The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract Neighboring countries and neighborhood policy are fundamental components of the foreign policy of any country, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the deep and wide-ranging impacts these relationships have on various areas such as economic, security, cultural, and geopolitical aspects. In this regard, Iraq, with its unique geographical, economic, and political characteristics, holds special significance for Iran. Iran's neighborhood policy with Iraq, particularly after the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the emergence of a new republic in Iraq, has undergone significant changes. This article, based on the field observations of the authors and library studies from articles, books, theses, and reports, examines the role of Iraq in Iran’s neighborhood policy and analyzes the priority and position of Iraq within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq’s importance as Iran’s western neighbor is highlighted for multiple strategic and historical reasons, especially within the framework of Iran’s neighborhood policy. Iraq, with a border length of 1,609 kilometers with Iran, is one of Iran’s primary neighbors. The extensive border impacts the security and interactions between the two countries, which are influenced by the various types of border—land, riverine, and maritime. In addition to these geographical features, the demographics of the two countries are also remarkably similar. The predominant population of both countries consists of similar ethnic groups, and religious ties, especially among the Shi’a population, form deep cultural and social connections between the two nations. Iraq, as a country with vast oil reserves and a unique geopolitical position, plays a crucial role in both regional and global policies of Iran. Iraq’s oil reserves, being among the largest in the world, are a key factor in the economic interactions between the two countries. These oil resources can serve as an important element in economic and energy cooperation, potentially fostering long-term collaborative relationships. In terms of people-to-people interactions, over 10 million citizens travel between the two countries annually. This is a clear indicator of the strong social and cultural relationships that exist between Iran and Iraq. These exchanges, especially in religious and pilgrimage activities (such as travels to Karbala and Najaf), play a significant role in shaping the deep human and cultural ties between the two nations, which have a profound impact on bilateral relations. Beyond these features, Iraq also holds a special place in Iran’s regional policies. Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, and with the rise of Shiite political influence in Iraq, unprecedented opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged in Iraq. This shift has turned Iraq from a strategic rival into a strategic partner, playing a key role in reducing regional tensions. Iraq has been able to serve as an intermediary between Iran and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and has facilitated the expansion of bilateral cooperation across various domains, including security, economy, and politics. Compared to other neighboring countries, Iraq holds a unique position in terms of culture, religion, economy, and security. Due to shared cultural and religious attributes—particularly the Shi’a population in both countries—Iraq is considered a crucial strategic and cultural partner for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Iraq, with its geopolitical and economic position in the region, can act as a bridge between Iran and other Arab countries, as well as Western nations. Based on the SWOT model analysis, Iraq holds significant advantages over other Iranian neighbors. In this model, Iraq ranks highly in over twelve indicators as strengths (SO), which indicates the substantial potential for interaction with Iran. However, Iraq also faces challenges and threats, reflected in some of the weaknesses (WO) and threats (WT) categories. Nevertheless, Iraq possesses the potential to move from the level of priority to that of paramount importance in Iran’s neighborhood policy. As a result, Iraq occupies a position of particular importance within Iran's neighborhood policy and stands at the forefront of Iran’s neighbors. In terms of strategic, cultural, and economic significance, Iraq takes precedence over other neighbors. This priority could lead to expanded bilateral cooperation in various fields, ultimately strengthening Iran's position both regionally and internationally. Therefore, effectively utilizing the existing opportunities and addressing any disagreements could elevate Iran-Iraq relations from priority status to primary importance, thus preventing security threats and challenges.  

Abstract The development of Iran’s missile program is one of the key military capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has significantly contributed to enhancing the country’s national security. However, this advancement has also led to increased pressure from adversaries aiming to undermine Iran’s national security. Western policies have primarily focused on weakening Iran’s deterrence tools, with export control regimes acting as a key countermeasure against the expansion of Iran’s missile capabilities. This study investigates the impact of export control regimes on Iran’s missile defense program from 1996 to 2022. The theoretical framework incorporates neorealism to analyze U.S. and Western behavior, and deterrence theory to interpret Iran’s strategic response. The findings reveal that export control regimes have had both positive and negative effects. On the negative side, they have limited Iran’s access to essential missile-related technologies, materials, and financial resources, as well as hindered knowledge exchange. On the positive side, these constraints have incentivized Iran to domestically develop missile technologies and achieve product innovation. The methodology used is descriptive-analytical, and data collection relied on library resources, official documents, and credible online sources.
The Islamic Republic of Iran's missile program constitutes a central pillar of its national defense strategy, playing a crucial role in deterrence and safeguarding national interests. In response to regional and international threats—especially following the Iran-Iraq war—Iran has advanced its missile capabilities despite increasing international restrictions. Among the most significant of these limitations is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established to prevent the proliferation of missile technologies.
The bitter experience of the Iran-Iraq war convinced Iranian leaders that survival in an anarchic international system necessitates robust defense capabilities. At the time of Iraq's invasion, Iran was suffering from post-revolution instability and a weakened military, leading adversaries to assume that Iran’s deterrent capacity was diminished. This historical lesson prompted Iran to prioritize missile deterrence as a strategic necessity.
Export control regimes have sought to hinder Iran’s missile program by restricting access to advanced technologies, raw materials, financial resources, and scientific cooperation. These efforts, however, have not halted Iran’s progress; instead, they have reinforced Tehran’s resolve to achieve technological self-reliance. Iranian engineers have employed reverse engineering and domestic innovation to design and produce various generations of missiles, including Shahab, Ghadr, Sejjil, Fateh, Qiam, Ashoura, and Emad. These missiles have shown significant improvements in range, accuracy, propulsion, and guidance systems. For instance, the transition from liquid to solid fuel has enhanced launch readiness, operational flexibility, and logistical efficiency.
Ironically, the export control regimes have contributed to Iran’s technological advancement by compelling the country to invest in domestic R&D and human capital development. Consequently, Iran has emerged as a regional missile power, boasting high-precision ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 2000 kilometers and equipped with advanced guidance systems.
From a neorealist perspective, the international system lacks a central authority to ensure state security. Hence, states must rely on their own capabilities to deter threats. Iran’s missile development is a rational response to the regional insecurity and continuous threats posed by powerful adversaries. The MTCR, initially founded by seven industrialized nations and now consisting of 35 members, attempts to control missile technology dissemination through legal and political mechanisms. Although Iran is not a member, it has been significantly affected by MTCR provisions. Nevertheless, Iran’s ability to achieve indigenous advancements despite these constraints reflects the regime’s limited effectiveness in restricting determined developing states.
The dual impact of export control regimes—obstructive and stimulative—is evident in Iran’s case. On the negative side, Iran has faced restrictions in acquiring technologies, financial support, and international partnerships. These obstacles have increased R&D costs and delayed innovation. On the positive side, the necessity for self-sufficiency has driven Iran to develop homegrown missile technologies with increased range and accuracy, such as SHAHAB-3, SEJJIL, and EMAD
The development of Iran’s missile capabilities is a fundamental component of its deterrence strategy. These weapons serve defensive purposes by deterring potential aggressors and securing Iran’s strategic interests. Recognized as one of Iran’s "strategic jewels," the missile program has also strengthened Iran’s bargaining position in international negotiations. Although export control regimes were designed to curb Iran’s progress, they have inadvertently fostered technological independence and resilience. Today, Iran stands as a key regional missile power, with its missile program playing a critical role in maintaining national security and enhancing diplomatic leverage against hostile states.
 

Abstract International institutions play a significant role in political, economic, social developments in general and legal issues such as conflicts, coalitions, arbitration and judicial and criminal affairs. One of the important institutions in this field is the United Nations Security Council. The central question is, according to the duties and powers of the Security Council, what are the governance challenges of this international body in the war after October 7? The investigation has shown that the Security Council has not performed well in the three areas of establishing global peace and security, resolving conflicts, and fulfilling assigned duties (not deserting). In terms of establishing peace and security, it has taken a conservative approach due to the influence of members of the Security Council, such as the United States, who have the right to veto; It has not taken the necessary measures in the area of powers to resolve conflicts in relation to preventing the occurrence of a crisis, and it has also failed to act in the area of preventing violations of the rules of war. For this reason, it must be said that the governance of the Security Council has not been favorable to the current crisis in Gaza. The present research has used descriptive and analytical method. One of the important and influential institutions is the UN Security Council, said to be the most important pillar of the UN. This institution plays a prominent role in important areas such as war and peace, international security, as well as imposing some sanctions and resolutions, operational and binding decisions. Specifically, one of the controversial issues is the conflict between Palestine and Israel. This conflict, which has involved many countries in the region and the world, has flared up again in the form of a massive war in 2023 and as a result of the October 7 attacks by Hamas. The recent conflict and war, which has been accompanied by Israel's tough and military response, has resulted in more than 50 thousand deaths and the displacement of more than one million people, while many international centers are critical of the forced migration of refugees and every day The dimensions of the crisis are also increasing. Considering that the Security Council has the power to establish peace and security in this region and resolve conflicts, help civilians, issue resolutions and compel the parties to comply with the rules of war to avoid killing civilians. To intervene, but so far he has not taken any effective and deterrent measures. Taking this procedure and its continuation has led to one of the serious doubts regarding the position and governance of international institutions, including the Security Council, which is the concern of the present study. This means that in this article, an attempt is made to examine the challenges of trust in international governance with regard to the role of the Security Council regarding the Gaza crisis and developments after October 7, 2023. The main text, which is the governance of the Security Council regarding the events of October 7, was discussed, which first addressed the role of the Security Council's approach to peace, security and human rights violations according to the United Nations Charter, and emphasized that when these requests and financial initiatives " "binding" by international institutions such as the Security Council, it will not have much effect in practice. Therefore, some activities and movements of the members of the Security Council in order to establish a temporary ceasefire or to convince Israel to stop the war have not yielded results until the time of writing this article. We have also tried to resolve conflicts through the Security Council and we have seen that the Security Council has failed even in the field of helping children and has also failed in the three areas of "safety", "support" and "restriction of commercial goods". Finally, he addressed the responsibility of international institutions in terms of omissions, and the reference here was the International Law Commission in the plan of responsibility of international organizations in 2011, and since the Security Council is the main pillar in the field of collective security in the international system, it witnessed serious inaction and shortcomings. Especially by America, England and France regarding the events of October 2023 in Gaza and Palestine. So; The United Nations Security Council can also be evaluated in terms of playing a role in the field of establishing international peace and security or preventing threats to these values, solving and resolving international disputes and hostilities, and fulfilling its duties (not giving up on actions). has created Specifically, several objections can be raised regarding the incidents that took place after the October 7 attacks by Hamas against Israel and the subsequent Israeli comprehensive military response to the military and civilians. The UN Security Council, without considering the pre-war conditions and infiltration, military intervention and killing of civilians in Gaza and Palestine by Israel, and disregarding the ignoring of the resolutions issued against Israel, considered the starting point of the conflict to be October 7, which itself It shows the lack of attention to the duty of this council in terms of dealing with the non-starting of hostilities. The Security Council has taken significant measures in preventing the formation of conflicts, but ignoring and not adopting a pragmatic approach to the potential capacity of the conflict between Gaza and Israel has fueled serious criticism against this international institution. Because based on the duties of the UN Security Council, the absence of conflict and military conflict between governments does not in itself indicate the guarantee of international peace and security. Another criticism of the performance of the Security Council regarding the Gaza crisis is the failure of this body to fulfill its assigned duties. So that every day a huge amount of killing and massacre of civilians, forced displacement, bombing of schools, hospitals and medical centers occurs and the Security Council, since the occurrence of this inhumane conflict, issued a resolution or Binding Israel to its obligations based on the 1967 treaties, the Madrid Treaty, or preventing the killing of civilians has not been done. In addition, in another dimension, the Security Council has not taken any significant action in the field of establishing peace and security and obliging the parties to observe the rules of war. The procedure of the Security Council is in a way a continuation of a kind of inequality inherent in the structure of the Security Council, which today has been manifested in the form of the support of the United States and some Western countries such as France and England for military intervention and genocide in the Gaza Strip. Considering the veto of a resolution for a ceasefire between the parties by the US and Israel's support for the development of military attacks in Gaza, the practice of conservatism, the dual approach of the Security Council and the influence of great powers in this council have become more evident. Therefore, considering the three components mentioned, the UN Security Council has lost the ability to maintain international peace and security as a main task in relation to the events of October 2023 in Palestine.    

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan are two countries that are facing the issue of ownership of common rivers in their international borders. Although the current land of Afghanistan has been part of the territories of Iran for a long time, but after the formation of this country, the relations between the two countries have entered new stages. The borders of the two countries, in addition to the issue of conflict, also face the phenomenon of drug and human trafficking. Necessarily, these issues have caused the border guards to face different managements of these borders. The dependence of parts of the eastern region of the country on water resources on the common borders with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan and Afghanistan's non-compliance with the laws related to border waters, the movement of water resources between regions, the heavy decline of underground water resources and their pollution, the drying up of water resources Like wells and springs, the emptying of rural settlements and group displacement of the population are among the most prominent challenges in the field of water, followed by security challenges in the region. The main problem between Iran and Afghanistan started when the political leaders of Afghanistan supported by Britain in the early 20th century assumed the Hirmand River as an internal river and considered any use of it as their exclusive right. Iran shares border rivers and water resources with all its neighbors, the war of neighboring countries over water resources is one of the dangers that threatens many of these countries and can be a potential source of differences between Iran and its neighbors. The problems of transboundary watersheds clarify the importance of studying and investigating the issue.   Methodology This research is practical in terms of purpose and based on the nature of the subject, the main question and the hypothesis of the research, it was carried out in a descriptive-analytical method using the document collection method. The question raised in this article is, what are the effects of the Hirmand river conflict on the political relations between the two countries?   Result and discussion In terms of hydropolitical indicators, Hirmand River is the only river among Iran's border rivers whose estuary is in the inner regions of Iran, and in this respect it is different from other border rivers of Iran. As the 10th largest river in Asia, this river is the main source of water supply for Lake Hamon and Sistan region. In recent years, the fluctuation of Hirmand water has been one of the factors influencing the political relations between Iran and Afghanistan. Some of the geopolitical and hydropolitical challenges that have been created for Iran due to Afghanistan's exclusive ownership of the Hirmand River are: In the last one hundred years, Afghanistan has reduced the amount of water flowing towards Iran (Sistan) by building reservoir and diversion dams on Hirmand and separating numerous channels from it. This has aggravated the water shortage in Sistan during droughts in the upper part of the river. The location of Sistan at the end of the Hirmand basin and its strong dependence on Hirmand water has made the Sistan region extremely vulnerable. The increase in water consumption of Hirmand in Afghanistan in the last hundred years and the decrease of water flowing towards Sistan has caused the area of ​​Hamun to decrease, the size of agricultural lands in Sistan has decreased and finally caused the migration of a large number of the population of this region. The location of 95% of the Hirmand river in Afghanistan, the use of Hirmand water by most Afghans and the high dependence of the southern and southwestern provinces of Afghanistan on the water of this river have caused the issue of the distribution of Hirmand water to become a national issue that is of concern to the people of the country. This case has made it difficult for the Afghan government to decide on the distribution of Hirmand water and to solve this problem between the two countries. Conclusion The Hirmand River in the east of the country originates from the upstream watersheds in Afghanistan, and this has caused Iran to consider this issue in its relations with Afghanistan. Cities and villages in eastern Iran are facing water problems. By examining the two countries of Iran and Afghanistan, it can be seen that the situation of Iran is better in terms of development, but both countries have challenges in the way of exploiting the waters of these two rivers. Always, when the sources of a river in the upstream country are accompanied by other characteristics such as weak management, lack of development, being in the third world, etc., it causes the statesmen of that country, to compensate for their weaknesses and their land, in such cases, i.e. exploitation show unjustified strictures from the shared waters. Like what we see in relation to the behavior of the Afghan government or Iran's lack of attention to the issue of Hirmand and Hariroud. These issues have had a negative impact on the situation of the border cities of the two countries in such a way that the agricultural and horticultural products of Sistan region have faced a decrease during these years. However, the governments of Iran and Afghanistan have a difficult way forward in reaching a comprehensive and practical agreement on the exploitation of border rivers.    

Abstract The fourth war of the Zionist regime against Gaza in May 2021, known among the Palestinians as the “Sword of Jerusalem” and in Zionist circles as the “Guardian of the Walls,” marked a turning point in the political, military, and security developments in the West Asian region. (Yassin, 2021:218) Following the Zionist regime’s attempt to evacuate the homes of Palestinian residents in the “Sheikh Jarrah” neighborhood in favor of Israeli settler populations in 2021, all Palestinian cities and movements, including armed and peaceful Palestinian resistance groups, launched a new intifada. The main excuse of the Zionist authorities for taking over this neighborhood is that they claim that Jewish families have been living in this area since before the 1948 war. This is despite the fact that Palestinians have documents for their residential homes dating back to the Ottoman period and were evicted from them in the 1948 war, so this claim by the Zionists has always been challenged. (Diab, 2021: 110) On the other hand, although the issue of the Sheikh Jarrah attack is the main reason for the tension in the city; apparently the actions and plans of the Zionists against the Al-Aqsa Mosque are the main driving factor in creating the current tension in the entire Palestinian territories. At the beginning of Ramadan 1432 AH, settler groups announced their intention to attack the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the occasion of Quds Day on May 10, 2021, which is the same day that Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967. (Arabic Post, 2021) As a result, clashes broke out between Palestinians and the Israeli police in the courtyard of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and attempts by the police and settlers to storm the mosque failed. Resistance movements in Gaza also entered the mainstream on May 10, 2021; in response to the crimes and aggressions of the Israeli regime against the city of Jerusalem and the pressure on Palestinians living in Sheikh Jarrah, the spokesman for the "Al-Qassam Brigades", the military wing of the "Hamas" movement, announced that the movement had launched a missile strike on the occupied city of Jerusalem during an operation called "Sword of Jerusalem". (Anadolu, 2021) The Israeli regime also announced on the same day in response to this attack; it had launched its military operation against Gaza under the title "Guardian of the Walls" and then began its airstrikes against various targets in the Gaza Strip. (Al-Jazeera Net, 2021) As in previous wars, Egypt, as a geographical neighbor of the warring parties, acted as a mediator to end it and reach a ceasefire agreement. In this way, it once again emphasized its position in this case and showed its concern for the Palestinian case, and continued these efforts to achieve a ceasefire through negotiations between the parties until an agreement was reached. In this regard, it presented the initiative to reconstruct Gaza through investment and participation of Egyptian companies as an opportunity to guarantee a ceasefire, and continued indirect negotiations on the cases of the siege, reconstruction, and prisoner exchange as the main axes of achieving a long-term ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and creating opportunities for Palestinian reconciliation and a political settlement of issues between Palestinian groups. (Yasin, 2021:115) In light of the above, the main issue of the research is to examine the developments and events of the 12-day war of 2021, from which perspective we will analyze Egypt's political-security actor in the 12-day war in Gaza based on the theory of pragmatism. This article aims to examine Egypt’s political agency and the role of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in mediating an end to the 12-day conflict between the Israeli regime and Palestinian Islamic resistance groups. Over the past decade, West Asia has witnessed five missile confrontations between Palestinian resistance factions—primarily led by the Hamas movement—and the Israeli regime in the Gaza Strip and occupied territories. Despite the geographically limited scope of these conflicts, they have yielded considerable strategic consequences for both sides and for the broader region. The research adopts a qualitative, content analysis methodology, and is fundamental in nature. The study integrates scholarly perspectives with empirical data gathered from 24 Arab and international media outlets, including television networks, newspapers, and news agencies. In total, over 170 news items and reports related to the conflict period were analyzed. Shared narratives were identified, their frequency compared, and key components were extracted using the theoretical framework of pragmatism. The findings suggest that Egypt’s political and security engagement during the recent Gaza war—regardless of the final outcomes for both the Palestinian and Israeli parties—has resulted in an enhanced regional status for Egypt and a strengthened international profile for President Sisi. Through a pragmatic and flexible diplomatic approach, Sisi has succeeded in aligning more closely with U.S. President Joe Biden and positioning Egypt as a pivotal actor in advancing the United States’ strategic interests in West Asia, thereby presenting both himself and Egypt as key allies of the West and the United States. Considering the purpose of the research and the question raised in the article, the following can be presented as the most important findings and results of the present study: By examining the Egyptian approach to the Palestine case, it can be claimed that the policy of the country's statesmen in the aforementioned case focuses on at least four strategies, which are: "Managing this case, not resolving it"; in other words, from the perspective of Egypt's former and current statesmen, the Palestine issue acts as an internal tool to convince its people of their rulers' belief in the Palestinian cause and, to a large extent, prevents domestic political groups and parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood from rebelling against it. In the regional arena, Egypt also seeks to "monopolise the management" of this case against its other rival actors and exploit it as a lever of pressure at the disposal of the Egyptian foreign policy apparatus to impose Cairo's will and regional tendencies in other cases such as the Libyan crisis, the Renaissance Dam (the disputed case with Ethiopia), and ... To this end, Egypt has been able to "securitize" this case, while gaining control of its intelligence apparatus over the PA on the one hand and the Palestinian resistance groups on the other, to the extent that it can limit the circle of entry of other regional actors into this scene. However, in the international arena, the Palestine case is a trump card in the hands of the pragmatic and opportunistic ruler of Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, to convince international powers, especially the United States, that in light of the failure of the Arab coalition led by the Saudi regime in the Yemen crisis and the existence of conflicting opinions and conflicts of interest between regional and international powers in the Libya case, Egypt remains the best option for protecting America's vital interests in the region and the best partner of the Zionist regime in its military confrontation against the Palestinian resistance groups.      

Abstract

Abstract The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is one of the significant political and security developments in the region having some extensive implications for internal stability and the region's geopolitics. A precise understanding of the factors influencing this phenomenon can be helpful to analyze the roots of the crisis and to propose appropriate solutions to prevent its recurrence. Taliban’s recurrence raises some fundamental questions about its structural, social, political, and international roots as follows: Why were the Taliban able to seize control of the country after twenty years of war without significant resistance from the Afghan government and the international community? What factors led to the collapse of Afghanistan’s governmental structures, allowing the Taliban to fill the power vacuum? Was the Taliban's recurrence a result of internal weaknesses and social crises in Afghanistan, or did external variables, such as the influence of regional powers and NATO's withdrawal, play a crucial role in this process? Answering these questions requires a systemic analysis of the factors that contributed to the Taliban's re-emergence. Therefore, the main question of the article is formulated as follows: "What factors have played a role in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and how have these factors interacted within a systemic framework?"
This article explains the foundations of the Taliban's resurgence, considering the surrounding geopolitical realities of Afghanistan. To this end, a descriptive-analytic method is employed, and the VIKOR technique is used to assess Afghanistan provinces’ rankings in terms of spatial justice indices. Furthermore, qualitative data and observation method is utilized to examine the roles of religion, ethnicity, language, foreign influence, the influence of warlords, and reactions to the Taliban within a systemic approach.
In a systemic approach, various factors are viewed as components of a complex and dynamic network. These factors interact with one another in a closed loop, leading to either the stability or change of the current situation. The systemic approach illustrates that the Taliban's resurgence is not merely the result of one factor but rather the product of a chain of complex relationships.
The rise of the Taliban has placed increased pressure on opposition groups, particularly ethnic minorities, raising the likelihood of new resistance movements. By assuming control over Afghanistan, the Taliban gained new financial and military resources, which strengthened their position against both internal and regional rivals. Through contradictory strategies (some supporting and others opposing), regional countries have contributed to the ongoing instability. A close examination of the factors influencing the Taliban's return to power reveals that this phenomenon is not simply the result of a single cause, rather, it is the outcome of a complex interplay between internal and external factors.
The systemic analysis indicate that the Taliban have not only exploited internal factors such as ethnic and religious divides but also international opportunities, including the withdrawal of American forces and the inability of regional countries to form a united front against them. Additionally, the systemic model demonstrates that the process of reproducing the crisis in Afghanistan is such that even after the Taliban's resurgence, the likelihood of new resistances and regional instability remains.
The results of the research indicate that spatial injustice, ethnic disparities, language policies, foreign support, the weakness of the central government, and the influence of warlords have been among the most significant factors facilitating the Taliban's return to power. The systemic analysis revealed that these factors are interconnected in a causal and feedback loop, and the withdrawal of foreign forces created a power vacuum that the Taliban exploited to gain control over the country. The systemic model presented in this research illustrates that the Taliban's resurgence is a multifaceted and complex process, and without reforms in governance structures and policymaking, the likelihood of similar crises remains high in the future.
 

Abstract This article examines the relations between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from the perspective of critical geopolitical theory and attempts to explain the role of "connection" as a tool for advancing Iran's economic and geopolitical goals in the Eurasian region. With the expansion of economic globalization, developing countries such as Iran have turned to regional cooperation to gain benefits and competitive advantage in the global market. In the meantime, the Eurasian Economic Union, as one of the important economic blocs in the former Soviet region, has provided a basis for preferential trade and economic convergence, which Iran also seeks to exploit.
In the globalization environment, regionalism is proposed as a gradual path to opening up national economies and integrating them into the global economy. Due to its unique geopolitical location, Iran is located on the north-south and east-west transit highways and can become a hub for the transit of goods in the region. This location enables Iran to strengthen its geopolitical role while developing economic relations. Citing the theories of Parag Khanna, the article emphasizes that in the modern era, power and territory are no longer defined solely on the basis of geography, but the degree of connection of countries to transportation, energy, communications and trade networks has become more important.
The Eurasian Economic Union was formed on the basis of freedom of capital, trade, services and movement of goods and has strong infrastructure, skilled manpower and a geostrategic position between the East and the West. Russia, as the driving force of the union, plays a key role in advancing its goals. Member countries have provided the basis for extensive cooperation by creating a common market, harmonized customs laws and industrial and agricultural infrastructure. This union can provide suitable opportunities for Iran's exports and import needs, while at the same time connecting Iran to regional and global markets
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's change of approach from Westernization to Eurasianization, the groundwork was laid for the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union. As a regional power with huge oil, gas, and petrochemical resources and being located at the center of international transportation routes, Iran plays an important role in connecting East and Southeast Asia to Europe. This geopolitical position further strengthens the possibility of Iran becoming a transit and goods connection center and can lead to the promotion of Iran's regional and global trade.
Relying on the critical geopolitical theory, the article highlights the three main elements of power, space, and identity in the analysis of Iran-Eurasia relations:
*Power : In this theory, power is considered not only in the sense of hard power, but also as a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, influenced by the discourses and mentality of politicians. Relations between states and regional actors can also be analyzed based on the interaction of active and reactive forces.
*Space : Space in critical geopolitics is not simply a physical reality, but is the result of social and discursive boundaries created by actors to maintain their cohesion and identity. The importance of space in this theory goes back to its connection with time, power, and ideology.
*Identity : Identity in this framework is an epistemological and social construct that is formed through the process of othering (us and them). Geopolitical discourses usually produce enemies and highlight differences to establish their identity.
Together, these elements allow for a deeper analysis of Iran’s foreign policy and regional relations and show how discourses of power, space, and identity influence Iran’s policies and orientations towards the Eurasian Union.
Parag Khanna emphasizes in her book “Linkage” that power in the present era is measured by the degree to which countries are connected to global networks, not simply by their geographical size. She believes that by accepting interdependence and cooperation, a brighter and more connected future can be built for the world. In his article “Critical Geopolitics,” Ahmadipour also describes the evolution of the concept of geopolitics from a traditional approach to a critical and discursive approach, emphasizing the role of social, ideological, and identity factors in shaping foreign policy. Sadeghi et al., in their analysis of the approach, show how the elements of space, power, and identity play a role in regional policymaking and geopolitical competition.
In addition to economic opportunities, Iran’s cooperation with the Eurasian Union also brings challenges. On the one hand, Iran can use its geopolitical position to become a hub for connectivity and transit of goods in the region and benefit from the benefits of preferential trade and a common market. On the other hand, regional competition, international sanctions, and structural obstacles can challenge the convergence process. However, adopting a connectivity approach and utilizing geopolitical capacities can make Iran a key player in regional and global networks
The article concludes that in the era of globalization and the formation of network civilization, the geopolitical power of countries depends more than ever on the extent of their connectivity to transportation, energy, and trade networks. Given its strategic location and location in international corridors, Iran can strengthen its position in the Eurasian region by adopting a connectivity approach and utilizing critical geopolitical theory.This requires smart policymaking, strengthening transit infrastructure, and active cooperation with Eurasian Union member states. Ultimately, harnessing the power of connectivity and embracing interdependence will be a key strategy for advancing national interests and enhancing Iran’s geopolitical position in the 21st century.

Abstract In Islamic countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, the explanation of human rights is inevitable to communicate with Islamic standards and the standards derived from it. Because in the constitutions of most of these countries, the legitimacy of the Islamic religion is specified and it is mentioned as the main source of legislation, and immediately the impermissibility of legislation contrary to Islamic standards and, on the other hand, conflicting with human rights and fundamental freedoms. In any case, these countries are faced with the two concepts of "human rights" and "Islamic standards" or in some cases with "Islamic principles, principles and rulings" which, while each of these two concepts needs theoretical explanation and practical implementation. The criteria and indicators are epistemological, more important than that is how to create a fruitful connection between these two concepts. Therefore, the main question of this article is how to use the element of "dignity" as an approach in explaining the duality of human rights and Islamic standards and creating harmony between them? Considering the importance of the main question, other questions are also raised: such as: Can dignity be considered an explanatory approach alongside competing approaches? Can it be considered as the dominant approach over other approaches? And finally, how can this element be the source of harmony between human rights and Islamic standards?   The answer to these questions, in the first step, requires a detailed explanation of the element of dignity, and in the next step, it is necessary to state the characteristics of the dignity-oriented approach. This article with an analytical method is based on the hypothesis that the element of "dignity" is on the one hand one of the important purposes of Islamic Sharia and on the other hand one of the main foundations of human rights, and therefore it can be used in the connection between human rights and understanding. Islamic standards are of indescribable importance and ultimately play a role in explaining Islamic standards and human rights and creating harmony between them and explaining common rights among humans, so the role and position of the element of dignity cannot be neglected. Regarding the research literature, it is important to remember that although many scientific works have been produced around dignity from a legal, philosophical, ethical and theological perspective, but the writing that is independently and directly related to it as an explanatory approach in order to create harmony between human rights and standards Islam should pay attention and pay attention to its role and place in harmony between human rights and Islamic standards. Dignity is a theoretical value that can have a practical aspect. When we accept that man is a precious and valuable gem, we will believe that he has common rights and those rights should be regulated and interpreted in a way that is compatible with his dignity. Therefore, any type of regulation in which human dignity is distorted is rejected. Since man is righteous, religion has been legislated for him, and after that, the system of guidance, legislation and government is formed. Not that because a person commits to the political system, then he has the right to dignity.  The dignity-oriented approach has characteristics such as universality, emphasis on what is and what should be, comprehensive ethics and independence in human personality, which automatically lead to harmony and interaction between human rights and Islamic standards. Because the basis of this approach is an inherent and inalienable basis, which is dignity, so this basis recognizes the standards of human rights and the general rules of religion for the sake of human sharing, and every human being is characterized by a value from birth. He is generous and as long as he does not take away this attribute, this attribute remains in him and makes him benefit from the standards of generosity. By emphasizing dignity, every human being has importance, equality, freedom, immunity and security by itself, and even social interests as a whole cannot be a negation of innate dignity and the rights arising from it. Individual dignity automatically leads to the dignity of the society and forms a generous society. Because the society consists of noble people, and therefore, dignity, because it is inherent, is not subject to political bargaining, power relations, or calculations for the sake of other interests. Dignity has a very important place in human rights and Islamic standards. Dignity is a gift that the human race and human beings have, which indicates its generality and is not specific to a specific group and class of human beings. Dignity is considered one of the main foundations of human rights, and this foundation can play an important role in determining and defining the examples and scope of common rights among humans. Since man is righteous, religion has been legislated for him, and after that, the system of guidance, legislation and government is formed. Not that because a person commits to the political system, then he has the right to dignity.  The dignity-oriented approach has characteristics such as universality, emphasis on what is and what should be, comprehensive ethics and independence in human personality, which automatically lead to harmony and interaction between human rights and Islamic standards. The dignity-based approach seeks to define a value that has a universal aspect. It is not possible to claim the existence of a universal legal system except by proving the sources and foundations of the universe. If there is a universal source and basis, then inevitably other components and contents and materials will also be universal. In the dignity-centered approach, man is God's creation, and his identity, his position, and his interaction with existence are all due to God's creation, and since man is within the system of existence, he is not a separate fabric from it, but all the particles of his existence work in the world. and because man has such a genuine relationship with the universe, and this relationship is the same in all ages and eras, and man is located within the system of creation, so the human species must have a common source and basis for a better and proper regulation of this relationship. which is the dignity, it needs. Although dignity is a necessity, it can also be destroyed. If a person tries to become an air worshiper and exploits his talent for evil purposes, such a person will be stripped of his dignity. Therefore, the deprivation of human dignity is based on his abuse of discretion, which is caused by the deprivation of his own dignity. When the human being, who belongs to human rights, is explained with a dignity-oriented approach, it can be proven that there is a lot of harmony and commonality between Islam and human rights, and the relationship of conflict and opposition that some people propose becomes the stage of interaction. arrive Islam, which is the founder of the good fight and the increase of commonalities, can have a constructive interaction with human rights.      

Abstract The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the main axes of regional and international interactions over the past three decades. Despite Iran’s emphasis on its peaceful nature and its reliance on international law, this program has always faced reactions from neighboring countries and major powers. Despite much research and study on various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program in international political studies, little attention has been paid to the effective role of Saudi Arabia in it. Saudi Arabia, as Iran’s regional rival and America’s main ally in the Persian Gulf, has adopted varying positions towards this program. This article examines the developments in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in four time periods against the Iranian nuclear program using the theoretical framework of “neoclassical realism.” Theoretical Framework of Neoclassical Realism: This theory, by combining two levels of micro and macro analysis, examines the impact of the international structure and the perceptions of political leaders on foreign policy decisions. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia's behavior is influenced by external factors (such as regional competition and the international system) and internal factors (such as the threat perception of leaders, public opinion, and decision-making structures). As the most important and largest Arab state in the Persian Gulf and also the most important US ally in the region, the Saudi government was most influenced by the security perceptions of its officials regarding Iran's nuclear and regional threats. When the United States took an aggressive approach to Iran's nuclear program, Saudi Arabia took a calm approach, and when the United States de-secured Iran's nuclear program by signing the JCPOA, it turned to staunch opposition to Iran's nuclear program. Four periods of Saudi Arabia's stance: The first period (1992–2002) Positive neutrality: During this period, Iran's nuclear program was not a priority for the international community, and only the United States considered it a threat. Saudi Arabia was also mainly involved in domestic issues, reforms, and regional conflicts with Iran and did not pay attention to Iran's nuclear program. It recognized Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and expressed only environmental concerns after the Iran-Russia agreement to complete the Bushehr power plant in 1992. Saudi Arabia considered the International Atomic Energy Agency's monitoring of Iran's activities sufficient. The second period (2002–2004) Negative neutrality: During this period, the Iranian nuclear crisis began and, after the publication of satellite images by CNN, the Iranian nuclear file entered a critical phase at the behest of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency confirmed Iran's secrecy and the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia, expressed their political, security, and environmental concerns. The United States increased pressure and demanded a suspension of Iran's nuclear activities. Iran entered into negotiations with the European Union and accepted a voluntary suspension of enrichment. Saudi Arabia supported the European diplomatic solution and considered the US military option dangerous. The country was concerned about the military consequences and the strengthening of radical groups in Iran, and emphasized that cooperation and dialogue were better than confrontation. At the same time, Saudi Arabia focused more on developments in Iraq and paid less attention to Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia was also critical of the US's dual approach towards Iran and Israel. The third period (2005–2015) Open confrontation and opposition: From 2005 to the signing of the JCPOA (2015), important changes occurred in Iran’s nuclear file. With the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran adopted a more assertive nuclear policy, left the Paris Agreement, and sought cooperation with new actors beyond the three European countries. The United States referred the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council, and it became a security file. Saudi Arabia, which had previously taken a soft approach, began to confront Iran’s nuclear program more harshly from this time on; including proposing the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Persian Gulf and supporting sanctions against Iran. WikiLeaks documents show that Saudi Arabia, behind closed doors, called on the United States to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, due to the sensitivities of Arab public opinion and support for Iran’s anti-Western policies, Saudi Arabia’s opposition remained unspoken and political and logistical support remained. Saudi-affiliated media outlets also engaged in psychological warfare against Iran’s nuclear program. Fourth period (2015 to present) Continuation of confrontation and efforts to strike a balance: The JCPOA treaty created a significant change in the regional order that Iran’s rival countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, were unhappy with. After Trump came to power and the US withdrew from the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to confront Iran intensified. Saudi Arabia adopted three main strategies within the framework of defensive neoclassical realism: calling for an international coalition to contain Iran, strengthening its defense and missile capabilities, and trying to acquire nuclear technology. Saudi Arabia initially sought to prevent the development of Iran’s nuclear program by supporting the Security Council and sanctions and tried to participate in the nuclear negotiations. The JCPOA agreement, which gave Iran a stronger position, worried Saudi Arabia and caused it to resort to more extensive security and military measures, including purchasing weapons from the US and bribing Russia to prevent the sale of defense systems to Iran. Even the claim of trying to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan sought to balance against Iran. Also, Saudi Arabia launched its national nuclear program to confront Iran and signed agreements for nuclear cooperation with the United States, France, and China. A plan to form an international uranium enrichment consortium was also presented by Saudi Arabia to control nuclear activities in the region, which Iran did not accept. These measures indicate Saudi Arabia's efforts to confront Iran's influence and nuclear capabilities in the region. Conclusion Iran and Saudi Arabia, two regional powers and rivals in the Islamic world, have complex relations that have been significantly affected by Iran's nuclear program. Initially, Saudi Arabia did not attach much importance to Iran's nuclear program, but over time, this issue became one of the important factors in the relations between the two countries. The theory of neoclassical realism shows that regional actors adopt appropriate security policies to maintain the balance of power and increase their sources of power. Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States, does not consider its behavior to be entirely in line with Washington's policies and has always emphasized a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue and the creation of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. However, since the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration, Saudi Arabia has taken a tougher stance against Iran's nuclear program, supporting sanctions and even considering military action. However, Saudi Arabia's willingness to pursue a military solution was limited, as this action could have provoked a strong reaction from Iran and the activation of its regional networks. The JCPOA agreement was not accepted by Saudi Arabia, and the country tried to reduce Iran's achievements by supporting Trump's anti-Iran policies. At the same time, competition and proxy wars between the two countries continue, but recently both sides have sought to reduce tensions and protect their interests, although their relations remain sensitive and changing.    

Abstract The wave of Arab uprisings in 2010 reshaped the Middle East’s regional order, prompting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an emerging regional power, to adopt an active role in the Syrian crisis. Prior to 2011, the UAE maintained close ties with the Assad government, investing heavily in Syria. However, in 2012, as the crisis escalated, the UAE severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and supported opposition groups. Between 2012 and 2014, the UAE pursued an aggressive policy aimed at toppling Assad, but from 2018 onward, it shifted toward de-escalation and normalization of relations. This shift, marked by the reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus and reciprocal high-level visits, is analyzed through the lens of pragmatism. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on library and electronic sources, this article examines the reasons behind this policy shift, positing that regional and international political, economic, and security considerations were the primary drivers of this pragmatic turn. Pragmatism in international relations prioritizes policies that maximize national interests without being constrained by abstract principles. In recent years, the UAE has sought to project itself as a pragmatic, interest-driven actor, engaging with diverse regional and international players. The UAE’s foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2024 can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first period, the UAE adopted an aggressive stance aimed at overthrowing Assad, aligning with U.S. policies. Politically, it closed its embassy in Damascus and supported the “Friends of Syria” group and the Syrian National Coalition. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed called for Assad’s ouster in 2013, while Mohammed bin Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, predicted Assad’s downfall in 2014. Militarily, the UAE provided over $1 billion in funding through operations like “Timber Sycamore” and participated in the MOC operations room, supporting armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Economically, Abu Dhabi hosted conferences like the 2012 “Partnership for Investment in Syria’s Future,” backing anti-Assad businessmen. This aggressive policy was rooted in pragmatism, as the UAE sought to enhance its regional influence and emerge as a key power. Cooperation with allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. aimed to counter Iran’s influence and the Axis of Resistance. The UAE perceived Iran as a geopolitical, nationalist (Arab-Persian), and sectarian (Sunni-Shia) threat. Politically and militarily, Abu Dhabi supported Assad’s opponents to advance these objectives. The entry of Russia into the Syrian crisis in 2015 and the reduced likelihood of Assad’s ouster prompted the UAE to retreat from its confrontational stance. Abu Dhabi withdrew from the anti-ISIS coalition and refrained from condemning Russia’s actions. Anwar Gargash, noted that Moscow was targeting a common enemy (ISIS). The prolonged crisis and the failure of opposition groups increased the UAE’s costs, leading it to redirect resources to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the UAE softened its critical rhetoric and began to view Assad as part of a potential resolution to the crisis. From 2018, the UAE adopted a pragmatic approach, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Improved relations were evident through official visits, the resumption of flights, and enhanced intelligence and economic cooperation. In 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed announced UAE support for Syria’s COVID-19 response, including aid shipments. In 2021, Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus, signing agreements for solar power investments. Assad’s visits to the UAE in 2022 and 2023 marked a turning point. The UAE also played a pivotal role in Syria’s reinstatement in the Arab League, advocating for regional stability. In 2024, Hassan Ahmed Al-Shehi was appointed UAE Ambassador to Damascus. The UAE’s shift toward normalization from 2015 was driven by multiple factors. Politically, the UAE sought to shape Syria’s future and curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it viewed as a regional security threat, considering Assad a preferable alternative to jihadist groups. Security-wise, the UAE aimed to reduce Iran and Turkey’s influence in Syria through diplomacy rather than confrontation, believing closer ties with Damascus would limit rivals’ leverage. Additionally, the UAE pursued an independent stance from Saudi Arabia to assert geopolitical primacy. Economically, the UAE sought opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, capturing 14% of Syria’s foreign trade by 2021. Overall, the UAE’s relations with Syria from 2011 to 2024 underwent significant shifts. Initially, the UAE cut ties and backed Assad’s opponents aggressively. However, from 2015, due to the opposition’s failures, Russia’s intervention, and high conflict costs, the UAE pivoted toward de-escalation. The reopening of its embassy in 2018, reciprocal visits, and support for Syria’s Arab League reinstatement reflected a pragmatic approach. Following Assad’s ouster in 2024, the UAE maintained ties with the new government but remained wary of Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence. These shifts, aligned with pragmatism, underscore the UAE’s flexibility in pursuing national interests, countering rivals, and asserting a pivotal regional role. Assad’s fall, however, presented both opportunities and challenges for the UAE. While it achieved its goal of distancing Syria from Iran, the rise of Turkey and Qatar as key backers of Syria’s new leadership—aligned with the UAE’s regional rivals—poses challenges. Abu Dhabi views the dominance of ideologically driven Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant threat, potentially sparking new competition with Turkey.    

Abstract The victory of the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini (RA) occurred in circumstances and at a time when none of the elites and thinkers in the fields of politics and sociology, as well as other social fields and even the intelligence and security institutions of that time, considered its realization possible. In addition to the surprise of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the prevailing mentality of the Western elites was that the revolution would be short-lived. However, after several decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran was able to become the greatest obstacle to the colonialist policies of the West, especially the United States, in addition to the West Asian region and other regions of the world. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran has reached a point where it can be proudly said that the sphere of influence of the values ​​of the Islamic Revolution encompasses a vast geographical area. From the Qibchak Plain to the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus, from the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the borders of China, from the Persian Gulf to the Indian subcontinent and especially from the Bab al-Mandab to the Mediterranean Sea and the American continent, it has become Iran's strategic depth area. On the other hand, this research is a new preparation to propose a call in which the “external deepening of the Islamic Revolution” itself becomes a political phenomenon and by invoking the discourse theory of “Lacla and Mouffe” at the table of “rereading”, it will be a new sublimation to respond to the colorful and diverse harms of the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution. Shiaphobia, Iranophobia and Islamophobia are fake names that have been created by rival discourses to confront the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. The main rival of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution in homogeneous environments is the “Wahhabi discourse”, under the Saudi leadership, the “Brotherhood discourse” and in heterogeneous environments, “liberal democracy”. Therefore, the factor of expanding and deepening the values ​​of the Islamic Revolution should first be sought in discourse-making, that is, transforming the values ​​of the Islamic Revolution into a general and common thought in the target society. Or, more clearly, it can be said, creating a collective understanding about an issue. One element of this discourse-making is the plan, idea, and strategies for its success, which is the goal of this research, and the other element is the elite group that receives, cultivates, and propagates the idea, which requires another article. The main question of the article is how, based on the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, it is possible to strengthen the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution in homogeneous and heterogeneous environments? This research has a descriptive-analytical nature, and one of the sub-questions of the research is how the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe affects and transforms the formation of power discourses in favor of increasing the scope of its hegemony; can it strengthen the external deepening of the Islamic Revolution? The main goal of this research, in addition to confronting the otherness of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, is to pursue the external deepening of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution through becoming and remaining hegemonic based on the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, which is actually the key point and heart of this research. An attempt will be made to prepare this theory for the process of external deepening by making modifications to it. In fact, to make Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory compatible with the process of external deepening, not every modification or change in the theory can be used. Just as Lakatos believes, if we make changes, however limited, in order to keep the research program compatible with new observations in its undeniable core or "hard core", that research program will be limited and will be ruined. Therefore, Lakatos recommends that any modifications and adjustments in the research program should be made in the "support belt" and not the hard core. Therefore, modifications and adjustments made in the protective belt of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory will be made only with the aim of helping to "refine" and not "justify" Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, and at the same time, in addition to the fact that the "hard core" has kept the theory safe from danger, it also prepares the theory for application in the discussion of this research.      

Abstract Neighboring countries and neighborhood policy are fundamental components of the foreign policy of any country, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the deep and wide-ranging impacts these relationships have on various areas such as economic, security, cultural, and geopolitical aspects. In this regard, Iraq, with its unique geographical, economic, and political characteristics, holds special significance for Iran. Iran's neighborhood policy with Iraq, particularly after the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the emergence of a new republic in Iraq, has undergone significant changes. This article, based on the field observations of the authors and library studies from articles, books, theses, and reports, examines the role of Iraq in Iran’s neighborhood policy and analyzes the priority and position of Iraq within the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq’s importance as Iran’s western neighbor is highlighted for multiple strategic and historical reasons, especially within the framework of Iran’s neighborhood policy. Iraq, with a border length of 1,609 kilometers with Iran, is one of Iran’s primary neighbors. The extensive border impacts the security and interactions between the two countries, which are influenced by the various types of border—land, riverine, and maritime. In addition to these geographical features, the demographics of the two countries are also remarkably similar. The predominant population of both countries consists of similar ethnic groups, and religious ties, especially among the Shi’a population, form deep cultural and social connections between the two nations. Iraq, as a country with vast oil reserves and a unique geopolitical position, plays a crucial role in both regional and global policies of Iran. Iraq’s oil reserves, being among the largest in the world, are a key factor in the economic interactions between the two countries. These oil resources can serve as an important element in economic and energy cooperation, potentially fostering long-term collaborative relationships. In terms of people-to-people interactions, over 10 million citizens travel between the two countries annually. This is a clear indicator of the strong social and cultural relationships that exist between Iran and Iraq. These exchanges, especially in religious and pilgrimage activities (such as travels to Karbala and Najaf), play a significant role in shaping the deep human and cultural ties between the two nations, which have a profound impact on bilateral relations. Beyond these features, Iraq also holds a special place in Iran’s regional policies. Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, and with the rise of Shiite political influence in Iraq, unprecedented opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged in Iraq. This shift has turned Iraq from a strategic rival into a strategic partner, playing a key role in reducing regional tensions. Iraq has been able to serve as an intermediary between Iran and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and has facilitated the expansion of bilateral cooperation across various domains, including security, economy, and politics. Compared to other neighboring countries, Iraq holds a unique position in terms of culture, religion, economy, and security. Due to shared cultural and religious attributes—particularly the Shi’a population in both countries—Iraq is considered a crucial strategic and cultural partner for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Iraq, with its geopolitical and economic position in the region, can act as a bridge between Iran and other Arab countries, as well as Western nations. Based on the SWOT model analysis, Iraq holds significant advantages over other Iranian neighbors. In this model, Iraq ranks highly in over twelve indicators as strengths (SO), which indicates the substantial potential for interaction with Iran. However, Iraq also faces challenges and threats, reflected in some of the weaknesses (WO) and threats (WT) categories. Nevertheless, Iraq possesses the potential to move from the level of priority to that of paramount importance in Iran’s neighborhood policy. As a result, Iraq occupies a position of particular importance within Iran's neighborhood policy and stands at the forefront of Iran’s neighbors. In terms of strategic, cultural, and economic significance, Iraq takes precedence over other neighbors. This priority could lead to expanded bilateral cooperation in various fields, ultimately strengthening Iran's position both regionally and internationally. Therefore, effectively utilizing the existing opportunities and addressing any disagreements could elevate Iran-Iraq relations from priority status to primary importance, thus preventing security threats and challenges.