The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World

Abstract This research examines the influence of the foreign policy of the twelfth government of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Afghanistan, the special focus of the research will be on changing the approach of the twelfth government towards the Taliban and the role of Iran in the Afghan peace process. Also, Iran has tried to play a constructive role in the peace process of Afghanistan, which has also influenced the position of the Taliban. This research helps to better understand the dynamics of Iran's foreign policy in the region and the challenges facing it. The main question of the research is, what effect has the foreign policy of the 12th government of Iran had on the process of developments in Afghanistan, especially in relation to the Taliban? It seems that Iran's foreign policy in this period, while supporting the process of peace and stability in Afghanistan, has tried to maintain its national interests by adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to the developments in this country and the re-emergence of the Taliban. The research method of this research is library, analytical and descriptive, which was done by using reliable domestic and foreign sources. To compile the research, the set of regional security theories and crisis management theories have been used in a consolidated manner. The research findings show that Iran's foreign policy in this period was formed based on the principles of constructive interaction, economic diplomacy and multilateralism.

Abstract The People's Republic of China is known as a country whose status in the international system has been continuously improved and has entered into competition with other powers of the international system. China's continuous economic growth has caused a change in the economic agenda of the government in creating an approach to development and consolidation of power in the structures of international political economy, especially in the sensitive region of West Asia. this research tries to address the basic question of what effect China's economic policies towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have had on the relations of the council members. The research hypothesis is designed with a qualitative method and an explanatory approach in such a way that the inter-regional relations between China and the members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have led to the formation of a network of relations between the members of the Council, which has strengthened the level of cooperation, competition and interdependence between the members. Therefore, in this research, an attempt is made to investigate the influence of the field of inter-regionalism on the indicators of cooperation and competition in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its location in the West Asia region and proximity to Central Asia and the Caucasus, requires an optimal regionalization strategy. Consequently, this research has been conducted with the aim of providing a scientific and analytical explanation of the dimensions and key components of the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy within the context of the ongoing transition in the international system. The main research question is as follows: within the theoretical framework of Neorealism and under the specific conditions of the transition of the international system, how can Iran's regionalization strategy and its components be delineated? In response to this question, the hypothesis is formulated that the Islamic Republic of Iran's regionalization strategy can be operationalized across five dimensions—political, security, economic, and socio-cultural—with specific components in each dimension. Employing an explanatory-analytical approach and utilizing library resources, policy documents, and up-to-date regional evidence, this study has identified and evaluated these dimensions and components. The results indicate that the combination and synergy of these five dimensions, while enhancing Iran's resilience and balancing power, will provide new opportunities for elevating the country's status as a pivotal actor in the emerging regional order.

Abstract Focusing on Iran's nuclear medicine capabilities and its role in strengthening regional convergence, the present study analyzes the technical, therapeutic, and policy dimensions of cooperation between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries. Relying on the framework of Mittrani's functionalist theory, the present study seeks to examine how cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine, especially in the production and use of radiopharmaceuticals, can deepen regional relations and promote convergence between Iran and neighboring countries. The research method used is qualitative content analysis, which was conducted through a review of scientific documents, international reports, and interviews with Iranian experts in the field of nuclear medicine. The findings indicate that Iran, by taking advantage of its technological advantages in the production of radiopharmaceuticals and providing cost-effective medical services, can act as a hub for scientific and technical cooperation in the region. Such cooperation not only leads to the improvement of health indicators in the Persian Gulf countries, but also paves the way for knowledge networking, information exchange, and the development of medical tourism. Accordingly, strengthening scientific cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine can be considered as an efficient tool for expanding political and economic interactions in the region.

Abstract This research was conducted with the aim of identifying the key factors influencing the relations between Iran and the Zionist regime, designing potential future scenarios (2025–2035), assessing their likelihood and consequences, and proposing strategic responses. This descriptive-analytical study adopts a futurology approach using the scenario analysis method. The statistical population consisted of relevant scientific sources, and purposive sampling was employed. Secondary data were collected through a review of Persian and Latin sources (library and documentary). Findings indicate that key factors include ideology, the nuclear program, geopolitics, security, economy, cyber warfare, and the role of major powers. By integrating the moderating variable of “domestic political transformations in Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime,” four scenarios were designed: 1) Balance of Power World, 2) Diplomacy and Limited Tension World, 3) Hidden War World, and 4) Direct Confrontation World. Probability assessment reveals that the “Hidden War” scenario is highly probable, acting as a dynamic equilibrium resilient to political shocks. The “Diplomacy and Limited Tension” scenario is likely in the short term but unstable in the long term. The “Balance of Power” scenario has a low to medium probability, while the “Direct Confrontation” scenario has a low probability, though it remains a critical tail risk with catastrophic consequences. The conclusion suggests that the probability of widespread war is low, but indirect tensions will persist. Strategic responses are proposed for Iran

Abstract The present study aims to analyze the consequences of the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran on regional security, the balance of power in West Asia, and the responses of regional and international actors. The main research question is: "How can the Zionist regime’s 12-Day War against Iran be analyzed from the perspectives of network geopolitics and critical security, and what are its security and geopolitical consequences?" The research hypothesis posits that the short-term war by the Zionist regime against Iran, by disrupting the political, economic, and security networks of the region, intensifies long-term geopolitical consequences as well as human and regional security threats. The findings, utilizing a combination of network geopolitics (to analyze complex relations among regional and extra-regional actors) and critical security approaches (to examine human, social, and beyond-military consequences), along with qualitative analysis based on case studies, secondary sources, and content analysis of political and security data, demonstrate that the 12-Day War disrupted regional networks, weakened collective security and regional cooperation, and threatened the geopolitical stability of West Asia. This study emphasizes the importance of network-based analysis and a critical approach in understanding regional crises and provides strategies for strengthening collective security and preventive diplomacy.

Abstract China, as an emerging power in the world, has rapidly increased its influence in the West Asia region. Since the rise of communism in China, the country has established strong relations with several countries in the region. Now Beijing seen as a serious competitor to the hegemony of the United States. The growing economy, military power, market productivity, and the so-called non-interventionist approach provide China with a powerful leverage for further engagement with countries in West Asia. China's ambitions in West Asia are not limited to oil, gas, and markets; this region also holds strategic importance, and the "Belt and Road Initiative" encompasses all aspects of it. Currently, China's expanding diplomatic, economic, and military power has become a serious threat to the United States. The goal of this research is to examine the dimensions of China's increasing influence on regional security and its impact on changing U.S. policies toward this region. In this context, the main research question is: How has China's growing influence in West Asia affected the shift in U.S. strategy in the region from 2021 to 2025? This study, based on a methodology and approach grounded in qualitative and descriptive-analytical methods, analyzes how China's influence has raised concerns in the United States regarding West Asia and has led to a revival of U.S. influence and presence through a return to the region, economic diplomacy, technological diplomacy, and the adoption of new multilayered alliance-building policies in the region between 2021 and 2025.

Abstract This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategies and deterrent measures employed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran to preserve public order and security. The study is situated within the evolving paradigm of security studies, which has expanded from traditional state-centric military defense to encompass broader concepts of "human security" and hybrid warfare. The article posits that the IRGC has developed a unique, multi-layered model of deterrence to address Iran's complex security challenges. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic position in West Asia, faces a multifaceted array of threats, ranging from conventional military risks and cross-border terrorist groups to more nuanced challenges such as cultural infiltration, cognitive warfare, media propaganda, cyber-attacks, and economic sanctions. Theoretical Framework and Methodology The study employs a mixed-methods research approach, combining qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative phase utilized a two-round Delphi method, involving semi-structured interviews and theoretical content analysis with 14 security and defense experts from relevant state institutions. This phase identified key dimensions, components, and themes related to the IRGC's management of terrorist crimes. The quantitative phase involved a closed questionnaire, derived from the Delphi findings, which was distributed to security experts and mid-level IRGC managers. Respondents rated the importance of various factors using a four-point Likert scale. Data analysis was performed using Friedman's test and Kendall's coefficient of concordance to rank the factors and measure the level of expert consensus.

Abstract Power is a fundamental concept in International Relations, particularly in Realist theory. While Realism defines power mainly in terms of survival, security, the balance of power, and national interest, Islamic thought incorporates material, ethical, normative, and divine dimensions into its understanding of power. This study examines the extent to which the Islamic conception of power overlaps with the realist perspective and identifies the areas in which it requires refinement. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a refinement (tanqīḥ) and purification (tahdhīb) approach, the article comparatively analyzes the concept of power in Realism and Islamic thought. The analysis is based on an interpretation of Islam that views power within the framework of justice, deterrence, legitimate defense, legitimacy, and moral responsibility. The findings show that Islam recognizes the necessity of power for maintaining security, deterrence, and the survival of the political community, thus sharing common ground with some realist assumptions. However, it rejects the realist view of power as an autonomous end based on the continuous accumulation of domination. Instead, it defines power through the principles of justice, human dignity, legitimacy, moral responsibility, divine purpose, and restrictions on the use of force. Given the diversity of Islamic interpretations concerning jihad, relations with non-Muslims, and the exercise of power, the study adopts a defensive–deterrent perspective as its analytical framework. It concludes that Islamic power emerges from the interaction of material capabilities, moral legitimacy, and divine purpose, providing a refined and context-based framework for understanding power in International Relations.

Abstract This article provides a comparative study of the challenges of annulment and enforcement of arbitral awards issued by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Given the increasing importance of international arbitration in investment disputes and the pivotal role of ICID in this field, it is essential to have a proper understanding of the legal mechanisms governing the annulment and enforcement of ICID awards. This study first examines the mechanisms and legal foundations of annulment of awards in the ICID system itself, and then, with a comparative approach, examines the domestic laws of different countries, especially Iran, and the approach of arbitral tribunals in other legal systems regarding the recognition and enforcement of these awards. In this regard, key concepts such as the rules governing jurisdiction, manifest violation of procedure, and grounds for annulment of awards in ICID, as well as the conditions and obstacles to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in national systems, will be analyzed. The main goal of this research is to provide a comprehensive picture of the current situation and the challenges ahead in the annulment and implementation of the ICSID votes, and to provide solutions to facilitate the fair and effective implementation processes of these votes at the international level.

Abstract Focusing on the cycle of political instability and development failure in Afghanistan, this research examines three main variables including ethnic divisions, external dependence, and legitimacy crisis as factors in this cycle. faults that are intertwined with internal political and security competitions and have prevented the creation of an inclusive and stable state. Also, historical and structural dependence on foreign support, whether in the form of direct interventions by world powers or in the form of dependence on financial and military aid, has weakened the country's independence of political decision-making and has led to the fragility of the state structure. The legitimacy crisis, as a complementary link in this cycle, is caused by the lack of transparent elections and the weakness of democratic institutions, which ultimately has led to citizens' distrust of the political system. The research method was conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner and data were collected from historical, political sources, and contemporary reports. The findings show that the combination of these three factors has trapped Afghanistan in a vicious cycle that is difficult to escape from, such that whenever there is room for development, ethnic divisions or foreign interventions have disrupted stability and exacerbated the legitimacy crisis. The results suggest that resolving the Afghan crisis depends only on redefining political legitimacy based on genuine citizen participation, reducing dependence on foreign support, and constructively managing ethnic diversity. Otherwise, the cycle of political instability will continue and the failure to progress on the path to development will continue.

Abstract In recent years, hedging theory has played a prominent role in analyzing the behavior of units in international politics. While in past studies, these behaviors were followed by countries in a haphazard manner, there have been no coherent theories to examine different patterns in the field. Now, with the changing environment of economic cooperation and structural changes in the international system, each country is pursuing its hedging path differently from the others. In this context, the research problem ahead is to analyze the hedging pattern in Iran and Saudi Arabia as two neighboring powers in the West Asian region and relatively similar political powers. Accordingly, the main question of the present study is: Based on what patterns of hedging do the two countries behave in economic diplomacy and what consequences does each of these patterns bring? The research findings indicate that Iran has moved towards a reactive hedging model in a situation where external pressures on the one hand and lack of decision-making coherence on the other have led the country to a level of reactivity to dominant global patterns. In contrast, the Saudi government, based on its development strategy, has adopted a coherent hedging model. At the same time, both models have been relatively implemented in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and their full realization depends on maintaining the status quo in the coming years. The research method of this article is based on the data analysis method and is based on a descriptive-analytical model.

Abstract After Operation Storm Al-Aqsa, the Zionist regime has taken a series of measures against the Palestinians, one of the most prominent of which was the attempt to dissolve UNRWA. The aim of this article is to examine the foundations of this regime's opposition to UNRWA. The main issue of this article is the series of actions taken by the Zionist regime against UNRWA, from October 7, 2023 to January 2025. The main question of the article is: "What are the most important behavioral patterns of the Zionist regime against Palestinian refugees, and what is the main reason for this regime's opposition to UNRWA's activities in the Palestinian issue, especially in the Gaza Strip?" The hypothesis of the article is formulated as follows: "Given that UNRWA has perpetuated the issue of Palestinian refugees and preserved their identity in order to pursue the right of return, the Zionist regime is trying to negate the right of return by eliminating the UNRWA institution." The findings of the article show that over the past 77 years, the Zionist regime has pursued measures such as creating a false narrative, paying compensation, transferring and settling in third countries, exchanging with Jewish refugees, forced migration, starving, and finally dissolving UNRWA to eliminate the issue of Palestinian refugees. The hypothesis of this article was processed by analyzing valid data, using a qualitative method and a descriptive-analytical approach, and the data collection method was also library.

Abstract This research employs a historical-analytical approach to examine the process of formation and institutionalization of commodity smuggling networks in the northern ports of the Persian Gulf during the first half of the twentieth century. Drawing on archival documents, consular reports, and the period press, the findings reveal that the interaction of three factors—the central government’s fiscal policies, the region’s socio-economic livelihood structures, and the targeted interventions of foreign powers (particularly Britain)—led to the emergence of an organized network for the smuggling of strategic commodities. Within the framework of Wallerstein’s World-Systems Theory, this phenomenon reflects Iran’s semi-peripheral position and the structural pressures exerted by the global core upon the periphery. Its consequences extended beyond economic loss to include the weakening of national sovereignty, the transfer of capital to the southern sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, the formation of transnational networks, and transformations in the region’s socio-political structure. This study interprets smuggling not merely as an economic problem, but as a socio-political phenomenon that reflects power dynamics along the frontiers of the Islamic world, offering insight into the formation of unequal relations as well as the capacities for agency within local communities in the peripheral regions of the Islamic world.

Abstract Embassies are one of the most important pillars in advancing a country's policies in all parts of the world. The former US embassy in Iran was no exception to this rule, and after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and Iran's transformation from a strategic ally to a discursive rival, it played a pivotal role in advancing US policies in the new era. Ultimately, the increase in tensions between the two countries led to the seizure of the embassy in November 1979, and according to the documents obtained from this embassy, ​​the US plans to influence Iran became more clear than before. Therefore, given the historical necessity and also the future-oriented understanding of the dimensions of this influence, this research seeks to answer this fundamental question: what was the pattern of US influence in Iran after the Islamic Revolution, based on the documents obtained from the former US embassy in Iran? To answer this question, a qualitative content analysis method with an inductive approach was used, and based on this method, all documents obtained from the former US embassy in the period after the victory of the Islamic Revolution were examined and analyzed. Based on the findings, the pattern of American influence in Iran after the Islamic Revolution can be divided into three main sections: goals of influence, targets or audiences of influence, and dimensions of influence. The documents obtained under each of these sections reflect America's serious efforts to influence Iran during the aforementioned period.

Abstract In recent decades Sino-Afghan relations have been based on Beijing's approach to regional and international developments. The elimination of American troops from Afghanistan and the seizure of Kabul by the Taliban changed China's approach to Afghanistan from different perspectives. The US withdrawal will change the balance of power in Afghanistan and its environs. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been based on security considerations, and now economic considerations have been added to it. China's economic project in Pakistan and Central Asia, along with fears of links between extremist groups in Afghanistan and neighboring Uighurs, is one of China's top security concerns. The Taliban's presence in power and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan have changed the pattern of relations from expected indifference to strategic partnership. Components such as environmental uncertainty and strategic compliance paved the way for China to adopt this model. In this context, the present study will examine why China's approach to Afghanistan changes from expected indifference to strategic partnership and will try to provide a clear picture of developments by mentioning China's role in Afghanistan.
Examining China-Afghanistan relations in the past decades proves that China's distance and proximity to Afghanistan depended on China's internal restrictions, regional and international developments, China's competition with other actors and dealing with extremist threats. In this regard, we can mention China's secret assistance to arm the Mujahedeen in 1980 during the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces . Therefore, the statement of relations based on the assessment of the needs of two actors has no place for Arabs here. The official relations between China and Afghanistan began in the 1950s with the recognition of China by Afghanistan. China's approach to Afghanistan has always been economic with an emphasis on security considerations. In the past decades, security considerations have always been the first priority in the eyes of the Chinese authorities towards Afghanistan, which include the seizure of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the civil war in Afghanistan, the dominance of the Taliban and finally the presence of American forces. As a great power that is consolidating its hegemony in its surrounding environment, China definitely evaluates every impulse and the presence of competing actors in the region from the perspective of its competition with that actor. The presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan in the past decades can be examined from this point of view.
In this regard, we can mention China's cooperation and lack of cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan. In the 1980s and with the attack of the Soviet forces on Afghanistan, China stood by the United States and against the Soviet Union, and after the attack of the Western coalition led by the United States on Afghanistan in September 2001, it refused military and security cooperation with these forces and distanced itself from the efforts of foreign actors presented in Afghanistan. For political reconciliation and reconstruction, Afghanistan kept as far away as possible and avoided accepting the title of the West's partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Huasheng, 2012), while the coalition forces were fighting the Taliban threatening China's strategic interests, Beijing exploration projects  began monitoring Afghanistan's underground resources, and this action faced serious criticism from the United States and even Russia .
The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has serious consequences on regional equations in South and Central Asia; Therefore, all regional actors are trying to closely monitor the developments and present multiple scenarios to minimize possible security and political costs. Any change in the arrangement of forces in Afghanistan definitely affects the current and future interests and goals of regional actors. China, as a neighboring country of Afghanistan and one of the most important players in the economic war with America, is definitely closely monitoring the developments in Afghanistan. From China's point of view, everything that provides the ground for terrorism and international extremism on the edge of its territorial borders and around its economic super project will be specially monitored. From this point of view, the developments in Afghanistan have both components.
Despite Beijing's previous approaches to the developments in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of American forces from this country has caused China to worry due to the change in the nature of threats. Since 2016, with increasing speculations about the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and the creation of a security evacuation in this country, Beijing, like other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, initiated the project of securing its border lines with Afghanistan . China has detailed plans for Afghanistan without foreign military forces for several reasons: 1. Afghanistan is one of the focal points in the One Belt One Road project; 2. There are religious extremists on both sides of the border lines between Afghanistan and China, and China is worried about the connection between the Uyghurs with ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan; 3. To expand its political influence in the region, China should expand its influence to the remaining regions such as Afghanistan and advance its security and political goals through an economic lens; 4. Beijing expects American material and moral support for Chinese Muslim protesters in the west of this country, and from this point of view, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan despite the ongoing crisis in this country has aroused China's suspicion.
As mentioned, China, as one of Afghanistan's neighboring countries, has chosen a "wait and wait" approach to Afghanistan's developments in the last twenty years; But since 2016, with the withdrawal of American forces, China has changed its policy of conscious and considered indifference towards Afghanistan and put a cooperative and step-by-step approach on the agenda. Strategic partnership is a new model of relations between governments that has entered international relations literature from the beginning of the 21st century. Based on the changing pattern of China's cooperation with Afghanistan, the current research tries to present a picture of the actions of foreign actors in the neighboring environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to provide the basis for other researches in this field. Therefore, in this research, by introducing the model of strategic partnership and explaining it, it will deal with the application of two economic and political components separately on the two variables of China's attitude and actions towards Afghanistan, and finally, the conclusion section and providing strategic recommendations for Iranian policy makers.

Abstract Of the most unexpected events in the year, 2021 was the collapse of the Afghanistan government, on August 15th, 2021, and the re-emergence of the Taliban’s Islamic state (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) without facing up serious resistance from the state and society. How can one analyze the Taliban`s takeover of the country? This is the central question that guides the analytical narration in the text. The present research attempts to come up with a multi-faceted scheme to respond to the question. In this regard, the paper hypothesizes that the Taliban movement managed to retrieve its sovereignty owing to symmetry of some factors: its internal social solidarity/ coherence in the context of Afghanistan’s segmented society and failed state, and connivance in the international environment as well. To justify the hypothesis, the paper takes advantage of some theoretical approaches under a combinative theoretical framework. The constituents are as follows: the concept of ‘Asabiyyah’ (social solidarity in Ibn Khalodn's sense of the word), ‘resource mobilization theory, the quadruple crisis of the regime, and the role of the international environment in revolutionary transformation.
 
According to the framework, the Taliban`s mobility to conquer the country was proceeding continually because of internal social solidarity driven by its ethnic (Pashtunism) and religious (Deobandi Salafi) foundations. It is whilst, on the contrary, there had been a segmented society and failed state due to a crisis in the process of nation-state building. Consequently, not only was there were lack of national solidarity and united orientation against the coherent ethnoreligious movement of the Taliban, but also the Taliban utilized the government’s inefficacies and miss-functions (such as juncture and corruption in the political system) to mobilize the followers and attract the potential ones among the disappointed people.
 
In terms of the process of capturing the country, the Taliban’s mobility pattern showed some formal similarities to ‘Eastern Revolutions’ (in Huntington's sense of the word); that is, launching from the periphery to the capital. Having learned from the past, the Taliban came up with a more pragmatic orientation in its second round. While showing a tendency to negotiate with internal and foreign effective agents in the political environment of Afghanistan, the Taliban aimed to represent a modified picture of the movement compared to the long-standing violent image. To sum up, the causes of the Taliban`s success in re-taking political power can be narrated as the symmetry of the strong movement and the weak nation-state; the ethnoreligious social solidarity of the Taliban, and the lack of national solidarity and efficient government.
 
Afghanistan went through difficult times in 2021. It was not yet summer when those provinces came under the pressure of the Taliban fighting forces and then dominoes fell one after another until the Taliban forces reached the gates of Kabul. Finally, in the middle of August, to the surprise of the world, the capital fell and the Taliban managed to seize power in Afghanistan for the second time and start a rapid transformation in the Afghan political system in order to revive the Islamic Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. There are factors involved in the occurrence of this transformation, some of which are the responsibility of the Afghan government and the others part of the United States: 1. The announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan; 2. Weakness and a deep gap in the leadership of the Afghan government; 3. The deep gap between army and country policies; 4. Perpetuation of the corrupting incomes caused by drugs, as well as increasing the Taliban's income generation from local sources; 5. Denial of many problems in the organization, training, equipment, and leadership of Afghan forces at least from 2007 onwards by the US, NATO, and the Afghan government; 6. The low level of readiness of the Afghan army due to dependence on American forces; 7. Dependence of Afghan forces on contractors for equipment; 8. The wrong focus of America and NATO on only the terrorist and military threat of the Taliban instead of evaluating the reasons for their increasing progress, 9. Focusing only on the cities and densely populated centers and leaving the villages and suburbs; 10. Not paying attention to the strategy of the Taliban, which was preparing for a massive advance toward the north and other regions at the same time as the peace talks.
This development has been analyzed from different perspectives, such as examining the causes of the weakness of the Afghan government, the role of foreign powers, its impact on the future of Afghanistan, regional relations, and its threats and opportunities for Iran. What distinguishes the current research is the focus on analyzing why and how this political transformation occurred from the perspective of "revolutionary transformation theories". In this context, the question is raised, how to analyze the Taliban's re-gaining power? The nature and context of the recent political transformation in Afghanistan have been such that the fixation on one of the common divisions of revolutionary transformations (revolution, coup, civil war, etc.) hinders the understanding of the various dimensions and complexities of this transformation. Based on this, the current research is based on the hypothesis that the theoretical analysis of this event requires a combination of old and new theories about the logic of political transformation. In this sense, the Taliban's ethnoreligious movement, relies on the element of nervousness, in the conditions of the crisis of the nation-state in Afghanistan, i.e. a mixture of a fragmented society and a bankrupt government and symmetry with suitable international conditions, without facing serious resistance from the society, the government and successful foreign actors to restore its sovereignty in Afghanistan. The way this transformation took place was similar to the style of eastern revolutions, advancing from the periphery to conquering the capital.
The present research consists of several parts. First, in the form of a combined theoretical framework, the theoretical possibilities of old and new theories are highlighted in the direction of designing the elements of a conceptual model. In the next steps, we show the implications and examples of each of the elements of this combined theoretical framework for the analysis of the Taliban's resumption of power. In order, to the importance of nervousness in the group cohesion of the Taliban, the effect of social disintegration and the absence of the national government on the non-formation of anti-mobilization against the Taliban, and symmetry with the appropriate international conditions in the transfer of power. In the end, by freely using the style of eastern revolutions, we explain the formation of this transformation (how the Taliban advance).

Abstract Understanding Israel's security policies from a realist point of view has almost become a fundamental principle. It seems that this regional actor has adjusted all its relations with regional countries based on the policy of zero sum, and therefore security concerns have overshadowed other aspects of the actor's policies. Accordingly, Israel's foreign policy is almost equivalent to its national security policy, and without understanding the nature of security threats and challenges, understanding Israel's foreign policy process cannot be understood and evaluated. In the long run, it seems that Israel's security problems have not changed much, and this small actor still faces the same challenges both at the peripheral and regional levels. Given that Israel views regional security relations vertically, that is exclusively state-to-state and confined to superior military power, not horizontally and strategically or multilaterally and under comprehensive security, effective deterrence remains at the core of Israel's strategic thinking.
Existing trends are likely to turn into turmoil sooner or later, forcing Israel to play a role in mitigating the challenges. From Israel's point of view, the emergence of this emerging Middle East has created a new multi-faceted and uncertain scenario in which a strategic doctrine adapted to these changing and unexpected conditions is essential for survival. Today's complex and challenging operating conditions, which have led to geostrategic changes in borders and the environment, are the result of regional developments and related events that have led to fundamental changes in the level of Israel's strategic decisions. At the core of Israel's strategic assessment is the challenge between its apparent power and success in various fields and the likelihood that this situation will continue, albeit temporarily and fragilely. This challenge stems from a number of factors that could in the future lead to the expansion of threats and conflicts with the escalation of the security dilemma, and includes Israel's approach to a series of key national security challenges.
Overall, in the view of Israeli security analysts, the window of strategic opportunity does not appear to have been sufficiently exploited, and growing threats require a rethinking of Israel's security strategy, defense policy, resource allocation, and more up-to-date strategies. These analysts suggest two possible approaches to Israel's strategy: one is a cautious and stabilizing solution, emphasizing diplomacy and controlling existing threats so that they do not become malignant. Second, it is a preventive and possibly aggressive solution to eliminate emerging threats, but it can lead to full-scale war in various fields. According to these analysts, the main prerequisite for choosing the right approach is to strengthen the foundation of the internal cohesion of Israeli society, and by emphasizing social solidarity, they seek to first heal social gaps and then restore confidence in governing institutions. In addition, the issue of Palestine continues to mean that the real problem that some actors are trying to ignore, or at least pretend to not exist, has significant implications for regional actors' relations. The issue of Palestine remains a regional issue with historical, religious and cultural dimensions, and Israel and its allies cannot ignore it. It is true that Israel's relations with some Arab countries have taken on a new form, but strong alliances with Israel are not expected to be formed before the Palestinian issue is resolved.
Analysis and strategic assessment of regional trends show that Israel does not face immediate and immediate threats at this time and in the short term. However, there are signs of internal, peripheral, and regional trends that could lead to malignancies in the future and increase the likelihood that these existential threats will become a reality. The timing of these threats, which are largely foreign sources, varies: while rocket and missile strikes can occur in the short term, other external threats, such as the formation of a regional coalition of hostile actors, the nuclearization of the Middle East, and international isolation, can occur in the interim. Long-term occur. At the same time, the internal threat of social incoherence to Israeli Jewish identity under certain conditions could also develop in the medium term. Regardless of the ideological point of view, in the end it should be emphasized that Israel is not a passive actor according to the existing assessments, but an actor that tries to change the existing threatening realities and keep the threats it faces away.

Abstract The wave of Arab uprisings in 2010 reshaped the Middle East’s regional order, prompting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an emerging regional power, to adopt an active role in the Syrian crisis. Prior to 2011, the UAE maintained close ties with the Assad government, investing heavily in Syria. However, in 2012, as the crisis escalated, the UAE severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and supported opposition groups. Between 2012 and 2014, the UAE pursued an aggressive policy aimed at toppling Assad, but from 2018 onward, it shifted toward de-escalation and normalization of relations. This shift, marked by the reopening of the UAE embassy in Damascus and reciprocal high-level visits, is analyzed through the lens of pragmatism. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on library and electronic sources, this article examines the reasons behind this policy shift, positing that regional and international political, economic, and security considerations were the primary drivers of this pragmatic turn. Pragmatism in international relations prioritizes policies that maximize national interests without being constrained by abstract principles. In recent years, the UAE has sought to project itself as a pragmatic, interest-driven actor, engaging with diverse regional and international players. The UAE’s foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2024 can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first period, the UAE adopted an aggressive stance aimed at overthrowing Assad, aligning with U.S. policies. Politically, it closed its embassy in Damascus and supported the “Friends of Syria” group and the Syrian National Coalition. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed called for Assad’s ouster in 2013, while Mohammed bin Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, predicted Assad’s downfall in 2014. Militarily, the UAE provided over $1 billion in funding through operations like “Timber Sycamore” and participated in the MOC operations room, supporting armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Economically, Abu Dhabi hosted conferences like the 2012 “Partnership for Investment in Syria’s Future,” backing anti-Assad businessmen. This aggressive policy was rooted in pragmatism, as the UAE sought to enhance its regional influence and emerge as a key power. Cooperation with allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. aimed to counter Iran’s influence and the Axis of Resistance. The UAE perceived Iran as a geopolitical, nationalist (Arab-Persian), and sectarian (Sunni-Shia) threat. Politically and militarily, Abu Dhabi supported Assad’s opponents to advance these objectives. The entry of Russia into the Syrian crisis in 2015 and the reduced likelihood of Assad’s ouster prompted the UAE to retreat from its confrontational stance. Abu Dhabi withdrew from the anti-ISIS coalition and refrained from condemning Russia’s actions. Anwar Gargash, noted that Moscow was targeting a common enemy (ISIS). The prolonged crisis and the failure of opposition groups increased the UAE’s costs, leading it to redirect resources to conflicts in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the UAE softened its critical rhetoric and began to view Assad as part of a potential resolution to the crisis. From 2018, the UAE adopted a pragmatic approach, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Improved relations were evident through official visits, the resumption of flights, and enhanced intelligence and economic cooperation. In 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed announced UAE support for Syria’s COVID-19 response, including aid shipments. In 2021, Abdullah bin Zayed visited Damascus, signing agreements for solar power investments. Assad’s visits to the UAE in 2022 and 2023 marked a turning point. The UAE also played a pivotal role in Syria’s reinstatement in the Arab League, advocating for regional stability. In 2024, Hassan Ahmed Al-Shehi was appointed UAE Ambassador to Damascus. The UAE’s shift toward normalization from 2015 was driven by multiple factors. Politically, the UAE sought to shape Syria’s future and curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it viewed as a regional security threat, considering Assad a preferable alternative to jihadist groups. Security-wise, the UAE aimed to reduce Iran and Turkey’s influence in Syria through diplomacy rather than confrontation, believing closer ties with Damascus would limit rivals’ leverage. Additionally, the UAE pursued an independent stance from Saudi Arabia to assert geopolitical primacy. Economically, the UAE sought opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, capturing 14% of Syria’s foreign trade by 2021. Overall, the UAE’s relations with Syria from 2011 to 2024 underwent significant shifts. Initially, the UAE cut ties and backed Assad’s opponents aggressively. However, from 2015, due to the opposition’s failures, Russia’s intervention, and high conflict costs, the UAE pivoted toward de-escalation. The reopening of its embassy in 2018, reciprocal visits, and support for Syria’s Arab League reinstatement reflected a pragmatic approach. Following Assad’s ouster in 2024, the UAE maintained ties with the new government but remained wary of Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence. These shifts, aligned with pragmatism, underscore the UAE’s flexibility in pursuing national interests, countering rivals, and asserting a pivotal regional role. Assad’s fall, however, presented both opportunities and challenges for the UAE. While it achieved its goal of distancing Syria from Iran, the rise of Turkey and Qatar as key backers of Syria’s new leadership—aligned with the UAE’s regional rivals—poses challenges. Abu Dhabi views the dominance of ideologically driven Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant threat, potentially sparking new competition with Turkey.    

Abstract  The Middle East is one of the most important, sensitive and complex regions in the world. What makes this region stand out in all its dimensions and areas is its unique political, economic, cultural-social, geographical and geopolitical features. These conditions have somehow overshadowed the structural equations of the region under the dialectical influence of the interaction of political, economic, cultural-social and security components and power in relation to other actors in the region, so that the increase of cooperation of these governments in this interaction space, eventually led to the formation of an organization called the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 in the Persian Gulf regional system. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is one of the most important regional organizations in the regional environment of Iran, and Iran's policies have always played an important role in the orientations and goals of the council. In this regard, the members of the Council considered the developments in the Middle East, especially the establishment of a democratic and Shiite government in Iraq and the developments of the Islamic Awakening as a shift in the balance of power in favor of Iran and increasing power and influence in the regions of Iran. Movements in the regions of Iran see their lives and survival in danger.  This has caused them to use all their facilities and tools to counter the growing power of the regions of Iran. Understanding the real tensions between Iran and the Saudi-led PGCC countries along the Shiite-Sunni lines in the PGCC has been shaped most regionally and internationally. These differences also undermine Iran's efforts to improve relations with council governments in recent years. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, he has repeatedly proposed peace initiatives for Saudi-led PGCC member states. Not only has this pragmatic policy not been very successful, but Iran-Saudi Arabia relations have become much colder than before. Relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have worsened since the Barjam nuclear deal. Iran's regional expansion and the siege of Qatar, while changing the power structure in the Persian Gulf region, created more tension and insecurity in the region and increased the scope of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially after Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the UN Security Council and the announcement of "maximum pressure policy." He turned against Iran. Although several smaller Gulf states have taken a more balanced approach to their relations with Iran, the main policy of the council is by Saudi Arabia with a new configuration of Middle East policy that sees a rare tripartite convergence of interests was regulated against Iran between Saudi Arabia and Israel. and the United States under Trump. According to the actions of the Cooperation Council and foreign interventionist powers, Iran's policy towards the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly based on three considerations: First, it hopes to turn enemies into friends, improves Iran's isolated position, and resolves the security-geopolitical dilemma in the Persian Gulf region. Second, Tehran's goal is to develop trade relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors and promote Iran's economic development, and third, to cooperate with Iran to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf and weaken its hostility to Iran. Therefore, this article uses a method of analytical research to review the regional and international policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a historical perspective to explain the relations with the neighbors of the Cooperation Council in the post-Iran-Iraq period. The question that arises is what has been the main component and axis of Iran's policy after the Holy Defense, especially during the presidency of Mr. Rouhani towards the PGCC? . This study shows that during Mr. Rouhani's administration, improving relations with the PGCC has been the main focus of Iran's efforts to improve security in the Persian Gulf region. However, a number of structural obstacles, historical distrust, and Iran's movements in the region have severely hostile Tehran's relations with the Cooperation Council and have further increased insecurity in the region as Iran's growing influence in the Arab region coincides with its anti-hegemonic policy. This means that Iran's peace initiatives with the Cooperation Council have faced major obstacles, and Iran's success in reducing tensions and promoting peace plans with the PGCC has not been useful.

Abstract Abstract
along the years of relationships , these two countries have witnessed various kinds of engagement within political, economic and security areas. Among the most important issues between our two countries are, Hirmand River,the problem of narcotic,Taleban Terrorism and the problem of Afghan refugees as well as economic cooperation.
Utilizing the descriptive-analytic method, this article provides true answers to the question of how the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan can be proceed within the De-security framework during 2000 to 2019.
In order to test and evaluate the hypothesis of utilizing the theoretical concepts and parameters of securitization -desecuritization within the framework of Copenhagen Security School, endeavors have been taken place to understand better the relationship between two countries within the axis of dsescuritizstion.
From this perspective, in answer to the main question, it should be said that with the gradual removal of security issues from the narrow military and political sphere and the transfer of foreign policy from the political-security layers to the economic-trade layers, Iran-Afghanistan relations is at the desired levels of their agents. The country will move towards insecurity.
A look at the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan shows that these two countries are affected by each other due to their neighborhood. For example, the civil war in Afghanistan led to instability on Iran's borders and the influx of Afghan refugees into Iran.
However, there are several factors in the formulation of security policies that have hindered the development of other relations and the emergence of challenges in Iran-Afghanistan relations. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US and NATO military movements in Afghanistan, political-consensus instability, and economic instability resulting from the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, along with drug trafficking, especially in the post-Taliban period from 2000 to 2019. It has been a collection of sources threatening the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue has emerged in the formulation of Iran's political-security relations with Afghanistan. This approach has hindered the development of economic-trade relations as a first step of cooperation and coordination.
From this perspective, getting out of the narrow military circle is criticized from the point of view of those who considered security one-dimensional and in military dimensions, and comprehensive security is discussed. For this purpose, the above research seeks to study the theory of the Copenhagen school and explain relations Economic and trade and its impact on foreign policy orientation in order to destabilize relations; To answer the question of how the relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the period 2000 to 2019 are in the process of becoming insecure?
Theoretical Framework
According to Buzan, security is a sense of security (mental security), protection against danger (objective security) and freedom from doubt (trust in the personal perceptions of others) .The process of securing issues goes through four main stages: first, the security discourse, which refers to the identification and urgency of existential threats against the government; second, the legitimacy and public acceptance; third, emergency security operations to deal with threats; These actions affect the internal and external relations of governments .
According to the practical solutions of the Copenhagen School to make many phenomena and threats insecure, an efficient political system is necessary to discuss the process of generating security threats before considering the appearance of the threat.
the concept of building security is one of the most important topics in the Copenhagen School. A phenomenon becomes a security phenomenon when the actor secures the phenomenon during the process and his audience accepts it. Belief in "manifestation of threat" and "public acceptance" are the two main pillars of "security logic".
 
History of Iran-Afghanistan relations
The Islamic Republic of Iran is neighboring 15 countries, but due to historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries are different. The two countries have a common history, culture, religion and language, and in many other cases there are many commonalities and even a common enemy. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to pursue good neighborliness properly. During the years of holy defense, when Iran was facing many problems, it did not hesitate to cooperate with Afghan refugees, which shows the depth of relations between the two countries. After the victory of Jihad, Iran was aligned with the Mojahedin government and did not leave the Afghan people alone during the Taliban rule. After the fall of the Taliban, he also helped build and institutionalize the government.
Iran and Afghanistan, despite having a common political border and common cultural and religious interests, are believed to have the greatest potential for expanding political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.
Conclusion
The economic diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Afghanistan has been a common element of profit and profit and an effective and relatively sustainable lever in managing water disputes, if the two countries can define a package of mutual interests in the form of economic diplomacy, this dependence Bilateral economic, the two sides will share in the fair use of water resources. In these circumstances, when the outcome of the combination of economic diplomacy and the water issue forms a kind of win-win diplomacy and paves the way for a major deal, it is highly likely that the parties can reach a common solution to the management of the existing water dispute.

Abstract Saudi Arabia has been known as one of the most important and influential countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East for its conservative approach to foreign policy, and has often been recognized as an actor who supports the status quo and opposes change. However, its behavior over the past decade in the regional arena indicates its transition from a conservative approach to a strong tendency towards an aggressive approach. Neoclassical realism analysis is a multilevel analysis that examines unit-level factors, government and macro-factors and offers a complete and appropriate theory of foreign policy by combining internal and external factors. For this reason, the authors claim that neoclassical realism provides a more coherent and appropriate theoretical framework for understanding Saudi foreign policy. In this regard, this article seeks to answer the question of how the behavior of Saudi Arabia's aggressive foreign policy in the last decade can be explained from the perspective of neoclassical realism, using the analytical-explanatory method and using library sources. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the article is that due to the changing domestic, regional and international conditions of Saudi Arabia; The foreign policy behaviors of this country have shifted from a conservative state to an aggressive and security-oriented behavior, and the domestic level has played an effective role in this transformation as well as the systemic and macro level. The results of the research confirm that the presence of multiple levels of change in the behavior of Saudi foreign policy has led to the continuation of approaches resulting from change. At the micro and national levels, the role of the third generation of Saudi leaders, especially the current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has now become a major player in Saudi foreign policy has been so important in transforming Saudi foreign policy by adopting traditional domestic and foreign policies. The importance of leadership characteristics and the impact of new domestic political priorities on foreign policy behavior. In addition to the role of emerging Saudi leaders, the traditional role of ideology and neo-Wahhabism and the position of Saudi geoculture and the position of the two holy shrines in an effort to restore the leadership of the Islamic world and the role of financial revenues from increased oil sales in recent years and Saudi Arabia. As the largest producer and supplier of oil, he noted that it is very important in adopting an active Saudi foreign policy in the last decade.
At the macro level, neoclassicists emphasize the rise of relative power, the influence and maximization of security as neorealists, and the balance of interests alongside the balance of power. According to this theory, countries are always seeking to increase and expand their relative power in order to influence the peripheral environment and beyond. The purpose of influence is to change the decisions of other countries in the direction of its own interests, and this influence usually results in shaping the regional security environment in a way that is in harmony with the interests of the influential country. Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen under its Arab League, intervened effectively in the Syrian crisis to secure its interests, formed an Arab coalition to change political relations with Qatar, both at the time of severing diplomatic relations and seeking to soften relations, and finally, in an effort to permanently balance relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as its main rival and reduce its deeper influence in the region, it has always sought to maximize its power, security and interests, even at the cost of opposing or disregarding the wishes of its traditional strategically( America) to act. It seems that Saudi Arabia is trying to use the card of necessity of putting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region in its relations with other supra-regional powers, including China, which is in line with China's Middle East policy of non-interference in its geopolitical rivalries. Iran, as a strategic partner and China's commitment to balancing relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be successful. However, these efforts represent a fundamental shift in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy approach. On the other hand, it can be a proof that Saudi Arabia and Muhammad bin Salman intend to pursue their active and aggressive approach in order to ensure the maximum interests of Al-Saud and to promote Saudi leadership in the Islamic world in the future.
Overall, Saudi Arabia's evolving and active approach to foreign policy over the past decade has several key components, resulting in a combination of levels of analysis influencing foreign policy behavior: first, pursuing the maximum interests of the Saudis and promoting Saudi Arabia's undisputed leadership in the Islamic world; Second, legitimizing Saudi policies and delegitimizing the behavior and approaches of rivals and enemies; Third, the lack of adherence to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy on the priorities of the United States' own traditional allied regions and the search for other powerful global allies looking east; Fourth, weakening the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and trying to influence regional and supra-regional alliances and coalitions; And finally, maintaining and strengthening the position of the regions of Saudi Arabia and promoting it in the changing world order.