studies and Research, and the comprehensive digital repository of the Espionage Den documents (usdoc.ir). The analytical procedure followed a rigorous three-phase protocol:
Preparation Phase: Formulating research objectives, defining analytical units (paragraphs, operational directives, and thematic entries), and selecting all relevant post-revolutionary documents.
Organization Phase: Executing open coding, extracting key textual units, assigning conceptual tags/labels, and iteratively grouping lower-order concepts into coherent sub-categories and main categories.
Reporting Phase: Synthesizing the emerging thematic categories into an integrated structural model and deriving qualitative inferences.
To ensure analytical rigor and validity, the coding process underwent peer debriefing and cross-coder verification, ensuring that extracted concepts directly corresponded to the primary archival materials.
Results and Findings: The inductive content analysis reveals that the pattern of U.S. infiltration in post-revolutionary Iran operates as a multi-layered, interconnected structural matrix structured around three primary pillars: Goals of Infiltration, Targets (Audience) of Infiltration, and Dimensions (Mechanisms) of Infiltration.
A. Goals of Infiltration
The primary documents indicate that U.S. strategic objectives evolved dynamically in response to on-the-ground political realities in post-revolutionary Iran:
Regime Overthrow: In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, intelligence documents reveal active attempts to establish communication channels with elements of the former Pahlavi regime and exile figures (such as Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of the monarchy) to finance, guide, or facilitate counter-revolutionary movements aimed at overthrowing the new political order.
Behavioral Modification and Normalization: As U.S. analysts acknowledged the resilience of the revolutionary state and the impossibility of immediate regime change, the objective shifted toward behavioral modification. Washington sought to infiltrate and cultivate moderate religious, political, and military factions to influence decision-making processes, neutralize radical anti-American orientations, and promote a pragmatic, pro-Western administration before the new constitution and state structures could fully consolidate.
Geopolitical Power Balance against the Soviet Union: Driven by Cold War imperatives, U.S. policy aimed to prevent Soviet encroachment into Iran. U.S. strategists calculated that even if post-revolutionary Iran ceased to be an active American ally, preventing Soviet strategic insertion into Iran's political and economic space remained a vital national security objective.
B. Targets (Audience) of Infiltration
The empirical findings classify the targets of U.S. infiltration into four distinct categories:
State Actors and Political Elites: U.S. intelligence targeted key figures within the provisional government and emerging state apparatus. Documents detail deliberate, step-by-step recruitment operations—such as contacting Abolhassan Banisadr in Paris under the guise of an economic consultancy firm with a monthly retainer fee, as well as maintaining direct channels with figures like Abbas Amir-Entezam. Intelligence assets were also embedded among remaining Western-leaning administrative managers. Furthermore, documents highlight clandestine contacts with prominent opposition clerical figures, notably Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari.
Formal Political Structures and State Institutions: Interventions focused on gaining structural access to critical state organs through the Provisional Government and targeting strategic media facilities, such as acquiring granular technical data on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) transmitters, power generators, and broadcast infrastructure.
Political Parties and Factions: U.S. operatives maintained dual-track communications, engaging both official ruling factions and opposition political organizations—including monarchist elements and leftist groups—to create leverage and destabilize the government.
General Public and Mass Consciousness: Efforts focused on shaping public perception through psychological operations and international broadcasting networks, particularly the Voice of America (VOA), which was strategically leveraged as an authoritative news source and morale booster for opposition groups.
C. Dimensions of Infiltration
The operational mechanisms of infiltration were deployed across two main domains:
Soft (Software) Infiltration: Emphasized cultural, educational, and linguistic instruments. Priority was given to expanding English language instruction—characterized in intelligence documents as a key soft-power weapon—fostering academic exchanges through the Ministry of Science to recruit Iranian youths, arranging international exchange programs for Muslim students and clerics to reframe religious narratives, and conducting targeted psychological warfare via VOA broadcasts.
Hard (Hardware) Infiltration: Leveraged military, intelligence, and economic pressure points. On the military front, U.S. strategy focused on maintaining intelligence exchanges, cultivating relationships with senior military officers reliant on American technical expertise and spare parts, and offering selective arms sales. Economically, U.S. officials exploited Iran's post-revolutionary economic disruptions, banking instabilities, and trade vulnerabilities, while encouraging American businessmen to maintain financial dependencies with pro-Western Iranian capitalists for political leverage.
Conclusion:The systematic analysis of the former U.S. Embassy documents demonstrates that post-revolutionary American infiltration in Iran was neither an ad-hoc set of isolated diplomatic encounters nor merely standard intelligence gathering. Rather, it constituted a highly organized, institutionalized, and multi-dimensional operational framework designed to preserve American hegemony in the strategically vital Persian Gulf. By operating across hard and soft dimensions and targeting elite actors, formal institutions, opposition parties, and public perception, the U.S. sought either to dismantle the revolutionary state or forcibly adjust its strategic orientation to align with Western interests.
These empirical findings provide critical historical insights into the mechanics of foreign intervention during political transitions. Furthermore, the framework developed in this study offers valuable policy and analytical lessons for sovereign nations hosting foreign diplomatic missions, highlighting how legitimate diplomatic infrastructure can be weaponized for strategic infiltration and political engineering.

Abstract The central research question of this study is: How does Xi Jinping’s operational code shape China’s foreign policy orientation, particularly toward the Islamic Republic of Iran? The article advanced the hypothesis that Xi Jinping’s operational code is neither aimed at overthrowing the liberal international order nor based on direct ideological confrontation with the United States. Rather, it reflects a gradual and pragmatic effort to expand China’s power, influence, and strategic autonomy within the existing international system through the selective use of international institutions, rules, and mechanisms. This approach enables China to compete with the United States while avoiding costly, full-scale confrontation and to calibrate its relations with countries such as Iran primarily on the basis of national interests and cost–benefit calculations. The findings of the study support this hypothesis. They indicate that Xi Jinping perceives the political environment as predominantly cooperative and consistently attributes cooperative intentions to other actors. At the same time, he believes that a profound historical transformation is underway in international relations and that China is capable of playing an active role in shaping this transformation. However, his score on this dimension is relatively moderate, suggesting that he does not regard historical developments as highly predictable. Furthermore, in dealing with international conflicts, Xi demonstrates a clear preference for peaceful settlement, while victory, stalemate, and surrender rank respectively as secondary options. Based on the operational code profile of Xi Jinping, the characteristics associated with his leadership style, and the historical evolution, opportunities, and challenges of Iran–China relations, several strategic implications for Iran’s policy toward China can be identified. First, it appears that China studies in Iran have often been shaped more by conventional assumptions than by rigorous empirical analysis. A widespread perception among many Iranian foreign policy elites is that China seeks to dismantle the liberal international order and that the Middle East constitutes a central pillar of this strategy. The present study, however, demonstrates that Xi Jinping’s personality profile is characterized by a preference for compromise and negotiated solutions rather than direct confrontation with the United States. Developments on the ground likewise support this conclusion. China has consistently sought to manage its strategic competition with the United States while avoiding direct conflict. Consequently, China’s Middle East policy—and, by extension, its policy toward Iran—should be understood as a function of its broader global strategy. Equally important, the Middle East occupies a lower strategic priority in Chinese foreign policy than China’s immediate neighborhood in the Asia-Pacific and even Central Asia. Another important finding emerging from Xi Jinping’s personality profile, which reinforces the previous point, is his preference for avoiding tension. In the Middle East, and particularly with regard to Iran, China generally opposes escalatory policies and prioritizes the preservation of state stability. This helps explain why Beijing simultaneously supported the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while also backing the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in Yemen. In essence, irrespective of the ideological orientation of governments, China seeks to cooperate with and support established state authorities whenever possible. Iran should therefore recognize that China is unlikely to become involved in situations that Beijing perceives as unnecessarily escalatory. China’s balancing strategy in the Middle East—including its simultaneous engagement with Tehran and Riyadh prior to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries—can also be understood within this broader framework. At the same time, China’s critique of the anarchic nature of the international system may create important opportunities for Iran. In pursuit of a more favorable international order and the maximization of its national interests, China has adopted a strategy of gradual institutional transformation. This strategy has involved establishing non-Western institutions while simultaneously seeking a greater role within long-standing international organizations. Such developments provide Iran with opportunities to expand cooperation with China through these institutional frameworks. Moreover, the convergence between Chinese initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the "Go West" strategy—and Iran’s "Look East" policy offers additional prospects for strengthening bilateral relations. Xi Jinping’s belief in the strategic importance of non-military sources of power, reflected in his concept of comprehensive security, represents another important opportunity for Iran. Xi adopts a holistic understanding of security that extends beyond military considerations. As discussed earlier, Chinese policymakers regard development as the foundation of security, which explains the central role of initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. This perspective provides a strong basis for expanding developmental cooperation between Tehran and Beijing. Furthermore, given China’s acute security concerns regarding ethnic terrorism in its northwestern provinces and Iran’s experience in confronting similar threats, the two countries also possess significant potential for cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Finally, the findings underscore the importance of assigning greater strategic priority to the Look East policy and a broader Asia-oriented approach in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the principal weaknesses of Iran’s Look East policy has been its largely instrumental and secondary character. Rather than being pursued as a long-term strategic orientation, engagement with Asia has frequently been employed as a means of balancing against the West. This approach has not only constrained and fragmented Iran’s relations with Asian countries but has also increased the likelihood of Iran becoming a bargaining instrument in the strategic calculations of other powers. Accordingly, a stronger commitment to multilateralism, improved relations with a wider range of major powers, and the adoption of a hedging strategy would reduce the risk of falling into such a strategic trap.

Abstract The realization of a society’s political, social, and civilizational aspirations depends largely on its capacity to establish and preserve sustainable security. This issue assumes particular importance in the Islamic Republic of Iran because of the value-oriented character of the Islamic Revolution, its civilizational objectives, and the persistence of multilayered internal and external threats. National security cannot therefore be understood merely as a static condition or as the result of military capability alone. It should instead be regarded as a continuous, multidimensional, and governance-dependent process. Broader understandings of security also show that its provision requires both formal institutions and the conscious participation of social actors. Accordingly, the present study examines the role of believers in the governance of national security and defense in the Islamic Republic of Iran through an analysis of the Qur’anic addresses beginning with “O you who have believed” (Yā ayyuhā alladhīna āmanū).
The central question is: What position do believers, as the direct addressees of these verses, occupy in providing, preserving, and promoting national security and defense? The main hypothesis is that the Qur’anic addresses do not define believers as passive elements. Rather, they portray them as responsible and influential actors whose role begins with preparedness and preventive vigilance and extends to resistance, participation in defense, countering infiltration, protecting confidential information, and confronting psychological and cognitive warfare. Sustainable security is therefore understood as the outcome of interaction among state guidance, institutional capacity, and the responsible participation of the believing community.
The epistemological foundation of the study is the Qur’an as a source of individual and social guidance. The repeated address “O you who have believed” indicates that faith in Qur’anic logic is not merely an inward condition, but also a social and responsibility-generating identity. Several such verses concern preparedness, border vigilance, enemy recognition, secrecy, resistance, steadfastness, and rejection of hostile domination, thereby providing a basis for analyzing believers’ role in security and defense governance.
Previous studies have examined either governance and national security or the jurisprudential, exegetical, and educational dimensions of these Qur’anic addresses. None has systematically analyzed believers’ role in national security and defense governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This research integrates governance, national security and defense, and Qur’anic discourse.
The study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach. Data were collected through library research using the Qur’an, recognized commentaries, lexical sources, books, and scholarly articles. Attride-Stirling’s thematic network analysis was employed at three levels: basic, organizing, and global themes. All verses containing the address “O you who have believed” were extracted, and concepts related to national security and defense were coded. Thirteen directly relevant verses were selected and organized into a thematic network. The themes were then interpreted through the model of “movement” derived from the philosophy of Allameh Tabataba’i.
The theoretical framework is structured around six components: origin, destination, mover, motive force, time, and place. The origin is the worldly sphere in which human beings fulfill individual and collective obligations. The destination is the attainment of a good and pure life and proximity to God. The mover is the community of believers, whose will and social action advance the security-building process. The motive force consists of piety, remembrance of God, hope for salvation, and belief in divine assistance. The temporal context is the glorious era of the Islamic Republic, while the spatial context is Islamic Iran as the arena of religious state-building and governance based on Islamic values.
The findings indicate that the role of believers can be analyzed at three levels. The first concerns the prewar stage and includes preparedness, vigilance, and prevention. At this level, the Qur’anic verses emphasize readiness, deterrence, border protection, and avoidance of negligence. The command to “be patient, outdo others in patience, and remain stationed” connects individual endurance with collective cohesion. The concept of murābaṭah refers not only to guarding frontiers but also to coordinating social and defensive capacities. Likewise, the command to “take your precautions” highlights continuous vigilance and preventive action.
Another major finding is the necessity of protecting secrets and blocking channels of enemy infiltration. The verses prohibiting the disclosure of confidential matters to outsiders, intimate friendship with enemies, and hostile domination show that information security is a fundamental component of defense governance. Unregulated relations with hostile actors may lead to information leakage, weakened deterrence, and increased vulnerability. The Qur’anic warning concerning possible threats through family relations indicates that public responsibility and collective security must prevail over personal attachment in sensitive circumstances.
The second level concerns direct confrontation and war. Perseverance, steadfastness, and collective resistance are central at this stage. The command to “be patient” refers to enduring hardship, while “outdo others in patience” indicates surpassing the enemy in resilience. The prohibition against turning one’s back on the enemy and the command to “stand firm” stress operational cohesion, psychological stability, and continuity of resistance. Resistance is therefore not an emotional reaction, but an organized practice based on discipline, will, and collective responsibility.
Threat prioritization also emerges as an important principle. The command to confront the nearest hostile forces indicates the necessity of addressing immediate threats and avoiding the dispersion of resources. Similarly, the instruction to advance in separate groups or collectively demonstrates flexibility in force organization. Depending on the threat, the believing community may employ limited operational units or comprehensive public mobilization. Defensive structures must therefore correspond to the type of threat and the strategic environment.
The third level concerns the multidimensional nature of hostility. Hostile action is not confined to the military sphere, but operates through belief, conduct, and language. The denial of truth, practical pressure and expulsion, and verbal hostility constitute a multilayered pattern of confrontation. National security and defense governance must therefore encompass military, media, cognitive, cultural, informational, and ideological dimensions. The Qur’anic warning that only part of hostility appears in speech while more remains concealed points to the need to avoid superficial assessments and examine hidden strategies and intentions.
Spiritual and moral factors are also decisive. Remembering divine blessings and assistance strengthens morale under difficult conditions. Freedom from fear of blame protects believers against psychological pressure, propaganda, and induced doubt. Piety is not merely an individual virtue; it is a mechanism for regulating power. It prevents defensive capability from departing from justice and becoming a means of domination or aggression. Remembrance of God likewise reinforces determination and psychological resilience.
In conclusion, the Qur’anic addresses “O you who have believed” present a comprehensive model of the role of believers in national security and defense governance. This role begins with preparedness and preventive vigilance, includes secrecy and counter-infiltration, develops into organized resistance during conflict, and extends to enemy recognition and confrontation with psychological and cognitive warfare. Believers in the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran should therefore be regarded as part of the social structure through which security is produced and sustained, while their participation complements formal institutions. Security and defense governance becomes more sustainable and effective when the participation of the believing community is integrated with state guidance, institutional organization, piety, justice, and social responsibility. Such a framework can reduce vulnerability, strengthen deterrence, preserve independence, and advance Islamic Iran, in the glorious era of the Islamic Republic, toward a good and pure life and proximity to God.

Abstract Over the past four decades, the United States has consistently portrayed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional challenger seeking to establish regional hegemony and ultimately undermine the U.S. presence in West Asia. Consequently, countering Iran’s regional influence has remained a persistent component of U.S. regional policy. However, much of the existing literature, as well as domestic analyses of U.S. policy toward Iran, tends to treat Washington’s perception of Iran as a constant and linear phenomenon. This study examines how U.S. governments from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump have assessed the level and nature of Iran’s regional threat and argues that U.S. threat perception has gradually evolved from the separate assessment of individual dimensions of Iran’s regional activism toward a more comprehensive and network-based understanding. The study employs a historical research methodology based primarily on documentary and library sources. The conceptual framework focuses on two principal variables—the level of Iranian threat and the regional distribution of power—and one intervening variable, the level of regional threat. The study distinguishes between benign and malign levels of threat according to the combination of an actor’s operational capabilities and political will to harm or challenge a major power. It also differentiates between a regional order in which the United States enjoys predominant power and one characterized by competition among major powers. The findings demonstrate that although U.S. core interests in West Asia have remained relatively stable, the interpretation of Iran’s threat has changed considerably. These enduring interests principally involve maintaining secure and stable access to energy markets, strategic waterways, military bases, and regional partners, while protecting U.S. citizens, forces, and territory from threats originating in the region. The way Iran is perceived as a threat depends largely on how its regional activities intersect with these interests and on Washington’s broader assessment of the regional and international balance of power. During the Clinton administration, the United States viewed itself as the dominant global power and generally regarded the regional security environment as relatively benign. Iran was portrayed as a potential challenger to the regional order, particularly because of its efforts to expand its military capabilities, including missile and naval capabilities. However, Iran’s actual ability and willingness to directly threaten U.S. interests remained limited. Consequently, the perception of Iran as a threat was driven more by its potential capabilities and by U.S. political priorities—particularly the Arab-Israeli peace process and the need to reassure Israel—than by sustained, concrete Iranian actions against U.S. interests. The George W. Bush administration marked a significant transformation. Following the September 11 attacks, the regional environment was perceived as substantially more dangerous, while the United States still considered itself the dominant global power. Iran increasingly came to be viewed not only through the lens of conventional military capabilities but also as a source of irregular and disruptive challenges. Its support for regional partners, asymmetric capabilities, and alleged assistance to militant groups in Iraq directly affected U.S. forces and Washington’s ability to maintain its presence and influence. Iran was therefore increasingly perceived as capable of combining conventional and unconventional tools to challenge U.S. regional objectives. Under Barack Obama, the United States faced a more competitive international environment and increasingly sought to reduce its military overextension in West Asia in order to devote greater attention to emerging major-power competition, particularly with China. Iran remained a source of regional instability, but the Obama administration distinguished between Iran as an opportunistic actor and the deeper structural causes of regional conflicts. The nuclear issue received priority because it was viewed as a potential trigger for a major regional war. Consequently, Washington sought to prevent Iran’s nuclear program from becoming an additional source of conflict while avoiding excessive pressure on Iran’s regional activities that could undermine the nuclear agreement. The Trump administration represented another major shift. Iran’s regional activism was increasingly understood as an immediate and concrete threat, comparable in urgency to the nuclear issue. Particular attention was given to Iran’s ballistic missiles, drones, maritime capabilities, support for regional armed groups, and activities in the “gray zone.” The administration also increasingly rejected the traditional notion of plausible deniability, explicitly attributing attacks conducted by Iran-aligned groups to Tehran itself. At the same time, U.S. policymakers increasingly emphasized Iran’s vulnerabilities, including the geographic expansion of its regional commitments and the limitations of its support networks, as potential pressure points. Overall, the study concludes that U.S. threat perception of Iran has not followed a linear or uniform trajectory. Rather, it has evolved in response to changes in Iran’s capabilities, regional conditions, and the distribution of power. Three major trends are particularly significant: first, differing U.S. administrations have attributed different degrees of responsibility to Iran for regional instability; second, U.S. assessments have gradually moved from separating Iran’s nuclear and regional activities toward viewing them as increasingly interconnected; and third, since the mid-2000s, Washington has increasingly focused not only on Iran’s capabilities but also on its vulnerabilities. These developments demonstrate that understanding the evolution of U.S. threat perception is essential for accurately anticipating Washington’s future policies toward Iran and for avoiding inappropriate policy responses based on the assumption that U.S. perceptions of Iran have remained constant.